Wellington’s Engineers: Military Engineering on the Peninsular War 1808-1814 (31 page)

Elphinstone seemed to delight in fighting with everyone, including the Board of Ordnance, his fellow officers and even Wellington. Whilst there was friction between the generals and some Ordnance officers, there was generally a good working relationship between engineer officers and the senior commanders. One example is demonstrated by a request from Burgoyne to General Cole to write a testimonial for Lieutenant Pitts after the siege was completed. Cole responded:

I enclose a letter you required respecting your friend Pitts … and have done it so as to appear as if it came from myself without the suggestion of others. Independent of my regard for Pitts, I shall feel great pleasure at all times in doing justice to a corps throughout the younger branches of which there is a spirit that no other corps I know of possesses to the same degree.
⁸⁰

Actions on the French Border

Whilst the siege of San Sebastian was still underway, Wellington was looking ahead to the next steps. Following Soult’s failed attacks at Maya, Roncesvalles and Sorauren, he considered pursuing the French straight across the Bidassoa. On 1 August 1813, Wellington asked Graham to bring up the pontoon train and prepare for the crossing of the Bidassoa.
⁸¹
But he quickly went off the idea when he took stock of his losses and the condition of his troops and equipment. Explaining his decision to Bathurst, he wrote:

It is a very common error, among those unacquainted with military affairs … that we shall immediately invade France; and some even here expect that we shall be in Paris in a month … the enemy still possesses all the strongholds within Spain [the border fortresses] … Then in France … there are other strongholds … [The] army … is much deteriorated … the equipment, ammunition, shoes etc. require renewal. I entertain no doubt that I could tomorrow enter France and establish the army on the Adour, but I could go no further.
⁸²

Wellington realised that securing his current position should be his priority. Major Charles Smith RE was ordered to Irun to make proposals for fortifying the place. Captain Todd RSC was similarly ordered to the area to survey the terrain. Wellington wrote to Graham on 15 August, in response to his recommendation to start a second line of defences behind the Bidassoa, remarking ‘we cannot make the position between Oyarzun and the Bidassoa too strong … no time should be lost in commencing the works’. On 21 August, Wellington wrote a detailed memo to Fletcher detailing the defensive works he wanted constructing around Irun. The first line would cover the site of the bridge at Irun through to the convent at San Marcial. It comprised three redoubts and ‘breastworks, abatis and musketry posts which the troops on the ground can construct’. Wellington said Captain Todd RSC would point out the locations. A second line would also be prepared overlooking the Bidassoa, which Major Smith RE could point out the locations for. Between Irun and Funterrabia, a third set of defences was to be constructed with a fourth set in the valley of the Bidassoa between Irun and Oyarzun.
⁸³
Wellington asked Fletcher to mark out the works and estimate the number of workers he would require. The following day Fletcher received a similarly detailed letter from George Murray, the QMG, confirming that the instructions were based on Wellington riding over part of the terrain with Captain Todd and also from the surveys carried out by Major Smith. Murray asked Fletcher if he could ride over the terrain and ‘exercise your judgement both as to the situation and the form of the works to be constructed’. He expressed the concern that this might not be possible owing to the wound Fletcher had recently received during the first assault at San Sebastian. Murray clarified the purpose of the defences in his final paragraph:

Our first object by these works is present security, until we can get possession of San Sebastian and Pamplona, But besides that, we should look forward to rendering a part of our force disposable for operations more to the eastward, if necessary; also securing tranquillity in the winter and even to something of permanent utility to the Spanish frontier. Our offensive operations have turned out very well, but we have not yet such firm hold of our conquests as we ought to have.
⁸⁴

Significant defensive works were also being constructed in the passes to the east. Lieutenant Pitts RE, who was present with the 4th Division during the French attacks at the end of July, was ordered to construct a number of redoubts and breastworks around Maya. Writing to Burgoyne on 25 August, he reported that Wellington had sent for him and asked him to make some changes to the defences that he had already completed.
⁸⁵
As mentioned earlier, Lieutenant Wright RE was ordered to construct similar defences at Roncesvalles. Work on improving the defences in this area continued through to October 1813.

