Fortunes of Feminism (33 page)

Until recently, the all-affected principle seemed to coincide in the eyes of many with the state-territorial principle. It was assumed, in keeping with the Westphalian world picture, that the common framework that determined patterns of advantage and disadvantage was precisely the constitutional order of the modern territorial state. As a result, it seemed that in applying the state-territorial principle, one simultaneously captured the normative force of the all-affected principle. In fact, this was never truly so, as the long history of colonialism and neocolonialism attests. From the perspective of the metropole, however, the conflation of state-territoriality with social effectivity appeared to have an emancipatory thrust, as it served to justify the progressive incorporation, as subjects of justice, of the subordinate classes and status groups who were resident on the territory but excluded from active citizenship.

Today, however, the idea that state-territoriality can serve as a proxy for social effectivity is no longer plausible. Under current conditions, one's chances to live a good life do not depend wholly on the internal political constitution of the territorial state in which one resides. Although the latter remains undeniably relevant, its effects are mediated by other structures, both extra- and non-territorial, whose impact is at least as significant.
²⁵
In general, globalization is driving a widening wedge between state territoriality and social effectivity. As those two principles increasingly diverge, the effect is to reveal the former as an inadequate surrogate for the latter. And so the question arises: is it possible to apply the all-affected principle directly to the framing of justice, without going through the detour of state-territoriality?
²⁶

This is precisely what some practitioners of transformative politics are attempting to do. Seeking leverage against offshore sources of maldistribution and misrecognition, some globalization activists are appealing directly to the all-affected principle in order to circumvent the state-territorial partitioning of political space. Contesting their exclusion by the Keynesian-Westphalian frame, environmentalists and indigenous peoples are claiming standing as subjects of justice in relation to the extra- and non-territorial powers that impact their lives. Insisting that effectivity trumps state-territoriality, they have joined development activists, international feminists, and others in asserting their right to make claims against the structures that harm them, even when the latter cannot be located in the space of places. Casting off the Westphalian grammar of frame-setting, these claimants are applying the all-affected principle directly to questions of justice in a globalizing world.
²⁷

In such cases, the transformative politics of framing proceeds simultaneously in multiple dimensions and on multiple levels.
²⁸
On one level, the social movements that practice this politics aim to redress first-order injustices of maldistribution, misrecognition, and ordinary-political misrepresentation. On a second level, these movements seek to redress meta-level injustices of framing by reconstituting the “who” of justice. In those cases, moreover, where the state-territorial principle serves more to indemnify than to challenge injustice, transformative social movements appeal instead to the all-affected principle. Invoking a post-Westphalian principle, they are seeking to change the very grammar of frame-setting—and thereby to reconstruct the meta-political foundations of justice for a globalizing world.

But the claims of transformative politics go further still. Above and beyond their other claims, these movements are also claiming a say in what amounts to a new, post-Westphalian process of frame-setting. Rejecting the standard view, which deems frame-setting the prerogative of states and transnational elites, they are effectively aiming to democratize the process by which the frameworks of justice are drawn and revised. Asserting their right to participate in constituting the “who” of justice, they are simultaneously transforming the “how”—by which I mean the accepted procedures for determining the “who.”
²⁹
At their most reflective and ambitious, transformative movements are demanding the creation of new democratic arenas for entertaining arguments about the frame. In some cases, they are creating such arenas themselves. In the World Social Forum, for example, some practitioners of transformative politics have fashioned a transnational public sphere where they can participate on a par with others in airing and resolving disputes about the frame.
³⁰
In this way, they are prefiguring the possibility of new institutions of
post-Westphalian democratic justice
.
³¹

The democratizing dimension of transformative politics points to a third level of political injustice, above and beyond the two already discussed. Previously, I distinguished first-order injustices of ordinary-political misrepresentation from second-order injustices of misframing. Now, however, we can discern a third-order species of political injustice, which corresponds to the question of the “how.” Exemplified by undemocratic processes of frame-setting, this injustice consists in the failure to institutionalize parity of participation at the meta-political level, in deliberations and decisions concerning the “who.” Because what is at stake here is the process by which first-order political space is constituted, I shall call this injustice
meta-political misrepresentation
. Meta-political misrepresentation arises when states and transnational elites monopolize the activity of frame-setting, denying voice to those who may be harmed in the process and blocking creation of democratic fora where the latter's claims can be vetted and redressed. The effect is to exclude the overwhelming majority of people from participation in the meta-discourses that determine the authoritative division of political space. Lacking any institutional arenas for such participation, and submitted to an undemocratic approach to the “how,” the majority is denied the chance to engage on terms of parity in decision-making about the “who.”

In general, then, struggles against misframing are revealing a new kind of democratic deficit. Just as globalization has made visible injustices of misframing, so transformative struggles against neoliberal globalization are making visible the injustice of meta-political misrepresentation. Exposing the lack of institutions where disputes about the “who” can be democratically aired and resolved, these struggles are focusing attention on the “how.” By demonstrating that the absence of such institutions impedes efforts to overcome injustice, they are revealing the deep internal connections between democracy and justice. The effect is to bring to light a structural feature of the current conjuncture: struggles for justice in a globalizing world cannot succeed unless they go hand in hand with struggles for
meta-political democracy
. At this level too, then, no redistribution or recognition without representation.

3. PARADIGM SHIFT: POST-WESTPHALIAN

DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE

I have been arguing that what distinguishes the current conjuncture is intensified contestation concerning both the “who” and the “how” of justice. Under these conditions, the theory of justice is undergoing a paradigm shift. Earlier, when the Keynesian-Westphalian frame was in place, most philosophers neglected the political dimension. Treating the territorial state as a given, they endeavored to ascertain the requirements of justice theoretically, in a monological fashion. Thus, they did not envision any role in determining those requirements for those who would be subject to them, let alone for those who would be excluded by the national frame. Neglecting to reflect on the question of the frame, these philosophers never imagined that those whose fates would be so decisively shaped by framing decisions might be entitled to participate in making them. Disavowing any need for a dialogical democratic moment, they were content to produce monological theories of social justice.

Today, however, monological theories of social justice are becoming increasingly implausible. As we have seen, globalization cannot help but problematize the question of the “how,” as it politicizes the question of the “who.” The process goes something like this: as the circle of those claiming a say in frame-setting expands, decisions about the “who” are increasingly viewed as political matters, which should be handled democratically, rather than as technical matters, which can be left to experts and elites. The effect is to shift the burden of argument, requiring defenders of expert privilege to make their case. No longer able to hold themselves above the fray, they are necessarily embroiled in disputes about the “how.” As a result, they must contend with demands for meta-political democratization.

An analogous shift is currently making itself felt in normative philosophy. Just as some activists are seeking to transfer elite frame-setting prerogatives to democratic publics, so some theorists of justice are proposing to rethink the classic division of labor between theorist and
demos
. No longer content to ascertain the requirements of justice in a monological fashion, these theorists are looking increasingly to dialogical approaches, which treat important aspects of justice as matters for collective decision-making, to be determined by the citizens themselves, through democratic deliberation. For them, accordingly, the grammar of the theory of justice is being transformed. What could once be called the “theory of social justice” now appears as the “theory of
democratic justice
.”
³²

In its current form, however, the theory of democratic justice remains incomplete. To complete the shift from a monological to dialogical theory requires a further step, beyond those envisioned by most proponents of the dialogical turn.
³³
Henceforth, democratic processes of determination must be applied not only to the “what” of justice, but also to the “who” and the “how.” In that case, by adopting a democratic approach to the “how,” the theory of justice assumes a guise appropriate to a globalizing world. Dialogical at
every
level, meta-political as well as ordinary-political, it becomes a theory of
post-Westphalian democratic justice
.

