Authors: Lamar Waldron
trying to deflect the spotlight from . . . Marcello and . . . Hoffa.” Given
that Garrison had originally set his sights on Marcello’s pilot, David
Ferrie, Sheridan’s assessment seems too harsh—at least in regard to
the Garrison inquiry’s early stages. Also, Sheridan had no direct ties to
Garrison himself and was apparently unaware of the District Attorney’s
suspicions of Marcello.10
However, a Garrison staffer’s defection sealed Sheridan’s and NBC’s
low opinion of the DA. Eleven days before the special was to air, the
former Garrison staff member personally told Bobby that “Garrison will
never shed any light on your brother’s murder.” However, the ex-staffer
was unable to explain Garrison’s motivation for his investigation; in
turn, Garrison claimed the man was not a major part of his investigation,
but was “merely a chauffeur and photographer.”11
Garrison supporters have documented how Sheridan and NBC’s June
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LEGACY OF SECRECY
19, 1967,
White Paper
went to unusual lengths to skewer Garrison, some
of which are detailed in William Turner’s autobiography
Rearview Mirror
.
While the show quite rightly noted Garrison’s weaker witnesses and
speculations, Garrison himself was not allowed to appear. Turner notes
the “special . . . attacked [Garrison] with such unremitting hostility that
the Federal Communications Commission ordered that he be allowed a
half hour of network time in rebuttal under the Fairness Doctrine.”12
CBS’s four-hour
Warren Report
special, hosted primarily by Walter
Cronkite, at least allowed Garrison a brief appearance, “where he held
his own under a when-did-you-stop-beating-your-wife interrogation by
Mike Wallace,” according to Turner. However, the special was primarily
a defense of the increasingly-under-attack Warren Report. One of the
Warren Commissioners, John McCloy, was even allowed to comment
on the show’s “rough script.”13
Numerous writers have noted many problems the show experienced
in dealing with issues like the number of shots that hit JFK, and how
quickly and accurately they were fired. For example, the show used
outstanding shooters to attempt to duplicate the three shots attributed
to Oswald, a relatively poor rifleman at the time he left the Marines.
The show and the Warren Report said that Oswald had hit JFK with
two of his three shots, but, as Michael T. Griffith noted, “not one of the
eleven participating expert marksmen scored at least two hits out of
three shots on his first attempt. Seven of them failed to do so on ANY of
their attempts. Oswald would have had only one attempt.”14
Even though the CBS show used a rifle that fired faster and was in bet-
ter condition than Oswald’s, more than a third of the attempts had to be
disqualified “because of trouble with the rifle.” To account for Oswald’s
amazing speed and accuracy, which the experts had trouble duplicating
even under better conditions, the script could only have Walter Cronkite
intone, “It seems equally reasonable to say that Oswald, under normal
circumstances, would take longer [than the experts to fire]. But these
were not normal circumstances.”15
It’s hard to determine how much of what Cronkite said was his own
opinion, and how much was simply part of an approved script he had to
use. Cronkite had only a few skeptical lines, such as noting that the War-
ren Commission “permitted the FBI and CIA to investigate themselves”
about whether Oswald was a government agent. After the special aired,
the field producer who had originally promised Bill Turner “an objective
look” resigned from CBS.
