Muslim Fortresses in the Levant: Between Crusaders and Mongols (46 page)

The Mamluk strategy along the Euphrates was carefully organized and clearly more intricate than any other contemporary border or frontier. They depended on their fortresses along the Euphrates and invested considerable time and funds in organizing their manpower. If the fortress garrisons together with the larger Mamluk relief forces failed to sound the alert and hold back the Īlkhānid army, the villages and cities of northern Syria would suffer severely.

The defense of Mamluk fortresses

Bearing in mind that the Mongols arrived with no new siege technology, any improvements or changes in Mamluk military architecture were the outcome of the composition, the size, or the particular methods of defense used by the Mamluk garrisons. The following pages will examine Mamluk methods of defense from within the fortress.

Compared to siege warfare, where there appears to be more of an opportunity to exercise and develop innovative ideas, the possibilities of defense are rather limited. A careful preparation for a lengthy siege was crucial. The garrison and the entire town or village population gathered and stocked food, water and weapons. The area round the fortification was stripped bare. Water sources were sealed or contaminated
and pasture that could support the besieging enemy camp was set on fire. Buildings that might provide shelter were removed so that the area below the walls was left exposed. When Ghazan was besieging the citadel of Damascus (Rajab-Jumādā II 699/ February–March 1300), the amir commanding the Mamluk garrison of the citadel, Sayf al-Dīn Arjawāsh, ordered all the buildings below its walls to be burnt down.
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Great emphasis is laid on the importance of having your city fortifications well-prepared even in times of peace, when one least expects the enemy to attack. Although it dates to the late fourteenth century and is considered a second-rate war manual, the
Tafrīj al-kurūb fī tadbīr
by
Ibn Ibrāhīm al-Awasī
(d. 811/1408) provides important information concerning the general policy sultans should follow as regards the fortification of their capital cities and fortresses throughout the Sultanate.
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It gives detailed instructions on the duties of fortress commanders in times of war and in times of peace, as well as the preparations to be carried out prior to a siege and while the siege is going on.
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Some of the instructions are rather obvious and at first sight appear slightly banal. But the very fact that they were written as a set of rules within a few years of Temür’s (Tamerlane) invasion
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implies that during Barqūq’s reign (792/1390–801/1399) old rules and regulations concerning the upkeep and running of fortresses were no longer being followed.

The author,
Ibn Ibrāhīm, was by no account an active member of the Mamluk army. Scanlon describes the manual in the following words: “The wok reeks of the library and of the court, rather than of the camp and the battlefield. Its tone is that of the observer rather than a participant.”
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And yet the information was gathered from high-ranking Mamluk amirs who had served in Syria. Thee seems to be little consensus among contemporary Muslim chroniclers. While Maqrīzī does not think much of him or of his work, Ibn Taghrī-Birdī says he was a respected member of the court.
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Ibn Ibrāhīm describes how the commander of a fortress should keep it in a constant state of alert
.
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The fortress must be strengthened, and each man should be assigned to a particular position within the defense. The commander must be certain he has a sufficient number of men and weapons, including siege machines. But above all he must see to it that the water and food supplies are well stocked. In addition, knowing the composition of the enemy’s army is essential in order to prepare accordingly.
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The composition and size of Mamluk garrisons

Fortress garrisons were constituted on similar lines to that of the Mamluk field army. They included infantry archers who probably used both crossbows and composite bows, teams that operated siege machines, and mounted men and infantry who could carry out raids and skirmishes against the enemy camped outside the walls. The main difference was in the hierarchical importance and size of each group. While mounted archers dominated on the battlefield, the importance of infantry archers and siege machine teams was evidently greater in a fortress garrison. The number of men a
fortress could accommodate ran from a few tens (Qāqūn) to as many as two thousand (Safad). Large urban citadels could maintain additional forces within the city quarters. But even in large cities the balance of power tilted in favor of the besieging army. Neither side could usually withstand a lengthy siege. While the besiegers had the constant anxiety of dwindling supplies and intercepted retreat routes, the garrison’s fears were much the same, for they knew their supplies would be exhausted and their manpower would lessen due to battle injury, exhaustion and death.

Mamluk strategy was based on a fairly simple scheme – the ability of the garrisons along the frontier to withstand a short siege until the arrival of Mamluk reinforcement. The next stage was to engage the Īlkhānid force on two fronts: that of the garrison and that of the relieving forces. At this point it will be useful to briefly survey the Mamluk garrisons along the Euphrates, which, notwithstanding their modest size, played a crucial part in the defense of the frontier.

Garrisons were recruited and composed in several different ways. The method of recruitment is of special interest because of the structure and hierarchy of the Mamluk army. The vast majority of the sultan’s Mamluks (who had a superior social and economic status) rejected the idea of serving in remote posts along the frontier far from the center of government in Cairo. Stationing a Mamluk in Syria was rather like a form of severe punishment, similar to exile. A large percentage of Mamluks serving in Syrian citadels and fortress garrisons consisted of Mamluks owned by local amirs and “free men.” Their military and social rank was lower than that of the sultan’s Mamluks. In reality much of the responsibility for defense of the north frontier fell on the Syrian contingents and garrisons, since many of the battles and sieges took place on Syrian soil. In consequence, a high proportion of the Syrian contingents was made up of infantry and siege experts.
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Since the infantry would have slowed down the army on the march from Egypt, there was an advantage in having infantry contingents based in various Syrian cities.
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Fortress and citadel commanders (
nuwwāb
) were appointed directly by the sultan and were subject to him alone. The sulta’s involvement did not end with choosing his nuwwāb and in many cases he participated in selecting the garrison’s soldiers. If the conquered fortress had a well-trained garrison that could be trusted to transfer its loyalties to the new Mamluk sultan, it was maintained. Occasionally it was strengthened. A good example is the organization of Karak by Baybars after it surrendered in 661/1263. The Ayyubid garrison was kept in place and paid from the sultan’s treasury. Their amirs received a rise in pay. In addition, Baybars sent a number of his own Mamluk archers from the
to join the garrison on a permanent basis. A similar procedure took place in the fortress of Kahybar, which was reinforced with Mamluk soldiers from the
. Ayalon raised some question concerning the composition and quality of the
who were chosen to serve in the Syrian fortresses during the reign of Baybars and that of his successors. According to Ayalon by the early 1260s their rank had thinned and many of the regiment’s men were fairly old.
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