By the end of August, the Allied army’s situation had improved significantly. San Sebastian had finally fallen. A final desperate attack by Soult at San Marcial on the 31st failed, in part due to the substantial defensive works that had been prepared over the last few weeks. Pamplona still held out, but the Allies were getting information on its state of supplies and knew the fortress could not last much longer. Wellington was sure that the French were unable to breach his defences and could look to his next move.

On 9 September, the day the castle at San Sebastian surrendered, he wrote to Graham ordering the officer in charge of the engineer department to do two things:

The pontoon train must be got together, with the exception of those boats absolutely necessary for the communication with San Sebastian, and the train should be assembled somewhere near Oyarzun.

He must immediately take measures for securing the place [San Sebastian] against a
coup de main
, by clearing the rubbish and blocking the breaches and he must let me have without loss of time, a plan and estimate for the repair of the place.
⁸⁶

Wellington mentions Dickson, the commander of the artillery, by name in the letter but refers to ‘the officer in charge of the engineer department’. Wellington was fully aware that Burgoyne was the senior engineer so the omission of his name is odd in the context of what happened next. On 17 September, Wellington, with great anger, complained to Graham that:

Lieutenant-Colonel Burgoyne is really too bad: this is the eighth day since he received the orders to collect the pontoon train on the high road and he is not now certain that the orders he sent have reached the officers in charge of them, and he has taken no measures to repeat them.
⁸⁷

On the same day, Burgoyne received a letter from the Adjutant General asking for an immediate detailed explanation of how he sent his orders for the movement of the pontoon train and asking for an officer to ride post to Vitoria to order the pontoon train forward. Two days later, Wellington was still angry, telling Bathurst that he had intended to move the army across the Bidassoa immediately after the fall of San Sebastian but it had ‘been delayed by a mistake made by the officer of engineers in transmitting the orders for the collection of the pontoon train’. He continued saying ‘But I acknowledge I feel a great disinclination to enter the French territory under existing circumstances’.
⁸⁸

Wellington’s letters around this time have an even greater level of sharpness than was usual for him. One wonders if the pressure was beginning to tell. He was trying to deal with a number of events that could or were impacting on his operations. These included:

• The failure of Royal Navy to blockade the northern coast leading to difficulties for his supplies and the regular supply of the French forces.

• The continued resistance of the French in Pamplona and San Sebastian.

• Murray’s mismanagement at Tarragona.

• The delays in the Board of Ordnance supplying additional siege guns.

• The continued issues with the Spanish government over command of their army.

• Concern about the reaction of the French population when he invaded France.

• Concern about how the Portuguese and Spanish troops would treat the French population.

• Concern about what the European powers were planning around the invasion of France.

Wellington’s complaint about Burgoyne does not ring true. Nothing done by that officer before or after this incident fits the unprofessional picture painted by Wellington. Burgoyne’s diary is strangely silent from 10 September, when the castle at San Sebastian surrendered, until the 27th. The inference is that he was working on the damage at San Sebastian as his diary entry for the 27th notes him completing his report on the repairs of San Sebastian and setting off for headquarters.
⁸⁹
Wellington must have had some knowledge that the pontoon train could not be moved immediately as he noted in a letter to his brother on 12 September, ‘I am waiting here till the animals of the pontoon train will be relieved from the work consequent on the siege, when I shall cross the Bidassoa’.
⁹⁰
Again, on 15 September, he asked Graham to let him know when the pontoon train was likely to be on the road with its equipment. Looking at Wellington’s original letter of 9 September, the priority of repairing San Sebastian is clear, the movement of the pontoon train less so.

On 15 September, Captain Stanway RE delivered a report on the options for crossing the river Bidassoa in front of the height of San Marcial. The same day Wellington rode over the area with an engineer officer (Stanway, I assume) pointing out where he wanted further redoubts building to support the planned crossing. Wellington was planning on the initial advance being carried out by infantry fording the mouth of the Bidassoa. This was only possible at the lowest tides which were around 23 September. Finding the pontoon train was not going to arrive in time for the fording of the river probably led to his show of impatience.

