Arrested Development and Philosophy (13 page)

A person who has such an aversion to sexuality would naturally be unfamiliar with sexual innuendo, turns of phrase, and double entendres. Such a person would understandably seem odd in social encounters, especially those that involve sexual suggestions. It’s also entirely plausible that a person who is uncomfortable with sexuality may be genuinely uncomfortable with the traditional sexual norms. Perhaps instead of criticizing Tobias (why do we care so much about what he does with his penis?), we should look at him as a source of wisdom. We ought to ask ourselves what he can teach us about gender and gender roles. Why might Tobias be so uncomfortable with traditional norms?

Gender Empowerment

While Tobias certainly misses a lot, so do we. While we’re busy laughing, we often don’t realize what might be gained from Tobias’s words. Tobias often uses phrases that give power to women, or the feminine generally (and remember, sex and gender aren’t the same!). When talking about feats of strength, Tobias often ignores the typical references to male abilities. Instead he says things like “you’d need the strength of a she-hulk” to open a jar, as he did in “Storming the Castle.”

In addition, Tobias doesn’t feel bound to the traditional gendered pronouns. He uses “she” and “he” nearly interchangeably, including in his book, where he changes all pronouns to the masculine “for ease of the reader.” Tobias later recognizes that perhaps it was a mistake to only focus on the masculine; he suspects that the lack of feminine pronouns may have resulted in alienation of women readers. Instead of using pronouns based on a person’s sex or sexual orientation, he uses them based on behaviors and traits. Thus, he uses gendered pronouns in a way unlike the way most people tend to.

For example, when a person is exhibiting feminine traits (such as when Steve Holt (!) is cast as Beatrice), Tobias uses feminine pronouns independent of the person’s biology or sexuality. Steve Holt (!) is a “she” because his
role
is that of a female. (It really is that simple, even if Michael can’t see it!). Calling Steve “she” has nothing to do with sexual orientation or biology. Gender is something we
perform,
it isn’t something we
are.

Tobias is bringing challenges to the English language through gender ambiguity and novel uses of gendered pronouns. By forcing us to reexamine our presumptions about gender, he shows us that we’ve been wrong to assume that all females are feminine and all males are masculine (as well as the assumption that the feminine are attracted to the masculine and vice versa).
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Analraping Tobias

At the end of the day it’s not important what gender Tobias has. Rather, what Tobias shows us is how deeply rooted
our
gender biases are. Most people quickly jump to the assumption that there’s something wrong with Tobias because he falls outside of traditional gender norms. Few people, however, take the time to ask themselves why they assume that he’s gay, nor do they reflect on the problems associated with making generalizations about a person on the basis of a stereotype. Additionally, people often tend to ignore why they think it
matters
whether Tobias is gay. The focus on his gender as a problem shows not only our preoccupation with gender, but also with sexual orientation. The merit of Tobias shouldn’t lie in his sexual orientation—whether he’s gay or straight isn’t a “problem” that needs a “solution.”

Moreover, focusing on biases prevents appreciation of Tobias’s admirable traits. Tobias sincerely wants to be a good person. Consider, for example, the episode “In God We Trust,” when he disrobes (a huge step for him!) to reveal his never-nudism because he believes it will help George Michael through his own body issues, as well as help him be a good actor. Granted, Tobias is often confused about what that being a good person entails, like when he tries to set George Michael up with Steve Holt (!) in “Bringing Up Buster,” but that doesn’t mean he is not earnest and sincere. He’s also the type of person who focuses on capabilities, propensities, skills and interests, not restrictive gender roles. Instead of defining himself entirely in the context of what is expected of him as a man, Tobias looks instead towards the universe’s plan. He need not adhere to social expectations of him on the basis of his sex and gender (many of his choices for auditions involve performances that are typically feminine, such as his excerpt from “The Vagina Monologues”); instead, he places his faith in the universe to prescribe the best course of action for him. Tobias tells the family’s publicist that, “I truly believe the universe wants me to be an actor and not a doctor, I’m just waiting for a sign.” And when Carl Weathers is on the same shuttle to the airport, Tobias exclaims, “Universe, You’ve done it again!” (“Public Relations”). Tobias believes the universe will devise a plan that’s best for him based on his character and his skills, not his gender.

