No Lack of Courage (28 page)

11
.  Captain C. Purdy, interview with author, 17 October 2006.

12
.  
Ibid
.

13
.  Brigadier-General David Fraser, interview with author, 21 October 2006. Aside from U.S. elements of his NCE, Fraser also cut over the remnants of “C” Coy combined with Major Lussier's ISTAR Coy, as well as JTACs, FOOs, and snipers.

14
.  Quoted in Adam Day, “Operation Medusa: The Battle for Panjwai, Part 3: The Fall of Objective Rugby,”
Legion Magazine
, 26 January 2008,
www.legionmagazine.com/en/index.php/2007/11/operation-medusa-the-battle-for-panjwai-2
, accessed 8 July 2008.

15
.  Lieutenant J. Bell, interview with author, 17 October 2006.

16
.  The Canadian troops actually developed improvised ramps to cross grape fields as an expedient method. Master-Corporal Justin O'Neil explained, “We basically took a six-foot-high I-beam, about a six-inch high I-beam, six-feet long, and then we cut six foot pickets up into about two foot sections and welded them all together and made a ramp so we could, if we had to cross any grape fields or whatnot, two or three men could lift them off the side of the LAV, lay them out, and the LAV could travel over top of them. We trialed them and there were good and bad points. We didn't actually get to employ them on Op Medusa, as we thought we might, but we have them and we've actually used them in other cases.” Interview with author, 18 October 2006.

Due to the absence of any doctrinal breaching or gap-crossing assets, Major Gasparotto, the OC of 23 Field Squadron, similarly described how the squadron “used its imagination and initiative to fabricate LAV III transportable/supportable and soldier portable ramps [that would allow] a combat loaded LAV III, weighing roughly 18 tonnes, to cross a 2.4 metre gap, which is the basic width of a small wadi.” Major Mark Gasparotto, “The Road to High Readiness,” in Mark Gasparotto, ed.,
Clearing the Way: The Story of 23 Field Squadron in Operation Medusa and Building Route Summit
, unpublished manuscript, December 2008.

17
.  Commander's Entry, TF Kandahar War Diary, period 1–30 September 2006.

18
.  Quoted in Day, “Operation Medusa: The Battle For Panjwai, Part 3.”
Major Ivey noted, “Scattered on the ground were the leaflets dropped there by NATO, warning the locals that an operation was coming through. The locals had also been warned over the radio and all the local Afghan troops knew the plan as well. This was operation was no surprise attack.” Major Greg Ivey, interview with author, 17 October 2006.

19
.  Lieutenant-Colonel Omer Lavoie, interview with author, 8 October 2006.

20
.  Brigadier-General David Fraser, interview with author, 21 October 2006.

21
.  Major Greg Ivey, interview with author, 17 October 2006.

22
.  
Ibid
.

23
.  
Ibid
.

24
.  Captain C. Purdy, interview with author, 17 October 2006.

25
.  Major M. Wright, interview with author, October 2006.

26
.  Lieutenant J. Bell, interview with author, 17 October 2006.

27
.  Sergeant Normand Godin, interview with author, 13 October 2006.

28
.  Lieutenant J. Hiltz, interview with author, 16 October 2006.

29
.  Lieutenant J. Bell, interview with author, 17 October 2006. Sergeant Godin explained, “Most times a small door led into an open courtyard. The walls would be anywhere from 10 to 20 metres high and from one-and-a-half to two-feet thick depending on the building size. Usually you'd have your courtyards and a little living area in the corner that could probably fit a family plus. The better buildings obviously were the bigger ones. Some places you would have three or four compounds back to back.” Sergeant Normand Godin, interview with author, 13 October 2006.

30
.  Lieutenant J. Bell, interview with author, 17 October 2006.

31
.  Captain Piers Pappin, interview with author, 14 July 2008.

32
.  Quoted in Day, “Operation Medusa: The Battle For Panjwai, Part 3.”

33
.  Brigadier-General David Fraser, interview with author, 21 October 2006.

34
.  
Ibid
. On 8 September, “C” Coy, 2nd Battalion, 87th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division had arrived to reinforce TF-31. The next day they cleared the ground north of the hilltop.

35
.  
Ibid
.

36
.  
Ibid
.

37
.  
Ibid
.

38
.  Canadian Press, “Path of Little Resistance,”
Kingston Whig-Standard
, 12 September 2006, 10.

