Read Slavery by Another Name Online
Authors: Douglas A. Blackmon
escaped from the Wil iams plantation in November 1920. Early in
1921, he made his way to the federal courthouse in Atlanta. Two
weeks after Chapman told his story to federal o cials, two agents
from the Department of Justice's stil new Bureau of Investigation
visited Wil iams to inquire about conditions.
They found eleven black forced laborers working in a eld, al of
them evidently there to work o criminal nes supposedly paid on
their behalf by Wil iams. The African American men were
supervised by Clyde Manning, a black overseer long entrusted by
Wil iams to keep the men on the farm while he was away. While
the agents were there, the plantation owner returned home.
Wil iams, a thin fty-four-year-old with a drawn face and slight
mustache, invited the two o cers to sit and have a glass of tea.
Reclining on chairs on the porch, the agents asked if the black eld
workers were being held in "peonage." Wil iams asked them to
explain exactly what the "peonage" law was about.
"If you pay a nigger's ne or go on his bond and you work him
on your place, you're guilty of peonage," replied George W Brown,
one of the Bureau of Investigation agents, using the time-honored
southern signal that his questions didn't indicate any particular
regard for black people.
Wil iams laughed softly, according to later testimony. "Wel , if
that is the case, me and most of the people who have done
anything of the sort were guilty of peonage," the farmer replied. "I
don't keep any of my niggers locked up. Of course, I do tel some of
them they shouldn't leave before paying the ne they rightly owe
me."
Brown and his partner seemed satis ed with the answer. The
farmer relaxed. But then Wil iams began to talk more about the
farm. He described how he sometimes hunted down escapees and
forced them to return. The agents asked if they could look around
the plantation. They saw the slave quarters, where shackles and
chains were clearly used to restrain forced laborers at night. Every
black worker they quizzed, while appearing terri ed and reluctant
to talk, nonetheless said they were satis ed with their treatment on
the farm. None of the workers spoke of the murder of Iron John or
the farm. None of the workers spoke of the murder of Iron John or
other acts of violence on the farm.
By the end of the day, the agents were convinced that Wil iams
had commit ed at least a technical violation of the peonage statute.
But to a pair of experienced eld agents, both native to the South,
the situation looked typical for most big southern farms. The
anxiety and mumbling of the workers were routine, given the
unwavering social custom of blacks showing absolute deference to
al whites and open fear to law enforcement. After al the years of
investigations and failed peonage prosecutions in the South, Brown
knew no Georgia jury would convict a white man for practices
engaged in by tens of thousands of other white farmers across the
region— especial y since Wil iams's laborers appeared relatively
wel fed and clothed. This wasn't a case worth wasting time on. The
agents explained the anti-peonage statute to the farmer again,
warning him not to violate it further.
"I don't think you need to have any fear of any case before the
federal grand jury," Brown told him as they departed.
That assurance wasn't enough for Wil iams. He was an intel igent
and relatively worldly man. Now that he understood the peonage
law more clearly—and knew that federal agents had identi ed him
as a violator— Wil iams recognized his vulnerability, and that of his
adult sons. The property he and his oldest sons farmed stretched for
miles across Jasper County. In Wil iams's big house at the center of
the plantation lived his wife and eight minor children.
He had built a comfortable and in uential life, and a farm
admired for its size and profitability. Wil iams had the distinction of
owning an early automobile, and the ear of white county leaders.
He would not risk seeing a personal empire built over twenty years
ruined. Wil iams resolved that no African American would ever
testify of the slavery on his plantation.
Just after dawn the next morning, Wil iams found Manning, the
black overseer, in the early chil and told him the other workers
could "ruin" them al . "You have to get rid of al the stockade
niggers," Wil iams said. "We'l have to do away with them."
niggers," Wil iams said. "We'l have to do away with them."
Two days later, Wil iams and Manning at acked Johnnie
Wil iams, one of the forced laborers, in a remote pasture and
bludgeoned him to death with the at side of an axe. The fol owing
morning, John Wil Gaither was ordered to begin digging a new
wel . Once it was a few feet deep, he was kil ed with a pickaxe
blow to the head and buried in the hole.
On the evening of Friday, February 25, 1921, a week after the
federal agents visited, Wil iams entered the slave quarters and told
the stunned men they were free to go. He said John Browne and
Johnny Benson should get in his car to go to the train station that
night. Instead, Wil iams drove them to an isolated spot, where
Manning wrapped chains around their bodies and at ached a heavy
iron wheel from a cot on press. The pair were thrown alive o a
bridge into the Alcovy River, where they sank into the murk and
drowned.
As darkness fel on Saturday night, Wil ie Preston, Lindsey
Peterson, and Harry Price climbed into the car under the same ruse.
They were chained to bags l ed with bricks, and Preston and
Peterson were thrown o a di erent bridge. Price, resigned to his
fate, jumped in on his own. Before the church hour on Sunday
morning, Manning split Johnny Green's skul with an axe. The
white farmer watched as Manning at acked and then instructed him
to keep hit ing Green's shat ered skul until al signs of life ceased.