Tobias as the Ideal

When we stop trying to figure out Tobias’s gender or sexual orientation, we can see that he has quite a bit to offer. In philosophy and different branches of feminism, androgyny has been suggested as either an ideal or an alternative to the feminine/masculine gender dichotomy.
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An androgynous individual possesses both feminine and masculine behavioral characteristics and traits. Instead of being wholly defined by one gender, an androgynous person blurs the lines and draws from both sets of traits. The benefit of androgyny is that it removes the polarity that a gender dichotomy presents. That is, instead of being feminine
or
masculine, an individual is just a person. The focus is moved from identifying a person based on expected behaviors determined by gender, to identifying the person based on traits, abilities, and so on.

In a society with a history of oppressing one gender, gender traits often reflect (and at times reinforce) that oppression. In removing the focus on gender by focusing instead on androgyny, we can also remove some of the damage caused by past and current oppression.

Tobias might in fact be pansexual or omnisexual (much like his server gig in Reno in “The Swallows”). A pansexual or omnisexual is a person whose identity and sexual choices are not limited or determined by gender (the person may engage in sexual acts with all genders). Thus, a person who is pan- or omnisexual will have a sexually diverse personality and lifestyle and will choose sexually diverse activities with partners independent of their biology or gender. What is important about these classifications is that they remind us about sexual and gender diversity. As we encounter greater varieties of people, lifestyles, and traits, it becomes clear that the classic conceptions of gender and sexuality are no longer sufficient. In the contemporary world, we must acknowledge our past mistakes of expecting people to fit into personality types. What a person like Tobias shows us is that we needn’t concern ourselves with fitting into a specific mould; we need not worry about whether we’re too feminine or masculine, nor about whether our sexuality or personality conforms to “normal” standards. Instead, like Tobias, we should find the universe’s plans for ourselves and follow them to the best of our abilities. Surprisingly, the problem with Tobias is that there may not be a problem at all; perhaps the problem is with social expectations about sex and gender. Perhaps we should all try to find the Tobias inside of us.

NOTES

1.
Jami L. Anderson,
Race, Gender and Sexuality: Philosophical Issues of Identity and Justice
(Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2002), p. 29.

2.
See season 1, episode 2, “Top Banana”; season 1, episode 3, “Bringing Up Buster”; season 2, episode 11, “Out on a Limb”; season 1, episode 11, “Public Relations”; season 2, episode 15, “Sword of Destiny.”

3.
In season 3, episode 11, “Faking It,” we see Tobias knitting on the couch. See scrapbooking in season 3, episode 12 “Exit Strategy,” and creating glitter-filled gift baskets in season 3, episode 9, “S.O.B.s.”

4.
In season 3, episode 12, “Exit Strategy,” he’s seen wearing an ill-fitting women’s blazer; season 1, episode 18, “Justice Is Blind,” and episode 11, “Out on a Limb,” he dresses in Maggie Lizer’s clothes (and in the latter, also her pregnancy suit); as Falidia Featherbottom in season 2, episodes 14–16, “The Immaculate Election,” “Sword of Destiny,” and “Meat the Veals.”

5.
See season 2, episode 11, “Out on a Limb”; season 1, episode 11, “Public Relations”; and season 2, episode 1, “Sword of Destiny.”

6.
The jokes about Tobias’s alleged homosexuality are too many to list or summarize entirely.

7.
“Out on a Limb” makes a play on this; Tobias accuses Lucille of being in denial, which he later exhibits in response to her criticism of him.

8.
See, for example, “Bringing Up Buster” and “Not Without My Daughter.”

9.
For an additional discussion of the benefits of recreating gendered pronouns, see, for example, Leslie Feinberg’s
Trans Liberation: Beyond Pink or Blue
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1999), which argues that the contemporary use of gendered pronouns puts too much emphasis on the social expectations and not enough on the humanity of an individual.