39
.  Les Perreaux, “Afghan Battle Enters Final Phase,”
Kingston-Whig Standard
, 13 September 2006, 11.

40
.  Brigadier-General David Fraser, interview with author, 21 October 2006.

41
.  
Ibid
.

42
.  Lieutenant-Colonel Omer Lavoie, interview with author, 10 October 2006. Lavoie noted, “Unfortunately we had very little ANA support. We were promised 300 and in the end all we received was 40. So the best I could do was push one platoon of ANA to the forward company at a time. So at any one time we had 20 ANA with the lead company to help do the clearance.”

43
.  Quoted in Day, “Operation Medusa: The Battle For Panjwai, Part 3.”

44
.  Brigadier-General David Fraser, interview with author, 21 October 2006.

45
.  Captain Piers Pappin, interview with author 14 July 2008.

46
.  Lieutenant J. Hiltz, interview with author, 16 October 2006.

47
.  Sergeant Craig Dinsmore, interview with author, 14 October 2006

48
.  Lieutenant-Colonel Omer Lavoie, letter to author, 25 May 2007.

49
.  Lieutenant-Colonel Omer Lavoie, interview with author, 10 October 2006.

Chapter Eight

1
.    Brigadier-General David Fraser, interview with author, 21 October 2006.

2
.    
Ibid
.

3
.    Paul Koring and Graeme Smith, “The Afghan Mission—Canadian Deaths Underscore PM's Plea to NATO,”
Globe and Mail
, 28 November 2006, A1.

4
.    Podcast, “Audio Report by Mark Laity, NATO's civilian spokesman in Afghanistan,” NATO Speeches, 22 Nov 2006, NATO Library online,
www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s060922b.htm
, accessed 26 November 2006.

5
.    NATO, Allied Command Operations, SHAPE News, “ISAF Concludes Operation Medusa in Southern Afghanistan,” 17 September 2006,
www.nato.int/shape/news/206/09/060917a.htm
, accessed 24 November 2006.

6
.    “Operation Medusa Foiled Taliban Plans, NATO Commander Says,” 20 September 2006,
london.usembassy.gov/afghn187.html
, accessed 24 November 2006.

7
.    NATO, “ISAF concludes Operation Medusa in Southern Afghanistan.”

8
.    “Aid Arriving in Panjwayi Following Taliban Defeat,”
ISAF News
, Issue No. 116, 1.

9
.    House of Commons Defence Committee,
UK Operations in Afghanistan. Thirteenth Report of Session 2006-07
(London: The Stationary Office Ltd, 18 July 2007), 16.

10
.  David McKeeby, “NATO's Operation Medusa Pushing Taliban from Southern Kandahar,” 18 September 2006,
usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2006&m=September&cx=2006091816051idybeckcm0.9616358
, accessed 24 November 2006.

11
.  CTV News Staff, “Operation Medusa a ‘Significant' Success: NATO,” 17 September 2006,
www.ctv.ca/serviet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060917/
suicidbomb060917?sname=&noads=24Nov06
, accessed 24 November 2006.

12
.  Graeme Smith, “Taliban ‘Eliminated' from Pivotal District,”
Globe and Mail
, 18 September 2006, A14.

13
.  Richard Foot, “Afghanistan Sliding Into Chaos,”
Montreal Gazette
, 6 Jan 2007, A3.

14
.  Paul Koring, “The Afghan Mission—A Thin Canadian Line Holds in Kandahar,”
Globe and Mail
, 6 December 2006, A26.

15
.  Mitch Potter, “General Frets About Home Front,” Middle East Bureau, 1 October 2006.

16
.  Brigadier-General Dave Fraser, interview with author, 21 October 2006.

17
.  Quoted in Janice Gross Stein,
The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar
(Toronto: Viking, 2007), 219.

18
.  Discussion at NDHQ, 8 May 2007.

19
.  CTV News Staff, “Operation Medusa a ‘Significant' Success: NATO,” 17 September 2006,
www.ctv.ca/serviet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060917/
suicidbomb060917?sname=&noads=24Nov06
, accessed 24 November 2006.

20
.  Lieutenant-Colonel Shane Schreiber, ACOS, Multi-National Brigade HQ, 1 CMBG briefing, 22 January 2007. General James Jones stated number of killed about 1,000, “but if you said 1,500 it wouldn't surprise me;” “Operation Medusa Foiled Taliban Plans, NATO Commander Says,” 20 September 2006,
usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2006&m=September&cx=20060920172756adtbbed0.444072
, accessed 24 November 2006.

