Thought Manipulation: The Use and Abuse of Psychological Trickery (19 page)

No doubt Machiavelli and Hayek use very appealing rhetoric. In desperate situations it is very attractive to seek the emergence of a strong peacemaking leader. However, the basic questions that the Machiavellian tradition struggles to explain are: How can we guarantee that the strong leader is a benevolent dictator who takes power to complete his historical peacemaking task? How could we be certain that the strong leader is a republican autocrat (Machiavelli), a liberal dictator (Hayek), or a peacemaking tyrant?

Part of the solution to such difficult questions can be found in the pages of
The Prince
. Machiavelli, in his brilliant and shocking rhetoric, offers a simple analysis. An absolute ruler, cruel and manipulative as he might be, will not survive long if he does not act for the benefit of his society (at least in the final account). Acting for the benefit of society means quelling the endless civil wars, uniting Italy, and restoring glory to Rome.

As attractive and brilliant as Machiavelli’s insights may seem, we dare never shrink from questioning and wondering: Should we trust a strong ruler to follow Machiavelli’s way of thinking? Should we believe that dictators necessarily perceive an overlap between their survival and all crucial altruistic tasks for the benefit of their society, in any final account? Was Machiavelli, 500 years ago, not familiar with vicious dictators like Saddam Hussein, Adolf Hitler, and Benito Mussolini?

MANIPULATING THE MANIPULATOR

Reading
The Prince
with careful attention indicates that this puzzling composition emerges in some twilight zone between imagination and reality. On the one hand, Machiavelli has constructed an imaginary figure of a legendary criminal dictator. On the other hand, it seems that our sophisticated author does not entirely trust “real” human autocrats to understand the pure logic of his super-arch- criminal. There is a gap between Machiavelli’s construction of the ideal gangster-ruler and his expectations from real-life human princes to understand and follow Machiavelli’s insights on the most efficient statecraft. How does Machiavelli intend to close the gap? How can Machiavelli motivate his unreliable ruler to build the foundation of a good society? Is it possible to persuade a manipulative prince to see an inevitable overlap between his political ambitions and the restoration of order and glory to the Italian society?

In
The Prince
, Machiavelli teaches his ruler all the manipulations, subterfuges, and stratagems that the prince must commit in order to build and stabilize his regime. Machiavelli patiently explains to the prince how to provide the perfect answer at the right time and in the right place. Toward the end of
The Prince
, however, Machiavelli admits that in the long run, achieving and maintaining leadership stability is an impossible mission for any mere mortal. A human prince, as successful and talented as he might be, would not survive politically should he live long enough. Eventually, human limitations, such as entrenched old habits, will prevent the prince from acting and reacting according to the complexity of the ongoing situations, and he will fall from power. The meaning is that the Machiavellian solution to civil war and intractable conflict, a manipulative state builder-dictator, is no more than a cheap illusion founded on a childish psychological desire—the longing for a protective father to solve all of our daunting problems.

However, Machiavelli, the dedicated adviser, does not leave his prince defeated and instead shows him the way to divine glory. Machiavelli promised his unreliable human prince a precious prize— world fame and a place in history forever—but only if he will devote himself to the restoration of order in Italian society: “This opportunity, therefore, must not be permitted to pass by so that Italy, after so long a time, may behold its redeemer. Nor can I express with what love he will be received in all those provinces that have suffered through these foreign floods; with the thirst of revenge, with what obstinate loyalty, with what compassion, with what tears! What doors will be closed to him? Which people will deny his obedience? What jealousy could oppose him? What Italian would deny him homage?” By appealing to the prince’s narcissist impulses, Machiavelli attempts to motivate—or more precisely, manipulate—him to undertake great and noble tasks for the benefit of his society.

Unfortunately, most manipulative rulers do not read Machiavelli, Hayek, or any other liberal thinker. As far as history shows, dictators and rulers make their own rules of conduct, at their own whims, and generally their behavior does not follow Machiavelli’s logic or his advice. Nevertheless, the sad history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, a painful situation of an intractable conflict, seems to demonstrate many of the insights that Machiavelli proposes in his political writings.

