Empires and Barbarians (113 page)

49
See further
Chapter 2
above.

50
This emerges with huge clarity from all the literary sources – everything from critiques of individual kings in historical narratives to the value systems underlying heroic poetry. Introductions to the mix of land and cash expected over the course of an individual’s lifetime are provided by Charles-Edwards (1989); Campbell (2000),
chapter 10
.

51
For a general introduction to the pre-Viking great powers, see Campbell (1982),
chapters 3
–
4
.

52
See Hooke (1998),
chapter 3
; Powlesland (1997); Esmonde-Cleary (1989).

53
For weapons burials, see Härke (1989), (1990). For continental parallels, see
Chapter 2
above.

54
Ward Perkins (2000).

55
See e.g. Kapelle (1979).

56
Woolf (2007), 127ff.

57
Even the land-grabbing that followed the Norman Conquest was not under William’s control, despite his relatively great authority, and the need for clarity as to who now held what was one of the reasons for the great survey that underlay the
Doomsday Book
:
Anglo-Saxon Chronicle
1085
AD
. I would imagine that the land-grabbing process of the fifth and sixth centuries was infinitely more chaotic, given that central authority among the incoming Anglo-Saxons was so much weaker than among the eleventh-century Normans, and that the land-grabbing followed piecemeal in the wake of many small victories rather than a single decisive one like the battle of Hastings.

58
This is also the conclusion of Woolf (2007), as, of course, of all of those writing in the tradition that does not seek to minimize the importance of Anglo-Saxon migration.

59
Julian and the Franks: Ammianus 17.8.3–5. This is an isolated incident, however, and it is therefore impossible to say whether the Franks had the same kind of functioning confederative structure as the Alamanni, although it is certainly possible. For introductions to early Frankish history and archaeology, see Zollner (1970); Perin (1987); James (1988); Ament (1996); Reichmann (1996); R. Kaiser (1997).

60
For materials and commentary on Childeric’s grave, see Perin and Kazanski (1996); Halsall (2001).

61
On Childeric’s career, see
PLRE
2, 285–6, with referencess. The ‘Roman’ Clovis
has been argued for by Halsall (2001), (2007), 269–71, 303–6. On Gundobad, see
PLRE
2, 524–5.

62
James (1988) started the controversy, and it has drawn counter-arguments from Perin (1996); MacGeorge (2002).

63
Gregory of Tours,
Histories
2.40–2.

64
On the dating controversies surrounding Clovis’ conversion, see Shanzer and Wood (2002), with more general commentary on his career in Wood (1985); Halsall (2001).

65
On the parallel rise of Theoderic and the Amal family, see
Chapter 5
.

66
See Halsall (2007), 346f. On the rise of Marseilles, see Loseby (1992), (1998).

67
For a general introduction, see Halsall (2007), 347ff. Halsall (1995a) looks at the re-emergence of the landed basis of real aristocracy in northern Gaul in the seventh century.

68
On the inscriptions at Trier, see Handley (2001), (2003). On Remigius, see Castellanos (2000). On the broader cultural changes, specifically on language, see Haubrichs (1996). On the disruption to ecclesiastical structures, especially bishoprics, across northern France, see Theuws and Hiddinck (1996), 66f.

69
The most recent general surveys are Perin and Feffer (1987), vol. 2; Wieczorek et al. (1997).

70
For introductions to rural settlement, see Van Ossel (1992); Van Ossel and Ouzoulias (2000); Lewitt (1991).

71
Werner (1950); Böhme (1974). The grander of these Frankish officers met with in historical sources are Fraomarius, Erocus, Silvanus, Mallobaudes, Bauto and Arbogast.

72
Halsall (2007), 152–61, with references; the argument was first made in Halsall (1992). Reichmann (1996), 61–4 discusses the funerary habits of Frankish groups before the rise of the Merovingians.

73
On ‘tutulus’ brooches, see Halsall (2007), 157–9; cf. Böhme (1974). Furthermore, as Halsall observes, even if it were established that the brooches signified Germanic origin, the appearance of weapons would still remain to be explained, since this would then become a ‘new’ habit adopted on Roman soil.

74
See
Chapter 5
, and p. 271 above.

75
On the Armorican revolt: Zosimus 6.5. On the 410s: Exsuperantius,
PLRE
2, 448. On the subsequent history, see MacGeorge (2002).

76
Slightly different views of the phenomenon of Bagaudae have been adopted by Van Dam (1985), 16–20, 25f.; Drinkwater (1989), (1992); Minor (1996), all of whom nevertheless step back from the old Marxist, class-warfare analysis to think instead in terms of local self-help in the face of Roman central control’s fragmentation.

77
For policies towards Alamannic overkings, see
Chapter 2
.

78
For general surveys, see note 69 above.

79
The historiography of the study is discussed by James (1988).

80
Pirling (1966) and Pirling and Siepen (2003) summarize the ongoing investigations.

81
James (1988), 25–8 surveys the tradition, which runs through Werner (1935); Bohner (1958); Perin (1980). Frénouville was the work of Buchet: see James (1988), 110f. For a useful overview, see Perin (1987), 138ff.

82
See p. 311 above.

83
For the ‘social-stress’ interpretation, see Halsall (2007), 350ff.

84
For the traditional argument, see e.g. Perin (1996) or Wieczorek (1996); for its critique, see Halsall (2007), 269f.

85
For references, see note 69 above.

86
For the ending of cremation in England, see e.g. Welch (1992).

87
For an excellent recent survey, see Haubrichs (1996). For the earlier emergence of structured estates, see Halsall (1995a).

88
I will return to this broader issue in the following chapter.

89
Ammianus 17.8.3–5.

90
See Holt (1987).

1
The radical wing on identity and the supposed migration topos is led by Amory (1996), and Kulikowski (2002), (2007), but the germanophone tradition had long been thinking in terms of very fluid group identities: see Wenskus (1961); Wolfram (1988). The idea that the fall of the western Empire was a surprisingly peaceful process is particularly associated with Goffart (1980), (1981), (2006). In a different combination of these trends, Halsall (2007) sees the Empire coming apart from the edges because of its own internal divisions, particularly that between east and west, with barbarian invasion as consequence rather than cause. In various combinations, these ideas have been exercising a huge influence over the scholarship of the last twenty years or so, on which see the excellent Ward Perkins (2005).

2
We have already encountered these examples in
Chapters 4
,
5
and
6
. The idea that the western Empire was actually going to end really only dawned on much of the Roman west after the defeated attempt to conquer North Africa in 468: see Heather (2005),
chapter 9
.

3
Heather (2005), 375–84.

4
See
Chapter 4
above.

5
See Halsall (2007),
chapter 7
, with
Chapter 4
above.

6
By my reckoning, the eleven campaigns comprise: Ad Salices (377); Hadrianople (378); the Macedonian defeat of Theodosius (381); Frigidus (393); the Macedonian campaign (395); Epirus (397); Verona and Pollentia (402); the defeat of Radagaisus (406); the sack of Rome (409/10); the assault of Flavius Constantius (413/15); and the savaging of the Vandals (416–18).

7
See
Chapter 5
.

8
The same was broadly true, with different date ranges, of the smaller migrant’ groups the Suevi and Burgundians. A third stage, where the migrantsí new states engaged in competition with one another, was also carried forward largely by violence, and occasionally generated further migration, such as that of the Visigoths to Spain – see Heather (1996),
chapter 9
– but that is beyond the limits of the story being explored here.

9
For further discussion of this model, see Heather (1995). I should note that this account of how the Empire unravelled does not significantly differ from that,
for example, of Goffart (1981), from the point at which barbarian groups were already on Roman soil.

10
See Jones (1964), vol. 3, Appendix III.

11
For more detailed discussion, see Heather (2005),
chapter 6
.

12
For lowland Britain, see
Chapter 6
.

13
In the 430s, the Burgundians first suffered a heavy military defeat at the hands of the Huns, and were then resettled on Roman soil: for an introduction, see Favrod (1997).

