1999 (10 page)

The superhawks overestimated the influence of external pressure on the Soviet system. A totalitarian government does not pack up and go home if external powers press it economically. When squeezed, the Soviet Union can clamp down on domestic consumption. The Soviet Union is not going to collapse despite its enormous weaknesses and problems. As they demonstrated in World War I and World War II, the people of the Soviet Union have a great capacity for sacrifice and suffering. A leader as skillful as Gorbachev will be even more successful than Stalin in mobilizing the people against any effort to bring the Soviet empire to its knees.

The superhawks did not understand how to use economic power in the U.S.–Soviet relationship. While economic incentives do not determine Soviet foreign policy, they can influence it. By attempting to isolate the Soviet Union, the administration minimized its own leverage. On the one hand, it did not reduce the Soviet access to Western goods. Moscow simply turned to other suppliers. On the other hand, it did reduce the American proportion of East–West trade. That meant the superhawks had achieved none of their goals but had minimized whatever leverage America could gain from its economic power.

The superhawks failed to understand basic American and allied
political realities. American policy too often amounted to belligerent rhetoric without strategy. Unless deeds match words, words become meaningless. American public opinion
hopes
for a quick resolution of the U.S.–Soviet conflict but does not
expect
one. It does, however, expect American leaders to try to reduce the risk of war with the only other nuclear superpower. Without hope for peace, free people will not make the sacrifice necessary to deter those who would wage war. Most Americans would categorically reject the theoretical proposition “Better red than dead.” But if they were ever faced with the stark fact of imminent death, it becomes a closer question. We must make sure that they do not have to make that choice. A strategy based on that approach was both practically and politically unsustainable.

A major problem with the Reagan administration has been that some of its policies have appeared to be dictated by politics, not strategy. It repealed President Carter's grain embargo because of pressure from American farmers. When polls showed that after the Carter years a majority wanted a strong anti-Soviet policy, it took the position that both SALT I and SALT II were bad agreements and that the United States should find ways to derail any serious efforts to reach new arms-control accords. As the 1984 campaign drew near, President Reagan dropped the approach of the superhawks and indicated more willingness to negotiate with the Soviets. Some say he did so because the polls showed that his principal weakness was the peace issue. This may have been true of some of his political advisers, but I doubt if it was true of the President. I am confident that the man who said no to a bad deal at Reykjavik will say no to a bad deal in Moscow.

We should not, however, underestimate the consequences of an obsession with opinion polls. If Moscow concludes that an administration policy will be affected by the polls it will concentrate on affecting the polls rather than negotiating seriously. In dealing with the Soviets, the worst mistake a President can make is to follow the polls rather than lead them. In the future, Moscow is sure to use public opinion as a lever against the United States. As negotiations near a conclusion and as crises call for a strong American response, Moscow will test the willingness of each U.S. administration to buck the polls in protecting American interests.

Since 1976, our policy toward the Soviet Union has been deeply flawed. It has been inconsistent, ambivalent, defensive, and plagued with starts and stops. Whatever else we say about the Soviets' foreign policy, we must concede that it is consistently hard-line. We might not like their policy, but we cannot claim we do not know what it is.

As we look to the future, none of the failed policies of the past is adequate for the eleven remaining years of this century. Containment is outdated. Détente has lost its meaning. For the superhawks, it is institutionalized surrender. For the superdoves, it is institutionalized brotherhood. The policy of the superdoves fails to understand the nature of Soviet foreign policy. The superhawks do not make this mistake, but their doctrinaire policies are unrealistic and politically unsustainable.

We need a new policy that recognizes the Soviets for what they are but which is designed to deal with them in an effective way. In developing a strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union, we must first take the steps necessary to assure a sound American economy. A strong, productive, growing economy is the indispensable foundation for the role the United States must play in the world. Without a strong economy we cannot have a strong foreign policy. Without a strong economy we will not be able to afford the defense expenditures necessary to deter Soviet aggression. Without a strong economy we will not be able to finance our foreign-assistance program for our friends and allies threatened by aggression. Most important, a strong, free economy can be a powerful example for newly developing countries that are searching for the road to progress with freedom. A protectionist, isolationist, fiscally irresponsible America weakens our ability to lead through the power of our ideas as well as through our military power.

In U.S.–Soviet relations, what America needs is a comprehensive policy that combines deterrence, competition, and negotiation.

