Confronting the Colonies (17 page)

By 1955 disgruntled figures inside the Colonial Office were fighting back. During the outbreak of violence in Malaya (generally speaking) colonial officials had allowed the insurgency to be conceptualised as part of the broader Cold War; but no longer. Officials were prepared to offer some leeway to Cold War understandings during a communist uprising, but when it came to nationalism, EOKA and Cyprus, they were far less generous. This created further distance between the Colonial Office on one side and the central intelligence organisation on the other. Ironically, such self-imposed exile served only to further propagate the Cold War dominance. It was a vicious cycle of discontent, distance, and further discontent. Dismissing the JIC merely as a military mouthpiece perpetuating flawed Cold War orthodoxies, the Colonial Office refused to cooperate. Demonstrating a lack of Whitehall harmony, which undermined the British intelligence assessment system, colonial officials argued that the JIC had failed to appropriately conceptualise the Cold War by seeing it as simply ‘something soldiers fight'. Damning the joint intelligence organisation, colonial officials further blustered that the Cold War ‘has been pursued and interpreted in such a way as to make the JIC
completely myopic and almost to ignore the essential field of political developments unconnected or only indirectly connected with the Cold War, but vitally affecting HMG's position in the world'. The fanfaronade continued: the Colonial Office ‘had much trouble with the dangerous misconception favoured by the Ministry of Defence and the Chiefs of Staff, and in no way questioned by the JIC, that practically all our difficulties in the Colonies (as in the world as a whole) can be attributed to the Cold War, that is to say to Soviet and/or Communist subversion'.
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Patrick Dean, the straightforward JIC chairman, was not amused. And yet his pressure on the Colonial Office to play ball was to no avail. Colonial officials continued to deride JIC output as being of ‘very debatable value'. Furthermore they refused requests for full-time attendance of the Heads of Sections meetings where intelligence was integrated and assessments were composed.
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As a result, the JIC continued to frame Cyprus within a paradigm of broader communist subversion or an impending conventional global war with the Soviets.

Strategic intelligence assessments regularly addressed the impact of activity within international institutions. One such context was the relationship between Cypriot violence and the efficient workings of NATO. Drawing on three and a half years of violence patterns, the JIC noted in 1958 that ‘as so often happens, the turn of events in Cyprus is again waiting on things happening outside the Island—in this case, the current negotiations in NATO'.
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According to the committee, such discussions added an extra dimension to the patterns of Cypriot violence. Indeed, the JIC shared British policymakers' concern that international tensions caused by the conflict had negative implications for the workings of NATO. For example, in September 1955 the committee's intelligence expressed apprehension regarding the deterioration of Greco-Turkish relations and informed consumers that ‘following anti-Greek riots in Turkey, the Greek Government withdrew from NATO exercises during September'. NATO swiftly criticised the Greek action, leading the JIC to warn that ‘while Greek public opinion continues to be excited over Cyprus, there will remain a danger of friction which might impair the working of NATO'. Such concern was not, however, extended to Turkey, as the committee believed that Turkey's allegiance
to NATO was ‘unlikely to be affected by any differences with Greece over Cyprus'.
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Greece and Turkey were both strategically important countries on NATO's eastern flank. The JIC was consequently concerned about worsening diplomatic relations between them and in 1956 advised the Foreign Office to keep ‘a look out' for deterioration.
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As with other Cold War implications, concern over Cyprus and NATO was likely to have been emphasised by the chiefs of staff for whom the integrity of NATO was naturally a big priority. In fact, a few months before reaching the JIC's agenda, the chiefs of staff warned Patrick Dean that ‘the breakdown of negotiations in Cyprus might also exacerbate relations between Greece and Turkey, thus still further weakening NATO'.
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It is hardly surprising, therefore, that when Dean asked the Foreign Office to merely keep a look out for deterioration, the director of naval intelligence frantically lobbied instead for a more detailed examination to be commissioned.
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A second influential international forum impacting upon Cypriot events was the United Nations. Relating less to the Cold War, the debates within the UN were highly relevant to that other dominant strand in British thinking—imperial pressures and Britain's global role. Greece had hopefully assumed that UN debates on Cyprus would inevitably result in
enosis
. When this failed to materialise, a highly charged atmosphere was created. The JIC quickly cottoned on and intelligence assessments emphasised a correlation between patterns of violence and international discussions of the Cyprus question, a precedent perhaps set by the termination of the December 1954 UN session, which resulted in riots in Greece and Cyprus.
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In fact the JIC believed that the UN debates were more influential in determining violence patterns than their NATO equivalents. For example, in 1955 JIC intelligence reports predicted that ‘no substantial change is to be expected in the situation until the week-end, when the inscription of the Cyprus question on the agenda of the General Assembly will have come up for discussion in New York. […] At this point further demonstrations may well be staged in the island, with the attendant threat to public order'.
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Assessments evolved as the insurgency intensified. Intelligence began to predict an increase of violence directly before the UN debate, so as to ‘keep Cyprus well to the fore in the news'. To its credit, the JIC was often correct in this. For example, in February 1957 the committee
stated that an ‘intensified terrorist effort in anticipation of the United Nations debate is developing as expected'. Correspondingly, the JIC linked falls in violence after UN debates to the failure of EOKA to successfully ‘exploit the UN debate as they had intended'.
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Similarly, in 1958 the committee assessed that ‘a resumption of violence immediately after the United Nations debate is unlikely [because] a short period, at least, will probably be needed by Makarios, Grivas, and the Greek Government to reassess their problems'.
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The JIC's treatment of both the UN and NATO usefully demonstrates how strategic intelligence places developments in the bigger picture.

