The Burden of Power: Countdown to Iraq - The Alastair Campbell Diaries (54 page)

He then did a call with GWB who was planning to tell Congress leaders TB was going to Camp David, so I got an operational note ready to go. The toughest question was what new evidence was there. He said the debate had got ahead of us, so we were going to
do the dossier earlier, in the next few weeks.
⁴⁶
The problem was this was going to raise expectations massively. Today was about beginning to turn the tide of public opinion and it was going to be very tough indeed. We went to Trimdon Labour Club for a reception mainly for the foreign media. Then Tom and I headed back to the airport. Good trip overall, strong press conference but a long way to go.

Generally positive press for TB. The problem, as shown by [now FCO minister] Mike O’Brien’s dreadful interview on the radio, was the dossier and the massive expectations. TB felt we could make the case. The story today was going to be Bush saying he would consult widely and go to the UN. Meeting on September 11 [anniversary], agreed we should be low-key, no minute’s silence other than at St Paul’s. Then I left for home and had a conference call with Condi and the White House team. Not brilliant. We agreed we needed a way of telling the whole story from the word go, maybe year by year. They were making fairly small presentational points. But we agreed we had to get CIC structures back up soon, and that there must be much better co-ordination of message than in August. We then discussed what message they wanted from Bush’s speech [to US Congress representatives at the White House] e.g. challenge to UN, bad stuff on Saddam, make clear he was going down the UN route, but it could not obstruct and divert. It was an OK call but I didn’t really feel we were at the races yet and it wasn’t clear how we were going to get there. The Commons would be important, but it was not going to be easy. Robin Cook called because he was doing press tomorrow re Commons modernisation and was clearly up for causing problems on Iraq. He said he would ‘try to stay on message’ but then said ‘I hope Tony and you don’t want a shooting war.’ He said Bush and Co. had screwed it up and we should not be held responsible for that.

The Bush [White House] speech went down OK. At the office meeting, out on the terrace, ostensibly to talk about follow-up to TB’s note, we
just talked about Iraq. All of us were pressing TB to go with the flow on the demands for a recall of Parliament, but he was very resistant. We were saying it would let off steam and show he was serious in our Parliament strategy. But he said there were too many questions that we could not really answer, added to which there was not really much to say at the moment. The press conference had settled things but the media were determined to keep a sense of frenzy going on this. Agreed to put out the line that there was no question of troops being sent without Parliament being consulted. But the idea of a ‘Council of War’ had taken hold. Added to which [Michael] Cockerell [BBC political documentary maker] was today screening his special-relationship documentary [
Hotline to the President
] in which TB’s answer to a question about ‘blood price’ was the big story.
⁴⁷
TB said we had to get the UN route but could not do it too much. We were pushing him on dossier timing.

JP was very loyal, said he was totally supportive. There was a lot of angst around. I called Robin C to give him the line on recall of Parliament and he said I hope you are not going to go down the road of war because I believe it could mean the end of the government. Meeting with John Scarlett, Tom McKane, Des Bowen [MoD], Edward Chaplin [FCO], Julian Miller [Cabinet Office intelligence and security official] to go over ‘the dossier’. It had to be revelatory and we needed to show that it was new and informative and part of a bigger case. John Williams [FCO director of public and press affairs] was offering to write it full-time. John Scarlett was clearly aware of the responsibility, he was so serious. I felt he was very human. He warned us that there was very little re nuclear. JS called to say he had seen C who had agreed to go through all the relevant material.

In late. TB meeting with Hans Blix [head of UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, UNMOVIC], plus David Manning, Jonathan, AC. He went through what they had to do, said that WE were the military threat and there was no movement by Iraq. But also, said that if the Iraqis felt the US had decided to do the military
option come what may, they would not move. DM spoke to Condi and got the sense they were going to be sensible re UNSCR. TB talked to Putin and Chirac who were OK.

