Grant Moves South (31 page)

The matter might have ended there, if Halleck had been willing, and although Grant much later wrote that he was “virtually in arrest” at this time it is clear that this was not the case; he was tied to Fort Henry, but otherwise he was under no restriction whatever. But Halleck was the sort that must repeat, explain and underline a scolding, to make certain that the person scolded is properly impressed, and in this case he lit a fire that almost got away from him. Also—and this was much more important than any incidental damage to either man's self-esteem—the whole process unquestionably served as a brake on action; Federal movements in the Tennessee Valley thereafter went more slowly than would otherwise have
been the case, and this was too bad because speedy movement was of very great importance.

Ever since the capture of Fort Donelson, the high command's contribution to the campaign had been negative, and what had been gained had come from sheer on-the-spot energy acting in the absence of orders from above. Halleck had been out of touch, contributing an occasional “Not so fast!” when the erratic telegraph let his voice be heard; Buell had occupied Nashville in spite of himself, had had the vapors as a result and was calling for top-level conferences; and McClellan had been too far off, too poorly informed and too busy with other matters to exert much influence. What had been done had been done by subordinates who would take advantage of any leeway provided by a system of defective communications and loose controls. Now the system was being tightened and the leeway was vanishing. In consequence, nobody would be moving very rapidly.

Halleck's plan was for a raid on Confederate railroad connections. Grant had planned to interpret his orders rather liberally, and just before Halleck's disciplinary blast struck him he had written to Smith explaining that he himself would immediately start upstream with part of the troops and that Smith was to assume command at Forts Henry and Donelson and lead an expedition to the town of Paris, twenty-five miles west of the Tennessee, on the railroad to Memphis. Grant was thinking beyond the immediate tactical problem, when he wrote this. Governor Isham Harris of Tennessee, a loyal Confederate and an all-out war man, was pushing the Confederate conscription act, and had ordered all Tennesseeans to register for the draft. Certain Confederate troops were in Paris to help enforce this order, and Grant believed that if his soldiers could disperse these troops, break up the conscription and in general weaken Confederate control over western Tennessee they would be inflicting lasting damage on the Confederacy's ability to make war.
²

However, this now was impossible. Grant sent Smith a copy of Halleck's plan of campaign, copying out for him the telegram of March 4: “You will place Major General C. F. Smith in command of expedition and remain yourself at Fort Henry.” Significantly, Grant did not add the final sentence which conveyed Halleck's
reprimand. Was he, in dealing with his former commandant at West Point, reluctant to put that humiliating note in the record?
³

On the first of March, Lieutenant William Gwin of the Navy had taken gunboats
Lexington
and
Tyler
far up the Tennessee to disperse a Rebel outpost at a place called Pittsburg Landing. This was a spot of no apparent consequence; there was a landing place at the water's edge, with a road climbing to high ground and meandering off through half-settled country (passing a log meetinghouse known as Shiloh Church, on the way) and going at last to the important railroad junction town of Corinth, which was a little more then twenty miles from the river. Lieutenant Gwin drove the Confederates away, picked up such news as he could get, and came back downstream to report; and from that moment Pittsburg Landing, Shiloh Church, and the fields and woods and orchards and ravines between and around them were invisibly touched with a power that would draw two great armies together.

Gwin brought back word that the Confederates were in considerable strength in the vicinity of Corinth—a thing which was not true then, but which very soon would be—and Grant, passing it along, warned Smith that he might find as many as twenty thousand enemy troops there. He went on:

If this should prove true I can hardly say what course should be pursued to carry out the instructions. A general engagement is to be avoided while the bridges are to be destroyed, if possible. The idea probably is there must be no defeat and rather than risk one it would be better to retreat.

