Authors: Elliott Abrams
Off to Rome. We had a preliminary session with Massimo D’Alema, a former prime minister (and former communist) who had become foreign minister in April. The Arabs want an immediate ceasefire, he told Rice. Let's call on Israel to stop bombing, particularly in the south, in the border area. Rice was tough: Don't try to direct Israel's military operations. She reminded D’Alema what the G-8 had done on July 16, just 10 days earlier, when it was meeting in St. Petersburg: It had issued a statement blaming Hizballah for starting the war and had
not
called for an immediate ceasefire.
In the conference room, Rice faced a terrible problem: Emotionally, most delegations simply wanted the fighting to end. They did not care about political and military considerations and avoiding the status quo ante. Siniora himself gave a tearful presentation about how Lebanon was being completely destroyed, which was false but moving. Everyone seemed to be demanding an immediate ceasefire, an end to the violence, an Israeli withdrawal. Rice was isolated – but she did not abandon or weaken the American position. She alone stopped the conference from giving in to Siniora's tears, with one brief moment of solidarity from the British Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett – Tony Blair's last foreign minister and the first woman to hold the post. Either Beckett was reflecting Blair's pragmatic and pro-American positions, or she was simply offering some sisterly solidarity to the lonely Rice. Rice told the delegates that we need immediate humanitarian aid and a big donor's conference to rebuild Lebanon. But this time, she said, we need real peace, not a failed ceasefire. This time we want a durable ceasefire, and that depends on Lebanese sovereignty in all its territory. We do not want to be back here in six months for the same thing. We want an “urgent” end to the violence, but one that lasts.
We returned to Israel. On July 27, the day after the Rome conference, Olmert told us he wanted 10 more days of bombing and the insertion of a real international force, a fighting force, and then the war would end. Lebanon should ask for the force, he said, and we will agree to it; I want Secretary Rice to have something to deliver. But it has to be real; something has to change on the ground. We need and you need to emerge with a sense of achievement. This is just a chapter in confronting Iran and
they must not win this test, he told us – sounding just like the president. Putting in a security force will take 10 days anyway; then I will be ready. Then came a long argument over the fate of Sheba'a: Olmert and Livni told Rice that leaving Sheba'a, or even agreeing to leave Sheba'a, or saying anything at all about Sheba'a, would be a victory for Hizballah. Sheba'a was not central, I thought, but this was the first real, prolonged argument between the Israelis and Rice on a policy matter.
At dinner on July 29, Rice and
Olmert covered mostly humanitarian issues
. Humanitarian corridors had been established, but Rice said they were not working. Olmert replied that Israel had no war with the government of Lebanon or the Lebanese people and was showing restraint, but errors are made – it is war. Yes, but you cannot win a solely military victory, she argued: Look at Iraq and Afghanistan. You can win militarily and lose politically; we did in Vietnam. The Israelis quoted Rice's recent speeches about Lebanon back at her: Hizballah must be defeated. After dinner, Rice and Olmert met alone. Olmert had reiterated that the IDF needed another week or 10 days; it believes it is really hurting Hizballah now. Of course, we felt that would be a good thing – if it were true – but we had no way of knowing that. Rice had replied that another week or 10 days of war was not sustainable without diplomacy, and diplomacy was not sustainable without some moves on Sheba'a. Olmert had given her three thousand reasons why that was not possible, she later told us. She had told Olmert that if Israel would not make any move on Sheba'a, we would: The United States could announce something, and we could give it to Lebanon.
I was startled by her report of her private meeting with Olmert: The tough and determined Rice of the Rome conference was now not only buying Siniora's Sheba'a argument lock, stock, and barrel but also telling the Israelis we would go forward on it with or without them. I thought an American move on Sheba'a would be a victory for Hizballah, won by starting a war. We could offer no other explanation for such a change in U.S. policy. It was also clear that the tone of the meeting with Olmert had not been positive – something else that was beginning to happen now. After all our meetings, I called home near midnight on a secure phone to report to the White House that slowly but surely our line was shifting. The president had been firm about dealing a defeat to Hizballah and Iran, but now we seemed to be seeking an accommodation. Perhaps the isolation at the Rome conference had taken a larger toll on Condi than I had thought – with everyone calling for an immediate end to the war, shedding tears for the Lebanese, and Condi standing almost alone for what we called “no status quo ante” but everyone else saw as “keep the war going.” Whatever the reason, she was now looking less for ways to win than for ways to get the thing over with. I urged that the president call Condi with a pep talk, lest we continue to drift away from the line he had taken.