14
On the creation of these new and larger groups, see pp. 189ff.

15
See
Chapter 5
above.

16
On the developing understanding of group identity, see
Chapter 1
above.

17
It is well documented that the Goths’ motivation for moving in 376 was political and negative. In my view, the same can be deduced with a high degree of probability for the migrants of 405–8, although the lack of explicit evidence means that other views of causation are possible (see above
Chapter 5
). These other views have no effect on my account of the amount of migration under way in the middle of the first decade of the fifth century.

18
There is no evidence for the Sueves, but the fact that so many other groups moved with women and children must make it a reasonable probability.

19
See
Chapter 6
.

20
See
Chapter 4
note 20 above for the suggestion that the
Historia Augusta
’s description of migrant Goths with large numbers of slaves, which ostensibly relates to the third-century migrations, actually relates to events after 376.

21
The distinction – but simultaneous intersection – between local Roman life and the structures of the state is often missed, but is a deeply important historical phenomenon. Just to give one example, the effects of wrenching the Church out of its Roman context show up vividly in the highly fragmented western Christendom examined in Brown (1996) and Markus (1997).

22
Goffart (1980) made the initial case, responding to the some of the critiques in Goffart (2006),
chapter 6
, which are well summarized, with much extra value besides, by Halsall (2007), 422–47.

23
Among Theoderic’s Ostrogoths in Italy, who are better documented than most other intrusive groups, there is good evidence for the existence of intermediate leaders who stood in between the king and their own personal followings among the rank and file. These leaders would presumably have been responsible for distributions of booty and property which affected their own men. See Heather (1995a).

24
Victor of Vita,
History of the Persecution
1.13, with Moderan (2002).

25
For an outline of this view, together with the settlement evidence, see Heather (1996),
chapter 8
. It should be noted in passing that Goffart (2006),
chapter 6
has commented that there is no evidence of public rather than private land ever being recycled to barbarians. However, this ignores
Novels of Valentinian
34, which records that the Roman state precisely compensated displaced landowners from Proconsularis with incomes from publicly owned land.

26
On the Burgundian settlement, see Wood (1990); cf. Halsall (2007), 438ff. on the Visigothic material.

27
For the conflict in Spain, see p. 204 above. For the conquest of North Africa, see Heather (2005),
chapter 6
.

28
For Ostrogoths, see
Chapter 5
above. Wood (1990) gives some thought to the trauma suffered by the Burgundians.

29
To this extent, we are seeing here an extension of third-century patterns, but with the added negative stimulus imparted by the Huns (see
Chapter 3
).

30
Or, at least, the capacity to create large enough forces, combined with the ability to exploit further movement: see p. 189ff.

31
For the Ostrogoths and the Franks, see pp. 248 and 309 respectively.

32
As we have seen, Priscus’ evidence makes it entirely clear that Attila’s chief aim in attacking the Roman Empire was to siphon off some of its wealth.

33
‘You [Anastasius] are the fairest . . .’: Cassiodorus,
Variae
1.1., trans. Hodgkin (1886); cf. more generally Heather (1996),
chapter 8
, with full references.

34
See
Chapter 2
, but note that the third-century migrations had partly collapsed the outer periphery into the inner zone.

35
On Theudebert in particular, see Collins (1983); cf., more generally on the growth of Merovingian power, Wood (1994),
chapters 3
–
4
.

36
Justinian’s decision to attack in the west was a highly contingent one: see Brown (1971). On the collapse of Theoderic’s quasi-imperial edifice, see Heather (1996), 248ff., with Wood (1994),
chapters 3
–
4
on Frankish expansion.

37
As Rome’s capacity to conquer most of the known world on the back of its Mediterranean assets makes clear.

38
See Wood (1994),
chapters 4
and
10
.

39
In my view, this process can broadly be characterized as its transformation from an outright conquest state to something more like a community of provincial communities, built on consent: see Heather (2005),
chapters 1
and
3
.