Nixon's Secret (89 page)

   “In fact, as his new term commenced [in January of 1973], the situation was far worse than he could begin to imagine. This was because he had remained largely uninformed of the facts, partly though his own design but also partly because of the reluctance of Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Mitchell to inform him precisely what had gone on and how matters were or were not being addressed.” (p. 193)

   “Although Nixon interpreted the information from Colson during their January 5 conversation as more finger-pointing among his subordinates, the truth was that his staff was slowly (and finally) giving him the basic facts about what had actually occurred—while not really explaining their own roles in the affair.” (p. 203)

   ‘That applies to Mitchell, too,’ I added, since the president seemed both interested and surprisingly unaware of the facts.” (p. 267)

   Nixon said as much himself: “The reason, if I knew all the facts, then I have an idea of what could come out.” (p. 282)

   Dean gives an excellent characterization of Nixon’s situation as of April 16, 1973: “Clearly the president was starting to develop a new defense: He would say he first learned of the serious nature of the problems on March 21, which was true. (His later claim that he first learned of the cover-up on March 21, however, was not.)” (p. 421)

•     The president’s staff was not informing him (or themselves) of their involvement or of what had transpired.

   Nixon expressed frustration that he did not know all the facts; he had been told conflicting stories, but is clear that he was consistently and adamantly against any cover-up (pp. 232-236).

   “‘I’ve got to know whether [Haldeman] knew about it, and I’ve got to know whether Colson knew about it.” No one had ever laid it out for him, even when he had asked.” (p. 232)

   Dean later admits that, like everyone else on the staff, he was less than candid in telling the president the full truth:

Not knowing what else I should tell Nixon, I was as vague as Haldeman and Ehrlichman when I explained, “There is a certain domino situation here. If some things start going, a lot of other things are going to start going, and there are going to be a lot of problems if everything starts falling. So there are dangers, Mr. President. I’d be less than candid if I didn’t tell you there are. There’s a reason for us not, not everyone, going up and testifying.” (p. 270)

   “Haldeman said he understood, yet clearly he was still not giving the president basic information that investigators would later uncover about his role leading up to the Watergate break-in. As the conversation continued, the president could merely speculate about who knew what, in order to assess his exposure.” (p. 280)

   “Conversations like this were remarkably inconclusive, because Haldeman, Ehrlichman and the president were not telling one another all they knew and this lack of candor continued to the end . . .” (p. 286)

   “While Mitchell, Ehrlichman and Haldeman had once discussed the problem among themselves in the early days, they now communicated almost exclusively through me, although Ehrlichman and Haldeman did exchange some information. No one was sharing anything with anyone else, nor with the president, who even at this late date [March 20, 1973] had no real idea of his exposure.” (p. 306)

   But the allegations against H and E seem almost inconsequential when they were asked to resign: