Method and Madness: The Hidden Story of Israel's Assaults on Gaza (18 page)

 
15.
  Norman G. Finkelstein,
“This Time We Went Too Far”: Truth and consequences of the Gaza invasion
(New York: 2010; expanded paperback edition, 2011), p. 218, quoting from the report by the Turkel Commission (more on which below).

 
16.
  The Entebbe raid was a hostage rescue operation carried out by elite Israeli commandos at Entebbe airport in Uganda on 4 July 1976. For its significance in this context, see Finkelstein,
“This Time,”
pp. 181–82.

 
17.
  Scott Wilson, “Israel Says Free Gaza Movement Poses Threat to Jewish State,”
Washington Post
(1 June 2010), quoting Itamar Rabinovich, former Israeli ambassador to the US; “Eiland: Flotilla was preventable,”
Jerusalem Post
(23 July 2010).

 
18.
  
Report of the Fact-Finding Mission
, paras. 76–77.

 
19.
  O9Beirut177 Date13/02/2009 05:56 Origin Embassy Beirut Classification SECRET//NOFORM (
WikiLeaks
).

 
20.
  Amos Oz, “Israeli Force, Adrift on the Sea,”
New York Times
(1 June 2010).

 
21.
  John J. Mearsheimer, “Sinking Ship,”
American Conservative
(1 August 2010).

 
22.
  Katz, “Duped.”

 
23.
  Kaspit, “It’s Not Enough”; David Horowitz, “Analysis: The flotilla fiasco,”
Jerusalem Post
(1 June 2010); Harel, “Straight into the Trap”; Charles Levinson and Jay Solomon, “Israel’s Isolation Deepens,”
Wall Street Journal
(3 June 2010).

 
24.
  Gideon Levy, “Operation Mini Cast Lead,”
Haaretz
(1 June 2010).

 
25.
  Kaspit, “It’s Not Enough.”

 
26.
  Uzi Mahnaimi and Gareth Jenkins, “Operation Calamity,”
Sunday Times
(6 June 2010).

 
27.
  Noam Sheizaf, “Flotilla: New
Mavi Marmara
pictures raise more questions regarding IDF attack,”
Promised Land
(6 June 2010;
http://tinyurl.com/2aj4qrc
).

 
28.
  Ken O’Keefe, “‘Soldiers Thought We Would Kill Them,’”
ynetnews.com
(7 June 2010;
http://tinyurl.com/25qbopw
).

 
29.
  Reuven Pedatzur, “A Failure Any Way You Slice It,”
Haaretz
(1 June 2010).

 
30.
  Jeffrey Goldberg, “Says One Israeli General: ‘Everybody thinks we’re bananas,’”
theatlantic.com
(1 June 2010).

 
31.
  University of Maryland, in conjunction with Zogby International,
2010 Arab Public Opinion Poll
. Forty-one percent responded that Israel’s power “has its strengths and weaknesses.”

 
32.
  In the original text, the author predicted that Israel’s next target would be Lebanon but, in the event, it proved not to be the case.

 
33.
  Jonathan Ferziger and Calev Ben-David, “Gaza Situation ‘Unsustainable,’ Clinton Says as Ship Approaches,”
Bloomberg Businessweek
(1 June 2010); United Nations Department of Public Information, “Security Council Condemns Acts Resulting in Civilian Deaths during Israeli Operation against Gaza-Bound Aid Convoy, Calls for Investigation, in Presidential Statement” (31 May 2010). See also Bernard Kouchner, Franco Frattini, and Miguel Angel Moratinos, “Averting Another Gaza,”
New York Times
(10 June 2010), “EU Strongly Condemns Gaza Flotilla Attack,”
EurActiv.com
(2 June 2010), and Yossi Lempkowicz, “Gaza Flotilla: EU Parliament calls for international inquiry and end to blockade,”
European Jewish Press
(17 June 2010).

