The Circle (57 page)

A
. We were under the tactical command of the flag on
KENNEDY,
CTG 21.1.

Q
. Was there a screen commander?

A
. The captain of
DEWEY
was screen commander.

Q
. What was the condition of the ship at the time she joined this task group?

A
. We had undergone heavy storms in the Arctic and sustained damage. Pumps and evaporators were down. The forward mount was smashed in and we had taken water forward and aft.

Q
. In your opinion, did any mechanical failure or material deficiency on USS
RYAN
contribute to the collision and subsequent loss of life?

A
. They may have contributed, yes.

Q
. What is your opinion of the general state of training and morale aboard?

A
. I think the state of training was okay. We had some good men. But they were overworked and morale was poor.

Q
. Did the helmsmen and lookouts perform properly?

A
. The helmsmen did. I had to ride BM3 Pettus about the lookouts.

Q
. Why?

A
. They—one in particular—did not stand proper watches. I had caught him sleeping on watch before and found him flaked out again a few minutes before the collision.

Q
. Please define “flaked out.”

A
. Asleep on watch.

Q
. Did you place him on report for this, or take other action?

A
. I told him I was placing him on report.

Q
. Who was this man?

A
. Seaman Recruit William Lassard. I believe he was one of the causes of the accident.

Q
. How so?

A
. It was a complicated situation that goes to the root of what was wrong on
RYAN.
I believe he used drugs and sold them to the rest of the crew. Earlier in the cruise, someone, several men, one of whom I believe to be Lassard, shoved me around on the fantail at night and I almost went overboard. In fact, I did go overboard, but caught the propeller guard and pulled myself up after they left. I reported this to the XO and to the captain and they instructed me to keep it under my hat until we returned to Newport, and Lassard would be taken care of there.

Q
. This is the man who was port lookout?

A
. Yes.

Q
. How do you relate him to the collision?

A
. I have thought this over for some time. I believe what might have happened is that the captain went out on the wing to pick up
KENNEDY.
He may have asked the lookout where the carrier was. If Lassard gave him the wrong bearing, he would have been looking at
CALLOOSAHATCHEE,
quite a few degrees to the left. If he thought that was the carrier, he might have concluded we were too far to the right.

Q
. Did this man survive the sinking?

A
. He is present in this room.

Q
. We will examine him this afternoon. Now, Mr. Len-son, would you go through the sequence of signals before the collision once more?

A
. We were on zero-one-zero, twenty knots, heading almost due north. The first signal brought the formation course right to one-zero-zero, a little south of due east. Then we had a flight course order to two-six-zero, almost due west, and increased speed.

Q
. Why were two course orders given? Why didn't the carrier simply come all the way around to two-six-zero?

A
. My understanding of the matter—according to the maneuvering instructions, you can't make a course change of greater than 180 degrees in one signal. You have to do it in steps to make sure everyone turns the same way.

Q
. Those were the only signals before the collision?

A
. As far as I heard.

Q
. Is it possible you did not hear a signal?

A
. I suppose so, especially as the time of collision neared.

Q
. Were all the alidades on the bridge working?

A
. Yes—no, they were not. The starboard alidade was fogged.

Q
. Did you report this?

A
. No. It had been fogged up since we got to the Arctic. We used the centerline and port alidades instead.

Q
. Did the captain know this?

A
. I think—no, I don't know if he did or not.

Q
. Did he use the starboard alidade?

A
. Not to my knowledge.

Q
. Did
RYAN
or
KENNEDY
sound any signals prior to the collision?

A
.
RYAN
did not. I recall a whistle from
KENNEDY,
but that was during or just seconds prior to colliding.

Q
. Did either ship turn on its navigation lights full?

A
. I don't think so.

Q
. Now, Mr. Lenson, we have brought into court a chalkboard, a pad of maneuvering-board paper, parallel rules, and dividers. I ask you to illustrate the position of the two ships, the maneuver in which they engaged, and the sequence of events leading up to collision. We will photograph the results and offer them in evidence.

A
. Yes, sir.

COUNSEL FOR THE COURT
: Let the record show the witness is drawing on the blackboard.

WITNESS
: [indicating chalkboard] At 0100, we were steaming on course zero-one-zero degrees, speed twenty knots.
KENNEDY
was in the center of the formation. The first signal changed formation course to one-zero-zero, about here. This was the first indication we had of her coming around. The second signal, turn two-six-zero, speed twenty-seven, brought her around to point almost directly at us. We had to maneuver such that we would end up astern of her and a little to port.

The maneuver the captain planned was to come right to one-three-zero until
KENNEDY
was somewhere along this line [indicating]. After we passed her, we were to come left with hard rudder. That would slide us into position astern. We were to start the maneuver as soon as the turn was executed and time the last part of it by watching
KENNEDY
's lights.

What actually happened was that we came to one-three-zero as planned and held that course for about a minute and a half or two minutes. The captain then took the conn and came left to zero-nine-zero. We held that course for a minute or two, then in here some place [indicating] for some reason the captain gave a left hard rudder. The effect of this was to cut across the bow of the carrier, and she hit us.

COUNSEL FOR THE COURT
: Now, you say this was all diagrammed on a maneuvering board. Did you see this diagram?

