and intentions, and assured the Soviets that it would avoid a direct confrontation with the United States. Moscow, on its side, made clear both privately to Mao and publicly that the Soviet Union would assist China in case of a conflict with the Americans. Although the Soviets were puzzled and not too pleased by the timing of the Chinese military operations, Khrushchev accepted Mao's underlining of Beijing's need to keep the issue of Chinese reunification in focus and to pressure Washington to open negotiations with China.
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In 1955, as collectivization transformed ancient patterns of production and ownership in the Chinese countryside, Mao began to regret the measured pace of socialist change during the first years of the People's Republic. Enflamed by what he saw as the creativity and energy of the masses, Mao believed that the introduction of socialism and increases in productivity should be speeded up, and he started to suspect that some of the leaders of his own party had been holding him back deliberately, because they feared relying on the masses and were too bound up by the stages of the Soviet experience. The post-Stalin changes that were taking place in the Soviet Union emboldened Mao in his new revolutionary optimism just as Khrushchev had unleashed the full productive forces of socialism, Mao hoped to mobilize his party for a quicker and more thorough socialist transformation.
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Mao's response to the CPSU Twentieth Congress in February 1956 must be seen in light of these changes in his political attitudes. The chairman welcomed Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin, noting to the Soviet ambassador in March that if the CCP had followed Stalin's advice, it never would have taken power. For Mao, de-Stalinization implied Soviet criticism of Stalin's China policy and Moscow's recognition of the achievements of the CCP and of Mao himself. Therefore, Khrushchev's criticism of Stalin would enable Mao to further his own visions of socialism in China.
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But while welcoming Khrushchev's "secret" speech, Mao saw at least three problems with the way the criticism of Stalin had been presented. He resented not having been consulted before the speech was made. Also, Mao felt that Khrushchev's condemnation was too general and wanted specific criticism of Stalin's policies (including, to be sure, his policies on China). Third, Mao took exception to the fact that the speech had been leaked to the West and feared that Khrushchev's behavior would weaken international socialism.
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For Mao, the popular rebellions against Communist rule in Poland and Hungary in the summer and fall of 1956 confirmed his worst fears about the consequences of Khrushchev's behavior and made him turn violently against the process of de-Stalinization.
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The East European crises arose just as Mao was receiving reports of resistance to collectivization and the party's control of culture and city administration. Expecting a full-scale confrontation with "counter-
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