The following day Rice met with Livni and
again pressed on the Sheba'a issue. On the timing of an Israeli end to operations, we were not so far apart because organizing a new force and getting the Security Council to approve it would probably take a week anyway. But Rice told Livni that it was increasingly hard to sustain the war; for us to arrange a decent finish we needed Siniora, and for that we needed something on Sheba'a. You're not thinking creatively, she told Livni, about strengthening the moderate Arabs. The United States cannot stay in its current position; we will have to move. If Israel cannot speak about Sheba'a, the United States will do so, in our own words.
Again, I was amazed by the way this marginal issue, a flimsy excuse that Hizballah proffered for its need to maintain an army, was taking center stage. If we took this position on Sheba'a, I thought, Hizballah would claim victory for its “resistance” and note that we all now acknowledged it had been right all along. And then it would find other excuses for its arms: There would be other villages it claimed were “really” Lebanese, not Israeli or Syrian.
Nevertheless, Sheba'a or no Sheba'a, Rice was working hard to get Olmert and
Siniora to commit to one piece of paper – a piece of paper that could become a Security Council resolution. There was progress; the basic elements were coming together in our minds. Our plan was to go to Beirut and get Siniora on board, then return to Jerusalem for Olmert's agreement, and then head for New York. With this resolution, the war would end. It would be quite an achievement not only for the United States but also, of course, for Rice herself. She had been secretary of state for a year and a half and securing a good ceasefire – one with elements that might change the situation on the ground in southern Lebanon – would be a tremendous feat. The arguments with the Israelis would go away, understood as a matter of wartime tension; Lebanon would be better off with Hizballah constrained; and Rice's own role would be celebrated.
We were not quite there yet. Our plan included deployment of the Lebanese Army in the south, plus an international peacekeeping force and a demand by the UN and the Lebanese government that Hizballah disarm. Then a ceasefire could be declared, and Israel would address the Sheba'a issue. Yet neither Lebanon nor Israel was fully on board. The Israelis were saying no on Sheba'a. The Lebanese Cabinet approved strengthening UNIFIL
and deploying the Lebanese Army in the south but no international force. And the sequence was not yet agreed: Did the ceasefire come first or would it come only after these deployments? As potential troop contributors balked, it was increasingly clear that such a quick deployment was simply not going to happen. Still, we were getting close; compromises and bridging proposals should still be possible.
Everything fell apart on the night of July 29–30. Shortly after midnight, Israeli jets bombed a three-story house in Qana, a village in South Lebanon from which Israel claimed there had been rockets fired into Israel repeatedly during the war. Hiding inside the house were civilians who were fleeing the combat. Twenty-eight people were killed, half of them children, although initial media reports suggested twice those numbers. I recalled Condi saying to Siniora a week before that “you might have a major accident by the IDF.” Now it had happened. We were on the phones throughout the morning hours, first trying to determine what had happened. We urged the Israelis to declare a bombing pause, at least while it investigated the incident; the following day, they announced a pause for 48 hours. The Lebanese called the bombing a deliberate assault, saying the Israelis must have known there were women and children hiding in the house;
it was a massacre and a war crime. The IDF claimed then and later that it thought the building was empty of civilians and was being used by Hizballah fighters. But the early versions varied: At one point, the Israelis were claiming they had hit the house eight hours before it collapsed on those hiding inside. This did not inspire confidence; it was the usual fog of war.
But the main effect was that Siniora canceled our visit to Beirut; we were not welcome. Siniora gave a televised address, saying, “There is no place on this sad morning for any discussion other than an immediate and unconditional cease-fire as well as an international investigation into the Israeli massacres.” He added that Israel's leaders were “war criminals.” Once again, I wondered why he thought he could outbid Hizballah in the rhetoric department. Rice decided to do one more round of talks with the Israelis and then head home overnight.
