The Burden of Power: Countdown to Iraq - The Alastair Campbell Diaries (5 page)

TB did a very good summing-up, first going through all the different measures that I should brief, then on the specific reports he wanted to commission, then on the importance of a diplomatic strategy to support the US. He said they would feel beleaguered and all the tensions that had been apparent before would now become more open, whatever the warm words around the world. He asked Jack and Geoff to come through to Number 10, said it was vital that we worked up an international agenda that went beyond the US just hitting Afghanistan. He felt NMD [National Missile Defense] would quickly rise up the agenda.

He intended to say to Bush that he should deliver an ultimatum to the Taliban to hand over Bin Laden and his people and then hit them if it didn’t happen. He had been reading the Koran over the summer. [The Prophet] Mohammed had lost battles but there was a belief that if you died in the cause that you believed in then you went straight to heaven. That was a very, very powerful thing to work against. TB’s public words were very much in total support of the US. He said this was going to be a nightmare, as big and as bad as any we had endured. It was interesting that he had not asked GB [Gordon Brown, Chancellor of the Exchequer] to come back for the smaller meeting. I asked him why and he said because in their recent discussions he had been monosyllabic. The Israelis were making
massive attacks on the terror groups. TB said we were going to have to work exceptionally hard on the international response. Bush was getting it in the neck for not being in Washington.

Everyone was in bed when I finally got home, and Fiona [Millar, AC’s partner and adviser to CB] had fallen asleep watching it all on the TV. I did a call with Jonathan to go over how much we would need to kick out of the diary in the coming days. Pretty much all of it, at least for a while. Jonathan said the Americans would be unlikely to let Bush travel – it was a bit much that he couldn’t even go to his own capital – but the fallout from this was going to need an awful lot of diplomatic activity. I think we’re going to be seeing a lot of the insides of planes, he said.

I turned off the TV in the bedroom and went downstairs to channel-hop while writing it all up. The TUC felt a bloody age ago. Some of the footage of the aftermath, clouds of dust and debris literally rolling down streets, was extraordinary. So were the eyewitness accounts. Gut-wrenching. What was amazing about this was that people like Bush, TB, Chirac and the rest were having to react and respond in exactly the same time frame, and with pretty much only the same knowledge of the incident as people watching on TV. The difference was they were going to have to take some huge decisions about it too.

Bush did a broadcast at 2am, said all the things you’d expect but looked a bit shaky. TB was generally thought to have handled it well yesterday and also got a fairly good press for the TUC speech that never was. I got in early and read the overnight intelligence reports, everything pointing now to Bin Laden. TB was starting to think about the long term and what to do about the whole terrorism agenda. It had clearly moved up to a different level. The day was taken up almost exclusively with the attack. TB wanted as much information as possible and he wanted to be in a position to work out Bush’s likely reaction. He felt it likely that Bush would feel the pressure for an early response. The full enormity of what had happened was only now really sinking in. TB was pretty clear that we would end up going for the Taliban. At Cobra there was a review of the security procedures put in place. RW [Richard Wilson] and others wanted to reopen City Airport but [Stephen] Byers [Transport Secretary] objected and TB, with GB and JS [Jack Straw] in full support, agreed to keep the airport shut and the flyover path over London shut too. GB at Cobra contributed when asked to, but otherwise pretty much sat there, or muttered out of the side of his mouth to Jack. He clearly hated it,
possibly hated the fact that TB was so clearly in charge in these crisis management situations.

Lander said that Bin Laden was last thought to be in Kandahar three days ago. John Stevens [Metropolitan Police commissioner] said there were more than a thousand extra police officers on the streets. TB said he had talked to the Governor of the Bank of England [Eddie George] and they were keeping in contact about how to maintain confidence in the financial system, while the supply of oil was also being constantly monitored. Jack said that we should not get ahead of the US in terms of what we say. He felt our best role was to stay close and try to exercise influence privately. Afterwards there was a smaller meeting in TB’s office with Richard Dearlove (C) [chief of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), MI6], Lander, Hoon, Jack and Kevin Tebbit [permanent secretary, Ministry of Defence]. C said there was a significant international operation going on by us and the Americans and others that he was confident would show who was behind it.