In to chase TB up to be ready to leave by 11, CB fretting over his clothes and hair. Cherie said she felt we were fine on Iraq provided we could go down the international route. TB said he believed we had materially influenced GWB and that DM was worth his weight in gold for the way he framed the argument. Despite the negative public line put out by the Russians, both he and GWB were encouraged by the Putin calls. Felt that he was saying the UN had to deal with it, though he was not keen on war. On the flight out, TB meeting DM, SM, Jonathan, Matthew Rycroft [private secretary, foreign affairs] and [General] Tony Pigott. TB did his usual thing, of going through things with a pad and pen and then calling us round. He set out what we should get into a UNSCR. Query over whether there should be a specific timeline. And the toughest question was whether we would have to go back to the UN for a second resolution if the first one was rebuffed. DM’s view, which TB came round to after a long discussion, was that it was probably best to get a tough first mandate by promising to go back to the UN, but make clear the UN had to face up to this. About half an hour or so going through all the tactical considerations, what the French and Russians would live with, how to get the US not to put in things that they would see as unreasonable, e.g. elections.

TB was clearly trying to get GWB in a more doveish position, all the more necessary when we heard that Cheney would also be at Camp David. When we did the media, TB pushed the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] report on potential activity at nuclear sites and we briefed the Sundays re threat to UK, dodging questions re the UN. On the plane, after the diplomatic run-through, Tony Pigott went through the US military thinking. There was a build-up going on now. The timelines were quite short because once we got to the really hot season it was impossible to fight. He said the Saudis would not give their territory so they had to go through the Gulf and Kuwait. But they also wanted to go in from the north, with our and Turkey’s help. He said there was a plan for a fifteen-day air build-up, followed by a massive ground force, which would be the moment of maximum danger because that would be the point at which he might use chemical/biological weapons. Tony Pigott said there were three packages on offer for the UK. One, weakening
Iraq’s ability to fire off at Israel. That was the most strategic. Two, a bigger land and air package. Three, a huge – possibly 15,000 troops – force as part of the northern advance. It would mean calling up reservists soon as well as doing something visible eg movement of warships. TB was clear that the threat of the build-up had to be real for the Iraqis to respond at all, though they may respond with madness.

Pigott was clear that the US were gearing up for it but didn’t want to do it alone. They would probably get a few others, e.g. Australia. TB was keen that we emphasise the Dutch had come out for it. He was clear the UN route was the best route but equally clear that if that was used for delay, we should not tolerate it. TB got changed at Andrews Airbase and we got on to the Marine 1 helicopter with Will Farish [US ambassador to London], Chris Meyer [UK ambassador to Washington], [John] Negroponte [US ambassador to the UN] and Bush’s main protocol guy. Forty-minute flight, going over what TB should say at the arrival doorstep with GWB. We landed, TB out the front, us out the back. They walked through a line of soldiers to where the doorstep was set up. Bush was his usual rather faltering self. TB OK, both talking up the threat. We went up to the main building and TB, Bush, Cheney, Condi and David had an initial session. TB felt that his job was to sell the case for the UN route to Cheney. Jonathan and I met with Karen Hughes [AC’s opposite number in the White House], Dan Bartlett [her deputy], Andy Card [chief of staff], Steve Hadley and Farish and went over the communications issues. I told the Bush advisers there was a lot of scepticism about motive, including people feeling it was about avenging Dad [Bush Sr]. I also said the sole superpower status of the US raised anti-Americanism and they didn’t understand that. Karen was pressing the usual stuff re visuals, Dan [Bartlett] saying we had to get Saddam’s story up, the abuses, etc. We gave them an honest assessment of where EU/Arab opinion was. I said our domestic problem was ‘poodle’ but also why now? Why only Saddam? What about the Middle East? On why now, the case had to be built on evidence. On why only Saddam because he was a unique threat.

On Middle East, TB was clear to GWB he really had to engage on that. Karen was asking if we could help the Middle East peace process by dealing with Iraq. [Steve] Hadley was pretty hard over, talking about the importance of promoting democracy and freedom, and I said we had to be careful we were not talking about Americanisation. After some of us were called in to the TB/GWB meeting, and asked to brief on our own discussions, I said to GWB I felt they had to GET
this anti-Americanism. A lot of it was jealousy and some of it resentment that they felt obliged to feel sympathy and solidarity post September 11. But some of it was just fear of their power. When I said we were worried about some of the language they used, Cheney looked pissed off and said ‘You mean we shouldn’t talk about democracy?’ I said not if what people take out of it is not a message about democracy but a message about Americanisation. GWB seemed to get it. At one point we had a break and Bush shouted out across the room ‘Hey, big guy’ to me. TB was not there at the time but I went over and Bush said ‘I’ll say this, and I don’t want it on the record, and with apology to the mixed audience, but your guy’s got balls. But it’s the right thing to do and future generations will surely thank us. I really believe that. I really believe the world has to get rid of Saddam and I really appreciate y’all coming over.’

