Authors: Martin Bowman
Tags: #Bisac Code 1: HIS027140
At Hunsdon in summer 1944 Pilot Officer Dudley Hemmings’ pilot in 464 Squadron completed his tour with him and was rested. The young navigator met Squadron Leader Don Wellings
DFC
‘a tall, unassuming man’, who had completed a tour on Blenheims at a night-vision course.
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He explains:
During the period June to October 1944 Don and I did thirty-five ops, thirty at night and five low-level trips by day. We commenced our first ops on the V-1 flying bomb sites in Northern France. The targets were difficult to locate in the woods, the ramps not much longer than a cricket pitch. I must say I was scared on my first trip when 50ft over the sea we saw the heavily defended French coast ahead. Low-level tight formation in Vics or Boxes was a must for the squadrons. This was difficult for some pilots to do continually. Wellings was a fearless man and could fly a perfect course from his navigator. During night attacks in Normandy he would press hard to destroy the target going as low as possible for accuracy; hence I would yell out to him altimeter readings fearing he was getting too low for my liking!
A typical night op: Take-off Lasham 23.00 hours then 16 minutes to Littlehampton on the coast and across the Channel at 50ft. When the French coast was coming up we climbed to 3,000ft, crossed the coast in a weaving dive to escape any flak then down to about 1,500-2,000ft and patrolled a given area in the battle zone. Eventually to find a moving train or transport column, climb a bit and drop a flare over the targets. It would burn on a parachute for about 7 to 10 minutes turning night into day. Bomb the train, the engine if possible; the train would stop; rake the train with machine guns and cannon and set it on fire. Sometimes we received flak and the cockpit filled with cordite smoke, which nearly made me sick as I called out altimeter readings to Wellings in our dives. I would identify the location with a Gee fix if possible and when all armaments expended set course for the French coast and back to base. Then a debriefing, bacon and eggs, and on to our camp stretchers for sleep around 3am.
In September the Allies launched Operation Market Garden, the aim of which was to cut the German-occupied Netherlands almost in half and to prepare the way for the invasion of Germany that would bypass the northern flank of Germany’s Westwall fortifications (The Siegfried line). The Allied plan was to capture bridges on the Rhine in Holland at Veghel, Grave, Nijmegen and Arnhem, using Britain’s 1st and America’s 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions. They were to cut off the Germany Army in the Belgian sector and save the bridges and the port of Antwerp for the American army units and British XXX Corps advancing north from the Dutch border. On 17 September the operation took place. Thirty-two FB.VIs of 107 and 613 Squadrons in 138 Wing were detailed to attack a German barracks at Arnhem, while 21 Squadron at Thorney Island bombed three school buildings in the centre of Nijmegen, which were being used by the German garrison. Both raids were to eliminate the opposition before the airborne forces went in later that day. Dudley Hemmings and Don Wellings, who in August had moved to 613 Squadron, recalls:
The attacks were scheduled to begin 5 minutes before midday Dutch time to soften the German defences ahead of the invading paratroopers. As was usual with all Mosquito daylight raids, low-level flying and careful routeing into the targets to gain surprise was essential for success. Whilst by late 1944 the
Luftwaffe
had diminished in the air, enemy anti-aircraft guns were still heavy around German held positions. The task given the Section led by Squadron Leader Don Wellings DFC and I as his navigator, was to attack the barracks in the centre of Arnhem.
The thirty-two FB.VI Mosquitoes of 107 and 613 Squadrons in 138 Wing were to attack, in shallow high-speed dives at between 800 and 1,500ft, two German barracks complexes in Arnhem, the
Willemskazerne
in the centre of the town and the
Saksen-Weimarkazerne
in the northern outskirts. Fifteen Mosquitoes of 21 Squadron in 140 Wing were to bomb three school buildings in the centre of Nijmegen, believed to being used as billets for the German garrison. One of the crews who took part was Canadian Flight Lieutenant Ed McQuarrie
RCAF
and his navigator Flight Lieutenant ‘Les’ Bulmer, who were flying their last operation as a crew. Bulmer recounts:
It was intended to be another of 2 Group’s pinpoint raids but it turned out to be a total cock-up. Both raids were to eliminate the opposition before the airborne forces of Market Garden went in later that day. We were still based at Thorney Island, so we would have quite a way to go to reach the target. As a result we had to carry wing tanks, which meant that our bomb load was confined to two 500-pounders in the bomb bay. At briefing we had the usual 2 Group model of the town that Basil Embry’s model shop always produced for these sort of pinpoint raids, so that we could familiarize ourselves with the target and the run-in over the town. There would be fifteen aircraft in five sets of three in echelon starboard. Wing Commander David F. Dennis
DSO DFC DFM
led with Squadron Leader ‘Jock’ Murray as his No.2. We led the third echelon with Flight Lieutenant Bert Willers as our No.2. To ensure that all fifteen aircraft would be clear of the target before the bombs exploded the leading aircraft (the first ten) had 25second fuses, whereas the rear echelons had the normal eleven-second delay. To stay clear of trouble we planned to fly across the Channel and up to the front line at high level. Once over enemy territory we would drop down to the deck and head for a road that ran north-west from Cleve into Nijmegen. The road would give us an accurate run-up to the target, which consisted of three large buildings forming a semi-circle facing the direction from which we planned to attack, so it would be easy to identify.