BETWEEN MACHIAVELLIAN PEACEMAKER AND THE ARAB–ISRAELI CONFLICT

The sad history of the Arab-Israeli conflict shows that concrete steps toward peace was finally achieved by the drastic move of a political leader. This leader was not a saint, and his political actions did not necessarily arrive from pure altruism. It was Anwar Sadat, the president of Egypt, whose astonishing visit to Israel in 1977 paved the way to negotiation of a peace agreement between Egypt and Israel.

From a realistic point of view, it appears that Sadat needed to advance a solution to the conflict for his own political survival. Sadat employed a diplomatic offensive in order to offer the Israelis a proposal that they would not be able to reject. Ironically, his dramatic political move enabled the Egyptian dictator to lead the peace process through negotiation and cooperation.

It may be difficult, if not impossible, to fathom the true motivations at work behind the behaviors and activities of human beings. We cannot see directly into Sadat’s mind and soul to explore his way of thinking, but combining the logic of the circumstances (or the complexity of the situation) with insights from Machiavelli’s school for statecraft might help us construct a “good” story. And a “good” story, or a fable, whether is true, half true, or completely imaginary, enfolds a lesson. Therefore, I propose to sketch a Machiavellian interpretation to Sadat’s historical dramatic move.

Egypt in Sadat’s era faced a financial crisis and, as a result, serious social problems. Egypt desperately needed an “economic fuel.” Sadat seemed to understand that a peace process with Israel could be extremely valuable for his country in that it could open a window to the west for Egypt and help the country recover the Sinai desert, a beautiful place that attracts tourists from all over the world.

However, it seemed that the Egyptian leader felt trapped because it was clear to him from past painful experiences that it would be extremely difficult to recover the lost asset by force and violence. (Sadat unsuccessfully challenged the very existence of Israel in the 1973 war.) On the other hand, recovering the desert by peaceful means also appeared impossible because the leadership of Israel, which constantly lives in a profound state of concern for Israel’s continued existence, was engaged in an uncompromising foreign policy. Israel’s policy compelled Sadat to understand that the conventional means of diplomacy and negotiation were doomed to failure.

Any attempt to build bridges between Egypt and Israel was inevitably received with extreme suspicion. Even the most optimistic statesmen were skeptical over the genuine intentions of the two bitter rivals to reach a peace agreement. Therefore, in defiance of any “rational” prediction, the Egyptian leader made an astonishing move. Sadat, the leader of the strongest Arab country and the most rigidly entrenched of Israel’s enemies, came to Jerusalem in 1977 to talk peace in the Israeli parliament, the Knesset:

“I can see the point of all those who were astounded by my decision or those who had any doubts as to the sincerity of the intentions behind the declaration of my decision. No one would have ever conceived that the President of the biggest Arab State, which bears the heaviest burden and the top responsibility pertaining to the cause of war and peace in the Middle East, could declare his readiness to go to the land of the adversary while we were still in a state of war. Rather, we all are still bearing the consequences of four fierce wars waged within thirty years. The families of the 1973 October War are still moaning under the cruel pains of widowhood and bereavement of sons, fathers and brothers.

As I have already declared, I have not consulted, as far as this decision is concerned, with any of my colleagues and brothers, the Arab Heads of State or the confrontation States. Those of them who contacted me, following the declaration of this decision, expressed their objection, because the feeling of utter suspicion and absolute lack of confidence between the Arab States and the Palestinian People on the one hand, and Israel on the other, still surges in us all. It is sufficient to say that many months in which peace could have been brought about had been wasted over differences and fruitless discussions on the procedure for the convocation of the Geneva Conference, all showing utter suspicion and absolute lack of confidence.”

