British Voices (15 page)

The following night, however, we were more successful as, acting on information we had previously received that after this Flying Column of the IRA had carried out an operation north of the Bandon River, they usually moved south and billetted in a group of farms in an area northeast of Kilbrittain, we took a strong party out in Crossley cars with a view to raiding these houses. The night was fairly moonlight and we therefore drove without lights. When about two miles from our destination we surprised a party of men trenching the road, who fled as we approached. Being unable to take the lorries further on account of the trench, we proceeded on foot, and on arrival at a cross road called Crushnalanniv close to our objective, we surprised an IRA picquet and accounted for four out of six of them, without any loss to ourselves. They were all armed with service rifles and carried about 50 rounds of SAA each. The firing, of course, alarmed the main body of the Flying Column who were billeted in the adjoining farms, and they immediately made off, but our tactics of surprise action, based on information available, had been entirely successful. The four dead men were subsequently identified as belonging to the local IRA Company which had evidently been called out for outpost duty during the night, while the main column rested.

A month or so later we were involved in what was probably one of the biggest fights in the open which took place during the ‘Irish War', and this action is worth describing in some detail.

The man who, as I told you, was captured in the Upton train ambush turned out to be the Company Commander of the local IRA Company. This man, hoping to save his life, one day, asked to see the Brigade IO at Cork and informed him the headquarters of the 3rd Cork Brigade. The IRA were located in a group of farms in the Ballymurphy townland and there was a dug-out in the same locality, but he did not know exactly where. It was, therefore, arranged for a combined operation to be carried out at dawn the following morning by about 60 men from Bandon and a similar number from Cork, each party being allotted a definite group of farms and being responsible for having these surrounded at Zero hour. (6am). The Bandon party set out in lorries at 2.30am and motored to the Brinny Cross Roads, from which point the lorries were sent back to avoid disturbing the enemy. An escort of one officer and eight men were sent with the lorries; they had one LG and the drivers (eight in number) were also armed with revolvers. Orders were given to the officer to bring the lorries out again to meet the raiding party at Cross Barry at 7.30am and to proceed to this point by bounds with a patrol on foot out in front.

The raiding party then marched the remaining five miles and were in position at Zero. An exciting episode immediately took place as on entering one of the houses, the officer in charge of one patrol was fired at, at point blank range, by a man standing inside. The man then bolted out of the back door where he was shot dead by a sergeant who had been posted there. It is always well before entering the door to remain behind the door post till it is certain the way is clear. The dead man turned out to be the commandant of the 3rd Cork Brigade IRA.

Several other captures were effected in this neighbourhood, but at 7.30 am a heavy burst of firing was heard from Cross Barry and we at once guessed that our own lorry convoy with the skeleton escort had been ambushed there. We therefore quickly collected our party and moved down with a view to attacking the ambushers in the flanks and if possible, saving the lorries. We found the party of IRA which consisted of their Flying Column reinforced by local Companies about 100 strong in all – holding a position on the high ground overlooking the road and, as we approached, a series of explosions showed that they were beginning to blow up the lorries which had fallen into their hands. Following their usual tactics they then beat a hasty retreat, which was remarkable for the speed with which they moved across country and their main body succeeded in escaping before we could throw a cordon round them.

Our losses in this action (mostly among the lorry drivers and escort) were:, one officer and nine men killed and two officers and five men wounded, while we had two lorries completely destroyed. The losses of the IRA were four killed and three prisoners, and a number of wounded whom they succeeded in getting away. We also captured and destroyed their ammunition cart.

This was the last big ambush in that part of the country, and the moral effect of our sudden appearance on the enemy's flank made him very ‘chary' of again laying ambushes on roads.

This was a very good example of the old saying that ‘It is the unexpected that happens in war' – and especially in a war of this nature.

With regard to the trenching of the roads, we tried many expedients to neutralise this, but they were none of them very successful. We started by carrying light bridges on the lorries, which were for a time effective, but we found that, when the trenches became more than fourteen feet wide, the bridges would not take the weight of the lorry. The best method then is to ‘ramp' the trench by sloping off the sides, but even that takes a long time. We also tried to fill them up with local civilian labour, but they would invariably be opened again within the next few days – probably by the same labour; in fact, the local inhabitants spent most of their time opening and filling in trenches during this period!

It is really impossible in warfare of this nature to keep road communications open if the enemy are determined to deny you the use of the roads.

This brought about an entirely new situation and in my next lecture, I will show you how we dealt with this situation.

L
ECTURE
2

Period April-July, 1921

In my last lecture I brought you up to the time when it became impossible any longer to use the roads for tactical purposes. It was obvious, therefore, that it was useless to rely any more on lorry movements, except for purposes of supply, etc. Summer was just coming on and it was decided to play the enemy at his own game, and form Military Mobile Columns, which would move on foot across country or by country lanes and thus avoid any danger of ambush. Further, by their power to move in any direction and at any time; these columns were able to make use of the element of surprise and also considerably lowered the enemy's morale by creating in him a feeling of insecurity.

Our columns consisted generally of two strong platoons, about two sections of which were mounted on cycles, and were accompanied by a cooker and a couple of GS limbered wagons to carry the men's kits. The men themselves were equipped as lightly as possible as we found mobility was of paramount importance to enable them to compete with the guerrilla tactics of the enemy.

