Mithridates the Great (10 page)

The legions were unavailable, but Sulla had coped well enough in Cappadocia with only native levies. Therefore it appears that the Roman commanders in Asia Minor decided that what they needed was more, much more, of the same. Out of a sense of sheer self-preservation, Nicomedes contributed as many troops as he could raise. The Galatians also contributed a good number, both because they were still furious with the Pontic occupation of part of their territory, and because it was out of the question that a major regional war should leave them sitting on the sidelines. However, such was the nature of Galatian politics that the very act of declaring against Pontus by one part of Galatia brought another section of that bellicose nation within the Pontic camp. Likewise, Cappadocia contributed all the troops that Ariobarzanes could raise, but matching levies were raised by the supporters of Gordias and Mithridates. It is highly probable (the chronology at this point is confused) that both sides started the year 89 BC by gathering their resources - further proof that neither side had really expected matters to come to such a pass so soon. Mithridates was probably best placed to get the war under way, but he was playing a long game, being keenly aware that (as his predecessor Pharnarces had discovered) he could not win a major regional war without allies in other states. Therefore he had to be seen as defending against aggression, however tempting it must have been to get his defending in first whilst his enemies were not fully prepared.

The Battle of Amnias

Asia Minor at this time was still very wealthy, and able to support armies of considerable magnitude. Whilst we have very precise figures from the ancient sources, these are by no means consistent. Exactly how many men were actually present must always be a matter of speculation. Appian reckons that the Romans mustered 120,000 men between them. Cassius put himself on the border of Bithynia and Galatia, whilst Aquillius moved into the most dangerous position, ready to intercept and defeat Mithridates along his line of march if, as expected, he took the initiative and invaded Bithynia. Oppius meanwhile was in Cappadocia positioning himself for an attack on the Pontic underbelly, perhaps considering a strike up the valley of the Iris at the Pontic capital of Amaseia.

Nicomedes was aiming for the same destination as Oppius, but by a different route. He had taken 50,000 foot and 6,000 cavalry, and was making his way up
the valley of the River Amnias, through the highlands of Paphlagonia. From there, once over the Halys, a good road led through the fertile olive groves of the Pontic heartland, past Lake Stiphane (modern Ladik Gyul), and then there was a gentle descent to the Iris river valley. Here, all going well, Nicomedes would unite with Oppius, and the pair would swoop on Amaseia (possibly detouring slightly en route to plunder Sinope) and claim victory. Such, at least, seems to have been the plan. As Wellington was later to observe, it is a rare plan that survives contact with the enemy, and Mithridates was following a different agenda entirely.

His army was mustering at Chiliokomon, between the Iris and the Amnias. This army was supposedly between 150,000 and a quarter of a million strong, though it is quite likely that the Roman historians greatly magnified the numbers so as to make their subsequent performance look better. For generals, Mithridates had chosen two brothers, Neoptolemus and Archelaus, whilst Arcathias, the son of one of Mithridates’ concubines, was in charge of 10,000 horse from Armenia.
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When news reached the Pontic camp that Nicomedes was on the move, Arcathias was sent to determine whether this was a full-scale invasion or a feint. Neoptolemus and Archelaus accompanied him with light infantry and some chariots, but the overall impression is of a reconnaissance in force rather than a full-scale counter-invasion.

The Pontic chariots – Mithridates is said to have had six hundred of these – were something of a throwback. As a platform for missile troops the chariot had over the centuries been replaced by horsemen, both because selective breeding had made horses steadily larger and more easily able to bear riders in combat, and because there were few areas in Asia Minor that lent themselves readily to chariot warfare. Yet Mithridates had chosen not merely chariots, but scythed chariots – heavy chariots with huge curved blades affixed to the wheels. These chariots could be devastating against enemies inexperienced with coping with them, assuming that somewhere suitable could be found for their deployment.

Such a place was the wide flat plain bordering the River Amnias, into which Nicomedes obligingly led his army, confident that his greatly-superior numbers and more heavily-armoured infantry would force the enemy to give ground. To avoid that very eventuality, the Pontic generals sent a force ahead to seize a rocky outcrop between the two armies which would make an excellent defensive bastion. Nicomedes anticipated the move and deployed his own forces so rapidly that the Pontic advance force was in danger of being enveloped. Neoptolemus advanced to their rescue, with the cavalry of
Arcathius keeping the enemy off his flanks. Meanwhile, Archelaus and his highly-mobile light infantry scooted around the edge of the enemy army to distract them with a flank attack should the need arise, as it probably would, given the greater strength and numbers of the Bithynians. Accordingly, once the Pontic centre started to crumble under the mauling its troops were receiving, Archelaus launched his attack to distract the enemy, whilst Neoptolemus’ men fell back and reorganized themselves.