Not surprisingly, this visit was a turning point in the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, it is not farfetched to consider that this dramatic turning point was part of a bold manipulative strategy—returning the Sinai desert to Egyptian control by a peace agreement with Israel. Therefore, Sadat’s historical move seems to rewrite one of the basic rules of
The Prince
: not every subversive manipulation is indecent, at least in the final account: “How praiseworthy it is for a prince to keep his word and to live by integrity and not by deceit everyone knows; nevertheless, one sees from the experience of our times that the princes who have accomplished great deeds are those who have cared little for keeping their promises and who have known how to manipulate the minds of men by shrewdness; and in the end they have surpassed those who laid their foundations upon honesty.”

Following the peace agreement, Israel turned over to Egypt the Sinai desert, including oil fields and Israeli air bases. Egypt received from the United States $2 billion in tanks, planes, and artifact weaponry, in addition to foreign aid allocation of $1 billion. Unfortunately, the relationship between Egypt and Israel has never evolved beyond a cold peace. These results indicate that, after all, Machiavelli’s manipulative methods of peacemaking, negotiation, and reconciliation look like the persistence of war by peaceful means.

If there is any truth in my interpretation of Sadat’s way of thinking, then it is worth recalling Machiavelli’s brilliant insight into how the personal ambition of a “hungry” leader might operate for the benefit of society. In Sadat’s case, Egypt acquired Sinai, and both countries gained peace. As attractive and heroic as our short story of manipulative initiative might sound, however, the final results are not as glorious as they are in fairy tales because any drastic political move is likely to have unintended and unpredictable implications.

One of the immediate results of the peace process between Egypt and Israel was that no Arab state would attempt war with Israel. This achievement has contributed to the Palestinization of the Arab-Israeli conflict and to the breaking of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s (Sadat’s predecessor) utopian dream of Pan-Arabism, two tendencies that actually started after the Six Day War. On the other hand, Sadat’s initiative added to the vacuum in the Arab world, which was created after the failure of the Pan-Arabism aspirations, and gave a push to the rise of political Islam. Unfortunately, Sadat paid a dear price for his peace initiative. On October 6, 1981, radical Islamists assassinated him.

NOTES

1. See Kelman, H. C., “Manipulation of Human Behavior: An Ethical Dilemma for the Social Scientist,” in Journal of Social Issues 21, no. 2 (1965): 33.

2. Ironically, Machiavelli, who proved excellence in humanist studies, was chosen to serve as a diplomat at the age of 29. See Skinner, Q.,
Machiavelli
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 3–4.

3. For a further discussion on the Machiavellian revolution in modern political philosophy, see Mannet, P., An Intellectual History of Liberalism, R. Balinski (trans.) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 10–19, and Strauss, L.,
An Introduction to Political Philosophy
(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989), 39–51.

4. In contrast to monistic ethical-political theories that center on one core super-value, pluralism is usually associated with the idea that there are irreducibly many prudential values. For a further discussion on the monism-pluralism issue, see Griffin, J.,
Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 89–92.

5. See Machiavelli, N.,
The Prince
in P. Bondanella and M. Musa (Eds.)
The Portable Machiavelli
(New York: Penguin Books, 1979), 130. There are many interpretations of
The Prince
, indicating that Machiavelli saw the authoritarian regime as a desperate alternative to the devastating and nigh total chaos that was so common in his time. For a further discussion, see Dietz, M. G., “Trapping The Prince: Machiavelli and the Politics of Deception,” in The
American Political Science Review
, 80 (1986): 778–779.

6. Compare to Silone, I.,
The School for Dictators
(New York and London: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1938), 26.

7. The very inapplicability of Machiavelli’s advice to realistic application was the basis for many interpretations of
The Prince
. For example, Dietz (“Trapping The Prince,” 777–799) noted that the intentions of Machiavelli, who was outcast by the Medici, were actually to trap the prince. According to this interpretation, Machiavelli hoped that Lorenzo de Medici, to whom he dedicated
The Prince
, would follow his deliberately poisonous bad advice and that it would lead him to eventually lose his regime.

8. See Machiavelli,
The Prince
and Machiavelli, N.,
The Discourses
in P. Bondanella and M. Musa (Eds.)
The Portable Machiavelli
(New York: Penguin Books, 1979a).