No More Vietnams (32 page)

In our military training programs, we should avoid another mistake we made in Vietnam: restructuring our allies' forces on the American model and thereby developing great capability for fighting a conventional war but very little for fighting
a guerrilla war. Armies must be equipped and trained to meet the threat they are facing. Money could be spent in far better way than in having a country like El Salvador equip itself with high-performance fighter aircraft for use against guerrillas who have no air force.

A third mistake many Americans made in the last years of the Vietnam War was failing to see that in Third World conflicts our choice is usually not between our allies and someone better but between our allies and something far worse. Liberals today frequently call for the United States to break its ties with rightwing dictators. Otherwise, they claim, we will be guilty of supporting the world's most flagrant violators of human rights. They are wrong. By any measure the most repressive governments are those of the Communists. The record is clear. Cubans are worse off under Castro than under Batista. The Vietnamese are worse off under the Communist Le Duan than under Thieu. Cambodians were worse off under Pol Pot than under Lon Nol. When non-Communist regimes were in power, the United States could at least exert some pressure to increase adherence to human rights in those countries. Now it can do nothing. We must never take a course of action that results in the fall of a government that permits some freedom and the victory of one that permits none. If there is one profound lesson to be learned from the aftermath of the Vietnam War, that is it.

Finally, we must not make the mistake of helping our allies fight the insurgency and ignoring the source of the insurgency. That is why it makes no sense to provide economic and military assistance to El Salvador without bringing pressure to bear on Nicaragua and other Soviet-bloc countries that are providing arms for the insurgents.

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Helping a country prevent a Communist regime from gaining power is difficult. It is even more difficult to help anti-Communist forces in countries where the Communists have already gained power. It is tempting to boldly proclaim that we will help anyone anywhere who fights against a repressive Communist regime, but we must recognize the limits of what we
can do. We must not make the tragic mistakes we made in Hungary in 1956 and at the Bay of Pigs in 1961, where we encouraged revolutions against Communist regimes and then failed to support our friends when they came under attack from superior forces. The test should be whether there is some reasonable chance for success. The anti-communist Savimbi forces in Angola, for example, would meet this test. The freedom fighters in Afghanistan also deserve support, especially because this is the only leverage we have on the Soviets to mitigate their repression in that country.

The Soviets cannot have it both ways. If they have a right to support Communist “liberation” forces in non-Communist countries, we have an even greater right to support true liberation forces in Communist countries. In Nicaragua we should help the contras as long as the Sandinistas continue to support the guerrillas in El Salvador. A more difficult question arises if the Nicaraguan government agrees to discontinue that activity. In that case, we will be justified in continuing aid to the contras only if we are prepared to see it through in the event that they come under attack from superior forces.

The successful operation in Grenada served three important purposes: It rescued Americans whose lives were in danger; it removed the possibility of another Soviet base being constructed in the Caribbean; and most important, it erased some of the feeling of impotence we developed after the fall of Saigon. But while Grenada demonstrated that we could still do something on the world stage, it did not prove that we could do everything. Public support for the Grenada operation was high because it was over quickly, casualties were light, and the immediate provocation—the threat to American lives—was clear. Overcoming 600 lightly armed Cubans on the beaches of Grenada is a far different task from the one we would confront if we had to fight 50,000 Sandinistas, armed with Soviet heavy weapons, in Nicaragua.

But while it would be dangerous to assume that Grenada proved we could do everything, it is even more dangerous to assume that because we failed in Vietnam, we will fail everywhere.
We must not allow our failure in Vietnam to blind us to the stark reality that without military power and the will to use it surgically and selectively in crucial Third World battles, we will lose the Third World war.

The reluctance of our military leaders to be bogged down in another Vietnam is understandable. It is not surprising that current military doctrine rules out the commitment of our military forces unless the following conditions are met: The actions must be “vital to our national interests” or those of our allies; we should commit forces only as a last resort; when we commit our troops, we must do so with the sole object of winning; the war must be winnable in that we have the means to achieve our goal of victory; and we must have assurance of support by Congress and the public.

No one can question these conditions if they are properly defined. But some go so far as to contend that our vital interests are involved only if there is an attack on our allies in Europe and Japan, a threat to our oil supplies in the Persian Gulf, or a threat against our close neighbors to the south. They are wrong. Our vital interests are affected by what happens in other parts of the world as well.

Israel is a case in point. Most military experts would agree that our interests would be affected if there were a threat to Saudi Arabia and the oil supplies of the West. On the other hand, Israel has virtually no oil. It is smaller than the state of Massachusetts. Only 4 million of the 100 million people who live in the Mideast live in Israel. It is not a formal ally of the United States. It could therefore be argued that Israel is not one of our vital interests. Yet when Israel has been attacked, every American President has made it clear that we would use military power to prevent Israel's defeat. Our interest in Israel's survival extends beyond the profound moral issues involved and the fact that Israel is an island of democracy in a sea of authoritarian states. Israel's regional presence and substantial military capability make its survival an important interest of the United States. And we cannot ignore the fact that the Soviet
Union is providing virtually unlimited arms to some of Israel's enemies.

Although it might not technically qualify as a vital American interest, most Americans understand both the moral and strategic reasons for our steadfast support of Israel. In the Third World war there will be other small countries where our interests, and the interests of the people of those countries, may be served by U.S. assistance in their efforts to resist Communist aggression. If we define our vital interests too narrowly solely out of fear of getting involved in another Vietnam, we run the risk of abandoning millions of people to totalitarianism and, eventually, of losing the Third World war.