10.
For example, Ann Ferguson, Mary Vetterling-Braggin, Mary Ann Warren, Andrea Dworkin, Carol Gould, Marilyn Freidman, and James Sterba, to name a few.

Chapter 11

I’M OSCAR.COM

The Problem(s) of Personal Identity in
Arrested Development

Kristopher Phillips

“Unfortunately for Oscar, ‘you’ve got the wrong twin’ was a common alibi” (“The Cabin Show”). Poor Oscar, nobody believes him. And why should they? Oscar looks just like George Sr., especially after George shaves Oscar’s head. They’re identical twins, after all. But this raises a host of important philosophical questions about the nature of personal identity—what makes Oscar
himself
and not George? What makes Oscar the same person from one moment to the next? What evidence do we have to help us tell the difference between Oscar and George?

There are a few different
kinds
of issues that philosophers raise about identity. Indeed what is often called “
the
problem of personal identity” is not one problem, but many. The first of the problems concerns what
actually
makes Oscar who he is and not somebody else (George Sr., for example). We’ll call this the metaphysical question. The second problem concerns persistence: What does it take to make Oscar the same person from one moment to the next? And the third problem concerns evidence: How do we
know
who is who? As we’ll see,
Arrested Development
teaches us the most about the first kind of problem, but it also offers some insights into the problems of persistence and evidence.

Bland (I mean, Ann), Marta, the Richters, Aristotle, and the Metaphysical Question

As we all know, Michael is no fan of his son’s girlfriend, Ann. Ann is
essentially
a bore. She and her family hold their parties on Bethlehem time and engage in hours upon hours of silent prayer. Ann is not the most beautiful woman in the world, nor is she ugly . . . she’s just
bland
. In fact, Ann was played by two different actresses, and the transition from one to the next was nearly seamless. I guess that’s what happens when your most defining feature is that you lack any defining features (I mean, under her school picture, it said “not pictured”). But Ann is not alone in her replaceability; indeed she is not the only character who was played by multiple actresses. Marta, Gob’s on again, off again girlfriend, is herself portrayed by a pair of actresses. Michael, though, is a big fan of Marta. Marta is
essentially
everything that Michael could want in a woman (for himself or for his son): She’s attractive, family oriented, charming, and successful. Despite the fundamental differences between Marta and Ann, both characters are seamlessly played by two different actresses. How could this work out so well? In answer to this question, we can appeal to the philosophical and scientific works of Aristotle (384–322 BCE).

According to Aristotle, each species has some specifically defining feature or set of features that make it what it is rather than some other species.
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He famously held that a “[hu]man is a rational animal.” This was what Aristotle took to be the
essential characteristic
that belongs to all and only humans. This isn’t to say that all humans are
essentially
and totally the same, for that’s obviously false. Rather, Aristotle says that all humans share this characteristic, and this explains why they’re all so similar, as well as what’s unique about them. (Aristotle also defines the human being as a featherless biped—but this doesn’t capture what’s
unique
about human beings). If something lacks the unique characteristic that makes us different from the other featherless bipeds (namely
rationality
), then it’s not a human.

But this alone doesn’t explain how two women could so easily be one character. Yes, both women are featherless bipeds, and both have the rational capacity Aristotle argues is unique to human beings. But these similarities don’t explain the differences between individuals that belong to any particular group. To account for these differences, Aristotle argues that each individual person has different kinds of characteristics, some
essential
(necessary), and some
accidental
(contingent). This is the key to understanding Aristotle’s view on what makes Annabelle (I only call her that because she’s shaped . . . she’s the belle of the ball!) who she is and not somebody else. Essential properties are those that Ann cannot get rid of
and still be Ann
. Ann, it seems, could change her hair color, or could have had different colored eyes and it wouldn’t mean that she’s literally a
different
person. Buster lost a hand to a seal, but he didn’t cease being Buster, even if he did become “a monster” (or “half-machine”). As we saw, Ann can even ditch her religious beliefs and take up a relationship with Gob, and still be Ann. These are all
accidental properties
. If Ann ceased to “have a low center of gravity, [so that] you can’t knock her down” or ceased being bland, then, it might seem that we’re not talking about the same person anymore.