After a Sunday dinner of fried chicken and biscuits, Wil iams
cal ed for Wil ie Givens, another black slave worker, to join him
and Manning for a walk into the nearby woods. At the edge of the
forest, Manning sank his axe in Givens's back. A week later,
Wil iams drowned Charlie Chisolm, the other African American
who had been ordered to assist in the kil ings, and then shot to
death Fletcher Smith, the last of the other forced laborers.
A total of eleven African Americans were murdered to conceal
slavery on the Wil iams farm. Men who had grown to adulthood in
a South steeped in terror of physical harm, or even more brutal
forms of involuntary servitude, in which they had no cause to
expect justice or equity from any white person, passively resigned
expect justice or equity from any white person, passively resigned
themselves to violent death, unwil ing or unable to resist.
Only after decomposing bodies began to surface in the rivers of
Jasper County did the federal agents who had been wil ing to
ignore Wil iams's slave farm a few weeks earlier grow suspicious.
Wil iams and Manning were eventual y tried and convicted for
murder in connection with the kil ings. Wil iams—the only white
man found guilty in Georgia of kil ing a black man during the
ninety years between 1877 and 1966—died in prison.45
The Wil iams farm was exceptional in the level of violence used to
conceal its use of slave labor—and the degree to which the
revolting details of that violence came to be revealed. But as John
Wil iams easily admit ed to the federal agents when they rst
arrived at his property, forced labor remained as ubiquitous as
cot on in the South, an endemic feature of the landscape and
economy.
During the investigation of Wil iams, a government prosecutor
brought charges against Arthur Farmer, Dr. James T. Tyner, and
Charles Madares for holding slaves in central Alabama. After the
indictment in March 1921, the primary witness in the case, a black
man named Jim Sten-son, was kidnapped—twice—and spirited out
of the state. The white men eventual y pleaded no contest to the
charges and received a nominal penalty. There was no prosecution
for having intimidated their victim into refusing to testify46
Increasingly, after years of absolute political hegemony by the
white supremacist southern wing of the Democratic Party, federal
o cials in the South wanted as lit le as possible to do with the
political and social in ammation that came with investigations into
any racial y oriented crime. An accusation in 1924 that the logging
camp and sawmil of S. J. Wilkins on Alabama's Tombigbee River
had held a twenty-two-year-old African American man and his
fteen-year-old brother for more than nine months— claiming they
owed the owner $150 each—went nowhere.47
owed the owner $150 each—went nowhere.
U.S. at orneys and eld o ces of the Department of Justice
abrogated their role in such cases, knowing ful wel that virtual y
no act of violence by whites against African Americans—and
certainly no cases of involuntary servitude whatsoever—would ever
be prosecuted by sheri s or state o cials in the South. In April
1926, federal authorities in Birmingham were told of a brutal
whipping given to a black man working in a textile mil as a signal
to other African Americans that they shouldn't seek work above the
level of oor sweepers or janitors. The fol owing month, J. Edgar
Hoover, director of what was then cal ed the Department of
Justice's Bureau of Investigation, wrote Assistant At orney General
O. R. Luhring blithely asserting that the facts surrounding an at ack
on a black worker by whites in the Birmingham, Alabama, textile
mil didn't merit a federal investigation. "We have an enormous
amount of work on hand involving undoubted violations of Federal
statutes and I can see no reason for proceeding with this mat er,"
Hoover wrote.48 The case was ignored.
Two months later, a black woman in Birmingham named
Rebecca Jones mailed a let er to the White House, asking President
Calvin Coolidge to help her free her teenage daughter, Carolina
Dixon. The mother said two men claiming to be sheri s had seized
her daughter on a country road when she was just thirteen years old
and then held her in col usion with the Butler County judge for ve
years—forcing her to work and abusing her sexual y. When Jones
went to the farm of Tom Couch, the man holding her daughter, "I
was met with threats under the point of high powered ri es, stating
that I could not take my daughter back," Jones wrote. My "child was
scarred unmerciful in several places on her body." A federal agent
was dispatched to investigate, and the facts of the kidnapping were
put before a grand jury. It refused to indict Couch. The mat er was
dropped.49
Yet even as the federal government did lit le to check the breadth of
the new slavery, the economic logic of the system weakened. Crude
the new slavery, the economic logic of the system weakened. Crude
industrial enterprises to which slave labor lent itself so e ectively
for fty years were being eclipsed by modern technologies and
business strategies. Mechanized coal mining—using hydraulic
digging tools, electric lights, modern pumps, and transportation—
made obsolete the old manual labor mines of Alabama, packed
with thousands of slave workers and mules.
When cot on prices fel drastical y after World War I, and the new
scourge of the bol weevil ravaged mil ions of acres of cot on elds,
depression set in across the rural landscape. The cost of labor
plunged yet further. Prisoners o ered for sale by state o cials who
expected the returns on their business in labor to steadily increase
grew too expensive for some market conditions. Buying and sel ing
them was less and less sensible. As nancial incentives for the states
faded, political scandals and abuse outrages gained traction. In even
the most notorious states, public cries to end the leasing of convicts
to private contractors arose for the first time.
In the winter of 1921, Martin Tabert, a twenty-two-year-old white
man from a middle-class farm family in Munich, North Dakota,
decided to take a walk-about through the United States, traveling
by train, sleeping in railroad camps with tramps, and working to
support himself as he crossed the West, Midwest, and nal y the
South. Running short of money in December, Tabert, along with a