Having established that Pontus had superiority in cavalry, Arcathius looped back to try to get behind the enemy lines, which were in some disarray after fighting on two different fronts. It was time for the scythed chariots. These, as Appian relates

were driven at high speed into the Bithynian ranks. Some men were sliced in two within an eyeblink, others were practically shredded. The army of Nicomedes saw men in two halves, yet still alive and breathing, others sliced to pieces, their mangled organs still hanging from the scythes. They had by no means lost the battle, yet the sight was so hideous that they were overcome with confusion, and fear disordered their ranks.
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The Pontic troops pressed their advantage. Archelaus and Neoptolemus returned to the attack, each from a different angle. This was disconcerting enough for the Bithynian phalangites, since the entire principle of the phalanx was that the entire army should fight pointing in the same direction. But the problem became immeasurably worse when Arcathius turned up again and hit them in the rear with his cavalry. Though now at a disadvantage, the Bithynians fought on grimly. Yet in the back of their minds there must have been the knowledge that if this was only the advance guard of the Pontic army, the Bithynians were surely doomed once the main Pontic force turned up, as it might do at any minute. Eventually, with his men dying in large numbers, and the battle turning steadily in favour of his enemies, Nicomedes decided that it was time to cut his losses, leave his army to its fate, and get himself off the plain whilst he still had the chance.

The departure of their king was the signal for the Bithynian army to call it a day. Fighting to the death was not a local tradition, and dying for one’s king became less appealing when that same king was a rapidly diminishing dot heading for safety on the horizon.

Battle of the River Amnias

Phase I

Phase II

Phase III

Phase IV

For Pontus this was a highly rewarding battle in every sense. It was certainly won through the skill of the commanders who had used the mobility of their troops to maximum advantage, and had played the trump card of the scythe chariots at the best possible moment. Yet this would not have been possible without the discipline of soldiers who could manoeuvre quickly in discrete units, and retain their formation in the face of enemies who were more numerous and better-equipped. Almost certainly, the experience gained in fighting Scythians was now paying dividends - this was the performance of a veteran army, confident in its ability and that of its commanders, even against uncomfortable odds. Not only was Pontic morale greatly boosted (since a major enemy army had been knocked out without even engaging the main Pontic force) but Pontic coffers received a commensurate boost, as Nicomedes’ camp was captured and his war-chest along with it.

Mithridates made the most of the propaganda value of his victory, explaining to the remnants of the Bithynian army now in his power that his quarrel was with Rome rather than themselves. He not only allowed anyone who wanted to go home to do so, but even gave each funds and provisions for the journey. But not everyone would have wanted to go home. The loyalty of Nicomedes’ mercenaries was to Nicomedes’ pay-chest, and if that was under Pontic control, then so were the mercenaries. Consequently, it is probable that the manpower of the Pontic forces actually increased despite the casualties incurred in the battle.

The campaign in Asia Minor

The Romans may have been disconcerted by the defeat of Nicomedes, but hardly surprised. Their deployment along the major lines of communication into Pontus suggests that they were ready to pile into Pontus if things went well, and to stop Mithridates from getting out if things went badly. What threw this plan out of kilter was that things turned out worse than the Roman worst-case scenario. What Rome had to face was not a Pontic army limping from a bruising encounter with Bithynia’s finest, but a Pontic army roaring over the passes with sky-high morale, eager for the next confrontation. Evidence of this, and of the demoralization of their enemies, is apparent from the next engagement, when 100 Sarmatian horse came across eight times their number of Bithynian cavalry, and promptly attacked. Those Bithynians who were not killed or scattered were taken as prisoners to Mithridates, who, as before, freed them and sent them to their homes.

At the time the Pontic army was moving to Mount Scoroba, on the border
between Bithynia and Pontus, which meant that Mithridates now had Aquillius squarely in his sights. The Roman was fully aware of this, and of the fact that the forces at his disposal were inadequate under these new circumstances. He had by now been joined by Nicomedes, who would have briefed him comprehensively on the gravity of the military situation. Accordingly, Aquillius decided that it was no longer possible to stop Mithridates at the fortress of Protopachium, as he had intended. Instead he ordered Nicomedes to join Cassius, and pulled his own troops back toward the River Sangarius.
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