Electromagnetic Pulse (16 page)

Depending on the rules regarding implementation, these provisions could prevent disclosure of a wide swath of industry information submitted to the federal government, including FERC filings. By definition, CEII might include, any “information related to critical electric infrastructure, or proposed critical electrical infrastructure, generated by or provided to [FERC] or other Federal agency, other than classified national security information,” and designated according to the rules to be established. Significantly, the new federal protection preempts state and local laws, preventing CEII disclosure even by a state or local agency pursuant to a state or local public disclosure law. However, to be designated as CEII, the information must have been generated by or submitted to a federal agency.

The new Section 215A gives the Department of Energy (“DOE”) increased authority in case of a “grid security emergency,” including malicious physical or electronic acts, magnetic disturbances due to the sun, direct physical attacks, and related threats and reliability disruptions. When the President identifies such an emergency, DOE can order emergency measures the Secretary of Energy (“Secretary”) deems necessary to protect or restore CEI reliability. FAST requires little administrative process prior to issuance of these emergency orders. Though the DOE must adopt procedures for such cases, the Secretary may issue emergency orders “with or without notice, hearing, or report.” The President must notify, but does not require the consent of Congress in making the emergency determination. It will be incumbent upon the DOE to consult with affected governments and CEI owners and operators.

An emergency order under the new FPA section 215A could affect “any owner, user, or operator” of CEI in the U.S., even entities not ordinarily subject to FERC jurisdiction (for example, municipally owned utilities, rural electric cooperatives, and federal power marketing agencies like the Tennessee Valley Authority and Bonneville Power Administration). The DOE’s new authority also explicitly extends to the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (“NERC”) and other regional power suppliers.

To overcome industry objections regarding the costs of implementing the law, if CEI owners, operators, or users incur expenses in complying with an emergency order, but cannot recover those costs through their existing rate structures, the new law directs FERC to establish mechanisms for recovery of those costs.

The issue of backup transformers has finally been addressed. The new law requires DOE’s Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, in consultation with FERC, NERC, and the Electricity Subsector Coordinating Council, to submit a plan to Congress evaluating the feasibility of establishing a Strategic Transformer Reserve for storage in strategic locations of spare large power transformers and emergency mobile substations. The plan would determine adequate amounts and locations to temporarily replace critically damaged large power transformers and substations. The reserve would reduce the vulnerability of U.S. critical infrastructure to physical or cyber attack, electromagnetic pulse, solar disturbance of the earth’s magnetic field, severe weather, and earthquake.

The DOE’s plan must include the funding options available to establish and maintain the Strategic Transformer Reserve, including imposing fees on owners and operators of bulk-power system facilities and CEI. Additionally, the plan must assess the possibility of imposing fees on the large power transformer owner/operators and substations that constitute CEI, to pay for Strategic Transformer Reserve operating costs.

Electric cooperatives have been concerned about the conflicts between the state laws and regulations imposed by the federal government. FAST amends Section 202(c) of the FPA (FERC’s existing emergency authority) to clarify that FERC emergency orders override federal, state, and local environmental laws. Congress intended to resolve the perceived conflict facing power plant operators, who feared violating either an emergency order from FERC or environmental regulations if an emergency arose.

Consistent with this administration’s concern for the environment, any emergency order must still minimize environmental impacts and must be consistent with all applicable environmental laws, “to the maximum extent practicable.” FERC must also consult with federal environmental regulators, before an order can remain in effect longer than ninety days. Further, FERC must incorporate any condition submitted by the environmental agency, or explain its determination of why that submitted condition would impede an adequate emergency response.

These specific provisions regarding the environment, ensure that utilities and other operators of electric generation and transmission facilities can now comply with FERC emergency orders with the enhanced assurance that they will not incur environmental liability, whether civil (including citizen suits) or criminal. The exemptions afforded under FAST provides that such acts or omissions, even when taken to “voluntarily comply” with an emergency order, will not be considered violations of any federal, state, or local environmental law. This protection continues, even if courts later alter or strike down the underlying FERC order. The existing language of Section 202(c) does not appear to limit FERC’s emergency authority to utilities otherwise under its jurisdiction, so it appears that the new exemption could benefit virtually any operator of electric infrastructure, should an emergency arise.

The FAST Act offers the electric power sector several benefits, most notably, the exemption from environmental regulations to the extent that they conflict with FERC emergency orders, improved cost recovery for compliance with such orders, and also some degree of added protection of sensitive information from public disclosure. On the other hand, system participants will now be subject to broader federal control, especially in emergency situations. The Strategic Transformer Reserve planning also foreshadows potentially significant costs that Congress could impose on owners, operators, and users of generation and grid assets in the future. Conclusively, most of the new agency powers and responsibilities just enacted apply not only to utilities and grid operators accustomed to dealing with FERC, but also to entities not ordinarily subject to FERC jurisdiction.

SUGGESTIONS TO U.S. POLICYMAKERS

At Heritage.org, Senior Policy Analyst, Michaela Dodge and Policy Analyst, Jessica Zuckerman provided this list of what Congress and the Administration should do:

·
        
Mandate additional research into mitigating EMP threats. Similar to what Maine is doing, the U.S. should undertake additional research into how an EMP would affect electronics and electrical systems and how these vulnerabilities can be removed or lessened.

