Authors: Lamar Waldron
stein points out that during “the Church Committee hearings, McCone
testified that his subordinates failed to tell him about domestic surveil-
lance activities or that they were working on plans to assassinate Fidel
Castro.”13
The vast majority of Hunt’s CIA files from 1963 onward have never
been released, and most were withheld from Congress. However, his
position shows that he would have been involved in one high-profile
attempt by Helms and the CIA to quash what they considered damag-
ing information. The impending publication, in 1964, of
The Invisible
Government
, by journalists David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, would have
alarmed the CIA in general, but Helms and Hunt in particular. The book
was the first objective look at the CIA that delved into topics like the
CIA’s 1954 coup against the president of Guatemala. It covered the Bay
of Pigs operation extensively, including the roles of Manuel Artime,
Tony Varona, Manolo Ray, and especially the Hunt-created Cuban Revo-
lutionary Council. The book noted the training of some Cuban exiles in
Louisiana, and even detailed the efforts of JFK’s personal emissary to
free three CIA agents from a Cuban prison in April 1963.
The Invisible Government
covered too many sensitive subjects at a time
when the Warren Commission had not yet issued its report. Helms had
successfully kept the Warren Commission from questioning or investi-
gating Artime, Ray, or Varona, or delving into the New Orleans branch
of the Cuban Revolutionary Council that involved David Ferrie, so he
would not have wanted a book drawing attention to those matters.
According to noted historian Thomas Powers, the CIA persuaded
Time
magazine’s “bureau chief in Washington to” kill a cover story
on
The
Invisible Government
. According to one report, the CIA actually
considered purchasing all copies of the book, until it realized that would
simply cause the publisher to release a second printing. The book was
published, but the CIA was able to suppress some of its publicity. The
CIA’s effort in 1964 set a pattern for what would happen in 1966, after
the mainstream press finally started to question the Warren Report.14
In the fall of 1964, Bantam Books rushed more than a million copies
of its paperback version of the Warren Report into print just after its
release, while two books criticizing the “lone nut” theory of JFK’s assas-
sination were available only in small quantities from tiny publishers.15
Both were of concern to the CIA, one in particular. The first critical book
about the JFK assassination, Thomas Buchanan’s
Who Killed Kennedy?
,
was published in the US in 1964 after its British release, but it contained
mainly speculation based on newspaper reports. The next critical book,
Oswald: Assassin or Fall Guy
, by Joachim Joesten, a left-wing European
journalist and concentration-camp survivor, was of more concern to the
CIA because Joesten had included an entire chapter entitled “Oswald
and the CIA.” It said Oswald may have been involved with US intel-
ligence because the fact “that in the McCarthy era a young private in
the Marines could study Marxism, learn Russian, and read Soviet news-
papers without any adverse repercussions is a little too much for even
the most naive person to accept.” Joesten’s book was quickly updated
with an additional critique of the Warren Report that set the pattern
for many books to come, by using information in the Report and its
twenty-six supporting volumes to attack the Report’s own “lone nut”
conclusion.16
Both Joesten’s and Buchanan’s books first appeared in Europe, so
the CIA and Helms could justify their actions because the books might
negatively influence foreign opinion. The CIA even dug up Nazi files
to use against Joesten, foreshadowing the more extensive efforts Helms
and the CIA would launch against Warren Report critics just two years
later.
In addition to his work with publishers and the press, E. Howard Hunt
continued to work on Cuban operations in 1964. Hunt’s long-standing
experience with coups, starting with overthrowing the Guatemalan
president in 1954, made him valuable to Helms. After that successful
coup, Hunt tried to help foment a 1959 CIA coup in Uruguay, where
Hunt was Chief of Station. However, Hunt angered the US ambassador
and had to be reassigned. Hunt was made an early leader of the CIA’s
anti-Castro operations and became one of the first to press for Fidel’s
assassination.
Hunt worked extensively with Tony Varona, Manuel Artime, and
322
LEGACY OF SECRECY
other exile leaders on what became the Bay of Pigs operation. Hunt likely
knew about, and may have played a part in, the CIA-Mafia plots, prior to
the invasion. Shortly after Hunt’s abrupt withdrawal over Manolo Ray,
a never explained, last-minute miscommunication between the CIA and
Tony Varona caused the CIA-Mafia assassination plot to fail just before
the invasion, ensuring its defeat. The CIA has never acknowledged that
Hunt had any role in the CIA-Mafia plots, but the same was also true for
his best friend, Manuel Artime—until one CIA memo slipped through
showing Artime was involved. Just weeks after the Bay of Pigs, Domini-
can dictator Trujillo’s chief of security alleged that Hunt had visited
that country with Johnny Rosselli, just before US-backed plotters assas-
sinated Trujillo. In addition, two of Hunt’s associates were working for
Trafficante at the time of the CIA-Mafia plots.17
Hunt’s experience with Cuban operations and coups led Helms and
FitzGerald to assign Hunt to work with Harry Williams on the JFK-
Almeida coup plan. The CIA claims that Hunt didn’t officially have a
role with Artime, though the Agency admits that the two close friends
remained in contact. However, Hunt’s work with Almeida and several
Artime associates make it almost certain that Hunt did have a covert
role with Artime, possibly involving Artime’s work in the CIA-Mafia
plots.
After President Johnson scaled back Cuban operations in 1964, Hunt
seems to have continued those roles. Hunt likely maintained a role in
providing CIA support for Almeida’s family, but with Almeida himself
no longer actively involved in the coup plan, the focus shifted to Cubela.
