Read Kissinger’s Shadow Online

Authors: Greg Grandin

Kissinger’s Shadow (6 page)

But the events need to be told again, not to rehearse culpability but because they capture nearly perfectly Kissinger's philosophy of history. Kissinger in the fall of 1968 was applying in practice what he had long argued for in theory: an insistence that individuals have a degree of freedom in shaping historical events, that they are not bound by any “true structure,” that risk is a requirement of real statesmanship, that initiative creates its own reality, and that political leaders shouldn't wait on the facts to seize that initiative. Transcendence was possible, despair could be avoided, and ends could be means or means could be ends. Quite so: negotiations to end the Vietnam War became the means of Kissinger's ascent. Thus what William Elliott described as a “demoniac” individual freedom was reconciled to the metaphysics of the system—that is, to the national security state. Kissinger was working out his “relationship to the universe.”

*   *   *

The story of Kissinger's involvement in the 1968 campaign starts with a question: Why did Kissinger—a close associate of the liberal Republican Nelson Rockefeller and occasional adviser to Democratic administrations—decide to throw in with Nixon, whom he considered a resentful right-winger?

“Richard Nixon is the most dangerous, of all the men running, to have as President,” Kissinger said just before the Republican National Convention in Miami.
6
Kissinger was stunned, therefore, when Rockefeller lost to Nixon at that convention, according to the journalists Marvin and Bernard Kalb. “He wept,” they wrote.
7
“Now the Republican Party is a disaster,” Kissinger said.
8
“That man Nixon is not fit to be president.” He knew of what he spoke, for Kissinger had been in charge of keeping Rockefeller's “shit files” on Nixon, “several filing cabinets” containing what today is called oppositional, or negative, research.
9
After Nixon's nomination, Kissinger slept through the morning, woken only by a telephone call from a friend. Kissinger, the friend later remarked, sounded “more shaken, more disappointed, more generally depressed than I had ever known him.” “That man Nixon,” Kissinger said, “doesn't have the right to rule.”

Kissinger himself, at a public conference organized in 2010 by the State Department on American involvement in Vietnam, cited his opposition to Nixon as evidence that he couldn't have been involved in schemes to get him elected: “I had never met Richard Nixon when he appointed me. And I had spent 12 years of my life trying to keep him from becoming President. I was the principal foreign policy advisor of Nelson Rockefeller. So when I read some of these books of how carefully I plotted my ascent to that office, I think it is important to keep—to remember that I was a close friend of Nelson Rockefeller and, actually, I knew Hubert Humphrey a lot better. Well, I didn't know Nixon at all.”
10

At that same conference, however, the diplomat Richard Holbrooke told a story that helps explain Kissinger's accommodation. Holbrooke spoke immediately after Kissinger, reminiscing about 1968, the assassinations of Martin Luther King and Robert F. Kennedy and the protests and riots over race and war. “There's never been a year like '68 in our lives,” he said. Then Holbrooke described how that summer he and Kissinger were in Martha's Vineyard, watching the Chicago Democratic Convention on TV. The police were beating protesters outside and Democrats were savaging each other inside. Nixon had already won his party's nomination, and, with the “destruction of the Democratic Party” being broadcast to the nation, Kissinger turned to Holbrooke and said, “This is the end of me.” “You remember?” Holbrooke asked, gesturing to Kissinger in the audience. Kissinger is off camera, but the crowd laughed and maybe he did too.

Holbrooke sets an evocative scene: Kissinger, on a warm late August in Martha's Vineyard, the summer heartland of America's Eastern establishment, watching the televised disintegration of that establishment and experiencing one of the longest and darkest nights of his soul. He cried: “Nelson Rockefeller and Hubert Humphrey are being destroyed. I'll never serve in the government again.”

