Lone Wolf Terrorism (24 page)

While there were differences in the psychological makeup of the four lone wolf assassins we looked at, they were similar in one respect.
They all had a major impact upon government and society with their violence and, in some cases, may have altered the course of history. The assassinations of Garfield, McKinley, Kennedy, and Rabin each shocked their respective publics and, of course, led to new leadership. While the Garfield assassination resulted in the passing of a sweeping civil-service reform act a couple years later, beyond that, it did not appear to greatly alter the course of US domestic or foreign policy. The same could not be said for the assassinations of McKinley and Kennedy. The rise to power of Theodore Roosevelt was accompanied by major domestic reforms, including government regulation of business and the protection of workers, an assertive foreign policy, and a “war on anarchism” that might not have occurred if McKinley was still in power. In the case of Kennedy, many observers believe that, had he lived, the United States would not have escalated its involvement in the Vietnam War. And the speculation as to whether the Oslo Accords would have been implemented had Rabin lived continues today, as the goal of Mideast peace remains elusive.

The four lone assassins were also similar in that none of them “came out of nowhere,” as is often said about lone wolf terrorists in general. All four lone assassins had exhibited erratic and other similar types of behavior that in some cases the authorities were aware of and, in other cases, other people knew about. Guiteau, for example, was known to President Garfield and his advisors, including Secretary of State Blaine, who became so exacerbated with the strange man wanting the appointment to Paris that he screamed at him one day to leave him alone. Czolgosz had alienated other anarchists with his odd behavior and his call for violent action. In the case of Oswald, the FBI was well aware of him, based on his defecting to the Soviet Union and his anti-US activity, including protests in favor of Communist Cuba when he returned to the United States. Amir, meanwhile, was known to Israeli authorities through his organizing of protests on behalf of the settlements in the occupied territories. None of this by itself would be a predictor that an individual would assassinate a head of state, but it at least indicates that these
individuals did not become radicalized overnight and then decide to kill their leader.

The question of how to identify the early warning signs of lone wolf terrorism, whether in the form of assassinations or other types of terrorist activity, is one of the most difficult challenges facing law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and others whose job it is to combat terrorism. There is no group or cell to infiltrate, no members to arrest and interrogate for information, and no communications to intercept when it comes to lone wolves. By working alone, lone wolves hold a major advantage over the government and society they intend to attack. What, then, can be done to prevent and respond to this growing form of terrorism? We now turn to that important challenge.

Combating terrorism is one of the oldest professions in the world. Beginning with the Zealots and the Sicarii of the first century, who walked up to their targets with short swords hidden in their long coats, and continuing today with extremists utilizing a wide variety of tactics and weapons, governments have waged an endless struggle to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.

It has been a mixed record. For every plot uncovered or bomb discovered, there have been a far greater number of terrorists who have succeeded in carrying out their attacks. The task for those dedicated to fighting terrorism is quite daunting. Terrorists can strike anywhere, anytime, while it is impossible to protect every target, everywhere. That is why there can never realistically be an end to terrorism. There will always be vulnerable targets somewhere for a group, cell, or individual with varying motivations to exploit in a terrorist operation.

Depending on the type of terrorist involved, there are different actions that can be taken to deal with the threat. For example, when a terrorist group has the sponsorship of a government, or a government is using its own agents in terrorist attacks, the counterterrorist options are virtually unlimited. The targeted country can use all the tools at its disposal to attempt to end the state sponsor's activities. During the 1980s and 1990s, for example, the United States utilized diplomatic, economic, and financial sanctions against Libya for its role in sponsoring anti-US terrorist attacks. The United States also launched a retaliatory military raid against Moammar Gadhafi's regime in 1986,
in response to the bombing by the Palestinian terrorist group, Abu Nidal, of a nightclub in West Berlin that was frequented by American troops. That incident illustrated the value of good intelligence in combating terrorism. US intelligence had intercepted conversations between Libyan diplomats in East Berlin and Gadhafi's headquarters in Tripoli that indicated Libya was behind the bombing that killed two US soldiers and one Turkish woman, and injured hundreds of others, including scores of American servicemen.

When dealing with a terrorist group that is independent of a state sponsor, as is the case for most terrorist groups around the world today, the options become more limited. Diplomatic and economic sanctions (i.e., trade embargoes and so forth) do not obviously apply for such groups. However, there are still many counterterrorist policies available, including cutting off terrorists' financing, as President George W. Bush did in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Executive Order 13224 froze the US-based assets of those individuals and organizations that were known to be involved with terrorism, including those who had provided support or who were associated with terrorists and terrorist groups.

