Hannibal: A Hellenistic Life (59 page)

21.
We know that there was another prominent opponent of the Carthaginians whose name was Decius Magius. He advocated murdering the Punic garrison in Capua and returning the city to its Roman allegiance. Livy tells us that Magius was rounded up by Hannibal, arrested, and sent to Carthage on a ship (without details of where he boarded the ship). The vessel was blown off course and Magius sought asylum with the Egyptian king Ptolemy IV.

22.
See Fronda, 2010, 139–143 on the Nola, Neapolis, Cumae allegiance.

23.
Again see Fronda, 2010, 100–147 for a detailed assessment of each city’s position during the war.

24.
Hannibal makes four attempts, between 216 and 214/213.

25.
For the literary topos of luxury, Capua and Hannibal see below, Epilogue, pp. 236–237.

26.
Lazenby, 1998, 92–93 points this out.

27.
As noted by Miles, 2010, 286 and Fronda, 2010, 146–147.

28.
As pointed out by Fronda, 2010, 50–52, 101, 146–147; and in 2007, 84 he states that the success at Capua led to Hannibal’s failure in Campania.

29.
As noted by many; for example see Goldsworthy, 2003, 224, Fronda, 2010, 41, Hoyos, 2005, 122–133, Lazenby, 1998, 87–88.

30.
Fronda, 2007, 83, and this did not include their armies in Iberia, Sicily, Apulia, etc.

31.
Manpower and the army after Cannae: see de Ligt, 2012, 72–77 on the Polybian numbers. Polybius estimated that the total manpower available to the Romans, including recruits from all their allies, just before the time of Hannibal was over 700,000 men: see Rosenstein,
2002, Lazenby, 1998, 90–124, Lancel, 1999, 127–30, Fronda, 2010 100–103. See also Rosenstein, 2002 on changes to land qualifications for recruitment.

32.
For the standing army under Augustus see Eck, 2007, 114–122.

33.
The figures may be greatly exaggerated but in the absence of any other estimates these are the best figures we have. De Ligt, 2012, 77 argues that there are ‘no good grounds to dismiss the Polybian figures’. See also Fronda, 2010, 51. Lazenby, 1996b, 43–45 points out that for Hannibal to succeed it was essential he fight the war with ‘Rome’s resources’.

34.
These elections are much discussed: see below, note 35 and Rosenstein, 1993.

35.
A very useful list of consuls for each year of the war is available in Lazenby, 1998, 278–283 and an excellent discussion of the politics at Rome can be found in Briscoe, 1989, 67–74. Broughton, 1951 covers the career of each of the magistrates during the period discussed here. For the competition between the Roman elite see for example Rosenstein, 1993 and Gruen, 1978.

36.
In Sardinia the commander described much the same situation.

37.
Lazenby, 1998, 93–95 notes the debasement, following Zonaras (8.26.14), who puts it in the year 217; see also Lancel, 1999, 122, who puts the devaluation in 217. Crawford, 1974, vol.1, 30 and vol. 2, 604 notes that the Roman loss of control in Italy meant the commanders were making their own arrangements for pay, and that standardization from Rome disappears.

38.
As described in Livy 24.11.9 and 24.18.1–15.

39.
Crawford, 1985, 60–62.

40.
As noted in Rawlings, 2005, 157–161 and 2011, 306.

41.
On Hannibal rating Pyrrhus’ strategic and military capabilities see Livy 35.14.5–12.

42.
For manpower comparison see Goldsworthy, 2003, 225–227.

43.
The following numbers are calculated by Erdkamp, 1998, 168–169.

44.
According to Polybius he aspired ‘to world domination’. See Walbank, 2002, 127–136 for a discussion on whether Philip was really as ambitious as that. Walbank notes, however, that Philip was descended from a family that tended to think along these lines. ‘Make higher the walls of Olympos, Zeus/Philip can scale everything’ is a line from Alcaeus of Messine’s epigram that speaks of the ambition of the Antigonid king (
Anth. Pal.
9.518, translation from Walbank, 2002, 128).

45.
The view here is of Livy and Plutarch constructing a Hellenistic Hannibal but a contemporary impression of Hannibal in the Hellenistic court is much harder to glimpse. The subsequent alliance between Philip and Hannibal implies that the world was watching. A clear discussion on the Roman relationship with Greece during this period can be found in Errington, 1989; see also Gruen, 1986, 359–382.