Dan Rather gave a mixed performance in the special. He admitted
he was not “totally convinced about the single-bullet theory” but said it
wasn’t “necessary to the final conclusion of the Warren Commission”—
even though most experts agree that it is central to their “lone nut” con-
clusion. While he was overwhelmingly supportive of the Warren Report,
even Rather said he was “not content with the findings on Oswald’s pos-
sible connections with government agencies, particularly the CIA.”16
Neither the NBC nor the CBS show mentioned David Ferrie’s work
for Carlos Marcello, and they didn’t mention Marcello (or Trafficante
or Rosselli) at all. Also avoided was any talk of a JFK-approved plot to
kill Castro in 1963, even though Garrison’s remarks about that had been
reported in high-profile newspapers the previous month. As a result of
the two specials, Garrison was largely discredited to the rest of the main-
stream press. More than two-thirds of the commercial television stations
in America were affiliated with CBS or NBC, and after they broadcast
their high-profile support for the Warren Report, major reporters for TV,
newspapers, or radio were not going to risk their careers by support-
ing a conspiracy. Essentially, those two specials ended any attempts by
mainstream journalists to seriously investigate the JFK assassination
until 1975, in the wake of Watergate. The fallout from the 1967 NBC
and CBS specials would have a similar chilling effect on the media’s
investigations of the assassinations of Bobby Kennedy and Dr. Martin
Luther King, the following year.
Even some of Garrison’s former associates admit that he could be his
own worst enemy, due in part to his love of publicity. Garrison also had
a tendency to overreach the limited evidence available to him, while not
realizing that infiltrators like Alberto Fowler were affecting the direc-
tion of his inquiry. While Garrison does not appear to have taken direct
orders from Marcello, the godfather was able to use intermediaries to
influence Garrison by using infiltrators, informants, and political associ-
ates, like Senator Russell Long.
Bobby Kennedy, Walter Sheridan, and Garrison had all focused on
Marcello by May 1967, but the NBC special and other attacks by Sheri-
dan ended any possibility of the three working together against Mar-
cello. Coupled with the lack of support (and outright hostility) from the
government, this situation probably helped to drive Garrison closer to
those he should have been most wary of, figures seeking to use him for
their own ends. This pattern became apparent by late June 1967, when
Garrison leaked to the press that he was investigating Edward Grady
Partin, the federal government’s key witness against Jimmy Hoffa,
thereby confirming Bobby’s and Sheridan’s worst fears.
From that point forward, Garrison’s investigation seems to have been
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hopelessly compromised. On July 7, 1967, Garrison even issued a war-
rant for Sheridan’s arrest, for allegedly trying to bribe a witness against
Shaw. When Sheridan surrendered, Bobby Kennedy issued a statement
saying that Sheridan wanted “as much as, or more than, any other man
to ascertain the truth about the events of November, 1963,” and that
Sheridan wouldn’t “do anything which would in the slightest degree
compromise the truth.” Sheridan eventually beat the charges.17
Though Clay Shaw’s investigation and eventual trial would drag on
for another two years, Garrison’s efforts increasingly became the gro-
tesque sideshow some journalists claimed it was. However, several pri-
vate citizens assisting Garrison (Turner, Fensterwald, and others) would
go on to play important roles in helping to expose the JFK-Almeida coup
plan and the Mafia’s use of it to assassinate JFK. Garrison’s investiga-
tive files, most of which were unrelated to Clay Shaw and never used at
trial, would also become an important reference for later Congressional
investigations and journalists.
Garrison suddenly focused on Hoffa informant Edward Grady Partin
in late June 1967 because Carlos Marcello was still trying to take advan-
tage of the Mafia’s $2 million Spring Hoffa fund (more than $12 million
today). If Partin could be induced or bribed to recant his testimony—or
claim the government had used illegal wiretaps to convict Hoffa—the
Teamster president would win a new trial, and likely his freedom.
Carlos Marcello summoned Frank Ragano to New Orleans so the
mob lawyer could meet with Partin personally. As a sign of the serious-
ness of the effort, Marcello himself drove Ragano to Baton Rouge to
see Partin. On the drive, Marcello was pulled over by a Louisiana State
Patrol officer who pointed out the expired tag on Marcello’s Cadillac.