The despair was fleeting. Kissinger acted immediately, positioning himself as useful to both the autumnal New Deal Democrats and the rising Republican Right. A few days after the Democratic Convention, Kissinger, still on the Vineyard and now sitting on a beach in West Tisbury, offered Rockefeller's Nixon files to another summering Harvard professor, Samuel Huntington, who was working for the Humphrey campaign. “It was a wonderful offer,” Huntington later recalled.
11

One that Kissinger never made good on. Even as he was running down Nixon to the Democrats (“I've hated Nixon for years,” he said, stalling Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was trying to get Kissinger to turn over the files), he was reaching out to Richard V. Allen, one of Nixon's top foreign policy advisers, to say that he would soon be traveling to Paris to assess the status of talks between Washington and Hanoi and would be available to advise the campaign on the matter. In Paris Kissinger cultivated contacts on Johnson's negotiating team, including a lawyer named Daniel Davidson. Davidson admitted he was “charmed and enchanted” by Kissinger. As he put it, “he had an intelligence, a sense of humor, and a conspiratorial manner that swept you into his camp.”
12

Holbrooke was also in the delegation: “Henry was the only person outside of the government we were authorized [by the White House, because of his past position as an adviser] to discuss the negotiations with,” he told Kissinger's biographer, Walter Isaacson. “We trusted him. It is not stretching the truth to say that the Nixon campaign had a secret source within the U.S. negotiating team.”
13
When Kissinger returned to Cambridge two weeks later, he called the Nixon campaign again, reporting that “something big was afoot regarding Vietnam.” Kissinger advised that Nixon keep any statement on the war he might make vague, so as not to be “undercut by negotiations.” Diplomats in Paris were working on a deal: Johnson would halt the bombing of North Vietnam, and Hanoi would reciprocate by agreeing to enter into formal negotiations with South Vietnam.

Kissinger contacted Nixon's staffers a number of times thereafter, speaking most often with Allen. It was Allen who first described, to Seymour Hersh, Kissinger's role in derailing the talks and over the years he has elaborated: “Henry Kissinger, on his own, volunteered information to us through a spy, a former student, that he had in the Paris peace talks, who would call him and debrief, and Kissinger called me from pay phones and we spoke in German. The fact that my German is better than his did not at all hinder my communication with Henry and he offloaded mostly every night what had happened that day in Paris.”
14

Kissinger placed his last call at the end of October. “I've got important information,” he said: the North Vietnamese had agreed to participate in official peace talks, scheduled to begin November 6, one day after the presidential vote. They had “broken open the champagne” in Paris, Kissinger reported. A few hours after Kissinger's call to the Nixon campaign, Johnson suspended the bombing.
15
Announcement of a deal between Washington, Saigon, and Hanoi might have pushed Humphrey, who was closing in on Nixon in the polls, over the top. But there would be no deal: the South Vietnamese scuttled the settlement, after hearing from Nixon's campaign that they could get better terms from a Republican administration: “Saigon Cannot Join Paris Talks under Present Plan,” ran the above-the-fold November 2 headline of the
New York Times
.

Later that day, Nixon, campaigning in Austin, Texas, said: “In view of early reports this morning, prospects for peace are not as bright as they were even a few days ago.”
16

Nixon's people had acted fast. Using Kissinger's intelligence and working through Anna Chennault (the Chinese-born widow of a World War II lieutenant general and a prominent conservative activist), they urged the South Vietnamese to derail the talks, promising better conditions were Nixon to be elected. President Johnson was informed of the meddling. Through wiretaps and intercepts, he learned that Nixon's campaign was telling the South Vietnamese that Nixon was going to win and “to hold on a while longer.” If the White House had gone public with the information, the outrage might also have swung the election to Humphrey. But Johnson hesitated. He feared that “Nixon's conniving” was just too explosive. “This is treason,” he said. “It would rock the world.”
17

Johnson stayed silent, Nixon won, and the war went on.

*   *   *

The fact that Kissinger participated in an intrigue that extended the war for five pointless years—seven, if you count the fighting between the 1973 Paris Peace Accords and the 1975 fall of Saigon—is undeniable.
*
Adding to the evidence is Kissinger himself. He's been caught on tape twice, on recordings recently released, admitting he passed on useful information to Nixon.

The first recording is of a meeting held by Nixon, Kissinger, and Bob Haldeman in the Oval Office on June 17, 1971. The three men were trying to come up with a plan to contain the fallout from Daniel Ellsberg's leaking of the Pentagon Papers to the
New York Times
. One idea, suggested by Haldeman and seconded by Nixon, was to “blackmail” Lyndon Johnson and force him to issue a public statement condemning Ellsberg's leak. Nixon believed that a file existed—the so-called “bombing halt” file—that held proof that Johnson stopped bombing North Vietnam to help Humphrey win the election.
*
The material was thought to be in a safe at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank, and Nixon, in this meeting, ordered Haldeman to use “thievery” to get it. This was the beginning of the black-bag group known as the “plumbers,” who would go on to burgle the Democratic Party headquarters at the Watergate Hotel.
18
“Goddamn it, get in and get those files. Blow the safe and get it,” Nixon instructed.