On 17 September 1,113 medium and heavy bombers escorted by 330 fighter aircraft carried out bombing attacks to eliminate the opposition before the airborne forces of Market Garden went in later that day. The first airlift alone involved 360 British and 1,174 American transport aircraft and 491 gliders, accompanied by 910 fighter escorts. During the course of the operation 20,190 parachutists, 13,781 glider-borne troops, 5,230 tons of equipment and stores, 1,927 vehicles and 568 pieces of artillery were landed behind the German lines. The bombing strikes included seventeen Mosquitoes of 107 Squadron and sixteen Mosquitoes of 613 Squadron at Lasham and sixteen Mosquitoes of 21 Squadron at Thorney Island. No.107 Squadron finally began taking off at half-minute intervals at 10.51 hours after a few last minute hiccups, as Dudley Hemmings continues:
We formed up in tight formation and set course for Southwold on the English coast for the 750 miles round trip. Across East Anglia we had a marvellous view of the sky filled with the great armada of some of the 2,000 transports and gliders
en route
to their drop zones several miles west of Arnhem. Crossing the English coast at Southwold we soon left the brave Red Berets behind and skimmed over the North Sea at 50ft and 250 mph; IFF off and bombs switched to ‘Fire’. As lead navigator I was map reading each pinpoint every 2 minutes to keep on track knowing there were seven crews behind relying on our lead. Our routeing into Arnhem was circuitous and required good timing, pinpoint map reading and the use of Gee over the 130 miles of sea to the Dutch coast. Midway over the North Sea we turned slightly to port at a DR position in order to cross the Dutch coast one-mile south of Egmont, a position presumed undefended. Landfall without incident was made as planned and we swept across the lowlands of Holland, lifting up over some high-tension lines east of Alkmaar. At a headland on the Zuider Zee near Hoorn we turned south-east to cross 32 miles of the Zuider Zee, making for a checkpoint at Nijkerk where a railway ran 90° to our track. We crossed the town of Nijkerk at house top level and looking behind us it was good to see the flight still in close formation.
We were now 8 minutes to our time on target. About 10 miles west of Arnhem we turned on an easterly course and climbed rapidly to 3,000ft, the others breaking the box formation to line astern. I had an oblique photo of a model made from aerial photographs and knew that a white gravel road led straight to the barracks. We flew in a shallow dive down this road. I pointed out the target to Don Wellings and we dropped our bombs from 1,000ft. The Mossies behind us did likewise. We carried instantaneous bombs on this trip and could not bomb at low level for fear of blowing up either the following aircraft or ourselves. When really low level bombing was done, eleven-second delay bombs were carried. Pilot aimed bombing became quite accurate after much practice by pilots on the bombing ranges back in England. Up came some flak and with the bomb doors open Wellings opened up with the firepower in the nose as our bombs were released. The Section followed us in. Until now the crews had maintained radio silence but soon after flattening out past the target I heard one of our crews over the radio call out “We’ve got it!”
On 21 Squadron meanwhile Ed McQuarrie and ‘Les’ Bulmer had taken off at 10.45 for Nijmegen and the Mosquitoes formed-up into tight formation. Les Bulmer continues:
Somewhere short of the front line we shed our drop tanks: empty tanks could be lethal if hit by flak. Just after crossing the front line we came under heavy ack-ack fire near Weert. There was nothing we could do to avoid it, as this would have destroyed the formation. But this didn’t stop No.2 in the second echelon from trying to weave. He was a bigger menace than the flak. As far as I know nobody was hit, although a message came over the R/T calling someone by name, which we didn’t catch, telling them that they were on fire. I think it probably came from some other formation because there were no signs of fire in ours. But I reckon it caused a mild panic among all our crews. On the deck it was hard work for the pilots trying to keep one eye on the ground and the other on the rest of the formation. Somewhere along the way there was a cry of “Wires, wires!” and we had to climb to get over an electricity pylon. I was amazed to see that Willers on our right seemed to fly underneath! In fact, I found out afterwards that he’d taken advantage of the droop in the cables to stay low.