 
34.
  Haneen Zoabi, “Freeing Gaza; Liberating Ourselves,” in Bayoumi, ed.,
Midnight
, p. 71.

 
35.
  Nicolas Pelham, “Hamas Back Out of Its Box,”
Middle East Report Online
(2 September 2010).

 
36.
  “John Ging: Conditions in Gaza have not changed since Israel declared it would ease the blockade,”
Middle East Monitor
(11 November 2010).

 
37.
  Sally Belfrage,
Freedom Summer
(New York: 1965), p. 130.

 
38.
  Norman G. Finkelstein,
What Gandhi Says: About nonviolence, resistance and courage
(New York: 2012).

 
39.
  James Foreman,
The Making of Black Revolutionaries
(New York: 1972), pp. 311–12.

 
40.
  Charles Levinson, “Israel’s Foes Embrace new Resistance Tactics,”
Wall Street Journal
(2 July 2010).

 
41.
  Finkelstein,
“This Time,”
pp. 168–80.

 
42.
  
Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Incident
(September 2011), p. 7, para. 3. Hereafter: UN Panel. For a fuller discussion of this report, see Norman G. Finkelstein, “Torpedoing the Law: How the Palmer Report justified Israel’s naval blockade of Gaza,”
Insight Turkey
(Fall 2011).

 
43.
  Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Israel to Participate in UN Panel on Flotilla Events” (2 August 2010).

 
44.
  It was merely “tasked with reviewing the reports of national investigations” into the assault. UN News Centre, “UN Chief Announces Panel of Inquiry into Gaza Flotilla Incident” (2 August 2010). This panel was separate and distinct from the UN fact-finding mission appointed by the Human Rights Council that was quoted earlier.

 
45.
  International Federation for Human Rights, “FIDH Deeply Concerned by the Composition of UN Panel of Inquiry into the Flotilla Events” (6 August 2010); Colombia Support Network, “A Failed Presidency? A New Beginning?” (4 August 2010;
http://tinyurl.com/2abja6x
).

 
46.
  Finkelstein,
“This Time,”
pp. 195–96.

 
47.
  UN Panel, pp. 39–40, para. 71; p. 45, para. 82; see also ibid., p. 43, para. 78.

 
48.
  Amnesty International, “Suffocating Gaza: The Israeli blockade’s effects on Palestinians” (1 June 2010).

 
49.
  Amnesty International, “Colombian President Should Stop False Accusations against Human Rights Group” (28 November 2008).

 
50.
  UN Panel, p. 39, para. 70.

 
51.
  Originally imposed in 1991, Israel’s closure policy in Gaza was incrementally tightened as time elapsed, entering its most egregious phase in 2007. See Gisha (Legal Center for Freedom of Movement),
A Guide to the Gaza Closure: In Israel’s own words
(Tel Aviv: September 2011).

 
52.
  The UN Panel, citing the Israeli Turkel Report (see following endnote), concedes that Israel’s blockade policies were “designed to weaken the economy” of Gaza—but then qualifies—“in order to undermine Hamas’s ability to attack Israel” (p. 69, para. 153). One can only tremble at the potency of Hamas’s military arsenal if Israel had allowed bonbons to enter Gaza.

 
53.
  Public Commission to Examine the Maritime Incident of 31 May 2010,
The Turkel Commission Report, Part One
(January 2011). Hereafter: Israeli Turkel Report. For detailed analysis of this report, see Finkelstein,
“This Time,”
Appendix 2.

 
54.
  Israeli Turkel Report, pp. 56–58, my emphases.

 
55.
  Ibid., pp. 66–67. It continues: “In other words, as long as the land crossings are subject to Israeli control, there is prima facie a possibility that the opening of an additional route to the Gaza Strip, such as a maritime route that is not controlled by the State of Israel, will affect the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip.”