Whether a battle could actually be avoided was an open question; a few days later Smith himself, writing to a friend, commented dryly:

My orders are to accomplish a certain purpose without bringing on a general engagement, to retire rather than to do so. Now if my men were soldiers in the proper acceptation of the term, this piece of strategy might do very well, but as they are not soldiers I mean to fight my way through if necessary. And when I get them into a fight it shall be no child's play. They begin to understand me about that.
⁴

Grant gave Smith his final orders on March 5, and on the same day Halleck sent Grant a telegram amplifying the original orders:

It is exceedingly important that there should be no delay in destroying the bridge at Corinth or Bear Creek. Don't delay the matter a moment. If successful, the expedition will not return to Paris but will encamp at Savannah [a town on the eastern bank of the river, about nine miles downstream from Pittsburg Landing] unless threatened by superior numbers. Prepare everything to reinforce him [Smith] there. Dismount the water batteries at Henry and Donelson, and remove all stores, except for a small garrison at Donelson. Travelers can pass to Nashville, but no one will be permitted to land at the forts except in extreme cases. None must be allowed to go up the Tennessee. See to this. What we do there must not be communicated to the public.
⁵

This, clearly, was not the sort of dispatch a department commander would send to a general who was “in virtual arrest.” Grant acknowledged it, saying that the transports would be loaded and sent upstream as soon as the gunboats arrived. Then Halleck returned to the question of the reprimand, sending Grant this telegram, dated March 6:

General McClellan directs that you report to me daily the number and positions of the forces under your command. Your neglect of repeated orders to report the strength of your command has created great dissatisfaction and seriously interfered with military plans. Your going to Nashville without authority, and when your presence with your troops was of the utmost importance, was a matter of very serious complaint at Washington, so much so that I was advised to arrest you on your return.

There were times when Grant seemed very modest, almost self-effacing, but there was not really anything meek about him. He promptly sent back a reply which conceded nothing whatever and which invited a showdown:

I did all I could to get you returns of the strength of my command. Every move I made was reported daily to your chief of
staff, who must have failed to keep you properly posted. I have done my very best to obey orders and to carry out the interests of the service. If my course is not satisfactory, remove me at once. I do not wish to impede in any way the success of our arms. I have averaged writing more than once a day since leaving Cairo to keep you informed of my position, and it is no fault of mine if you have not received my letters. My going to Nashville was strictly intended for the good of the service, and not to gratify any desire of my own.

Believing sincerely that I must have enemies between you and myself, who are trying to impair my usefulness, I respectfully ask to be relieved from further duty in the department.
⁶

Halleck picked this up without delay, and telegraphed in retort:

You are mistaken. There is no enemy between you and me. There is no letter of yours stating the number and position of your command since capture of Fort Donelson. General McClellan has asked for it repeatedly with reference to ulterior movements, but I could not give him the information. He is out of all patience waiting for it. Answer by telegraph in general terms.

Dutifully enough, Grant made his report. Of infantry, present for duty, he had 35,147; of cavalry, 3169; of artillery, 54 pieces and 1231 men. Approximately 25,000 were embarked on the expedition, and 5700 more were at the landing above Fort Henry awaiting transportation. The rest of the men were at Clarksville, Fort Donelson and Fort Henry. In the grand total, he noted, were 7829 men in a new division commanded by Sherman.

Grant also returned to the argument, still without discernible meekness:

Your dispatch of yesterday just received. I will do all in my power to advance the expedition now started. You had better chance of knowing my strength whilst surrounding Fort Donelson than I had. Troops were reporting daily, by your orders, and immediately assigned to brigades. There were no orders received from you until the 28th February to make out returns, and I made every effort to get them in as early as possible. I have always been ready to move anywhere, regardless of consequences
to myself, but with a disposition to take the best care of the troops under my command. I renew my application to be relieved from further duty.
⁷

