1916 (31 page)

The more MacCurtain thought about the situation, however, the more difficult it appeared. His men had only just returned home from a gruelling day on Easter Sunday, during which the majority had been soaked to the skin and at least one day’s rations had been consumed. The expected German arms had not materialised. He had no effective communications with Dublin. He had no reliable intelligence reports from which to make any deductions. His brigade was now completely dispersed and even if he could manage to mobilise some of them they would provide no opposition whatsoever to the combined firepower of the British army and RIC. A hostile crowd had also gathered in the street outside his headquarters, and
with the British army in Victoria Barracks probably preparing to move against him MacCurtain knew he no longer had any room to manoeuvre. In the absence of any clear orders or information from Dublin he decided his best course of action was to concentrate on defending the Volunteer Hall against attack. He later recorded that:

We decided not to leave the hall, come what may. We were convinced that the soldiers would surround us and that we would die there, but we were satisfied – no one could say that we had run away from the fight, and indeed there was no such thought in our minds.
³²

If nothing else this was at least consistent with his last instructions from MacNeill. However, not all of his men were satisfied with this decision. Second Lieut. Robaird Langford, C Company, Cork City Battalion, later recalled:

The situation was very tense and strained. The younger officers particularly wanted to fight, and were very resentful of the waiting policy adopted by the leaders. They expressed their views, but the weight of the influence and authority of the older men (as they regarded the brigade officers) was against them.
³³

In the meantime, and unknown to MacCurtain, the lord mayor of Cork, Councillor T.C. Butterfield had already commenced an initiative to prevent an outbreak of hostilities in the city by contacting Brigadier General W.F.H. Stafford, the General Officer Commanding (GOC) in Cork. He suggested that before any military attempt be made to capture the Volunteer Hall he (Butterfield) should first be given an opportunity to persuade the Volunteers to hand over their weapons peacefully and thus avoid any casualties or damage to the city. Stafford agreed and appointed his aidede-camp, Captain F.W. Dickie, to take charge of negotiations. Butterfield then called on the Auxiliary Bishop of Cork, Dr Daniel Cohalan, to enlist his help. On Monday night they went to the Volunteer Hall and met Mac-Curtain, who assured them that he had no intention of initiating military action but would defend his position if attacked. Satisfied that violence was not about to break out Butterfield and Cohalan then began a sequence of negotiations in an effort to find a peaceful solution to the crisis.

The following morning, Tuesday 25 April, saw an intensification of the fighting in Dublin, but in Cork all remained quiet. Some news of the
rebellion, however, was now spreading throughout Cork county, and while some individual company commanders responded and mobilised small numbers, in the absence of any concrete information they too decided to remain in their respective locations and await further orders. For his part, MacCurtain remained fortified within his headquarters awaiting further contact with the lord mayor and the bishop, but none was made. Instead, early on Wednesday morning, he received reports that the British army had deployed artillery on the hill of Gurranebraher and positioned a number of machine guns in the Malt House directly opposite the Volunteer Hall. He then received a visit from the City Coroner, William Murphy, who also asked that no military action be taken until Butterfield and Cohalan returned.

Throughout Wednesday and Thursday Butterfield and Cohalan continued to negotiate with Captain Dickie until an agreement was eventually reached. The Volunteers would hand up their arms to the lord mayor on the following Monday for safekeeping, and in return no action would be taken against them.

On Friday Butterfield and Cohalan returned to the Volunteer Hall and put these terms to MacCurtain, together with a threat from Dickie that the Volunteer Hall would be shelled if he refused to accept them. MacCurtain agreed in principle but sought clarification on the following questions: would the matter be kept out of the newspapers; would the arms handed-in be returned to the Volunteers once the crisis was over; would the RIC cease harassing his men; and would MacCurtain and MacSwiney be permitted to visit Volunteer units in Limerick and Kerry to inform them of the situation in Cork and recommend acceptance of similar terms?

These queries were transmitted to General Stafford and later that night Captain Dickie met with Bishop Cohalan at his residence and informed him that as far as the GOC was concerned the arms would be returned once the crisis had passed – but he couldn’t speak for parliament or the civil authority. He also stated that the GOC would use his influence to curb the activities of the RIC and to ensure that the terms of the agreement were kept out of the press. He would also issue the travel permits requested by MacCurtain and if these terms were accepted he would agree to a general amnesty for all the Volunteers in his area other than those found in treasonable correspondence with the enemy.
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Satisfied with this news Butterfield, accompanied by Captain Dickie, returned to the Volunteer Hall at around 2am on Saturday morning, and met MacCurtain, MacSwiney, and Seán O’Sullivan. The five of them sat
around the fire in deep discussion until 5am, when the following terms were agreed:

Having spent the night without sleep agonising over the decisions they had taken, MacCurtain and MacSwiney departed for Limerick and Kerry on the 8am train, unaware that their comrades in Dublin were on the verge of surrender, or that the
Cork Constitution
was carrying a report which stated: ‘The Cork Sinn Féiners have handed up their rifles to the police.’
³⁶
This was a flagrant breach of the terms agreed just hours before and caused considerable unrest amongst the Volunteers in the city. The situation was made worse later on Saturday night when Captain Dickie arrived at Volunteer Hall to see MacCurtain on his return from Limerick, and demanded that all arms now be handed up by midnight on Sunday, rather than on Monday as previously agreed. MacCurtain was incensed by this demand and Dickie’s failure to keep the matter out of the newspapers. The following morning (Sunday 30 April), accompanied by MacSwiney, he again met with the bishop and lord mayor, and informed them that under the current circumstances he could not possibly ask his men to hand over their arms. After lengthy debate Cohalan eventually persuaded the brigade commander to put the matter before a general meeting of the Volunteers at 8pm on Monday, at which time both he and the lord mayor would also address them. Butterfield then wrote to Dickie outlining explaining the Volunteer’s and suggesting a meeting at noon the following day.