If the military took the lead within the JIC regarding NATO and the Cold War, then the Colonial Office finally took charge regarding the impact of a potential Arab-Israeli war on Cyprus. This was in marked contrast to events during the Malayan Emergency when military members framed and dominated most discussions. It indicates the initial impact of the 1955 reforms designed to better integrate the Colonial Office with the joint intelligence organisation. The Colonial Office was at last beginning to make its mark. Treaty obligations dating back to 1948 stipulating British defence commitment to Jordan worried policymakers towards the end of 1955. Of particular concern was the threat of a Jordanian conflict with Israel and the implications for British intervention. Consequently, the chiefs of staff brought the issue to the JIC's attention in November, initially under the broad banner of ‘The Likelihood of War between Israel and the Arab States'. Signifying the Colonial Office's newfound ability to frame the intelligence agenda, however, Charles Carstairs narrowed the main JIC discussion to ‘Possible Israeli Action Against Cyprus'.
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Carstairs emphasised the impact of foreign developments on colonial matters. He argued that ‘if the Israelis were intending to start a war, it would be in their interests to make it as difficult as possible for us to meet our commitments to Jordan. This could be done by tying troops down in Cyprus: It might, therefore, be in Israel's interest in these circumstances to stimulate the activities of EOKA in Cyprus by sending money'. Carstairs did admit that the Colonial Office ‘had no evidence that this was being done', but ‘wondered if other Departments had any
information'.
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This is an intriguing and instructive episode in the history of the JIC and the empire. The meeting firstly demonstrates how the insurgency engulfing Cyprus was considered as part of a broader context. Secondly, it reveals how the Colonial Office began to shape the central intelligence machinery when Cold War issues were not at stake. And thirdly, it conveys the benefits of the joint intelligence machinery: an integral role of the JIC was to provide a forum where different departments could discuss intelligence-related concerns and where integrated analysis of problems allowed committee members to understand cross-departmental implications of ongoing developments and then take the necessary action. In this case, the JIC ‘invited Departments to watch for signs of Israeli assistance to EOKA'.
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Consequently an informed interdepartmental discussion could take place when the committee next discussed the issue under the narrower colonial header. For his part, Carstairs continued to argue that ‘it seemed at least possible that, in the event of UK intervention against Israel in an Arab/Israeli war, Israel might see advantage in exploiting the situation in Cyprus to tie up British forces'. The options available to Israel, according to Carstairs, were to directly assist EOKA or to inflict air attacks on Cyprus in order to ‘cause panic and to induce civil disturbances'. An unnamed representative of SIS confirmed that ‘there was no doubt some elements in Israel, particularly the IZL [Irgun Zvai Leumi], would welcome any opportunity to foster anti-British activities', and it was well-known that the IZL had ‘approached Cypriots in the Levant'. The SIS intelligence appears to be at odds with reality. The Irgun were a Jewish militia operating during the British mandate of Palestine. They had, however, disbanded or merged into the Israeli Defence Force long before 1955. Perhaps SIS was referring to some unofficial remnants of the group or to dissident elements within the Israeli state. Either way, according to SIS, it was possible that Israelis (not necessarily with the knowledge of the government) ‘were training a few of the Cypriot terrorists, but so far there was no firm evidence to support this'. Again illustrating interdepartmental coordination, the SIS officer closed by reassuring the Colonial Office that they would be informed as soon as more evidence appeared.
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Ultimately, these concerns were irrelevant as there was no war, but nonetheless the discussions illustrate not only the JIC's internationalisation of insurgencies, but also the greater role for the Colonial Office in terms of framing the agenda and the beginnings of a
more integrated departmental discussion—so crucial for accurate intelligence assessment in the British system.

