A History of Strategy (2 page)

To the Chinese, war was both a necessary evil and a temporary departure from “cosmic harmony,” or
dao
. By definition,
dao
can only be restored by
dao
. Hence the war will be won by the side possessing the greatest Virtue, Virtue itself being but another translation of
dao
. “You should cultivate your Virtue … and observe the
dao
of Heaven” says Ta’i Kung in his Opening Instructions. “In general, warfare is a question of Heaven, material resources, and excellence,” says Ssu-ma Ch'ien. “Appraise it [war] in terms of the five fundamental factors,” says Sun Tzu. “The first of these factors is moral influence … by moral influence I mean that which causes the people to be in harmony with their leaders, so that they will accompany them in life and unto death without fear of mortal peril.” In the words of Sun Pin, “engaging in a battle without righteousness, no one under Heaven would be able to be solid and strong.”

The military virtue of an army takes the form of strict discipline. Or perhaps one should say that, since necessity is not for every private to judge, discipline is the general’s way to impose it on his troops. A famous story told about Sun Tzu illustrates the point. As Sun Tzu asked the King of Wu to employ him as a general, the king in turn asked him if he could fashion an army out of the royal wives and concubines. Sun Tzu said he could, and promptly set about to teach them drill. The women took it as a lark: laughing and joking among themselves, they disobeyed Sun Tzu’s instructions. Having explained himself several times over, and seeing himself disobeyed still, he ordered that the king’s two favorite wives be executed. To the king, who tried to intervene, Sun Tzu explained that since he himself was now the commanding general he need not take all the sovereign’s orders. After the two had been executed the remainder immediately fell into line and carried out the required evolutions. Putting himself at their head, Sun Tzu told the king that they would now be prepared to follow his orders “through fire and water.”

The need for strict discipline as a basis for all military action is equally evident in the remaining texts. According to Ssu-Ma the perfect army, placed far in the legendary past, requires neither rewards nor punishments. To make use of rewards but impose no punishments is the height of instruction; to impose punishments but issue no rewards is the height of awesomeness. Finally, employing a mixture of both punishments and rewards—combining sticks with carrots, as modern terminology has it—will end up by causing Virtue to decline. Thus the basic idea of
dao
, which underlines every one of these texts, breaks through once again. Governed by necessity, the best-disciplined army is so flawless that it requires neither rewards nor punishments. Behaving as if it were a single personality, it will follow its commander of its own accord. However, as the remaining texts make clear, this is an ideal that is rarely, if ever, attained.

These matters having been seen to, one may discuss such questions as organization, armaments, and supply. To Wei Liao Tzu, organization was primarily a question of establishing clear regulations so that every soldier would know just what was expected of him. The men (he also speaks of chariots, though by the age of the warring states they were obsolete) were to be divided into units five, ten, one hundred, one thousand, and ten thousand strong, each with its own commander. In each unit, the strongest and most outstanding soldiers were to be positioned in front.

According to T’ai Kung, the commander in chief was to surround himself by: 1. A chief of planning. 2. Five planning officers. 3. Three astrologers. 4. Three topographers. 5. Nine “strategists” (what we would call staff officers), “responsible for discussing divergent views, analyzing the probable success or failure of various operations”). 6. Four supply officers. 7. A variety of officers responsible for keeping discipline, gathering intelligence, carrying out engineering jobs, administering medicines, and accounting. Command was exercised by using pennants, gongs, drums, and whistles. The pennants were to be employed by day, the other three by night.

All the texts under consideration are set in a legendary past, assumed to be both unchanging and far superior to the present. Hence they have relatively little to say about armament. In this respect they differ sharply from the voluminous discussions of our present-day, so-called “Revolution in Military Affairs” which are based on the assumption that the key to warfare is shaped by technology. In the China of the warring principalities, a revolution in military affairs had already taken place. Cavalry was taking the place of chariots. The use of large formations of infantry was on the rise, iron weapons had replaced bronze, and swords had supplanted daggers.

In his chapter on “Preparation of Strategic Power,” Sun Pin gives a succinct account of the evolution of weapons and equipment as well as their use. “The Yellow Emperor created swords and imagized military formations upon them. Yi created bows and crossbows and imagized strategic power on them. Yu created boats and carts and imagized (tactical) changes on them. T’ang and Wu [all these are legendary emperors] made long [i.e. missile] weapons and imagized the strategic imbalance of power on them.” Thus four types of weapons and equipment are listed. The first provides formations with staying power. The second enables users to act from a distance. The third provides mobility (change); and the fourth enables them to dominate the enemy. The art of war consists of combining the four, employing each in correct interaction with the others so as to bring out their advantages and mask their weaknesses. “If one knows their
dao
then the army will be successful … if someone wants to employ them but does not know their
dao
, the army will lack success.”

Concerning supply, “money is the sinews of war.” According to Sun Tzu, an army numbering one hundred thousand men with all its equipment, if led one thousand
li
into enemy territory, will cost one thousand gold coins a day to maintain. Included in the calculus are such esoteric items as presents for the commanders’ guests and glue for fixing broken chariots. However, the greatest expenditure is that which must cover provisioning. The larger the distance from home, the more ruinous the cost of transport. For that reason, but also because the presence of an army will cause the price of everything to rise, a commander who tries to support his forces from his own country will ruin the people. It is therefore best to impose the logistic burden on the enemy, a principle that Sun Tzu considers so important that he repeats it twice.

T’ai Kung, whom we have already quoted, wanted the army to have four officers who would look after the organization of supply. They are “responsible for calculating the requirements for food and water; preparing the food stocks and supplies and transporting the provisions along the route; and supplying the five grains so as to ensure that the army will not suffer any hardship or shortage.” Once an army had entered enemy country an army was to resort to plunder as a matter of course. Conversely an army operating in a country where there were neither towns nor villages to feed the men nor grass to meet the needs of horses and oxen found itself in dire straits. In such a situation, continues T’ai Kung, the commander should “seek some opportunity to trick the enemy and quickly get away.” If necessary, by using “gold and jade” to obtain the necessary intelligence.

Plentiful supplies, everything that is needed by way of arms and equipment, good organization, and strict discipline constitute the foundation on which a successful campaign can be built. Provided these are available, it is time to carry out a survey as to the respective strength of one’s own side and that of the enemy. The favor of Heaven apart, four factors are to be considered. They are, first the weather, second terrain, third command, and fourth doctrine. The weather will determine which season is the most favorable for campaigning and how this is to be done. Knowledge of the terrain will enable the general to calculate the size of the forces, the kind of troops needed, and which kind of operational plan to adopt. Command refers to the qualities of the opposing general; whereas by doctrine is meant everything that pertains to the organization of the enemy and his supply system. “There is,” sums up Sun Tzu, “no general who has not heard of these … matters. Those who master them, win; those who do not, are defeated.”

But how, precisely, will victory be won? Since violence represents a disturbance of
dao
, its use should be kept to the indispensable minimum. “No state has ever benefited from a long war” said Sun Tzu. “Those that garner five victories will meet with disaster; those with four victories will be exhausted; those with three victories will become hegemons; those with two victories will be kings; and those with one victory will become emperors” (Wu Tzu). The best way to settle a dispute, explains Sun Tzu, is by diplomacy as when you negotiate with the enemy and give him presents. Second best is the use of dirty tricks such as assassinating the enemy commander or bribing his officers. Those who cannot use dirty tricks engage in maneuver. Those who cannot maneuver fight a battle, and those who cannot fight a battle lay siege.