Although we carried out a number of minor raids with these columns, and were constantly arresting some of the lesser lights of the IRA, we always insisted on regarding the enemy Flying Columns as our main objective as it was only by the destruction of those columns that we could hope to stop the IRA activities.

Our usual method of working these mobile columns was to send out two or three at the same time and to allot each an area to work in, leaving empty an area, which we knew was a favourite resort of the IRA column. Then, during an agreed night all columns would move by a forced march, often of fifteen miles or so, and concentrate on the empty area and during the next day carry out a thorough search of this area.

With regard to what may be called the minor tactics of the mobile columns, we relied almost entirely on surprise action. If our objective was a village we would billet or bivouac five or six miles away, and then send off a bicycle patrol to make a sudden descent on the village at dusk. At other times, we would send out a patrol on foot to ambush a crossroads, for a portion of the night.

The principle we worked on was that, to obtain surprise, you must work well away from your transport, which on a still night can be heard miles off coming along the road. We almost invariably moved by night and rested by day, often doubling back on our footsteps, so that the enemy never knew in which direction we were going to move next.

The result of these manoeuvres was that between April and July we were never once ambushed by the enemy.

In addition to the Mobile Columns a great deal of local patrolling was carried out by each Detachment, so as to keep the enemy on the move, and prevent him resting in any quiet area. The general idea was that there should be no quiet areas, and that the enemy columns should be constantly harassed.

The course usually pursued by the rebels during this period was to make off to the mountainous district to the northwest of our area when things became too hot for them. Several drives on a big scale in these mountains were organised by the Brigade, but generally speaking they had very little success. It was found to be almost impossible to keep secret the preparations necessary for controlling a large force in a small area and to feed them when they had got there.

It is, of course, a very difficult matter to round up a party of 20-30 Irregulars in this sort of warfare owing to their mobility and good intelligence, but we had conclusive evidence that, at the time of the Truce in July, our tactics of rapid movement and surprise had had such a demoralising effect on their nerves that in another few weeks the back of the Rebellion would have been broken.

The IRA during this period reverted to ‘sniping' tactics. They regularly sniped policemen standing outside their Barracks, and on one occasion carried out simultaneous raids on all our Detachments, the object being to snipe the sentry and then make off. Fortunately they were only successful in one instance. An interesting incident occurred on the same day. One of their leaders was taking ammunition to a point of rendezvous for a raid on the Detachment at the Old Head of Kinsale, and was ambushed by a Mobile Column. His ammunition consisting of about 150 rounds of Mauser cartridges was captured though he himself escaped through having a scout on a horse 100 yards in front who gave the alarm in time.

It must be remembered that the IRA were no fools in the conduct of guerrilla warfare. Captured documents contained very clear and detailed instructions as to the best methods of carrying out different operations, and they even laid down certain principles of war – the majority of which were the same as ours. One of these principles was the principle of security, which was strictly observed by the rebel leader on this occasion, who saved himself by having a scout out in front.

Another step taken by the IRA during this period was the inauguration of a ruthless campaign against the Loyalists. Every success of ours was almost invariably followed by the murder or kidnapping of one or two Loyalists, who were, of course, entirely unprotected. Their object in doing this, when they saw they were being pressed in the active operations, was to induce the authorities to conclude a Truce. The culminating point in their policy of murder and arson was reached in June 1921, when Castle Bernard, the residence of Lord Bandon, was burnt to the ground and Lord Bandon himself was kidnapped. A few days later a well known lady, who had become an ardent Sinn Féin, came down to Castle Bernard and said to Lady Bandon, ‘I have been sent down by our people to warn you that, unless the Government conclude a Truce, Lord Bandon will be killed.'The reply was – ‘If that is all you have to say, you had better go home.'

In a struggle of this nature, the existence of a number of Loyalists among an otherwise hostile population is, and always will be, a powerful weapon in the hands of the rebels. Repeated demands will be received from these Loyalists for the protection of their persons and property, but this it will usually be impossible to grant. The only method of protecting them is to concentrate those who are willing to leave their homes in ‘protected areas'. This it was proposed to do if the negotiations for a settlement had broken down. As long as they remain in the country they are a source of great weakness, as not only are they entirely at the mercy of the rebels, but they are also forced at the point of a revolver to keep the rebels supplied with funds and food.

Intelligence

I think it is clear from what I have already told you that it would have been impossible to carry out any operations without having a reasonably good Intelligence service. This was not fully realised in the early days of the struggle, and it was not till early in 1920 that the appointment of Battalion IOs was first made. The information in our possession at that time as to who was or who was not mixed up in the Sinn Féin movement was practically nil. What information there was was in the hands of the RIC and it took a lot of talking before you got very much out of them.

Objects of Intelligence

The objects of the Intelligence service were, I think, three in number:

• (i)
  To obtain all possible information as to the organisation and plans of the IRA
  
• (ii)
  To find out all about the inhabitants of the country.
  
• (iii)
  To get a thorough knowledge of the topography of the country.
  

I will deal with these three objects in detail.

(i) The Organisation and plans of the IRA

It is obviously impossible to carry on a campaign unless you know who your opponents are. It was, therefore, necessary to study the organisation of the IRA and with this end in view an ‘Order of Battle' of the IRA was issued from time to time from Brigade headquarters and was kept up to date at Battalion headquarters. This order of battle included particulars as to the Battalion and Company organisation of the IRA Brigades, and the names of the officers in those units as far as known. It was, therefore, the duty of the Battalion IOs to find out who these officers were, where they lived and what they looked like.