As noted earlier, the CIA’s goal was to persuade Cubela and Artime
to work together, and Spain was one of the key countries where those
meetings could take place. According to Tad Szulc, after JFK’s death,
Helms had tried to appoint Hunt as the CIA’s Deputy Chief of Station
in Madrid. However, the US ambassador at that time was the same
one Hunt had clashed with in Uruguay in 1959, and, in a rare move, he
vetoed Hunt’s appointment.18 That meant that Hunt’s role with Artime
in Spain would have to be under very deep cover, which would set a
pattern that Hunt would repeat during Watergate.
After almost a year of pain, the fall of 1964 brought good news for Bobby
Kennedy. A month before Bobby’s September 2, 1964, resignation as
Attorney General to run for the Senate, Bobby heard that a key juror in
the November 1963 Marcello trial had been bribed. Marcello initially
refused to pay the juror he had arranged to bribe, since it would be
suspicious if a leading juror suddenly had lots of money just after acquit-
ting the godfather. After Marcello eventually paid the juror only $1,000
instead of a promised $25,000, the man went to the authorities. Shortly
after that, the US Attorney in New Orleans learned that Marcello “had
threatened to kill” the government’s main witness during the same
trial.
Bobby had left the Justice Department in the hands of his trusted
deputy, Nicholas Katzenbach, who announced on October 6, 1964, that
Carlos Marcello had been indicted for a conspiracy and obstruction of
justice, including “seeking the murder of a government witness.”19 Four
weeks later, Bobby won his race to become a New York senator. The first
anniversary of JFK’s death was no doubt full of anguish for Bobby, but
it looked as if he might be able to find at least some measure of justice
in the future.
Just over a year after JFK’s murder, on November 30, 1964, the heroin
network Carlos Marcello shared with Santo Trafficante and Michel Vic-
tor Mertz experienced a rare and very unusual setback. One of Mertz’s
trusted couriers had parked a Citroen car, loaded with heroin in hid-
den compartments, on the street near Mertz’s townhouse on Boulevard
Suchet in Paris. Mertz had lived well since JFK’s murder, and this was
one of the finer districts of Paris, home to the Duke and Duchess of
Windsor. Since the car was filled with a million dollars’ worth of heroin
(street value), the courier was careful to disconnect the spark-plug leads
and take the car’s distributor cap with him, to make sure nothing hap-
pened to it overnight. The following day, the automobile would begin its
journey to America, crossing the Atlantic on an ocean liner, as depicted
in the classic book and film
The
French Connection
. Mertz’s other routes
involved transport ships, or riskier border crossings into the US from
Canada or Mexico.20
Mertz’s Paris courier was stunned the next morning to find that
Mertz’s heroin-laden car had vanished. The street had been lined with
cars, some more expensive than the Citroen, and thus more attractive
to an ordinary thief. In addition, someone had gone to extra trouble to
steal a car whose engine wouldn’t start because of its missing distributor
cap. Mertz’s car had clearly been targeted, but by whom? The missing
heroin never turned up, since French heroin distributors—like American
law enforcement—were able to distinguish the output of the different
French heroin labs. Mertz’s deadly reputation in the French underworld
was such that anyone familiar with his heroin network would know that
324
LEGACY OF SECRECY
stealing Mertz’s heroin was tantamount to a death sentence. There were
no warring factions in the French heroin trade at that time—Mertz and
his allies reigned supreme. Mertz was also known for his ties to French
Intelligence, which were yet another reason criminals in France didn’t
challenge him.21
Only weeks before the unusual theft of Mertz’s heroin, CIA Direc-
tor John McCone had shown a sudden interest in European assassin
recruiter QJWIN, the former agent with so many parallels to Mertz.
QJWIN had been paid through the Paris CIA station, and McCone
requested they provide a “roundup of QJWIN Project and activities .
. . and any knowledge you have of him” since his termination in April
1964 (after the CIA learned that Mertz had been deported from Dal-
las after JFK’s assassination). McCone’s October 1964 inquiry about
QJWIN was sent within days of Mertz’s obtaining a new US visa in
Brussels, Belgium, where QJWIN had been living. However, for some
reason, McCone quickly changed his mind and cabled Europe to “please
destroy” his original request.22 It might be relevant that one of Harry
Williams’s CIA contacts—a man who Harry felt was honest and tried to
do the right thing—had been stationed in Europe just prior to his work
on the JFK-Almeida coup plan, and was back in Europe at that time.
Had McCone, Helms, or that CIA official learned that Mertz had been
part of JFK’s assassination, possibly through the QJWIN operation or
the CIA’s efforts to assassinate Castro?
Whether coincidental or not, Mertz’s loss of a million dollars’ worth
of heroin just after the anniversary of his deportation from Dallas and
JFK’s murder was certainly poetic justice. It also put a brief dent in Traf-
ficante and Marcello’s heroin network, though it was only a foretaste of
the disruption the two godfathers and Mertz would face the following
year.
Phillips, and E. Howard Hunt were close to having their own coup
plan, this time under the complete control of the CIA and not the Ken-
nedys. By combining some of the remnants of JFK’s original coup plan
(Manolo Ray, Eloy Menoyo) with Artime’s AMWORLD, AMTRUNK,
and especially AMLASH (Rolando Cubela), they hoped to have a viable
operation without the participation of Almeida, Harry Williams, or
Bobby. The CIA officials also lacked the full support of President John-
son and even their own Director, John McCone, neither of whom was
fully informed about the new scheme. But the ensuing actions of Artime,
Menoyo, Cubela, and Che Guevara would soon result in three of the four
losing their freedom, and would bring an end to massive US support
for covert anti-Castro paramilitary operations.
While on a highly publicized trip to the UN in New York, Che Gue-
vara had a private meeting on December 13, 1964, with
New York Times