Halleck seems to have been inclined to let the matter rest here. He replied that McClellan had repeatedly asked for information which he could not give, saying: “This certainly indicated a great want of order and system in your command, the blame of which was partially thrown on me, and perhaps justly, as it is the duty of every commander to compel those under him to obey orders and enforce discipline. Don't let such neglect occur again, for it is equally discreditable to you and me.” Then Halleck dropped the argument, beginning a new paragraph, “But to business …” Guns and stores at Clarksville should be sent down to Paducah, skeleton garrisons should be planted at Fort Henry and Fort Donelson and all other troops should be rushed up the Tennessee as rapidly as possible. And, finally:

As soon as these things are arranged you will hold yourself in readiness to take the command. There will probably be some desperate fighting in that vicinity and we must be prepared.… I shall organize and send you reinforcements as rapidly as possible, and when I get them under way I shall join you myself.
⁸

This probably would have ended it, except that on March 11 Grant got a letter which Halleck had mailed on March 6, enclosing an unsigned letter which had been passed on by the eminent Judge David Davis and which alleged extensive disorders at Fort Donelson and much defalcation of captured Confederate stores and equipment. In a covering note, Halleck remarked:

The want of order and discipline and the numerous irregularities in your command since the capture of Fort Donelson are matters of general notoriety, and have attracted the serious attention of the authorities at Washington. Unless these things are immediately corrected I am directed to relieve you of the command.

The anonymous letter rambled slightly. It asserted that a good deal of captured food had been taken over by a regimental quartermaster
and by him delivered to sutlers, who repackaged the goods and sent them to Illinois for private sale. A Colonel John Cook—an Illinois officer, acting as brigadier in C. F. Smith's division—was alleged to be assisting in all of this, in conjunction with one G. W. Graham, a civilian who frequented Grant's headquarters. Rather confusingly, the writer added that he did not think that either Cook or Graham was profiting by the deals; Cook, he believed, was just accommodating his friends. He went on to say that a good many captured dirks, pistols, muskets and the like had been carried off by individuals; if all could be taken care of and sold by the government, the Treasury would receive several thousands of dollars.

Grant's reply displays about as much unvarnished anger as anything he ever wrote. He sent back this telegram:

Yours of the 6th instant, inclosing an anonymous letter to the Hon. David Davis, speaking of frauds committed against the government, is just received. I refer you to my orders to suppress marauding as the only reply necessary. There is such a disposition to find fault with me that I again ask to be relieved from further duty until I can be placed right in the estimation of those higher in authority.

In plain English, Grant would demand a court of inquiry, which would involve an official ventilation of the entire situation. Halleck did not want this to happen. He replied, in a vein much more soothing than anything in his earlier messages:

You cannot be relieved from your command. There is no good reason for it. I am certain that all which the authorities at Washington ask is that you enforce discipline and punish the disorderly. The power is in your hands; use it, and you will be sustained by all above you. Instead of relieving you I wish you as soon as your new army is in the field to assume the immediate command and lead it on to new victories.
⁹

What Grant did not know when he got this reply was that the entire situation had suddenly changed. Washington at last had lost patience with McClellan, had removed him from the over-all command of the Union Army, and had limited him to the command of
the Army of the Potomac. On top of that, Halleck had finally been given what he had been demanding so long—full control in the West. The eastern limit of his department was extended to a north-and-south line drawn through Nashville, which brought Buell and his field army under Halleck's control. If earlier refusals had put him badly out of humor, this was calculated to make him feel much better.

In addition, President Lincoln had quietly intervened in Grant's favor. Some of the details of Halleck's complaints had reached the White House, and the White House was in no mood to see the victor at Fort Donelson dropped without a fair hearing. To Halleck, on March 10, had come a formal wire from Lorenzo Thomas, Adjutant General of the Army:

It has been reported that soon after the battle of Fort Donelson Brigadier General Grant left his command without leave. By direction of the President the Secretary of War desires you to ascertain and report whether General Grant left his command at any time without proper authority, and, if so, for how long; whether he has made to you proper reports and returns of his force; whether he has committed any acts which were unauthorized or not in accordance with military subordination or propriety, and, if so, what.