Mithridates the Great (29 page)

Either way, we get some spirited anti-Roman invective:

From the beginning of their existence, they have nothing, not homes, wives, nor empire, which they have not stolen. Parentless, homeless vagabonds, created to be the scourge of the world, no laws, human or divine are allowed to stand in the way of rapine and destruction ... The Romans are the enemies of mankind, most vicious where the loot is greatest. By audacity and deceit, leapfrogging from war to war, they have grown great. They will destroy humanity, or themselves perish in the process.
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The argument of Mithridates was simple. Rome was an out-of-control juggernaut. Ultimately foiled in the west by the Atlantic shore, the monster had turned east, successively destroying Philip of Macedon, Antiochus of Seleucia and Pontus itself. ‘Do you think that when we have all been crushed, that the wars will end, or that you can withstand the Romans otherwise?’

Though this last comment was both prescient and correct, the Parthian king chose to send sympathetic responses, but no help. Arsaces had in fact also sent envoys to Lucullus assuring him of his complete goodwill, so it was as well that Mithridates was not basing his survival strategy on Parthian intervention.

The campaign of 68 BC

It was fortunate for Mithridates and Tigranes that the Battle of Tigranocerta had taken place late in the campaigning season, in October, as this allowed the pair to withdraw their remaining forces to the fastnesses of upper Armenia. This meant leaving lower Armenia to its fate, but the Romans would not venture to follow their enemies through the mountain passes so late in the year. The two kings had until the start of the campaigning season of 68 BC to brace for the storm.

Mithridates had the smithys of every town working overtime to produce weapons, and set about raising a sizeable infantry force. This was organized and trained legionary-style by his Pontic officers, who had learned their skills from the Romans. Indeed, there were still some genuine Romans in his entourage, simply because these men had nowhere else to go. Tigranes meanwhile mustered the cavalry. Since we can discount out of hand Appian’s figure of 70,000 men, all that can be said with certainty is that the two kings had a handy army, albeit raw, partially trained and fragile, with which to withstand Lucullus when he arrived in the summer of 68 BC.
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As instructed by Mithridates, Tigranes avoided bringing his cavalry to battle, but harassed the Roman supply lines. The historian Cassius Dio tells us that the Armenian light cavalry, like their Parthian counterparts, were expert at shooting over the rumps of their horses even as they retreated. Not only were the legionaries unable to get to grips with their enemy, but those hit by bowfire suffered doubly, both because the Armenians allegedly poisoned their arrows, and because they deliberately made the heads loose, so that these came off in the wound when an attempt was made to remove them.
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Much of the summer was spent in marching and counter-marching about the mountains in a game of large-scale chess. Lucullus attempted to bring the Armenians to battle, while the Armenians attempted to isolate and cut off his
columns, attack his forage parties and lead the Romans on fruitless pursuits. It would appear from the fragmentary evidence available that Lucullus attempted to advance to the west of Lake Van, though his exact route cannot be determined. Whichever of the two possible paths the Roman took, his army, and especially his foragers, would at some point have been exposed to the Armenian cavalry on the plain of Mutsch.
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However, when an increasingly confident Tigranes decided to challenge the Romans at a river crossing (probably the eastern Euphrates in the valley of Arsanias), he received a sharp setback. This eased the pressure on the Roman supply lines and allowed Lucullus to set his course for Artaxata, the capital of Armenia proper, where he hoped to repeat the success he had enjoyed before Tigranocerta, the former capital of Tigranes’ Armenian empire. However, Mithridates’ delaying tactics had achieved their purpose. Winter came early in northern Armenia and it was already too late in the year for a major initiative. A frustrated Lucullus was forced by his cold and hungry troops to swerve westward and try to draw Tigranes into battle by besieging Nisbis.

Both sides were disappointed, Tigranes because he wrongly calculated that the walls of Nisbis were equal to the highly-practised skills of the besieging Romans, not least because the city was well garrisoned and commanded by his brother and Callimachus, the man who had for so long withstood the Romans at Amisus. However, although Lucullus took the city and helped himself to another royal treasury, Mithridates and Tigranes ignored his provocation. Instead, working on the principle that Lucullus did not have the troops available to both fight and hold his conquests, Tigranes spent the time busily repossessing himself of Lucullus’ conquests in southern Armenia, no doubt consoled by the thought that Nisbis too would fall back into his hands when Lucullus moved on.