Our turning point on the Cleve-Nijmegen road came up, which we planned to follow into Nijmegen but we carried straight on, then circled starboard to come up on Cleve from the east. I had no idea what was going on. Every navigator in the formation, except the leader, must have been wondering what the hell was happening. I could hardly believe my eyes when the leading aircraft opened their bomb doors. Ed followed suit and I yelled at him that this wasn’t the target and not to release our bombs. Poor Ed was totally confused and probably thought I had gone off my head since the leaders were obviously intent on bombing whatever was coming up. After what seemed ages but was probably only seconds the leader’s bomb doors closed and I breathed a sigh of relief as we shot over Cleve. On the straight road, with houses on either side and a larger building, which could have been a church or chapel, people were standing watching us go over. I looked back to check that the rear echelons had noticed that bomb doors had been closed. To my surprise I saw a huge cloud of black smoke and dust from bombs which some of the rear six aircraft had let go. (According to later official reports three aircraft bombed a barrack square in Cleve and machine-gunned troops). South-west of Cleve is the
Reichwald,
a large forest and we proceeded to career around this. By now there was not much formation left, just a gaggle of aircraft milling around waiting for someone to make a decision. Suddenly I saw two aircraft haring off in the right direction. One of them, I later discovered, was Jock Murray. I told Ed to follow and we chased after them, with everyone else tagging along behind or beside us. We were now fifteen aircraft all flying individually towards Nijmegen. And we had no means of knowing whether any of the leading planes were the ones with the short fuses.
We sped up the road to Nijmegen and I could see the bridge over on the right. Then we were over the town looking anxiously for the target. It seemed to be chaos, with Mosquitoes going in all directions, flak coming up and Mustangs milling around above us. I noticed one Mosquito climbing away to the north and wondered where the hell he was going. Then another Mosquito shot underneath us almost at right angles. I shall never know how he found room between the rooftops and us and I wondered why he was going in that particular direction. Then I realised that he’d seen the target and was heading straight for it. I yelled to Ed to pull round and pointed to the target, by now almost on our port wing-tip. He put us into a tight turn but we couldn’t make it in time. We shot over the town and I saw a green train in the railway station with a crowd of people on the platform looking up and, presumably, wondering what was happening. In a flash we were clear and out over farmland where we dumped our bombs and got out fast. The element of surprise was long gone so it as suicidal to go round again. Many others did the same. We were fortunate in not having a rearward-facing camera connected to the bomb release so no one was aware that, in our haste to get away, we’d omitted to drop them safe. I just hoped that no one would be passing that way within the next 25 seconds. (Those who had such a camera got a rocket at the subsequent debriefing). On the way in and on the way out the farmers and their families were standing in their doorways waving like mad. Probably they were cheering on ‘the brave RAF’ while we were thinking, ‘what the hell are we doing here, let’s get the hell out of it.’ We found another Mosquito, which seemed to be going in the same direction as us, so we joined him for the journey home. This was uneventful; we didn’t even get shot at over Weert this time. Maybe the Germans didn’t consider two aircraft to be worth wasting ammunition on. And besides, we were heading for home.
We returned to Thorney Island (one crew was missing) where the full story of the confusion over the target route unfolded. Wing Commander Dennis had a bird hit his windscreen just before reaching the turning point. In retrospect it might have been wiser for him to pull out and hand over to Jock Murray immediately but he chose to carry on, not being able to see properly and hence the mess we finished up in. Only five aircraft claimed to have located and bombed the target. Most of the rest did as we did and dumped them in fields, apart from those who had already got rid of theirs over Cleve. I’ve always felt that it was a mistake to have fifteen planes in one formation. The usual formation on previous raids of this sort was groups of six in two vics of three. Because each of the following echelons had to be stepped down on the one in front to avoid slipstream problems, it meant that the leader had to keep a reasonable height above the deck. Otherwise the rear echelons would be ploughing a furrow across the countryside. In the event, it was impossible to avoid hitting slipstreams and we were being thrown all over the place and at tree top height this is not the healthiest of situations. To cap it all we learned afterwards that the German troops were not in their barracks at the time, so all we succeeded in doing was probably to kill a few innocent Dutchmen and some German civilians. Such is war. In wartime I suppose you can’t very well admit to the world that you made a cock-up.