The Suez misadventure of 1956 was a vital episode in the recent history of Britain's role in the Middle East. Serving as a fascinating case study, it demonstrates not only an international event impacting upon an insurgency, but also relations between the central intelligence machinery and a constituent Whitehall department. Once again colonial officials were initially marginalised within the joint intelligence assessment organisation, before then asserting themselves and strongly criticising the JIC for neglecting colonial interests. The Suez Crisis, and the JIC's role within it, has been covered elsewhere and lies beyond the focus of this book.
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Specifically regarding Cyprus however, Operation Musketeer demanded many British forces be transferred from internal counter-insurgency duties for use against Egypt. Harding lost five ‘of the best units in the island', thereby giving ‘the sign for Grivas to step up EOKA's efforts'. It is, therefore, no coincidence that Operation Musketeer coincided with the largest EOKA offensive of the conflict.
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Intelligence assessments had long linked events in Egypt to those in Cyprus and as early as March 1956 warned of arms trafficking into Cyprus via Egyptian ports and airfields. Connecting these developments to the Egyptian authorities, intelligence further warned that ‘it has recently been reported that the Egyptian Government recently formed a “front” of Greeks living in Egypt to help the Cypriot resistance movement'.
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Similarly, the JIC investigated the impact of Cairo Radio, Nasser's notorious propaganda outlet, on the colony. By the late summer, the JIC confirmed that ‘Cairo Radio has been transmitting every evening a Greek programme of one hour's duration directed at Cyprus and including a fifteen minute commentary on Cyprus affairs partly derived from Greek sources. Some of these programmes (which are audible in Cyprus) have contained violent attacks on British policy in Cyprus and expressed support for the enosis movement'.
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The JIC was clearly aware of connections between Egypt and Cyprus. It is therefore surprising that the implications for the Cypriot insurgency of the Suez Canal nationalisation were so badly underestimated.

Nasser famously nationalised the canal in July 1956. The following month, the JIC predicted the situation that might arise if diplomatic
measures resulted in deadlock but short of war. Assessing the impact on Cyprus, it concluded that ‘The EOKA terrorist campaign is already dying down and may soon come to an end altogether. The local Communist Party has a considerable following in the Island, but even so, the dispute over the Suez Canal is unlikely to have any significant repercussions and we do not foresee any need for further troops'.
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Whilst the conclusion that there would be no need for extra troops in conditions short of war was accurate, intelligence grossly underestimated the strength of EOKA.