TB commissioned a note on what Bush’s options were, saying he had to get inside his mind if he could. Hoon said al-Qaeda tentacles were all over the place – Africa, Chechnya, this wasn’t just about Afghanistan. There was also the view that the intelligent thing would be to wait several weeks but TB pointed out things were likely to move much more quickly than that. If the Americans are as convinced as we are that this is Bin Laden, there should be pressure put on to yield him up and if they refuse to co-operate, then he would be entitled to hit them. TB warned, following on from his phone call with Putin, that the Russians would essentially co-opt this whole event as justification for what they were doing in Chechnya. There was a discussion about recalling Parliament.

Later TB saw Scarlett and Lander and others to get a fuller briefing on Afghanistan and Bin Laden and how he operated. One of the experts from the FCO [Foreign and Commonwealth Office], a total Arabist, came very close to saying the attack was justified, saying the Americans should look to their own policy on the Middle East to understand why so many people don’t like them. Scarlett said it wasn’t clear that OBL controlled all the training camps, but what he did know was that there was a very large supply of young men ready to die for the cause. It was also clear that there were likely to be would-be terrorists here as asylum seekers. Both C and Lander were very good on big picture and detail. They both felt Bush would need a few days for the Americans properly to assess all this stuff. TB and I agreed he should do a press conference, saying that Cabinet would meet tomorrow and Parliament on Friday. We worked on the script
and went through various options of how to express the support he would give to Bush, which was pretty full on.

We got a message that Bush wanted to speak to him. It was a good call, Bush was pretty calm and TB very supportive. Bush said he was the first foreign leader he was speaking to and he would value staying in touch. He said the American people would give him a bit of time. TB said there might be a case for a G8. TB went over some of the things he had been saying to us, and Bush said he was grateful for the help and would appreciate if he put some of those thoughts in writing. Bush said the UN and NATO statements were ‘useful cover for the work that we would have to do’, by which I think he meant continuing intelligence gathering and then attack. He said this was ‘a new war, Pearl Harbor in the twenty-first century’. He said these people had to come out of their holes sometime. TB said he felt for him personally and Bush replied ‘I know what I’ve got to do. I’m not a good mourner. I’m a weeper. I’ll weep with the country but then act, but I don’t just want to hit cruise missiles into the sand.’ TB was a bit worried that the longer he waited, the more he would be expected to do.

TB wrote off a note for Bush’s eyes only, which spelled out some of the problems we were facing and where Bush might go to build useful alliances. I felt Bush was almost Zen-like, almost too calm. Maybe he had decided he could wait longer than we thought. TB was sure we would need to do a lot more than just take out OBL. There was a second Cobra meeting with another discussion about whether to lift some of the restrictions. John Stevens said that the casualty figures were very vague but the UK casualties could be up to a thousand. TB agreed we should get out the possibility that figures could go into the hundreds. TB and Blunkett had a meeting on asylum with DB pushing hard for ID cards and detention centres. The general feeling was that TB was doing well. He was constantly telling us about bits of the Koran. Earlier we got the Muslim Council to condemn the attacks. Ben Wilson [press officer] started in the press office. What a day to start.

TB’s worry was that GWB would turn inwards. He had sensed a bit of resistance to the G8 idea, which he felt was a big mistake. He felt now was the time to bind in as much international support as possible. He felt a big military hit combined with a big international effort of support and a long-term agenda for terrorism was the way to go. There was a whole load more intelligence all pointing towards OBL.
We went through to the Cobra meeting where we agreed we could wind down the emergency response. TB’s note to Bush was strong but he was not sure he would be receptive. TB had a meeting pre Cabinet with Jack S, Geoff [Hoon], [Admiral Sir Michael] Boyce [Chief of the Defence Staff, CDS] – who had replaced [General Sir Charles] Guthrie. I felt that with all the focus on the States, there was a danger we would neglect the Brits involved, and the fallout, which would be substantial, so suggested Tessa [Jowell, Culture Secretary] be used to sort out all that logistically etc. but also to be a kind of minister for helping families and victims. Jack was worried it would cut across the FCO stuff but I felt it needed a specific minister, specifically deputed. The Palace played the US national anthem at the Changing of the Guard while Prince Charles was visiting the embassy to sign the condolence book.