We must start by recognizing that we must undertake whatever actions are necessary to ensure the security of the United States and its allies. That must involve keeping up our nuclear deterrent. We will not be able to agree with Moscow on total disarmament. We will not be able to build a perfect defense against nuclear
weapons. We should decide today what kinds of strategic forces we need to best deter the Soviet Union in the future. We must also maintain forces sufficient to deter a Soviet attack on our key allies in Europe and the Far East and on our vital interests in the Persian Gulf.

Our task is to deter the Soviet Union not only at the nuclear level but also on the conventional level in Europe and elsewhere. Great as the task may be, we can succeed. As B. H. Liddell Hart wrote of the Soviets, “Their very belief in force makes them more susceptible to the deterrent effect of a formidable opposing force.”

Beyond deterrence, the United States must adopt the policies necessary to compete effectively with the Soviet Union across the board on those issues and in those areas in which mutual agreements are not possible. There will eventually be a winner and a loser in the American–Soviet rivalry—and we cannot win if we fail to compete.

Our negotiating strategy must also be founded on an understanding of what the two superpowers can agree about and what we cannot agree about.

We can agree on measures to reduce the likelihood of accidental nuclear war. We can agree on ways to reduce and stabilize the strategic nuclear balance. We can agree on means to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We can agree on ways to resolve some—but not all—conflicts in contentious regions of the world. We can agree on ways to structure mutually beneficial relations, such as trade and cultural exchange. We should work with the Soviet Union to prevent conflicts in the Third World from erupting into a major war, while not expecting to settle all the differences that divide the two superpowers in those conflicts. All of those issues belong in the negotiating process.

We should make it clear that we are prepared for a genuinely peaceful and cooperative relationship whenever they are. But we should also make it clear that the burden of overcoming Western suspicion rests with the Kremlin, because it arose not from paranoia on our part but from a long history of aggression on their part. We should reward positive change but must keep the reward proportionate to their actions, not to our hopes.

We have never had an adequate comprehensive strategy for deterring Moscow, for competing with Moscow, and for negotiating with Moscow. We must develop one today or risk repeating the failures of the recent past. If we ignore any one of these three key tasks—deterrence, competition, and negotiation—we will do irreparable damage to the chances of forging real peace between the superpowers.

Finally, in our election campaigns and in the halls of Congress we should debate our differences about policy toward the Soviet Union fairly and freely. Let us agree that those who are anti-Soviet are not prowar and that those who are antiwar are not pro-Soviet. The issue is not whether a policy is anticommunist. Anticommunism is not a policy. It is a faith—faith in freedom. Most Americans support the faith, but they disagree about the policy that will best defend or extend the faith. We should debate the policy without questioning the faith of those who disagree with us.

If Tocqueville were alive today, what would he predict for the future of the American–Soviet struggle?

No doubt he would shake his head over the sorry state of American policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. He would conclude he was correct in writing that in “foreign affairs democractic governments do appear decidedly inferior to others” and that “a democracy finds it difficult to coordinate the details of a great undertaking and to fix on some plan and carry it through with determination in spite of obstacles.” Consequently, he would be forced to acknowledge that Moscow holds a natural advantage in the American–Soviet conflict.

We should not despair at Tocqueville's hypothetical conclusion. We should take it as constructive criticism and turn it to our advantage. His pessimism about the capabilities of a democracy in foreign policy does not tell the whole story. America's inherent economic and political strength is so great that it overcomes our weakness in executing foreign policy. Moscow's inherent economic and political weakness is so great that its strength in executing policy cannot compensate. If the United States sharpens its
skills in strategy and foreign policy, it will have overcome the key weakness about which Tocqueville warned.

If we adopt a strategy combining deterrence, competition, and negotiation, we can succeed in building a structure for real peace beyond 1999.

The change we would like to see in the Soviet Union will not come soon, but we should never lose patience in trying to bring it about. Most important, we must put it into historical perspective. Before I went to Moscow in 1959 Harold Macmillan pointed out to me that one hundred years had elapsed between Queen Elizabeth I, who sent her advisers who fell out of favor to the scaffold, and Queen Anne, who sent those she did not like into exile. Only five years elapsed between Stalin, who had his adversaries executed, and Khrushchev, who sent Malenkov out to run a power plant in Siberia.

Gorbachev is in an enviable position. He can become not just the man of the year but the man of the century. He comes on the center stage of history at a time when his decisions as to which way he leads his country will affect the lives of not only his own people but all of the people in the world. Change in the Soviet Union can lead to a safer world or to a more dangerous world. How much, what kind, and how fast change will take place under Gorbachev depends on him
and
on us.