A
. No, sir, I base my reconstruction on what I heard. The carrier had headed west to launch her planes on the previous watch and everyone assumed that they'd recover on the same course, or close to it, since the wind was the same.

Q
. And
RYAN
had been assigned plane guard then, is that correct?

A
. Yes, sir.

Q
. And what is that station?

A
. It is 1,000 yards astern of the carrier offset twenty degrees.

Q
. And Mr. Evlin had discussed the maneuver with Commander Packer?

A
. Yes, sir.

Q
. Will you relate that conversation to the court?

A
. I heard only part of it. It started out that the captain had forgotten his pipe and Mr. Evlin asked him why not go and get it. Then he said, “Well, you know about the time I leave they'll put a signal in the air.” The lieutenant said he could handle it. The captain asked him what he would do if they came to two-six-zero. Mr. Evlin told him he would do the maneuver the same way he had before—come around to the right with ten degrees rudder, slow down, wait for
KENNEDY
to pass, then fall in behind her.

But as Mr. Silver testified, we had received that signal when we joined, saying that when a destroyer wasn't on station, it wasn't doing any good; that there wouldn't be any more sluggishness, something about love being dependent on timing, and that from now on ships would get to station by the fastest means possible even if they made a mistake. So when Alan—Lieutenant Evlin—said that, the captain blew up and said no, that would take forever. He then outlined the maneuver he wanted.

Q
. After Mr. Evlin had recommended a more conservative maneuver?

A
. Yes, sir; as I said, they had words over it.

Q
. What did Mr. Evlin say, as precisely as you can recall?

A
. He admitted the captain's solution would be faster, but he said it would take us too close to the carrier, and that she would be pointing right at us at some point.

Q
. This message you refer to was from Rear Admiral Hoelscher?

A
. Yes, sir.

Q
. And who assigned you to plane guard station?

A
. Beacon—that would be him. Or his staff, I guess.

Q
. Who receipted for that order?

A
. Lieutenant Evlin made the call on the pritac. As I said yesterday, they forgot to assign a plane guard, and he wanted to clarify that it would be us again. That was logical, since she was turning toward us. It was easier for us to fall in astern than for another destroyer to try to catch up.

Q
. That question was raised subsequent to the execution of the signal to turn two-six-zero?

A
. It was answered in the same transmission as the execute signal.

Q
. All right. Now the carrier has turned toward you.
RYAN
is on course one-three-zero, heading for her new station astern of her. At what point did the captain take the conn?

A
. About a minute and a half after we had steadied up on two-three-zero. I mean, one-three-zero.

Q
. Take your time. Who had the conn at the moment of collision?

A
. Commander Packer.

Q
. How long did he have it before the collision?

A
. It is hard to say, but I would guess—I would estimate, no longer than two or three minutes.

Q
. Let us return to the moment when he ordered a course change forty degrees to the left. Did either you or Mr. Evlin raise any objection to that order?

[Witness requested a glass of water. When he was refreshed, the question was repeated.]

A
. Not immediately. Mr. Evlin went to the chart table to check what it would do. I went out to the wing for another bearing on
KENNEDY.
I recall now that when I went to use the alidade, it was set a few degrees off to the left. That might have been where the captain left it when he had gone out a moment before to do the same thing.

Q
. But no one made any verbal objection?

A
. Yes, we did. A minute or so later, I came back and told the captain the bearing to the guide was zero-eight-zero. At the same time, Mr. Evlin said that the new course put us only 400 yards from the carrier.

Q
. When you took this last bearing, did you observe
KENNEDY
's sidelights?

A
. I have the impression of having seen green lights, more than one. I am almost sure I saw them, but things were happening so fast, I couldn't swear to that.

Q
. How long before the collision was it that you saw the green lights?

A
. Not more than a minute.

Q
. And you did not report them?

A
. I was not sure they were running lights. They were dim and there were all kinds of deck-edge lights and others. I think they were turned on for aircraft recovery.

Q
. You are positive that the maneuver the commanding officer had in mind ended with a left turn rather than a right?

A
. Yes, sir.

Q
. And your explanation of the reason Commander Packer decided to depart from his plan was that he mistook the lights of
CALLOOSAHATCHEE
for those of
KENNEDY?

A
. As I have said, I believe he was misinformed by Lassard and focused his attention on the wrong lights.

Q
. Had any maneuvering-board solution been done that included a course of zero-nine-zero?

A
. Not to my knowledge.

Q
. Now, when the captain received these two pieces of information—your bearing and Evlin's estimate of how close
RYAN
would pass
KENNEDY
—what was his response?

A
. He hesitated, then increased his rudder.

Q
. To the left?

A
. Yes, sir. I had gone out on the wing again by then. I realized that the carrier was almost on us, and went back inside. The captain then increased his rudder to hard left and ordered all engines ahead emergency flank.

Q
. Which would give what speed?

A
. We had boiler power for thirty knots.

Q
. And then you collided.

A
. Yes, sir. Another 200 feet and we would have made it. Or if the captain had given a right rudder instead of a left, we might have shaved down
KENNEDY
's side, but not hit her.

Q
. Did you see the commanding officer after the collision?