China's Territorial Disputes (38 page)

16    “PRC: Oil Firm, Chevron Sign Oil Exploration Contract 16 May,”
FBIS
China,16 May 1996, from Beijing XINHUA.

17    Lee Ngok, “Fishing in Troubled Waters?: Chinese Strategic Considerations in South China Sea,”
American Asian Review,
winter 1994, vol. XII, no. 4,112.

18    Craig Snyder, “The Implications of Hydrocarbon Development in the South China Sea,”
International Journal
, winter 1996/1997, vol. LII, 142-158.

19    Henry J. Kenny, “The South China Sea: A Dangerous Ground,”
Naval War College Review
summer 1996, vol. XLIX, no. 3, 97-98.

20 Mark J. Valencia, ‘Asia, the Law of the Sea, and IR,”
International Affairs,
1997, vol. 73, no. 2, 270.

21    Alice D. Ba, “China, Oil, and the South China Sea: Prospect    for Joint Development,”

American Asian Review,
winter 1994, vol. XII, no. 4,135.

22    S. Jayasankaran and John Beth, “Oil and Water,”
Far Eastern Economic Review
, 3 July 2003, 17.

23    
Md.

24    Ba, “China, Oil, and the South China Sea,” 132-133.

25    Lee Lai To, “ASEAN and the South China Sea Conflicts,”
Pacific Review
,    1995, vol.    8,

no. 3, 538-539.

26    Lee Lai To, “Defusing Rising Tension in the Spratlys: An Analysis of the Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea,”
American Asian Review
, winter 1994, vol. XII, no. 4, 189-190.

27    Lam Peng Er, ‘“Japan and the Spratlys Dispute,”
Asian Survey,
October 1996, vol. XXXVI, no.10, 998.

28    Lee, “Defusing Rising Tension in the Spratlys,” 192.

29    
Ibid.
, 193.

30    “Alatas Opens Workshop on Spratlys 3 Dec”
FBIS
East Asia, 4 December 1997, 4, Jakarta Media, Indonesia.

31 Jose T. Almonte, “Ensuring Security the ‘ASEAN Way’,”
Survival,
winter 1997/1998, 81.

32    “New Law Claims Sovereignty over the Spratly Islands,”
FBIS
China, 27 February 1992,15, Tokyo KYODO.

33    The CCP’s Central Committee Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group is headed by the premier and functions as a key policy coordination and supervision mechanism between the Politburo Standing Committee and the Foreign Ministry establishment. See Michael D. Swaine,
The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking
(Santa Monica CA: RAND, 1996), chapter 3, “Foreign Policy Subarena,” 19-36.

34    “Foreign Ministry Opposes Law,”
FBIS
China, 27 February 1992, 15-16, Tokyo KYODO.

35    Daojiong Zha, “Localizing the South China Sea Problem: The Case of China’s Hainan,”
Pacific Review,
2001, vol.14, no. 4, 580-581.

36    John W Garver, “China’s Push Through the South China Sea: The Interaction of

Bureaucratic and National Interests,”
China Quarterly,
December 1992, no. 132, 1022.    "

37    
Ibid.

38    Garver, “China’s Push Through the South China Sea,” 1008-1009.

39    You Ji and You Xu, “In Search of Blue Water Power: The PLA Navy’s Maritime Survey in the 1990s,”
Pacific Review,
1999, vol.4, no. 2,137-149.

40    Frank Ching, “Manila Looks for a Slingshot,”
Far Eastern Economic Review
, 9 May

1995, 40.    ^

41    Rodney Tasker, “A Line in the Sand,”
Far Eastern Economics Review
, 6 April 1995, 14.

42    Ross Marlay, “China, the Philippines, and the Spratly Islands,”
Asian Affairs - An American Review
, winter 1997, vol. 23, no. 4, 207.

43    
Asiaweek
, “A Breakthrough on the Spratlys,” 25 August 1995, 24.

44    Nayan Chanda, Rigoberto Tiglao and John McBeth, “Territorial Imperative,”
Far Eastern Economics Review
, 23 February 1995, 14.

45    “Ramos Defends Oil Search in Disputed Waters,”
FBIS
East Asia, 6 July 1994, Tokyo

KYODO.    ^

46    Rodney Tasker, “Ways and Means,”
Far Eastern Economic Review
, 11 May 1995, 14.

47    “The Claim on the Kalayaan Islands in Spratlys Group,”
BusinessWorld Weekender
(Philippines),14 February 1997.
http://bworld.net/oe021497/Weekend/
Focus/story3.html (accessed 20 January 2003).

48    Marlay, “China, the Philippines, and the Spratly Islands,” 207.

49    
Ibid.

50    Cheng-yi Lin, “Taiwan’s South China Sea Policy,”
Asian Survey
, April 1997, vol. XXXVLL, no. 4, 328.

51    Marlay, “China, the Philippines, and the Spratly Islands,” 207.

52    Shim Jae Hoon, “Blood Thicker than Politics,”
Far Eastern Economic Review
, 5 May 1988, 26.

53    Lin, “Taiwan’s South China Sea Policy,” 332.

54 Chen Jie, “China’s Spratly Policy,”
Asian Survey,
October 1984, vol. XXXIV, no.10, 900.

55    “Beijing Official on Cooperation to Tap Spratlys,”
FBIS
China, 30 August 1995, Taipei CNA.

56    “The South China Sea Policy Guidelines,” reprinted in Kuan-ming Sun, “Policy of the Republic of China towards the South China Sea,”
Marine Policy,
1995, vol.19, no.

5, 408.

57    Long-Distance Radio Century Club (DXCC), “BS7H 1997 Bulletin 13 - 0530Z, 07 May 1997.”
http://www.iglou.com/n4gn/sr/bltns/bltn13.html
(accessed 20 January

1999).

58    Andrew Sherry and Rigoberto Tiglao, “Law of the Seize,”
Far Eastern Economic Review,
12 June 1997, vol.17, 20-21.

59    “Philippines: Government Urged to Arm Residents in Spratly Islands,”
FBIS
East Asia, 9 May 1997.

60    “Manila To Build Lighthouses in Spratlys,”
FBIS
East Asia,19 May 1997.

61    “Philippines: Manila, PRC Agree on Working Group to Avert War in Spratlys,”
FBIS
East Asia, 30 May 1997.

62    “Philippines: China Warned on Spratlys Satellite Plans,”
FBIS
East Asia, 3 March 1998, Quezon City GMA-7 Radio-Television Arts Network.

63    Scott Snyder and Ralph A. Cossa, “Measures to Manage Potential Disputes in the South China Sea,”
Pacific Forum CSIS,
PacNet 22,1June 2001,1.

64    Zha, “Localizing the South China Sea Problem,” 588.

65    Clive Schofield and Shelagh Furness, “Boundary and Security Bulletin,”
International Boundaries Research Unit,
spring 2001, vol.9, no.1,60, quoting
Janets Foreign Report,
2627, 2 August 2001.

66    Brad Glosserman, “Cooling South China Sea Competition,”
Pacific Forum CSIS
, PacNet 22A, 1 June 2001, 2.

67    Zha, “Localizing the South China Sea Problem,” 577.

68    
Ibid.
, 581.

69    Garver, “China’s Push Through the South China Sea,” 1022.

70    Selig S. Harrison,
China, Oil and Asia: Conflict Ahead
(New York: Columbia University

Press, 1977), 206-207.    ^

71    Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam in 2001: The Ninth Party Congress and after,”
Asian Survey
, January-February 2002, vol. 42, no. 1, 81; and “Vietnam’s Government Defends Border Agreement with China,” Uyghur Information Agency,
http://www.uyghurinfo.com/viewNews.asp?newsid=5720
(accessed 4 July 2003).

72    Fred Herschede, “Trade between China and ASEAN: The Impact of the Pacific Rim Era,”
Pacific Affairs
, summer 1991, vol. 64, no. 2, 179-193.

73    Zhan Shiliang, “Yatai diqu xingshi he Zhongguo mulin youhao zhengce,”
Guoji wenti yanjiu,
1993, no. 4, 3.

74    Noor Aini Khalifah and Mohammad Haflah Piei, “ASEAN-China Economic Relations: Complementing or Competing,” in Joseph C. H. Chai, Y. Y. Kueh and Clement A. Tisdell (eds)
China and the Asia-Pacific Economy
(Commack NY: Nova Science Publishers, 1997), 226-227.

75    Thomas Voon and Xiangdong Wei, “Export Competition Among China and ASEAN in the US Market: Application of Market Share Models,” in Joseph C. H. Chai, Y. Y. Kueh and Clement A. Tisdell (eds)
China and the Asia-Pacific Economy
(Commack NY: Nova Science Publishers, 1997), 245-253.

76    
China Business Review,
“China Data,” May-June 1997, 41;and
People’s Daily,
10 January 2003; 25 February 2003.

77    That seems to have been the position of the Chinese government as late as 1997, when then Assistant Foreign Minister of China, Chen Jian, stated “on the problems concerning territory, sovereignty, and marine rights, only China and the countries starting the controversies should and can be allowed to solve their disputes through bilateral negotiations.” See Lee Lai To,
China and the South China Sea Dialogues
(Westport CT: Praeger, 1999), 94.

78    
Lianhe Zaobao
(Singapore), 5 August 1995.

79    Aileen San Pablo-Baviera, “Transforming the South China Sea Conflict,”
The SEACSN Bulletin,
October-December 2002,1;and Ralf Emmers, “ASEAN, China and the South China Sea: An Opportunity Missed,”
IDSS Commentaries
, 19 November 2002, 2.

80    For the proposed creation and envisaged role of the High Council, see Ramses Amer, “Expanding ASEAN’s Conflict Management Framework in Southeast Asia: The Border Dispute Dimension,”
Asian Journal of Political Science
, December 1998, vol. 6, no. 2, 36-39.

81    For dispute settlement mechanisms available under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, see J. R. Merrills,
International Dispute Settlement
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), chapter 8, “The Law of the Sea Convention,” 170-196.

82 United States Department of State,
United States Policy on the Spratlys and South China Sea,
(Washington DC: Government Printing Office,11 May 1995).

7 Testing the propositions of the two-level game hypothesis

Two-level game analysis and China，s territorial sovereignty disputes: strengths and limitations

An integrative perspective has come increasingly to dominate contemporary theorizing on diplomacy and international bargaining. The role of international and domestic factors in the mutual and simultaneous determination of the outcomes of international negotiations has now been widely recognized. While deals reached at the international level change the character of domestic politics, the dynamics of domestic constraints may open up or retard new possibilities for international accords. The framework put forward in Robert Putnam’s 1988 article provided a conceptual springboard for just such an integrative approach to international bargaining. My limited sample of three cases of extended territorial sovereignty dispute negotiation, plus a briefer treatment of a claim that may give rise to sovereignty talks some time in the future, cannot have rigorously tested the propositions generated by Putnam’s two-level game theory, propositions that should have wide-ranging implications for existing theories of international and domestic politics. However, by contrasting the recurrent failure to begin sovereignty talks on the East China Sea islands with the success in settling the Sino-Russian territorial dispute, along with China’s border dispute with India somewhere in between, and the involvement of transnational and subnational groups in the South China Sea islands dispute, I believe I have managed to explore and refine this bargaining theory of diplomacy, and used these recurring territorial controversies to discover more about its strengths and limitations than were apparent.

Having identified “win-sets” as the key variables of negotiation outcomes, the Putnam framework identified three broad factors or determinants that shape the size of these win-sets, to wit, societal preferences and governmental coalitions, ratification procedures of political institutions, and strategies of the negotiators. This framework follows closely the three traditional levels of analysis employed in the study of politics, namely society, state and leadership. Each of these determinants in turn gives rise to several propositions or predictions that allow us to make use of the findings derived from our study to evaluate the theory of two-level games. These are as listed below: 146
Testing the two-level game hypothesis