46.
Errington, 1989, 94–97.

47.
To the Romans the narrow Straits of Otranto that separated Italy from Illyria needed close protection in an effort to control piracy in the Adriatic.

48.
The real impact of the newly constructed Macedonian fleet was, in fact, negligible. When it was deployed in the Adriatic in 216, it quickly disappeared when challenged by Roman ships (Polyb. 5.110.8–11).

49.
Polybius claimed to have read the document and provided a copy of it in his history (7.9), whilst the background to the drama comes solely from Livy.

50.
Livy’s version of the treaty claimed that Hannibal and Philip were intent on world domination and the destruction of Rome, but this is in clear opposition to the text preserved in Polybius (7.9).

51.
Bickerman, 1952, 5; see also Barré, 1983, and Lancel, 1999, 117–118.

52.
See Bickerman, 1944, and 1952.

53.
This is further affirmation that he acted on behalf of the Carthaginian state in this war, rather than the post-war claims that Hannibal acted as a rogue general.

54.
According to Bickermann, 1944.

55.
Can we learn about Carthaginian statecraft from the terms of this treaty and from the gods invoked by it? The oath invokes the Greek versions of the Punic gods Ba’al Hammon, Tanit and Reshef. It continues: ‘in the presence of the god of Carthage, of Heracles and of Iolaus;
in the presence of Ares, Triton and Poseidon;’ – which may be a standard formula listing gods that the Carthaginians included in their treaties. Some scholars have argued that the deities called upon in the treaty were more personal to Hannibal, but others have pointed out that the Carthaginian state was the key player in this alliance and that the god-list reflected the official pantheon of Carthage. A detailed study can be found in Barré, 1983, who looks at the god-list in light of the tradition of Near Eastern treaties. See also Miles, 2010, 289–290; Lancel, 1999, 118.

56.
For an overview see Rankov, 1996.

57.
In 211 the Roman state reached an agreement with Philip’s enemies in Greece, the Aetolian League, including the provision of 25 Roman quinqueremes, and the Aetolians were expected to immediately engage Philip in a land war; in that way the Romans could be sure he would not interfere in the Italian theatre. Philip was constrained by his lack of a reliable navy and called on the Carthaginians to support him, but Carthage could ill afford to divert any resources from its own interests in the war. In 209/208 the admiral Bomilcar took his fleet from Tarentum to Philip. The result for Carthage was the loss of the city. By 206 the Aetolians had made peace with Philip, against the provisions of their treaty with Rome and in the following year Philip and the Romans reached a treaty agreement. By that time the war against Carthage had turned strongly in the Romans’ favour and they were less concerned with Philip’s intervention. See Edwell, 2011, 324–326 for a summary of the main events; see also Errington, 1989, esp. 94–106.

58.
Gruen, 1992, 94 calls it a ‘major turning point’ in the Hannabalic War.

59.
Hiero was first tyrant, then king, or even ‘client king’; his precise dates are unclear – he may have ruled from as early as 270, or 265, see Lazenby, 1996a, 36 on the reason for uncertainty; see also Walbank, vol. 1, 54–55 for a discussion of the sources and dates. For details of Hiero’s hegemony and the nature of his kingship see also Zambon, 2006, 88–90.

60.
Polybius 7.7.7 implies that Gelo ruled as co-regent with Hiero. For the spelling used here I prefer Gelo and Hiero as opposed to Gelon and Hieron – although both can be used.

61.
The power struggle at Syracuse and its significance in the story of Hannibal reflect its long regional hegemony in the Greek west. What happened was of keen interest to a wide audience. Livy’s account is derived from Polybius’ detailed description, although we only have fragments of the Polybian version of events (7.2–7.8, 8.2–8.7). For other further influences on Livy’s Syracuse and intertexuality see Jaeger, 2010.

62.
Their mother was Carthaginian and their grandfather had been an exile from Syracuse (Livy 24.6.1–2; Polyb. 7.2.4); see Walbank, vol. 2, 32 for further thoughts on who these men might have been and whether or not they were Carthaginian citizens. Polybius tells us that their Syracusan grandfather had ‘adopted Carthage as his country’.