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Determine which countries could undertake EMP attacks. The U.S. should understand where potential EMP attacks could come from and produce intelligence estimates on nations that are pursuing or already have weapons capable of producing an EMP. This information can then be used to better inform policymakers on how best to respond to potential threats and prevent EMP attacks from occurring.

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Improve and fully fund U.S. missile defense. Ballistic missiles are one of the most effective means of delivering an EMP. U.S. missile defense should be advanced to address the threat, especially as the East Coast remains less protected than the West Coast. Improved command-and-control features and interceptors tied to forward-deployed radar would give the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptor the ability to counter long-range ballistic missiles in the late midcourse stage of flight. The government should improve the SM-3’s ability to intercept short-range ballistic missiles in the ascent phase of flight. Ultimately, the U.S. should develop and deploy space-based missile defense, the best way to protect the U.S. and its allies from ballistic missiles.

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Develop a National Recovery Plan and National Planning Scenario for EMP. The catastrophic cost of an EMP event means that it deserves careful preparation and planning. Such plans should take the advice of the EMP commission and employ a risk-based approach that recognizes that certain infrastructure—particularly electrical and telecommunication systems upon which all other sectors depend—is most important in preparing for and recovering from an EMP event. Additionally, DHS should have a National Planning Scenario dedicated to EMP so that local, state, and federal authorities understand what would happen in an EMP event and what their respective responsibilities are in terms of both response and recovery.

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Prepare and protect critical cyber infrastructure. Cyber infrastructure is completely and uniquely dependent on the power grid, which makes it particularly vulnerable to an EMP. The U.S. should explore ways to protect and shield the circuit boards of critical networks. Additionally, the U.S. should consider the interdependency between the nation’s cyber infrastructure and the other critical infrastructures and take actions to prevent cascading failures.

Chapter Fourteen
U. S. Department of Defense Preparations

Military moves NORAD to Cheyenne Mountain

New concerns are being raised that the nation's electrical grid and critical infrastructure are increasingly vulnerable to a catastrophic foreign attack -- amid speculation over whether officials are eyeing a former Cold War bunker, inside a Colorado mountain, as a
shield
against such a strike.

The North American Aerospace Defense Command is looking for ways to protect itself in the event of a massive EMP. A $700 million contract with Raytheon to upgrade electronics inside Colorado's Cheyenne Mountain facility may provide a clue about just how worried the military is about the threat.

The Cheyenne Mountain bunker is a half-acre cavern carved into a mountain in the 1960s that was designed to withstand a Soviet nuclear attack. From inside the massive complex, airmen were poised to send warnings that could trigger the launch of nuclear missiles.

The Air Force moved out of Cheyenne Mountain, which was built to survive a nuclear attack, in 2006, establishing its NORAD headquarters at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado. But that facility, inside the mountain, could offer protection against a so-called EMP attack.

The head of NORAD recently suggested, at an April 2015 Pentagon press conference, that Cheyenne may still be needed. "My primary concern was, are we going to have the space inside the mountain for everybody who wants to move in there?" Admiral William Gortney told reporters, "I'm not at liberty to discuss who's moving in there, but we do have that capability to be there. And so, there's a lot of movement to put capability into Cheyenne Mountain and to be able to communicate in there.”

NORAD spokesman Capt. Jeff Davis, told Fox News, "The mountain's ability to provide a shield against an EMP is certainly a valuable feature, and that is one reason we maintain the ability to return there quickly, if needed."

Now, officials say that the Pentagon is looking at shifting communications gear to the Cheyenne bunker.

"A lot of the back office communications is being moved there," said one defense official.

Officials agree that the military's dependence on computer networks and digital communications makes it much more vulnerable to an electromagnetic pulse, which can occur naturally or result from a high-altitude nuclear explosion.

Under the 10-year contract, Raytheon is supposed to deliver "sustainment" services to help the military perform "accurate, timely, and unambiguous warning and attack assessment of air, missile, and space threats" at the Cheyenne and Peterson bases.

Raytheon's contract also involves unspecified work at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California and Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska.

Pentagon constructs $44 million EMP-proof bunker in Alaska

Fort Greely, Alaska is home to one of America’s two domestic missile defense bases. Now, it’s getting armored against high-altitude electromagnetic energy attacks—like the kind emitted from nuclear blasts. The Pentagon is spending millions on a bunker designed to protect against exactly that. According to contract documents from the Army Corps of Engineers, the military plans to spend $44 million on an “HEMP-protected” bunker housing the base’s missile launch control systems. The base at Fort Greely houses anti-ballistic missile interceptors stored in silos, and can also control and direct interceptors fired from a similar site at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California.

The sum allocated to the Fort Greely project is small in comparison to the $41 billion the Pentagon is spending on its ground-based defense program through FY2017. The plan calls for the installation of dozens of missile interceptors in Alaska and California. These interceptors will carry kinetic kill weapons, designed to impact and destroy ballistic missiles during their mid-course phase. Mid-course defense refers to the flight pattern of ballistic missiles as they travel through space—and before they reenter the atmosphere moving at extremely high speeds.