goes on to list commandments that fall on men and women alike and punishments that result from laxity with regard to them. Thus, even a potential discourse positing an essential relationship between women's sexuality and death is countered by the classical culture text, the Talmud, and precisely where it could have been expected to be activated, with regard to menstruation. 27
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Nor was this contestation only Babylonian; the Palestinian midrash on Ecclesiastes also "emends" the text, as it were, to read "For three things women die in childbirth, and for three things men die" (Kohellet Rabba
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| | 27. At least in the classical rabbinic period, this was not understood as an essential manifestation of demonic evil associated with blood, death, birth, or sexuality and was certainly not an association of woman per se with impurity or contamination, pace Wegner (Shaye J. D. Cohen 1991, 281).
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| | Other evidence cited by Wegner for her claim that rabbinic Judaism manifests an atavistic fear of women also seems to me to be misread, or at least to allow for another reading. Wegner's argument from the prohibition of a man from being alone with two women when a woman is not prohibited from being alone with two men simply does not establish her point that "the sages' androcentric perspective blames the dangers of private encounters between the sexes on women's moral laxity rather than on men's greater susceptibility to arousal" (Wegner 1988, 15961). The same argument can be made with reference to other rabbinic sexual "hedges," for example, the prohibition on a man hearing a woman singing if she is not his wife. Here again, there is no reason to assume that moral laxity of women rather than arousability of men is at all at issue. Indeed, this latter interpretation can be strengthened considerably when we remember that men are not supposed to look at the colored clothing of women on the clothesline, lest they be aroused by it, a situation in which moral laxity of women could hardly be the issue. These talmudic practices do propose some essential difference between men and women, and presuppose a social hierarchy, but they do not provide compelling or even persuasive evidence for a perception of women as dangerous and contaminating.
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| | Similarly, I do not think that the evidence cited by Nehama Aschkenasy supports her claim that in rabbinic culture, "Woman is seen primarily as a sexual being whose moral weakness is coupled with sexual power which she puts to evil use" (1986, 40), still less for her suggestion that "woman in general is condemned by the Midrash as immodest and voluptuous, especially in connection with the story of Creation" (ibid., 74). Aschkenasy gives three references to support this claim for what ''the Midrash" holds. As for the evidence from Genesis Rabba, it is apposite but not typical. I have already cited it above and evaluated its extent there. I see nothing on Sota 19b that supports such a claim at all and assume that the reference must be misprinted. The third text cited is The Fathers According to Rabbi Nathan 1. A careful reading of that entire passage supports only an argument that Eve was more susceptible to being deceived by the Serpent than Adam, no more than that. Moreover, the text explicitly blames even this on Adam, when it says, "What led to Eve's touching the tree? It was the hedge that Adam put around his words"that is, his exaggeration in reporting God's interdiction on eating from the tree caused Eve to be deceived. God had said not to eat, but Adam's report that he had said not even to touch the tree enabled the snake to fool her (Goldin 1955, 910).
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