I expect that Burgoyne got distracted working to make San Sebastian defensible and, having passed the order for the pontoon train to move, lost sight of what appeared to be a secondary task. It is also clear that Graham had done nothing to check on the situation even though the orders had been sent to him. Everyone had taken their eye off the ball. It unlike Wellington to miss an important detail like this. Perhaps, it suited him to have someone to blame for the delay in entering France? The next low tide was around 9 October 1813 and Wellington planned to be ready.
⁹¹

In the days leading up to 7 October 1813, Wellington tried with evident success to convince the French that his attack, when it came, would be inland, probably around Maya. Soult therefore placed the bulk of his troops in this area, leaving the mouth of the Bidassoa virtually undefended, believing that the river was not fordable. Unfortunately for the French, Wellington knew that it was, thanks to the help of local fishermen. The French had heavily fortified the right bank of the river and their troops were spread over many miles, manning various redoubt and forts. The defences looked impressive but Wellington was confident they could be taken, saying to Captain Harry Smith of the 95th Foot ‘These fellows think themselves invulnerable, but I will beat them out with great ease’.
¹
He went on to explain that they did not have enough troops to hold their position. On the morning of 7 October, the attacks were launched. The two main attacks were at the mouth of the Bidassoa and against Vera. Captain Todd RSC, who had been surveying the area for some weeks, was with the attackers fording the river, no doubt guiding them to the fords. Other RSC officers carried out similar roles at the several fords used to get the troops across. As predicted, Wellington was able to outflank and overwhelm the enemy.

Two days later the whole area was in Allied hands and Soult had withdrawn his demoralised troops across the next barrier, the river Nivelle. As soon as the right bank was secured, work started on laying the bridges. Wellington’s orders for the attack stated:

A pontoon bridge is to be thrown across the river near the ruined bridge [at Irun] as soon as it is possible to establish it. To cover its construction and the passage of the troops, the 18-pounder battery and two other batteries are to be placed on the San Marcial heights.
²

Apart from the number of guns, the 18-pounders would have greater range than anything the French could bring up to try and disrupt the operation. Wellington’s orders also specified a second pontoon bridge further up the river. Burgoyne noted ‘we commenced throwing bridges of trestles, boats, pontoons, etc. over the Bidassoa’.
³
Frazer also wrote that by 10 October there were two pontoon bridges and a third bridge of boats in place. As well as the bridges, new redoubts were started on the right bank. This was the first occasion where a substantial number of Pasley’s trained Royal Sappers and Miners (RSM) were present. Some worked under Lieutenant Piper RE to throw the pontoon bridges across the river at Irun, while another company under Captain Dickens RE built a trestle bridge further upstream. Although these bridges were washed away by the strong current, they were speedily restored. Captain Wells RE was building defences on the Bidassoa, General Hope reporting that working parties had been assigned to him and asked if Burgoyne could look at the ground around the pontoon bridge as he thought ‘that several considerable works may be necessary’.
⁴
Further east, Captain Pitts RE with another company of RSM quickly erected breastworks at Vera and then proceeded to build several redoubts around La Rhune. Further east again, Lieutenant Wright RE was erecting defences around Roncesvalles. The work done by the Royal Engineers, Royal Staff Corps and Royal Sappers and Miners is often difficult to identify, but these corps made a significant contribution to strengthening the defences to resist French attacks, then in getting the army across the Bidassoa and then building further defences to allow Wellington to retain his toe-hold in France.

For the first time in the Peninsular War there were now sufficient artificers from the RSM to attach companies to divisions in the army. For the next few months they lived and fought with the soldiers and after a shaky start, appreciation of their value grew, Reid, who commanded the company with the Light Division, remarking ‘the arrangement seems to answer. My Company was taken away the other day, which put all the division in a rage. Sappers are thought absolutely necessary now.’ A few weeks later, Reid commented again, that ‘Baron Alten got in a rage and wanted to write to Wellington’ when the divisional entrenching tools were taken away.
⁵

For the next few weeks Wellington waited for the surrender of Pamplona and for news from northern Europe. Following a request from Sir John Hope, Captain Todd RSC was employed to improve the roads around Vera to aid troop movements. As mentioned earlier, there was change of command in the Royal Engineers. Elphinstone returned to headquarters on 13 October and Burgoyne was speedily reassigned to Sir John Hope’s force. Elphinstone, having arrived by sea, needed to settle himself in. Writing to his wife he said:

Hitherto I get on famously with Lord W., but he is said to be so violent and capricious that it is impossible for any one to say how long the civility may continue. It was decidedly his wish that I should come up [I do not believe this is true] and I think he is pleased with my coming up as I have done without any regard to my personal comfort … I have purchased a mare … for the enormous price of 80 guineas … In England I should not have paid above 40 for her. I have also purchased a mule for 130 dollars … Ellicombe and myself dine with each other alternately, each party bringing their own plates, knives and forks, as always living with Fletcher he is as badly of for canteen, cook etc. as myself. I shall be very glad to get my new canteens … I am told my coming up is already making a row in the artillery – there certainly will be a breeze, whether I shall stand the squall or not remains to be proved. I heard rather a moderate man say he thought if any officer senior to Dixon [
sic
, Dickens] remained to serve under him after my coming up they ought to be sent to Coventry by the regiment.
⁶

Following the surrender of Pamplona on 31 October, Wellington was free to act. The Allies had superiority in numbers and probably also in the quality of their troops. The next challenge was to pass the river Nivelle. Following the French withdrawal, Soult has set his troops to work building a set of defences on the banks of that river, similar to those that had failed to work on the Bidassoa. The natural defences of the area also assisted the French. Heavy rain and snow now fell and the river levels rose, making crossing difficult, if not impossible. Hope was concerned that the bridges across the Bidassoa could be lost. He wrote to Wellington on 1 November:

We have had torrents of rain last night and it has just been reported to me that the upper bridge, constructed, I believe, by the Portuguese, has been carried away, and that they are in some apprehension the coming down of the materials and other matters carried by the river may injure the Spanish bridge. Burgoyne and Todd are, however, doing what they can to secure it, as well as our pontoon bridge.

Writing again the next morning, he reported ‘I found that a premature report had been made respecting the trestle bridge above Biriatou, which, though in danger, was not carried away.’
⁷
There are a number of interesting points in this letter. Firstly, the Royal Engineers and Royal Staff Corps are once again mixing roles as circumstances required. Secondly, Hope mentions both the Portuguese and Spanish as having a role in the construction of the bridges. Burgoyne had mentioned some weeks earlier that there was a company of Portuguese artificers with engineer officers at San Sebastian. The same day that Hope wrote the letter above, Wellington remarked that ‘Hill, however, being up to his knees in snow, it is absolutely necessary to defer our movement for a day or two’. The weather continued poor and Wellington had to postpone an attack that was planned for 8 November, which was re-scheduled for the 10th. Hope carried out feint attacks around the mouth of the Nivelle at St Jean de Luz, Hill similarly demonstrated around Ainhoue and Beresford made the main attack around Sarre.

The outnumbered and demoralised French put up only limited resistance before once again retiring to the next barrier, the river Nive, and the city of Bayonne. As the French retired from St Jean de Luz on the morning of 11 November, the Allies quickly moved into the town, Burgoyne recording that ‘the bridges … were burning but saved them before much mischief was done’.
⁸
Hope reported the next day that Captain Todd was repairing the bridges at St Jean de Luz and having moved forward to Guethary, noted on the 13th that ‘a pontoon bridge has been established across the stream of Bidart’.
⁹
As Burgoyne was with him, it is likely that he was involved in its construction. Wellington agreed with the need to have the pontoon bridge because a means to move artillery across the river would be the ‘best defence for our posts towards the Nive’, but cautioned that the bridge should be able to be quickly removed.
¹⁰
A third bridge had been built across the Nivelle at Sarre by the company of RSM under Captain Pitts. The trestle bridge had been constructed using material taken from a local farmhouse.
¹¹
Pitts, describing the action around Sarre, mentions around thirty redoubts built by the French to defend the area.
¹²
Elphinstone also recorded the events of the last few days in a letter to his wife:

Good news and I am quite safe and well. Having stated above what is of most consequence to you I shall now add an outline of our proceedings, that is such part of them that I happened to see. On the 10th at 3am I left Vera and went to the advance post where I knew the attack was to commence. Lord Wellington arrived soon after and as soon as it was light, a cannonade commenced on the advance redoubt of the enemy … the gentlemen not approving much of the effects of our artillery, saved us the trouble by taking to their heels … The works were also deserted one after another except one which was the largest and most formidable. This Lord Wellington continued to surround most completely that an officer was sent to advise them to lay down their arms … They then retreated across the Nivelle in such a hurry that they had not time to destroy the bridges. Our people followed them and got into the village of St Pé … It was at this place that I regret to say Mr Power [Lieutenant Robert Power RE] was killed … It is the only casualty in the Corps … we set off to return to Vera at least 3 leagues off, and where we arrived at half past eight o’clock. The ride home was altogether the worst part of the day. It was so dark that they rode with a torch before Lord Wellington to show him the way and we were obliged to follow trusting entirely to our horses … Except a few shots from the first redoubt, the Head Quarters party were never nearer than a mile to the enemy, so that it was nothing more than being at a review. I took out plenty of toast and hard eggs so that I had nothing to do but munch all day. What a fortunate thing it has now been my coming round by water.
¹³

I am sure his engineer officers would have been happy to have nothing to do but munch all day! The Allied army’s communications were now divided by two major rivers and the next few weeks was a constant battle to keeping the bridges in place as the winter torrents battered them and trying to move bulky pontoon trains on near-impassable roads.

Once again the Allied army settled themselves in to guarding the crossing-points over the Nivelle. The French destroyed their bridge and
tête du pont
at Cambo on 17 November and Colville reported that he had ordered Captain Henderson RE to strengthen his piquet defences around Ustaritz to be able to withstand field artillery. Whilst Wellington was keen to press on, the weather made any rapid movement impossible and there was a lull as all the equipment and material was moved into place.

The final action of 1813 was the passage of the river Nive. Wellington wanted to expand the area his troops occupied but also restrict the ability of the French to supply Bayonne. If he could place his troops on the left bank of the Adour, the French could not use the river to bring in supplies. Once again, Wellington decided on three simultaneous attacks. The first column under Hope was to advance up the coast from St Jean de Luz. As part of his advance, Hope was asked to push on to the mouth of the Adour to reconnoitre for the ‘possibility of a bridge being thrown over the river there in some future operations of the army’.
¹⁴
Inland, Beresford was to attack in the centre at Ustaritz where the plan was to capture the bridges and if required to thrown pontoon bridges across. Further east, Hill was to attack at Cambo, again with the intention of throwing a bridge across. Detachments of Royal Sappers and Miners and Royal Staff Corps were attached to each of these columns.

The pontoon train was moved up and a pontoon bridge thrown across the Nive at Ustaritz in the early hours of 9 December. Burgoyne, describing the situation a few days’ earlier, wrote:

Five pontoons have been ordered to Ustaritz, to throw a bridge across the Nive, where an island to which we have access, makes it very narrow … There is great difficulty however to get pontoons to the spot, on account of the state of the roads and the heavy rains that have now recommenced; two days of them will probably increase the Nive and stop the operation.
¹⁵

Early that night, the pontoon train was laid from the left bank to the island and in the morning the troops forded the river to the right bank. Once secure, the final part of the bridge from the island to the right bank was completed.

At the same time, Hill forded the river at Cambo with the intention of re-establishing the bridge once the right bank was secure. Burgoyne praised the inventiveness of Sub-Lieutenant Calder RSM:

A bridge was to be made over the Nive above Cambo. It was there 90 feet wide with low banks frequently inundated. – Goldfinch asked Mr Calder if he would undertake it with a few Sappers and some rough carpenters tools only – he said he would – well how will you do it? – why, I’ll cut a large mallet and drive a few piles.
¹⁶

Both these crossing were achieved with surprisingly little opposition. Wellington’s army was now split on both sides of the river Nive with lengthy communications between them. This appears to be what Soult had hoped for, and on successive days he attacked each formation separately. The first attack against Hope seems to have been unexpected and there was hard fighting before the French retreated. The following day, Soult moved his forces back through Bayonne and attacked Hill on the right bank of the Nive. Soult’s superior forces came very close to defeating Hill before reinforcements could arrive. The Allied situation was made more critical by the pontoon bridge at Villefranque being washed away and it was after noon on that day before it was repaired and reinforcements could move to support Hill.