Lucullus had in fact noted the same point, and sent to Sornatius for some of the remaining legions garrisoning Pontus. These, with true Fimbrian recalcitrance, simply refused to move. Nor could Lucullus press the point too hard. The truth was that he had overstayed his tenure in command, and that command had only been for Cilicia in the first place. It was not just the Fimbrians, but some very highly-placed senators in Rome who were asking exactly why the ex-commander in Cilicia was currently hundreds of miles away from there, charging around Armenia with several unwilling Roman legions in tow.

Partly because his legions followed orders with ever-increasing reluctance, the Armenian campaign of 68 BC was ultimately inconclusive. The military initiative lay with Lucullus, but the wile and experience of Mithridates
ensured that he could not use it. It almost seems as though, despite the loss of his armies, his conquests and his kingdom, Mithridates was beginning to enjoy himself. The king who had once, like a true Asiatic monarch, sent generals and armies to war on his behalf had now matured into a hardened warrior king who led from the front. His early setbacks had given him a resilience and cunning which made him a formidable general, and though now in his sixties, Mithridates’ sheer physical presence made him a terrifying opponent on the battlefield.

Certainly, Mithridates showed no traces of war weariness and threw himself into campaigning with gusto. Leaving Tigranes to tidy southern Armenia, Mithridates took a small expeditionary force of about 8,000 men to Armenia Minor. Half of this force was Pontic (perhaps including the cavalry detachment which had been with him since Cabira) and half loaned by Tigranes. With this force Mithridates began to harry the small Roman garrison in eastern Pontus, catching many small Roman detachments unaware and cutting them down before they were even aware that there was a serious enemy presence in the region.

Perhaps because of his inability to get Lucullus his desperately needed reinforcements, Sornatius was now gone, and command was with Hadrianus, another Roman commander with whom Mithridates had clashed in the past. Like many a Roman before him, Hadrianus found that Mithridates was not to be underestimated. For a start, Hadrianus lost the strong force of Thracian mercenaries which he had inherited from Mithridates after the latter’s flight from Cabira. As soon as they heard of his return, these men defected in a body back to their old master. Shortly afterwards, an early clash lost the Roman legate 500 of his men. He withdrew to his camp and sent out desperate messengers seeking reinforcements. Even so, when the attack came, Hadrianus was in danger of being overwhelmed until Mithridates exposed too much of himself in his enthusiasm to take the walls. He received a dart under the eye and a stone, probably from a sling, damaged his knee. The attack faltered as the king was taken away, and for a while his men feared for his life.

The Romans remained quiet over this period, for they had wounds of their own to lick. Among the retinue of Mithridates were members of the Agari, Scythians who treated wounds with snakebite. This appealed to a king with an interest in pharmaceuticals, and the royal patient was entrusted to them. Evidently the Agari were up to the job. Valerius Triarius, another Roman general, had been bringing reinforcements to Lucullus. Hearing of the crisis at Cabira, Triarius promptly changed direction and headed to his comrade’s
relief. Mithridates, thanks to his exotic medical treatments (or despite them) was able to rise from his sickbed to resume command. A cowed Hadrianus handed his battered troops to the command of the newcomer, but it soon became evident that the only battle over the next few days would be against the elements. A terrific late autumn storm developed, which soldiers afterwards reported as lifting whole tents into the air, and blowing to their doom those who strayed too near cliff tops.

Mithridates pulled back before the combined Roman force, toward Comana. Even in retreat he was dangerous, for after crossing a river (probably the Iris) he prepared to attack Triarius as his men came over the same bridge. Meanwhile, a second force had been sent hurrying back post-haste with the intention of re-crossing the river by a second bridge, so that the Romans would be caught halfway over the river and attacked by Mithridates’ men on both sides. However, the bridge collapsed, so Mithridates was forced once more to retreat after a brisk but inconclusive engagement. Thereafter he followed the Roman example and went into winter quarters.