Military measures can also be used against terrorist organizations. This includes the targeted killing or capture of high-value terrorists overseas, such as group or cell leaders and bomb makers. Good intelligence and law-enforcement activities are also valuable assets that are used against terrorist groups, including the interception of their communications, using informants to learn about plots, and so forth. Cooperation among different nations' intelligence and law-enforcement agencies is an important part of this strategy. And, of course, good physical security measures, such as metal detectors, x-ray machines, and full-body scanners at airports, embassies, and other buildings and facilities that terrorists might strike, as well as closed-circuit television surveillance monitors and other devices, are all critical in helping to reduce the risk of terrorist attacks.

It is when the terrorist threat involves lone wolves and cells not affiliated with a central terrorist organization that problems arise in
trying to design effective strategies. With regard to the unaffiliated cells, a lot of attention has been given in recent years to the threat posed by decentralized Islamic cells throughout the world. As noted in
chapter 1
, Marc Sageman has described these cells as “leaderless jihad.” They act independent of “al Qaeda Central” (i.e., the core leadership), with no directions or communications coming from al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan or from al Qaeda–affiliated groups in Europe, Africa, Asia, and elsewhere. Oftentimes, the leaderless jihad cells are comprised of just a few individuals who decide to conspire together to promote jihad; they are basically “‘homegrown' wannabes [who] form a scattered global network.”
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Leaderless cells, however, can inflict as many casualties and cause as much destruction as the larger, more organized terrorist groups. Authorities often do not know who these individuals are or where their cells are located, in addition to various other factors that inhibit taking effective action against them. The threat, as Sageman points out, “has evolved from infiltration by outside trained terrorists against whom international liaison cooperation and border protection are effective to inside homegrown, self-financed, self-trained terrorists against whom the most effective countermeasures would be to stop the process of radicalization before it reaches its violent end.”
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The way to do this, Sageman proposes, is to take the glory and thrill out of being a terrorist, diminish the sense of moral outrage over US policies and actions, counter the enemy's appeal, end discrimination against Muslims, and eliminate terrorist networks.
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How, though, do we deal with lone wolf terrorists? Not all are attracted to notions of jihad or Islamic extremism. Among the lone wolves I have discussed in this book are politically motivated, nonreligious extremists; white supremacists; single-issue militants; lone assassins; idiosyncratic individuals; and others. An end to Islamic extremism would not affect their activities. And there can always be new causes and issues that will arise and attract new types of lone wolves. It is, therefore, necessary to design a creative mix of policies and actions to deal with the unpredictable nature of lone wolf terrorism.
This involves identifying both the preventive and responsive measures that hold the most promise.

PREVENTIVE MEASURES

“You don't prevent bank robberies,” said James Thompson, former governor of Illinois. “You solve bank robberies after they happen…. The notion of trying to prevent attacks by radicalized Americans, or people in this country lawfully, is almost impossible.”
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The National Security Preparedness Group also expressed frustration regarding the prevention of lone wolf terrorism. In a report reviewing US counterterrorism efforts on the tenth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, the group wrote that “it is simply impossible to know the inner thinking of every at-risk person. Thus, self-radicalization poses a serious emerging threat in the U.S.”
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And reporter and television commentator Geraldo Rivera, also writing on the tenth anniversary of the suicide attacks, noted that, while the United States was in a better position to prevent another 9/11-type attack from occurring, the lone wolf threat was a different story. “The one thing we can't prevent is not these vast [terrorist] plots but it's the lone wolf who gets it in his head to get a gun and shoot people. That's the danger going forward.”
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The thinking that lone wolf terrorism cannot be prevented is understandable. Whereas governments, militaries, and law-enforcement agencies can devise comprehensive strategies to go after state sponsors of terrorism or terrorist groups themselves, the individual terrorist poses special problems due to his or her ability to “fly under the radar.” It is ironic that we spend so much money and resources on the group terrorist threat—more than one trillion dollars was spent on homeland security in the United States in the decade following the 9/11 attacks
⁷
—with the goal of “defeating” terrorism, yet when it comes to the lone wolf terrorist, the tendency is to throw up our hands and say that there is very little we can do about it.