Unsurprisingly, these were the worst talks we had ever had with Israelis. Olmert described his impression later: “I got the message that Condi wanted to meet me immediately. She was absolutely angry at the event in Qana. It was two o'clock in the afternoon. I advised my staff to set the meeting for 7 pm. Time will cool off the atmosphere, I thought.”
4
The frost was evident immediately when we entered his office: Olmert addressed her formally as “Madam Secretary,” not the usual “Condi,” and as I recall it, they did not even shake hands. The discussion began with an argument about leaks. Rice complained that matters she had brought up with him in private ended up in the newspapers. He responded with the same complaint about the U.S. side: Someone had told the papers that she was going to have a very tough talk with him about Sheba'a, and that someone was not an Israeli.
Having established that each was deeply irritated with the other, they moved on. Rice pressed Olmert for compromises; give me something to work with, she told him. He responded that the Israeli view had not changed: This is not the moment to retreat or all will have been lost; a ceasefire now would make the whole effort useless; we will issue an apology but we cannot stop now or the whole effort is lost. Olmert also told her that the cabinet rejected the idea of giving up Sheba'a; even the Labor Party people said the message would be that kidnapping pays. You must keep that out of the UN resolution, or the whole world will be sending that message. He said Israel had apologized for Qana and would now investigate the incident. Rice brushed that aside. This is a new situation; pressures have been building for 18 days now (the duration of the war) and this pushes it over. After their nasty exchange over leaks, Rice warned Olmert that you said you needed 10 days; now we don't have 10 days. We will be in the Security Council this week. You have shown perseverance and strength, Olmert replied, and I see why you're angry and how difficult it is for the United States. But you know that we are right. We live here and cannot give up everything because of this one event. The ceasefire you now have in mind will not work; it will be like all the ceasefires with the Palestinians and last three days.
Rice shot back that she hadn't been standing with Israel for 18 days but for 5 years. I am analyzing this situation and we have to make some moves. We need to avoid a damaging UN resolution that says “immediate and unconditional ceasefire.” You and we will need to announce a “suspension of hostilities.” But what about the international force, Olmert asked. We all agreed it had to be in place before Israel would stop fighting. There will be no international force, Rice said; the circumstances have changed. The potential contributors have pulled back. Olmert speculated about an Israeli ground operation, using the limited time that remained to gain more territory, but Rice pushed back; she was trying to end this war. Olmert talked of the gains that could be achieved in a few more days on the ground, the damage Hizballah could suffer, but Rice replied that perhaps if she believed Israel could achieve this…but she did not. There is no political context and political sensitivity. Today puts you in a bad position. The damage is done. We cannot undo it, she told the prime minister. I need 10 more days, Olmert answered; we will hit them hard. Hizballah must get no benefit from this war.
In separate meetings, aides to Olmert told us that he would not survive politically if the war ended this way. That would mean Israel had lost the war and Iran had won: It would be a victory for Hizballah, and worse yet under U.S. pressure. This would be the first time since 9/11, Turbowitz said to me, that the United States was taking a stand against Israel after a terrorist attack.
In fact, Olmert and Rice's timetables were not so far apart because action in the UN did not come until August 11, just over 10 days later. But Olmert was arguing for the original U.S. and Israeli conditions: full deployment of an international force before a ceasefire. To Rice, this was simply unrealistic: There was going to be no such force, no matter what Israel or the United States did. So other grounds for the ceasefire would have to be found, or the war would go on forever. The minute any new forces start to deploy, you must stop, she told Olmert. I cannot hold the line against calls for an immediate ceasefire any more. There will be a gap between that call and deployment. You need to announce some sort of pause in action today, and we will shoot for the best resolution we can. We will not veto a resolution because it has “immediate ceasefire” language. Don't put us in a different position from that of the United States, Olmert pleaded – a position where the resolution passes, you say stop, and we won't stop. But Rice had said her piece: If we can establish the conditions, we are for a ceasefire and we will vote for it, she told him as the meeting ended. Accept the resolution when it passes and start implementing it. It may not be 10 days from today but it will likely be 10 days from the first time you told me you just needed 10 more days.