Even after campaigning finished for 68 BC, the advantage lay with Mithridates, for - as was the case almost anywhere in Asia Minor that had experienced the benefits of Roman rule - the local population were desperately keen to assist anyone who might offer an alternative. This meant that hordes of volunteers flocked to the royal standards, and allowed Mithridates to extend his power to include several local fortresses.

This left Lucullus with the thankless task of persuading his surly troops out of their winter quarters and informing them that it was necessary to abandon the conquest of Armenia and return with all speed to prevent Mithridates taking back Pontus. In order to save fellow Romans, the troops eventually agreed, but the effort cost Lucullus the little credibility that he had left with his men.

Events of 67 BC

It was a sign of the renewed confidence of Mithridates that he took the initiative and opened campaigning. When Triarius declined his initial offer of battle, he followed this up with an attack on the Roman fortress of Dadasa. This showed two things. Firstly that the Mithridatic intelligence organization was back to its usual level of efficiency, and secondly, that having been informed by his scouts that Lucullus was on his way, Mithridates had determined to dispatch Triarius before his arch-enemy arrived. The attack on Dadasa was a neat choice, for it held the booty looted
by the legionaries on their campaigns so far. Either Triarius would be compelled by his men to defend their hard-won gains, or Mithridates would help himself to a handy financial windfall.

In the event, it turned out that Triarius needed little persuading. He may have been regretting his earlier reluctance to engage. After all, the Pontic troops had fled the region once before when confronted by Lucullus at Cabira, and the Armenians could not be worth much as soldiers if the legionaries of Lucullus had defeated ten times their number at Tigranocerta. Now, with his troops motivated by the defence of their booty, he felt reasonably confident of being able to present Lucullus with a tidy victory by the time his commander and the rest of the army arrived, and in the process would have done his career no harm.

Mithridates chose to meet Triarius near Zela, a fortified town which guarded the approaches to Amaseia from the Anatolian highlands. Though the walls of Zela itself are buttressed by a hill, the surrounding plain gave the Pontic cavalry excellent room for manoeuvre. It is also possible that Triarius had not expected the local reinforcements Mithridates had picked up over the winter. Not all of these would have been raw recruits either, as it may be that many who defected after Mithridates’ retreat from Cabira had, like the Thracian mercenaries, returned to their old commander.

Exactly what happened at Zela is unknown. The Romans are much happier giving details about their victories than they are fond of describing defeats, and nobody sufficiently prominent for a biographer to take an interest in fought on the Roman side. From the scanty details we have, we know that there were perhaps two legions on the Roman side, and that Mithridates had a considerable force of cavalry. It appears that Mithridates sized up the Roman approach, threw his entire force against one section of the advancing enemy and defeated it whilst holding off the other section. Thereafter his cavalry rode around to the rear of the remainder of the Roman force and broke that too. There are tight-lipped Roman references to ‘a ditch’ across the plain, which Mithridates may (with fond memories of Sulla) have constructed in preparation for the battle, and then flooded. Many Romans were trapped against this unexpected obstacle and cut down in great numbers. Appian ruefully lists 150 centurions among the Roman casualties, which other sources put at about 7,000 men.
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Things could have been much worse for the fleeing Romans, for the Pontic cavalry were ideally placed to cut down the survivors. However, in the confusion of flight and pursuit, a Roman centurion found himself alongside
Mithridates himself, who evidently took him for one of the Romans in his own entourage. This man ran up to the king as though bearing dispatches and stabbed him in the thigh, which was probably the only accessible point where Mithridates could be wounded, since he was armoured Armenian-style in a metal corselet.

The would-be killer was promptly cut down, but the damage had been done. The entire Pontic army came to a disconcerted halt. Fortunately the king’s physician (a Greek called Timotheus on this occasion) was near at hand and he ordered the king to be lifted above the throng of worried followers, so that his men could see that their leader still lived. Not only was Mithridates alive, he was furious that the pursuit of the Romans had been halted. Despite his wound, he personally set the attack back in motion, directing it toward the Roman camp. However, Mithridates soon discovered that in the delay his birds had flown. The Romans made no attempt to defend their camp, but fled directly to Lucullus, who had to take pains to prevent his men from lynching Triarius.