 
56.
  Ibid., pp. 67–68, my emphases.

 
57.
  Ibid., p. 108.

 
58.
  For a recent restatement of this consensus opinion, see “Flotillas and the Gaza Blockade,”
Diakonia
(July 2011).

 
59.
  The UN Panel’s legal strategy recalls the approach of the Israel High Court in the Wall case. In July 2004, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered an advisory opinion that found Israel’s construction of a wall inside occupied Palestinian territory illegal. When the Israel High Court subsequently heard the case, it sought to avoid a ruling that frontally contradicted the ICJ. Taking issue with the ICJ’s comprehensive finding, the High Court instead proposed that the legality of the Wall should be assessed on a segment-by-segment basis. The High Court also alleged that it possessed data mitigating Israeli culpability that was unavailable to the ICJ. Likewise, the UN Panel alleged (p. 44, para. 81) that it possessed “additional material” unavailable to the UN Human Rights Council Fact-Finding Mission, which had found the Israeli blockade illegal. For a juxtaposition of the ICJ advisory opinion and Israel High Court rulings, see Norman G. Finkelstein,
Knowing Too Much: Why the American Jewish romance with Israel is coming to an end
(New York: 2012), Appendix.

 
60.
  UN Panel, p. 39, para. 70, p. 43, para. 77.

 
61.
  Ibid., p. 45, para. 82.

 
62.
  
Contraband
denotes “goods which are ultimately destined for territory under the control of the enemy and which may be susceptible for use in armed conflict” (UK Ministry of Defense,
The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict
(Oxford: 2005), p. 350).

 
63.
  The Israeli Turkel Report was at pains to argue that the visit and search procedure did not meet the challenge Israel confronted and was replaced by a naval blockade “only” as a last resort. Still, the report alleged (p. 58)—without authoritative citation and against common sense—that “during an armed conflict, it is lawful to impose a naval blockade, without considering alternatives.”

 
64.
  UN Panel, p. 40, para. 72, citing the Israeli Turkel Report, p. 33. The three named attempts occurred in, respectively, 2001 (
Santorini
), 2002 (
Karine A
), and 2003 (
Abu Hassan
). The 2002 attempt has been disputed. The Turkel Report (p. 37) also alleged a fourth attempt in 2009 (
Tali
), but the UN Panel does not cite it, and not even the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs alleged that this vessel was carrying weapons (
http://tinyurl.com/aqdb7h
). The UN Panel also notes that, “Most recently, Israel intercepted . . . a vessel on its way from Syria to Egypt, which carried 25 tons of weapons and ammunition suspected to be destined for Gaza” (p. 40n258). Would the UN Panel also uphold the legality of an Israeli naval blockade imposed on Egypt?

 
65.
  UN Panel, pp. 40–41, para. 72, p. 42, para. 74, citing the Israeli Turkel Report, pp. 54–56. The Israeli Turkel Report (p. 58) alleged that visit and search was impracticable because of the “virtual certainty that consent for search would not be granted by the Masters of the ships bent on reaching Gaza,” and “it was not certain that the consent of the flag State would actually be obtained.” The report provided no basis—because none existed—for its “virtual certainty,” while in fact Israel’s real problem—more on which presently—was the “virtual certainty” that it would not find any weapons after such a search and consequently had to let the ships pass. In another desperate iteration, the Israeli Turkel Report alleged (p. 60) that “a key requirement is that such a right [of visit and search] cannot be arbitrarily exercised. The challenge that confronted the Israeli authorities was to obtain sufficient information regarding the cargo and/or personnel on board the vessels in order to find a ground for suspicion that the vessel is engaged in transporting contraband, enemy combatants.” But the report provided no example or illustration of how such a requirement in practice proved a hindrance. Other states have exercised the right of visit and search on the basis of reasonable suspicion in wartime; why did it work elsewhere? Additionally, the Israeli Turkel Report alleged (p. 59) that Israel could not resort to the lesser measure of declaring Gaza’s coastal waters an “exclusion zone” because “there is a lack of clarity in the law as to whether such a zone provides an authority to
only
search for contraband” (my emphasis). In other words, the problem was that declaring an “exclusion zone” did not explicitly allow Israel to turn back vessels
not
carrying contraband.

 
66.
  UN Panel, p. 40, para. 72, citing the Israeli Turkel Report, pp. 53–54 (see also Turkel Report, pp. 60, 91).