In Clausewitz’s view, “the maximum employment of force by no way rules out the use of intelligence.” Not so the Chinese commander-sages who, following the fundamental worldview laid down by Lao Tzu, look at the two as opposites. They always seek to minimize the first by relying on the second. Force is to be used in carefully measured doses, neither more nor less than is necessary and in sharp, short bursts. This means that it must be very precisely aimed. “Throw rocks at eggs” is how Sun Tzu puts it in one of those incomparable metaphors that have helped make his work the most famous of all. When you are strong, pretend to be weak so as to tempt the enemy. When you are weak, pretend to be strong so as to deter him. Use speed and secrecy to make out that you concentrate at one place, then attack at another. If weaker than the enemy, avoid him, harass him, and draw him into terrain that is unfavorable for him; if equal to him, wait patiently until he commits an error, as in chess. Confuse him and keep him ignorant of your designs by offering bait, mounting feints, and/or spreading disinformation as appropriate. Finally, when you have the enemy where you want him—i.e. just when he feels secure—fall on him like a thunderbolt.

Thus the strongest, most successful action is at the same time the most economic one. To achieve this ideal, the two things are needed. The first is extreme flexibility which will enable one to take advantage of fleeting opportunities. Said Sun Tzu, “an army is like water which adapts itself to the configuration of the ground.” Plans must have many branches and be so arranged that alternate ones can be put into operation without undue disruption. Forces earmarked for one mission must be capable of switching to another, if necessary, at a moment’s notice, and without either commanders or troops missing a beat. In all this activity there can be no fixed routine, no unalterable modus operandi, but as many stratagems as there are enemies and circumstances.

The second requirement is intelligence. Still remaining with Sun Tzu, he distinguishes between five types of spies. To wit, local spies, internal spies turned spies, dead spies, and the living spy. Local spies are simply travelers and residents of the theater of war who are examined concerning the terrain, its resources, and whatever they may know of the enemy. Internal spies are people who hold positions inside the enemy’s forces. Turned spies are double agents, i.e. the enemy’s spies who have been forced or persuaded to work for us. Dead [expendable] spies are sent out to the enemy camp in order to spread disinformation. Finally, living spies consist of our own agents who are sent out in the expectation that they will return and deliver their reports. The entire question of espionage requires “the wisdom of a sage” both when it comes to perceiving the truth of incoming reports and in handling those valuable but difficult creatures, the spies themselves. “There are no areas in which one does not employ spies.”

Correctly and systematically employed, espionage will endow the commander with a thorough understanding of the enemy, his strengths and weaknesses. The art of war demands that the former be avoided and the latter, exploited. In other words, that the enemy’s qualities be made to mesh, or synchronize, with our own. Thus knowing oneself is no less, and may be more, of a requirement than understanding the enemy. According to T’ai tsung, ‘“know them and know yourself” is the great essence of military strategy. Contemporary generals, even if they do not know the enemy, ought to be able to know themselves, so how could they lose the advantage?’ Said Sun Tzu: “Know the enemy and know yourself. In a hundred battles you will never be in peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril.” To which the commentator Li Chu’an adds: ‘such people are called “mad bandits.” What can they expect if not defeat?’

In spite of their antiquarian bent, which leads to the discussion of out of date weapons and sometimes gives the whole a quaint air, for sheer sophistication the Chinese military writings have never been equaled. In them high seriousness alternates with play, pungent sayings with relaxed discussion, abstract analysis with an abundance of concrete examples taken from the annals of the warring states and more often than not associated with the names of famous generals. Yet seldom do they descend to the kind of technical trivia which, as we shall presently see, marks much of ancient Western military thought. An underlying humanity pervades all: “[virtue is] sparing the people from death, eliminating the hardships of the people, relieving the misfortunes of the people, and sustaining the people in their extremities” (T’ai Kung). This is combined with a readiness to ignore personal considerations concerning love and hate, take the most drastic measures (including such as we should consider underhand or immoral), and inflict the harshest punishments. All as may be dictated by necessity which knows no bounds. Above all, no clear line is drawn between military affairs and the rest of life. On the contrary, it is a question of achieving
dao
in the military field also.