When the officer realized he had pulled over Carlos Marcello, the patrol-
man became apologetic. Ragano says Marcello asked the officer if he
“would buy the plate for me and bring it to my office.” The patrolman
replied, “Yes, sir, I’d be glad to.” Marcello gave the officer $20 for the
tag, plus another $100 in thanks, before continuing on his way with
Ragano.18
Ragano’s meeting with Partin didn’t produce the desired results, so
Marcello had his associates offer a bribe of $1 million, which Partin
declined. That was the most Marcello was willing to offer, even though
the Spring Hoffa fund contained twice that amount; the rest would have
been profit for Marcello. The effort to free Hoffa would soon involve
Senator Russell Long, Louisiana’s governor, World War II hero and
B-movie star Audie Murphy, and Dallas media owner Gordon McClen-
don, a friend of both Jack Ruby and the CIA’s David Atlee Phillips.19
Even though Marcello’s 1967 efforts to free Hoffa were unsuccessful,
Marcello still felt he deserved a huge loan from the Teamster Pension
Fund, so that he could build a Las Vegas casino for himself and Traf-
ficante, fronted by a seemingly legitimate business associate. Hoffa had
left Allan Dorfman in charge of distributing such loans, but with Hoffa
in prison, Dorfman became greedy, demanding a $500,000 fee and 25
percent interest in the casino. Marcello and Trafficante were outraged.
A few weeks later, on July 26, 1967, in an upscale Chicago suburb, two
masked gunmen blasted Dorfman’s car with shotgun fire. Dorfman was
driving but was uninjured. As Trafficante explained to Ragano, “If they
had wanted to kill him they would have. This was just a warning.”20
Marcello preferred dealing with Hoffa, but it became apparent that
getting him out of prison would be a longer-term undertaking. The 1968
election would represent an opportunity, since it looked like Richard
Nixon was going to run. Marcello and Hoffa had donated $500,000 to
Nixon’s 1960 presidential run, and Nixon would soon be seeking Team-
ster backing for his bid. Also, given both Hoffa’s and Carmine Galante’s
ties to Marcello, it’s likely that at some point Marcello was told of Hoffa’s
plan to kill Bobby Kennedy if he tried to run for president.
In the early summer of 1967, the future looked promising for Johnny
Rosselli. A year earlier, he’d faced the possibility of deportation and the
loss of his patron, Sam Giancana. Now he had a new financial source
(Howard Hughes) and had recently gotten his cut from their first casino
deal, with more in the works. Leaking the CIA-Mafia plots to Jack Ander-
son had worked as he’d hoped, and Rosselli’s friend William Harvey
was still able to feed him inside information from the CIA.
Even though he was in the clear, the sixty-three-year-old Rosselli
wasn’t ready to relax or back off from his illegal activities. A criminal for
all of his adult life, Rosselli couldn’t resist continuing a card-cheating
scam at the prestigious Los Angeles Friars Club, where Frank Sinatra
had sponsored Rosselli for membership in 1963. Since then, Rosselli’s
men had bilked some of the wealthy members—including comedian
Phil Silvers and singer Tony Martin—for $400,000.
On July 20, 1967, the FBI raided the Friars Club in Los Angeles and
found the electronic equipment Rosselli and his men used in their card-
cheating scam. The government then used a grand jury to pressure
Rosselli. Because of the still pending immigration matter, the Mafia don
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couldn’t even answer when asked, “Are you . . . John Rosselli?” and
instead had to plead the Fifth.21
Because of the high-profile nature of the case and the notables
involved, a new criminal division chief at the US attorney’s office in
Los Angeles also used it to press the immigration case against Ros-
selli. Eight members of Rosselli’s family were subpoenaed, followed by
several of his Los Angeles friends. According to Rosselli’s biographers,
“on October 21, 1967, Rosselli was indicted on six counts for failure to
register as an alien.” Though “released on $5,000 bond,” Rosselli and
five codefendants would be indicted in December 1967 for the Friars
Club charges. True to form, Rosselli’s first reaction was to hire notori-
ous hit man Jimmy “The Weasel” Fratianno to kill the main witness in
the Friars Club case. However, that approach failed when the man went
into the Federal Witness Protection Program, leaving Rosselli with few