The view of justice as participatory parity lends itself easily to such an approach. This principle has a double quality that expresses the reflexive character of democratic justice. On the one hand, the principle of participatory parity is an outcome notion, which specifies a substantive principle of justice by which we may evaluate social arrangements: the latter are just if and only if they permit all the relevant social actors to participate as peers in social life. On the other hand, participatory parity is also a process notion, which specifies a procedural standard by which we may evaluate the democratic legitimacy of norms: the latter are legitimate if and only if they can command the assent of all concerned in fair and open processes of deliberation, in which all can participate as peers. By virtue of this double quality, the view of justice as participatory parity has an inherent reflexivity. Able to problematize both substance and procedure, it renders visible the mutual entwinement of those two aspects of social arrangements. Thus, this approach can expose both the unjust background conditions that skew putatively democratic decision-making and the undemocratic procedures that generate substantively unequal outcomes. As a result, it enables us to shift levels easily, moving back and forth as necessary between first-order and meta-level questions. Making manifest the co-implication of democracy and justice, the view of justice as participatory parity supplies just the sort of reflexivity that is needed in a globalizing world.

Let me conclude by recalling the principal features of the theory of justice that I have sketched here. An account of post-Westphalian democratic justice, this theory encompasses three fundamental dimensions: economic, cultural, and political. As a result, it renders visible, and criticizable, the mutual entwinement of maldistribution, misrecognition, and misrepresentation. In addition, this theory's account of political injustice encompasses three levels. Addressing not only ordinary-political misrepresentation, but also misframing and meta-political misrepresentation, it allows us to grasp the problem of the frame as a matter of justice. Focused not only on the “what” of justice, but also on the “who” and the “how,” it enables us to evaluate the justice of alternative principles and alternative processes of frame-setting. Above all, as I noted before, the theory of post-Westphalian democratic justice encourages us to pose, and hopefully to answer, the key political question of our time: how can we integrate struggles against maldistribution, misrecognition, and misrepresentation within a post-Westphalian frame?

^*
This chapter is a revised and expanded version of my second Spinoza Lecture, delivered at the University of Amsterdam, December 2, 2004. The lecture was drafted during my tenure there as Spinoza Professor in spring 2004 and revised during my subsequent fellowship year at the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin, 2004–05. My warmest thanks to both institutions for their generous support of this work. Special thanks to Yolande Jansen and Hilla Dayan for selfless and good-natured assistance in a time of great need and to James Bohman for expert bibliographical advice. Thanks also to Amy Allen, Seyla Benhabib, Bert van den Brink, Alessandro Ferrara, Rainer Forst, Stefan Gosepath, John Judis, Ted Koditschek, Maria Pia Lara, David Peritz, Ann Laura Stoler, and Eli Zaretsky for thoughtful comments on earlier drafts. Thanks, finally, to Kristin Gissberg and Keith Haysom for expert research assistance.

1
The phrase “Keynesian-Westphalian frame” is meant to signal the national-territorial underpinnings of justice disputes in the heyday of the postwar democratic welfare state, roughly 1945 through the 1970s. In this period, struggles over distribution in North America and Western Europe were premised on the assumption of state steering of national economies. And national Keynesianism, in turn, was premised on the assumption of an international state system that recognized territorial state sovereignty over domestic affairs, which included responsibility for the citizenry's welfare. Analogous assumptions also governed disputes about recognition in this period. The term “Westphalian” refers to the Treaty of 1648, which established some key features of the international state system in question. However, I am concerned neither with the actual achievements of the Treaty nor with the centuries-long process by which the system it inaugurated evolved. Rather, I invoke “Westphalia” as a political imaginary that mapped the world as a system of mutually recognizing sovereign territorial states. My claim is that this imaginary undergirded the postwar framing of debates about justice in the First World. For the distinction between Westphalia as “event,” as “idea/ideal,” as “process of evolution,” and as “normative scoresheet,” see Richard Falk, “Revisiting Westphalia, discovering post-Westphalia,”
Journal of Ethics
6:4, 2002, 311–52.