21
.  Brigadier-General Dave Fraser, interview with author, 21 October 2006.

22
.  Major Mark Gasparotto, “Route Summit Phase 1—Squadron Combat Team,” in Mark Gasparotto, ed.,
Clearing the Way: The Story of 23 Field Squadron in Operation Medusa and Building Route Summit
, unpublished manuscript, December 2008.

23
.  Declan Walsh, Richard Norton-Taylor, and Julian Borger, “From Soft Hats to Hard Facts in Battle to Beat Taliban,”
The Guardian
, 18 November 2006, 4.

24
.  
Ibid
., 5.

25
.  CTV News Staff, “Operation Medusa a ‘Significant' Success: NATO,” 17 September 2006,
www.ctv.ca/serviet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060917/
suicidbomb060917?sname=&noads=24Nov06
, accessed 24 November 2006.

26
.  Graeme Smith, “The Afghan Mission: Knowing the Enemy: The Taliban,”
Globe and Mail
, 27 November 2006, A1.

27
.  Graeme Smith, “Noise of War Gives Way to the Sound of Rebuilding,”
Globe and Mail
, 13 January 2007.

28
.  Brigadier-General Dave Fraser, interview with author, 21 October 2006.

29
.  Memo, Director Army Training to Commander Land Force Development Training System, “Tactical Reconnaissance Report—
Training Assessment OP Archer Rotation 3,” 21 September 2006, 5.

30
.  Lieutenant-Colonel Omer Lavoie, interview with author, 13 October 2006.

31
.  
Ibid
.

32
.  Lieutenant-Colonel Shane Schreiber, ACOS, Multi-National Brigade HQ, 1 CMBG briefing, 22 January 2007.

33
.  Lieutenant-Colonel Omer Lavoie, interview with author, 13 October 2006.

34
.  
Ibid
.

35
.  Retrospectively, Lavoie assessed: “Well, I think first and foremost is the requirement to ensure at all levels that the battle, particularly for us the Canadian component, is fully thought through to the end state. And that means it must be very clear. For instance, we may have to embrace the idea of unlimited exploitation. Lines on the map look good—based on our conventional training in this case the lines looked about the right sort of amount of area that battle groups would take on. But they didn't account for the next steps forward, the terrain or type of conflict we're fighting. What we accepted as exploitation, what we all accepted and recognized as just a line on a map did not correspond to reality on the ground. The insurgents don't respect that line. So in thinking through the whole battle and, and looking beyond my own battle, which really just amounts to my areas of influence and interests, in hindsight, we should have looked beyond the doctrinal approach to exploitation.” Colonel Omer Lavoie, interview with author, 13 October 2006.

36
.  
Ibid
.

37
.  Commander's Entry, Task Force Kandahar 3-06, Op Archer War Diary, 1–30 September 2006.

38
.  Lieutenant-Colonel Omer Lavoie, interview with author, 13 October 2006.

39
.  Graeme Smith, “Taliban Vow to Retake Panjwai Redoubt,”
Globe and Mail
, 18 September 2006, A1.

40
.  Adnan R. Khan, “Prepare to Bury Your Dead,”
Maclean's
, 20 March 2006,
www.macleans.ca/topstories/world/article.jsp?content=20060320_123593_123593
, accessed 24 November 2006.

Chapter Nine

1
.    Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Peter Williams, Joint Effects Coordination Officer, 22 October 2006.

2
.    Major Marty Lipcsey, interview with author, 20 October 2006.

3
.    Lavoie was awarded the Meritorious Service Medal. The commendation read in part, “LCol Lavoie through his personal courage and example led his battle group in a deliberate attack against a well entrenched enemy. Demonstrating a rare high level of professional competence and courage, LCol Lavoie created a detailed attack plan utilising coordinated fires in order to defeat the enemy and secure the objectives in the Panjwayi region.” Commendation Meritorious Service Medal, Lieutenant-Colonel Omer Lavoie, 25 October 2006.

4
.    The “long war” refers to the counter-insurgency conflict. In a more global sense, the Americans also use the phrase to refer to the global counter-insurgency they believe themselves to be against—ideologically and religiously motivated adversaries intent on fighting the U.S., if not the entire West and its supporters, in a global jihad. Al Qaeda is prominent in this enemy grouping. The “long war” has also come to replace the term GWOT (global war on terrorism).