When TB came back in, GWB said he’d decided to go to the UN and put down a new UNSCR, challenge the UN to deal with the problems for its own sake. He could not stand by. He would say OK, what will you do? Earlier, not too convincingly, Karen had claimed GWB was always going to go down the UN route. Cheney looked very sour throughout, and after dinner, when TB and Bush walked alone to the chopper, Bush was open with him that Cheney was in a different position. Earlier, when we had said that the international community was pressing for some direction but that in the US there would be people saying ‘Why are you going to the UN, why aren’t you doing it now?’ Cheney smiled across the table, making it pretty clear that was where he was. The mood was good. As we left, Bush joked to me ‘I suppose you can tell the story of how Tony flew in and pulled the crazed unilateralist back from the brink.’ He said he was going to make clear that if the UN didn’t deal with it – no hesitation. He said he didn’t commit troops lightly, nobody would. Said TB totally understands link between WMD/Iraq and terrorism. Condi said the Cold War was about our values winning and we should push that. I said it was important they didn’t come over as ideologues.

DM said the TB/GWB/Cheney meeting was quite extraordinary, a US president using a UK prime minister to persuade an American vice president. Cheney had not looked happy but it was clear Bush had made his mind up. He was very clear on the threat, and the need of the UN to deal with it. He said he would get something on the Middle East. ‘That’s a promise.’ He was, as Sally said, far more impressive close up. At the dinner, a lot of politics having been done, there was a fair bit of small talk. He was quizzing TB about what Balmoral was like. Also filling us in on the row at Augusta golf club [in Georgia]
where women were trying to win entry against the rednecks. He said they would have to let them in so the sooner the better. He and I discussed our running. He had done one marathon and his mum and dad had come out to cheer him at nineteen miles and his mother had shouted out ‘There are three fat ladies ahead of you.’ Cheney said next to nothing over dinner, ditto Hadley. TB got very bad stomach cramps. On the helicopter, TB and I agreed the top lines for the media waiting at Andrews Airbase. Shared strategy, shared determination to deal with it. The press conference went fine, TB feeling a job well done. I slept right through the flight to Aberdeen [where TB was visiting Balmoral]. First thing, TB, Godric and I discussed the line from the [forthcoming TUC] speech to push. The argument that the UN was the route provided it was dealt with was perfectly strong. Briefed on that. Maybe went a bit far for the Yanks, but TB and DM had done a bloody good job.

The press on the trip was OK and there was a sense we were in a different position but we were still facing a lot of press and public hostility. I did the morning meeting, then chatted to TB up at Balmoral re the speech. He was a bit alarmed that the story on Leo singing the national anthem to the Queen had been leaked to the
Sun
. He remained of the view that we would get there in the end, and also that it was still possible to avoid war.

Meeting with John Scarlett on dossier before being joined by three senior SIS people. They were all pissed off at reports in the
Telegraph
and
FT
that MI6 were unhappy at being asked to do the report and put intelligence material in it. They said that was not the case, and they believed it was the FCO setting them up for the blame if the report was not good enough. We agreed a process for writing the report. Scarlett agreed with me that the FCO was trying to take it over and I said I will chair a group looking at it from the presentational point of view. Jack Straw called me about it and I said John Williams should be part of the team, not the writer. John Scarlett felt there was an ownership issue. He said he must feel he will have ownership of it. He and the SIS guys were really helpful. Went over some of the issues, Arab media, links with CIC, agreed there should be a permanent plug-in. Good meeting and felt they were basically OK to deal with. Then did a note to JS [Scarlett], copied very widely, setting out the process. JS to own. AC to help.