63.
In fact Livy omits the Carthaginians from his version (24.6.4), perhaps to lessen the insult to Rome, as suggested by Walbank, vol. 2, 33.

64.
The formulation of an inter-state treaty as laid out here may reflect a different process from the treaty made with Philip V but the incomplete set of evidence prevents an accurate comparison.

65.
Lazenby, 1998, 103–105 lays out some of the densely complicated events that led to the Roman siege of Syracuse. See Walbank, vol. 2, 2–3, 69 on the chronology in Polybius’ account, and Eckstein, 1987, 136–144 on the role of Appius Claudius Pulcher in the events before Marcellus arrived late in 214.

66.
Marcellus was in command of the legions and the navy, according to Walbank who claims that Polybius (8.3.1) is inaccurate in attributing the land forces to Appius Claudius and the fleet to Marcellus, see Walbank, vol. 2, 70.

67.
See Walbank, vol. 2, 77–78, and Livy 24.27.5, 36.4.

68.
Strabo 7.2.4 included
Epipolae
whilst Diodorus Siculus 26.19 calls Syracuse a
tetrapolis
, leaving out
Epipolae
.

69.
180
stadia
in Strabo. For the length of the circuit walls of Syracuse, see Lawrence, 1946, 9; see also Seibert, 1993a, map 9a.

70.
They functioned as a kind of boarding-bridge, which is described by Polybius in some detail in 8.4.3–11. Plutarch,
Marc.
14.3 implied that the machine was used across eight ships together; see Walbank, vol. 2, 72.

71.
Polybius 8.3.3, in similar words.

72.
For the biography of Archimedes we rely on the Byzantine source Tzetzes,
Chil.
2.35.105. See Chondros, 2007, 1–2 for a brief biographical sketch and more in Jaeger, 2008.

73.
Tangible evidence for Archimedes’ contribution to Syracusan defensive fortifications is elusive. The tyrant Dionysus originally built the walls in the fifth century. The assumption is that modernization work was done during Hiero’s rule and Archimedes was a part of the planning of the defence of the city. The failure of the Roman siege means the walls must have been updated since they were built to withstand the very state-of-the-art siegecraft of the Roman army and navy: see Lawrence, 1946 and Chondros, 2007.

74.
See Jaeger, 2008, 101–122 on the ‘defence of Syracuse’, see also Walbank, vol. 2, 69–78 on Polybius’ account of the siege, Karlsson, 1989, 89 on Sicilian fortifications and Lawrence, 1946 on the design of the Euryalus fort.

75.
A full account of the death and legend of Archimedes in Jaeger, 2008, and on the passages in Livy see Jaeger, 2006 and 2010.

76.
Walbank, vol. 2, 77 takes Polybius to mean the eight months from the beginning of the siege in 213 to the spring of 212 when Appius Claudius left to take up the consulship in Rome. The city did not fall until the autumn of 212.

77.
Livy 24.37.1.

78.
Enna was the site of a sacred shrine to the goddess Persephone whose kidnap by Hades tradition located nearby.

79.
Livy notes that Marcellus made sure his men had ‘taken refreshments and rest in good time’ for the night operation ahead; this is similar to Polybius’ reports of Hannibal’s concerns for his men in the lead-up to Trebia and Trasimeno (Livy 25.23.) and reflects the actions of the ‘good’ Hellenistic general.

80.
See Jaeger, 2006 and 2010 on the influences of Cicero’s Verrine speeches on Livy’s stories of the Syracuse episode in the war – the intertextuality of Livy’s Marcellus.

81.
For weeping generals see Hoyos, 2006, 662–663, note 24.

82.
Livy does not say if this included the 35 he originally left with, but the assumption is yes – so the Carthaginians supplied another 65 ships at short notice.

83.
The plague of 211 was followed by food shortages in 210 at Rome, due to the impact of the fighting, especially in Sicily whose wheat crop was perhaps essential for feeding Rome even at this early date. The Romans appealed to the Egyptian king Ptolemy for corn supply, for the embassy: see Polybius 9.11a.1–4. See Walbank, vol.2, 137–138.

84.
Marcellus’ triumph is termed an ‘ovation’ by Livy (26.21), who describes the sumptuous victory parade and the debate around the celebration. For Polybius’ disapproval see 9.10.

Chapter 9 Hannibal’s Dilemma, 212–209