Cabinet was very sombre, though Clare [Short, International Development Secretary] did her usual bit. TB was very much in charge. He said it was an act carried out in America which should be seen as an attack on the democratic world. Of the thousands killed, he feared several hundred would be British. He said all the evidence pointed to OBL. He said long term there had to be a strategy for dealing with Islamic fundamentalism but for the moment the focus was on finding the perpetrators, putting in place the security measures needed here, and assessing the financial implications for the world economy.

Jack went through the diplomatic activity, said the UNSC [United Nations Security Council] had been easier to mobilise than the EU in some respects. On security, he said the problem was security is only as good as the weakest link. Blunkett went through all that was being done to protect public buildings, big computer installations and infrastructure sites. He said suicide bombers are notoriously difficult to plan for. He pointed out, as did others, the importance of reaching out to decent British Muslims. TB said there were three areas to focus on – whatever US military response is made, and our participation within it. Politics and diplomacy and in particular trying to get impetus into the Middle East peace process [MEPP]. And practical security arrangements. Clare said the real problem was lack of progress in the Middle East, the fact that so many people were willing to be suicide bombers, and she asked if we had the will to improve life for the Arab world. Patricia [Hewitt, Trade and Industry Secretary] briefed on oil and energy supplies, and was fairly confident. It was a good meeting, and I think people sensed TB was going to have an important role, not just here. Jack was doing fine on the media but agreed we would need to broaden the field.

TB and I then spent a while working on his statement for tomorrow, though getting the right balance and tone would be the hard bit. Both Hilary Armstrong [chief whip] and Robert Hill warned him that the PLP [Parliamentary Labour Party] may be a bit dodgy on this and TB said ‘Are they mad? Do we just let these people get away with killing thousands of people?’ He said if this had been on British soil, just imagine the pressure for a swift response. Jonathan had brought in some interesting books on the Taliban which we were trying to read in addition to the material being provided by the spooks. TB sent a message to all Arab leaders. We did a TB article for about fifty regional newspapers in areas with large numbers of Muslims. There was the beginning of talk in the States about how TB’s response was better than Bush’s, which made him a bit anxious, and he recalled how [former US President Bill] Clinton had got a bit jumpy during Kosovo.

David Manning [Blair’s newly appointed senior foreign policy adviser], who had been in the States at the time of the attacks, was now back. Quite a baptism. He gave a very good assessment of where the various bits of the American set-up were. He felt Bush was being fairly restrained but at some point that would stop. We had a meeting with TB, C, Lander, Francis Richards [director] of GCHQ [Government Communications Headquarters, intelligence monitoring agency]. Everything pointed to OBL, training camps, possibly some help from the Taliban. The US clearly believed there was real evidence but we agreed it would not be possible to publish much of it. We left for the Commons, got the tone of the statement right and went over the difficult questions. TB did fine. IDS [Iain Duncan Smith, new leader of the Conservative Party] was OK but there were too many clichés and not enough smart questions. TB felt he was perfectly bright but lacking in real imagination. Our backbenchers were fine, and the Tories and Lib Dems basically onside for the approach he set out. TB was sure that ultimatum followed by attack if no response was the right way. Anji [Hunter, head of Downing Street presentation and planning] took a call from Will Farish, the new US ambassador [to London], specifically inviting some of us to the service at St Paul’s. We travelled up with Richard Wilson and John Gieve [permanent secretary, Home Office] and ended up in the front row, which was a bit embarrassing. [John] Major, [Margaret] Thatcher and [James] Callaghan [former Prime Ministers] were all there. GB was sitting next to IDS. It was a nice service. I chatted with Jamie Rubin [former
US State Department chief spokesman, 1997–2000] at the end, who said the American right would use this as an excuse to do all sorts of things right round the world. Be very careful of these people, he said.