Why, though, should we concede the battle to the lone wolf when we spend so much time and resources on the other aspects of terrorism? While we can't expect to prevent every act of lone wolf terrorism, we can, however, take some preventive measures to help reduce the risk of lone wolves succeeding in their nefarious plans.

Improved Detection Devices

When one thinks about the millions of people who pass through airport security systems each day and the millions of pieces of mail that are sent daily around the world, it is amazing that we do not experience more terrorism than we have already. Finding every potential knife, gun, explosive, or other weapon that is either hidden in luggage or on a person who is traveling, as well as screening for every type of explosive that may be in an envelope or package that goes through postal offices, is an incredibly difficult task.

Protecting against terrorism has been a never-ending technological race against terrorists. As soon as new devices are designed and installed at airports, post offices, and other places to detect weapons, terrorists change their tactics to defeat them. It is a battle of wits, and the terrorists hold the ultimate advantage. No matter how many times security measures are effective in preventing terrorist attacks, the terrorists need to penetrate the system only once to demonstrate its weakness. Security personnel are then blamed for allowing the incident to occur. For example, Pan American World Airways was found guilty by a federal jury in 1992 of “willful negligence” for failing to prevent the 1988 bombing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in which 270 people were killed, including all 259 on board and 11 others on the ground.
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Lone wolves have proven particularly adept at exploiting the postal service to send bombs or hazardous material. One of the most famous cases is that of Theodore Kaczynski, the Unabomber, whom I discussed in
chapter 2
. Kaczynski successfully sent bombs to targets throughout the United States for more than seventeen years. As noted
in
chapter 2
, his campaign of violence led the United States Postal Service (USPS) and the FBI to warn the public about not opening letters or packages that had oily stains on the wrapping, since that could indicate leakage from batteries and/or other devices that were parts of a bomb. The public and postal employees were also warned about wires protruding from packages or letters, oddly-shaped packages (or ones of unusual weight given their size), excessive postage, hand-addressed letters or packages (perhaps with misspellings and no return address), or those with a return address that did not match the postmark. A law was also enacted requiring any letter or package weighing over thirteen ounces to be presented in person at a post office. That took some of the anonymity away from a potential lone wolf package bomber.

The sending of letter and package bombs was nothing new. As noted earlier in this book, an anarchist group, the Galleanists, sent thirty package bombs to various targets in April 1919, while Muharem Kurbegovic, the Alphabet Bomber, claimed to have sent nerve gas through the mail to the US Supreme Court justices in 1974, which turned out to be a hoax. Palestinians and Israelis traded letter bombs throughout the 1970s. And in October 2010, the Yemen-based al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) sent two cargo packages containing bombs hidden in the ink cartridges of printers to a Jewish synagogue and a Jewish community center in Chicago. The packages were intercepted by security personnel in Britain and Dubai after a tip from Saudi intelligence.

The experience of the British police with the AQAP package bombs is indicative of the tough job police, security, and intelligence personnel have with respect to discovering bombs in packages. London's Metropolitan Police Department Bomb Squad was called to the East Midlands Airport in central England in the early-morning hours of October 29, 2010, to inspect a United Parcel Service package from Yemen that Saudi intelligence believed contained a bomb. Bomb squads get calls all the time about suspicious packages that turn out to be harmless, but the Saudi tip made this one seem not
likely to be a hoax. The police inspected a printer from the package, including lifting out its ink cartridge, but found no explosives. They also used specially trained bomb-sniffing dogs and put the printer through an x-ray scanner. When no explosives were detected, the bomb squad thought their day was over. But Saudi intelligence asked them to look again, because they were convinced that there was a bomb hidden in the printer. Sure enough, the second examination of the printer revealed four hundred grams of high-explosive pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN) hidden inside the ink cartridge. PETN was also found inside the ink cartridge of the package at the Dubai airport.
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AQAP taunted the West after the bomb attempt with the following statement: “[Our goal was to] force upon the West two choices: You either spend billions of dollars to inspect each and every package in the world or you do nothing and we keep trying again.”
¹⁰
Since screening for cargo is not as extensive as the screening of passengers and their luggage and other possessions, AQAP had found a vulnerability and exploited it. And even when the British authorities were looking for the bomb, they still could not initially find it, since it is difficult to distinguish the plastic explosive PETN from similar nonlethal powdered substances.