Similar things can be said about Marta. She seems to be
essentially
beautiful, charming, an accomplished actress, and, well, Hispanic.
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These are the traits common across the two actresses who portray her. Her height, her hairstyle, and so on, aren’t things that the two Marta’s have in common, but that doesn’t really seem to matter much. These aren’t
essential
to who Marta is. The
essential
traits we’re considering are all fairly shallow, though. We don’t know much about Marta, and as central a character as Ann is, we don’t know all that much about her, either.

Many of these
essential
traits have to do with the way Ann and Marta appear. But what if, as is the case with George and Oscar, the people we’re wondering about look as if they are (and actually
are
) qualitatively identical? This is exactly the case with Andy Richter and his four identical siblings, who appear in “S.O.B.s.” The only way to distinguish between these five characters (Andy, Rocky, Donny, Chareth, and Emmitt) is by appealing to what the infinitely wise Narrator offers as the defining characteristic of each of them, “there’s Andy, the show-off; Chareth, the flirt; Rocky, the stuntman; Donny, the sensitive one; and Emmitt, but we’re not allowed to show his face . . .” This way of explaining the essence of each person may at first glance appear to be a promising answer to the metaphysical question, and maybe even the evidential question. After all, if an Andy Richter look-alike charges into your house and pretends to slam you against a wall and hold you there, you can probably assume that it’s Rocky (as long as he leaves you in total control of the situation). Yet, this might not be as promising for the evidential approach as it first appears. Andy himself shows up at the “Save Our Bluths” banquet pretending to be Emmitt, and, though suspicious, nobody can prove it is really Andy. So, maybe this speaks against essences as a solution to the evidential problem.

The case of George and Oscar isn’t so different from that of the Richters. George and Oscar have very different essential properties. Oscar isn’t particularly ambitious, while George is overly ambitious. Oscar isn’t worried about money, while that’s all George seems to value. These essential differences aren’t enough to convince the cops, but they are enough for Michael. When Oscar states, “I understand, your child comes first,” this cues Michael in to Oscar’s identity (“The Cabin Show”).

Despite the seeming promise of the essentialist approach to the metaphysical question, our discussion of
the essence
of a person is still pretty mysterious. What
is
this essence that we keep talking about? So far we’ve enumerated a few different things that might be
examples
of an essence, or of an
essential property
, but we’re still a far cry from knowing just what the essence
is
. So let’s consider how Aristotle’s view could be revised to make it more informative.

Oh My God . . . You’re Oscar. Dot com. [and George Sr. and the Metaphysical and Persistence Problems]

Aristotle’s work in philosophy and science was hugely influential for a long time after his death (in 322 BCE). Many medieval theologians and philosophers, such as Augustine of Hippo
3
(354–430) and Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), constructed philosophical systems at least in part based on Aristotle’s principles. During this period, there was an “exapting” of the idea of the essence from Aristotelian doctrine, to the Christian doctrine of the immaterial soul (the bearer of mind and personality, and the part of humans that survives the death of the material body).

This approach was picked up by the first modern philosopher, René Descartes (1596–1650), who was a devout (and some argue, terrible) Catholic. Descartes made
substance
dualism
one of the cornerstones of his philosophical system. Substance dualism is the view that there are two distinct kinds of stuff that exist, matter or body and mind or spirit, and neither one requires the other to exist. According to Descartes, each of us has our own immaterial soul, and that soul is the bearer of our individual mind; it makes us who we are. In a way, the soul
is
the essence of a person. In light of other traditional theological considerations, the “essence as soul” approach becomes a bit less mysterious, and a bit more robust. This gives us a more straightforward answer to the metaphysical question: What makes George Sr. different from Oscar? Oscar has a unique soul, and thus we can explain the fundamentally different feel that Oscar’s character has from his brother throughout the show. George and Oscar have different immaterial souls, despite having such similar bodies.