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No one can quarrel with the proposition that we must not use military force unless we have the means to achieve our goal of victory. But we must recognize that where our interests are clearly involved, we must take risks to protect them. Every military operation cannot be a sure thing. The United States is a great power with worldwide responsibilities. We will not prevail against an enemy willing to take any risk to achieve victory if we are unwilling to take some risks to prevent defeat.

The same principle applies to international terrorism. Some urge restraint in retaliating against terrorism because of the admittedly significant risk of casualties among civilians, hostages, and our military personnel. But while we cannot act in every instance of terrorism, we should always act decisively when we know who is responsible and where they are. Otherwise we give carte blanche to these international outlaws to strike again. If one group of terrorists succeeds in intimidating the United States, others will be encouraged to try, and more lives will undoubtedly be lost as a result. Swift, timely retaliation, even if there is some risk to innocent people, will mean that other terrorists will be less likely to threaten and kill innocent people in the future. Repeated threats to retaliate that are not followed by action are counterproductive. A President of the United States should warn only once.

Terrorism, whether undertaken by states, political groups, or individuals, is one of the most insidious and deadly aspects of the Third World war. The Soviet Union and its proxies use terrorism to wage covert war against the West and its friends and allies. It is also a tactic that our enemies use to try to drive the United States out of the Third World. We were forced out of Lebanon not by another country but by suicidal terrorist bands whom we could barely identify and whose sponsors remain out of our reach. Our military forces can only fight an enemy they can see. All the military power in the world is useless against shadows. If the United States wants to continue to play a role in the Third World, it must attack terrorism at its source. We must hold those who inspire it and pay for it accountable for their actions.

The most powerful weapon the terrorists have is the civilized world's parochial approach to combating them. If Americans are taken hostage, the world considers it solely an American problem. If most of the passengers of a hijacked jet are Kuwaitis, the hijacking is considered primarily Kuwait's problem. When a car bomb explodes in the streets of Paris, we leave it up to France to respond. By reacting in this narrow-minded way, we play into the terrorists' hands. Terrorism today is an international challenge to international order, and it requires an international response.

The Soviet Union's record in fueling international terrorism is well known. But it is not the only nation that does so. Khomeini's Iran and Qaddafi's Libya are both international outlaws that openly praise, protect, and incite those who commit terrorist acts. Such state-supported and sponsored terrorism is one of the most dangerous threats to peace in the world.

Dealings within and between nations depend on order. Diplomats must be able to travel, and embassies must be able to keep their doors open, without fear of assassinations and attacks, and businessmen must be able to go about their business without fear of being kidnapped. Terrorism breeds fear; fear breeds insularity and suspiciousness; and these inevitably will
serve to drive nations apart. When that happens, the whole world will suffer the consequences.

In most cases of state-sponsored terrorism, military reprisals, though tempting, are impractical. But what has been most pathetic about the civilized world's response to terrorism is that it has made so little use of the wide array of choices short of military action available to it. Terrorism is a way to divide and conquer—but only if its victims allow themselves to be divided. When terrorists act against one nation, other nations should respond as if it is an attack on them all—because, in essence, it is. The first impulse of other nations should not be relief that they
were not
the victims but outrage that someone
was
.

The civilized world must develop a unified policy for dealing with terrorism. All nations that are potential victims should pool and share intelligence-gathering and communications resources. When military retaliation is appropriate, they must be prepared to act together. Most important, they must recognize that even nations that support terrorism depend on their victims. While neither Iran nor Libya could survive without selling oil, the rest of the world could survive without Iranian and Libyan oil. In the past, economic and diplomatic sanctions and quarantines have been justifiably criticized for being ineffective. They were ineffective, however, primarily because too few nations participated.

Terrorists will not be deterred by UN resolutions or expressions of outrage by leaders and legislatures. But they may be deterred once they realize that by using terror they will spark the wrath of all nations that do not want to exist in a world riven by a tiny minority who have resorted to violence in pursuit of their objectives. We will only eliminate terrorism if we choke it off by drawing the dark curtain of international condemnation around its sponsors. And actions will speak louder than words. Unless they are willing to live peacefully in the community of nations, we cannot allow them any of the privileges of membership.

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Wars cannot be waged without the support of the Congress and the people. But there are times when the Congress and the people may not recognize our vital interests in Third World conflicts. Leaders should lead and not just follow uninformed public opinion. It is their responsibility to educate the people and the Congress about where our vital interests are and then gain support for whatever military actions may be necessary to protect them. Leaders who do only what opinion polls indicate uninformed voters will support are not true leaders, and if America follows them, it will cease to be a great nation. Trotsky once wrote, “You may not be interested in strategy, but strategy is interested in you.” Uninformed people may not be interested in affecting what goes on in the Third World, but what goes on in the Third World is interested in affecting them.

We should be selective insofar as our involvement in Third World conflicts is concerned. As Frederick the Great observed, “He who attempts to defend everywhere, defends nothing.” Simply because we are the major free world power does not mean we have a responsibility for everything that goes wrong in the world. Qaddafi's invasion of Chad was an example. The French had far more assets in Chad than we did, and they very appropriately assumed the responsibility for countering Qaddafi. That they have found him a difficult nut to crack does not mean that we could or should have done any better. But as Vietnam so clearly demonstrated, victory by a Soviet proxy in one Third World conflict encourages Soviet adventurism and leads to more aggression in other parts of the Third World. Therefore, no instance of Soviet aggression anywhere in the Third World should go unchallenged by the West.