It's a disreputable scene: a president and his top advisers, including Kissinger, sitting around discussing blackmailing a former president and blowing up safes.
†
For our purposes here, what is important is that Kissinger reveals that he knew that Johnson didn't time the bombing halt to help Humphrey because, contrary to his latter statements, he had access to classified information about the Paris negotiations:

KISSINGER:
I used to give you info—I used to—you remember, I used to give you information about it at the time so I have no—

NIXON:
I know.

KISSINGER:
I mean, about the timing.

NIXON:
Yeah.

KISSINGER:
But I, to the best of my knowledge, there was never any conversation in which they said we'll hold it until the end of October. I wasn't in on the discussions here. I just saw the instructions to Harriman.

The reference is to Averell Harriman, who headed the US Paris delegation. Kissinger is admitting not only that he passed on information to Nixon's campaign but that he had access to specific, classified negotiating instructions—that is, the terms the White House was willing to accept, the concessions it was offering, and the timeline it was proposing for drawing down hostilities.

Kissinger's second admission, which came nearly a year later, on April 19, 1972, is more succinct. It was in response to Nixon's opinion that the North Vietnamese would begin to soften their negotiating position in the period prior to the 1972 presidential elections. The reason he thought this was because that's what they did in 1968, compromising with Johnson's envoys in Paris prior to the presidential elections. “They are quite aware of American political things,” Nixon told Kissinger. Kissinger agreed: “As I told you all that fall, what the game was.”
19
“Only eleven words,” the historian Jeffrey P. Kimball writes, “but with these words Kissinger affirmed that in the fall of 1968 he had passed to ‘you'—that is, not only the Nixon camp but Nixon himself—information about the looming diplomatic breakthrough in Paris.”
20

Guardians of Kissinger's legacy say his accusers misread or overstate the importance of such evidence: Nixon would have won the election anyway; the information Kissinger passed on wasn't very specific; the Nixon campaign had other sources, so sabotage of the talks would have taken place even without Kissinger's participation; and the South Vietnamese didn't want a Humphrey presidency and would have balked of their own accord, without any prompting from Nixon. Intentionally or not, these excuses mimic the approach to the past Kissinger outlined in his undergraduate thesis. Truth is not found in “the facts of history” but from a “construct” of hypotheticals, counterfactuals, and conjectures.

Yet, in a way, Kissinger's defenders are right. Not that Kissinger wasn't implicated in Nixon's preelection machinations. He was. But focusing too intently on the search for evidence establishing culpability can miss the episode's larger meaning, its importance in Kissinger's ascent, how it allowed him to perform a trial run of his philosophy of politics.

*   *   *

Four years earlier, Kissinger had elaborated on the importance of political imagination in his discussion of JFK's response to the Cuban missile crisis. The “essence” of good foreign policy, Kissinger wrote, “is its contingency; its success depends on the correctness of an estimate which is in part conjectural.”
21
The problem, though, is that successful nation-states rationalize their foreign policy. They create a foreign service, with protocols, guidelines, clear procedures, and grades for promotion, administered by functionaries who depend on experts deeply versed in the particularities of their particular region. The whole system is set up to strive for “safety” and “predictability,” to work for the maintenance and reproduction of the status quo. “The attempt to conduct policy bureaucratically leads to a quest for calculability which tends to become a prisoner of events.” Routinization leads to caution, caution to inaction, inaction to atrophy. Success is measured by “mistakes avoided rather than by goals achieved.”
22

Other books

The Captain and the Enemy by Graham Greene
Calling All the Shots by Katherine Garbera
Stormcaller (Book 1) by Everet Martins
Con-Red: Recourse by Feinstein, Max
Camp Rock 2 by Wendy Loggia
TIME QUAKE by Linda Buckley-Archer


readsbookonline.com Copyright 2016 - 2024