Aristotle thought that a person consisted of a specific combination of essence (he called it “form”) and matter. Ann is bland and is bound to her bell-shaped-body, Marta is a fox, and is bound to the material that makes up her body. The Cartesian (Descartes’s) view,
4
on the other hand, isn’t committed to this at all. There’s nothing specific to your body that’s essential to you on his view. To be sure, Oscar and George have different bodies, Oscar has hair (oh, that hair . . .) while George doesn’t. They can stand next to each other, and that would only be possible if they had numerically distinct bodies. To be sure, there’s a fair amount of switching places because their bodies look so much alike. On Descartes’s view, if George had the power, he could switch souls with Oscar, and that would probably solve many of his problems. By doing this, he wouldn’t have to rely on the Cornballer’s shoddy craftsmanship to burn off Oscar’s fingerprints, or his adopted Korean child, Annyong (hello!), playing Uncle Sam in a school play so that he can “take wig”; he could
really
switch bodies.

This raises an interesting question about the interaction of the soul with the body: if George and Oscar did switch souls, would the George body, now inhabited by Oscar’s soul, start growing hair? Just how the soul interacts, and is joined with the body is an issue central to the philosophy of mind, and most philosophers after Descartes find his explanation wanting. But that’s an issue for another day. Descartes, of course, doesn’t think that any of us have the power to swap souls with one another (and isn’t really concerned with George Sr.’s lack of hair) and, if he’s right, that’s a good thing for Oscar. It’s hard enough for him to stay out of prison as it is.

Aside from the obvious explanatory value of the Cartesian picture for the metaphysical question (which seems to speak in favor of the Cartesian picture), Descartes’s use of the immaterial soul provides an answer to the persistence problem. Descartes maintained, in accord with the Judeo-Christian tradition, that the soul can and does survive the death of the body. This offers an easy answer to the persistence problem: If the soul is what makes George different from Oscar, and George’s soul will survive the
actual
death of his body, as opposed to the less-than-perfect deception attempted by the Mexican authorities, then it seems to follow that from one moment to the next, George’s soul does the work of making him continue to be George Sr. But, as with most answers to philosophical questions, the Cartesian view is not without problems.

Larry (the Surrogate), Forget-Me-Nows, and Locke’s Criticism of Descartes

John Locke (1632–1704) is not just a character from
Lost
. There was also a John Locke who was a contemporary of Descartes, and on more than one occasion took on Descartes’s views directly. In his
Essay Concerning Human Understanding
Locke not only considers the Cartesian view on personal identity, but he offers a troubling counterexample. The idea is basically this: if Descartes is right that the soul makes you,
you
, then what if Socrates’s soul “revolved around several human bodies” and what if we met a man who was able to convince you that “his had been the
soul
of Socrates . . . would any one say that he, being not conscious of Socrates’ actions or thoughts could be the same person as Socrates?”
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This is a simple question, but it gets to the heart of Locke’s objection, and it foreshadows his own account of personal identity. Before we get to what Locke thought makes you
you
, we should flesh out this objection a bit. It’s a strong objection that hits the Cartesian view on two levels. First, it’s a metaphysical objection. If the soul is immaterial (does not exist in space, time, and so on), then we may end up having to say that you are
the same person
as many people that have lived before you. This is a startling conclusion, and when we consider how bad we feel for Oscar as he sits in prison, wrongly accused of his brother’s crimes, this might make us uncomfortable. If Oscar has the soul of many others from the past, and the soul makes him who he is, then he
may well
be responsible for having done something terrible in the past (albeit distinct from the terrible things George Sr. has done). If this is right, we shouldn’t feel so bad about Oscar’s time in prison, even if he doesn’t remember doing any of those terrible things
he
did.