While all of these discussions were taking place the Cork Brigade did actually manage to take some offensive military action – but without either MacCurtain’s approval or knowledge. On Sunday, 30 April, a small party of Volunteers apprehended, searched and threatened Sergeant Crean of the RIC barracks at Ballinadee in west Cork. They then moved on and cut the telegraph wires between Clonakilty and the war signal station at Galley Head.
³⁷
Clearly these Volunteers wanted to make some contribution to the Rising, but by then it was far too late.

Unknown to them, however, their very limited action probably did have an impact, because when Captain Dickie met with Butterfield and Cohalan in the City Club at noon the following day (Monday, 1 May), his manner was far from conciliatory. In fact he delivered the following ultimatum:

The agreement between the Asst. Bishop of Cork, the Lord Mayor of Cork, the Cork City Branch of Irish Volunteers, and the General Commanding in the South of Ireland, has not been complied with as agreed on, and the General can no longer hold himself bound by the concessions agreed on. If however, all arms, ammunition and explosives of any kind in the possession of any member of that body be handed over by them to the custody of the Lord Mayor of Cork, before 8pm, on this date, the General will make every effort to ensure that the concessions agreed on will be carried out. He cannot guarantee this, as the matter now rests with the Commander in Chief, Ireland. In the event of arms not being handed over as agreed, it will be the General’s duty to consider all concerned as offering opposition to H.M. Forces and they will be dealt with accordingly as rebels in arms against the Crown.

Signed at Cork at noon, on May 1, 1916, on behalf of the General Officer Commanding the South Irish Area.

F.W. Dickie
Captain, ADC and Intelligence Officer, General Staff.
³⁸

Later that afternoon Cohalan received a phone call from Dickie confirming that all guarantees previously given by the British authorities were now withdrawn. When the bishop protested vehemently at this development Dickie assured him that although the formal guarantees were withdrawn, the arrangements agreed to would go through and it was on this basis that the bishop and the lord mayor went to speak to the rank and file Volunteers that night.
³⁹

Some 140 Volunteers had gathered in the hall and they heard Butterfield and Cohalan urge them to accept the terms of the agreement and
hand up their weapons. In the subsequent ballot 90 per cent of those present voted in favour of the agreement and once the meeting was over some of these Volunteers immediately marched down to the lord mayor’s home at 68 South Mall and handed in their guns. Those who disagreed with this decision were adamant that the British would again renege on their commitments, with Second Lieut. Donal Óg O’Callaghan, B Company, Cork City Battalion, declaring: ‘There will be treachery. The leopard does not change his spots.’
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Accordingly, they either retained their arms at secret locations around the city or, in a final act of defiance, removed the firing pins to render the weapons unserviceable. From MacCurtain’s perspective the week-long crisis had now been brought to an end without bloodshed; the Cork Brigade remained intact; he genuinely expected the British authorities to honour the terms of the agreement; and all things considered he was convinced he had taken the correct course of action.

However, the agreement lasted a mere twenty four hours because on the morning of Tuesday, 2 May, the homes of known Volunteers across the city were raided with MacCurtain, his brother Seán, and nine others arrested and incarcerated in the county gaol.
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The lord mayor later managed to negotiate MacCurtain’s release but it was abundantly clear that the agreement was not worth the paper upon which it was written.

T
HOMAS
K
ENT

On that same day the last major incident of the Easter Rising occurred, not in Dublin or in Cork city, but at a farmhouse owned by the Kent family at Bawnard, Castlelyons, County Cork. A party of RIC had been dispatched to arrest the Kent brothers – Thomas, David, Richard, and William – as part of the ongoing nationwide round-up of known Volunteers. They were not expecting any violent resistance but that was precisely what they encountered. When called upon to surrender the brothers refused and a gun battle erupted that lasted three hours and only came to an end when David was wounded and all of their ammunition had been expended.

During the fighting Head Constable Rowe had been shot and killed. In reprisal the RIC now decided to summarily execute all four brothers. This was stopped when a British army officer intervened, but when Richard Kent then attempted to escape he was shot and seriously wounded.

The two wounded brothers were taken to the military hospital in Fermoy, but Thomas and William were moved to Cork and incarcerated in
the Military Detention Barracks.
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When they were court martialled on 4 May William was acquitted, but Thomas was found guilty and sentenced to death. He was executed by firing squad in the exercise yard of the barracks at dawn on 9 May.

The circumstances of that court martial, however, the quality and quantity of the evidence produced, the speed with which the entire proceedings were conducted, and the legality of the sentence imposed raised a number of serious issues. In the first instance, the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA), passed by parliament on 8 August 1914, vested extraordinary powers in the hands of the military. Thus when Kent appeared in Victoria Barracks to be charged he found himself standing not before a judge and jury but rather a field general court martial. He was then charged with contravening the Act: