On August 7, 2008, the day the war started, the situation was so tense that only a
spark was needed to set Georgia afire. There have been discussions afterward over
who actually fired the first shot. It was clearly in Russia’s interests that this
first shot should be fired by Georgia so that the Russian aggression could be presented
as a defense. In the EU-sponsored Tagliavini Report, published on September 30, 2009,
the opening of the hostilities was attributed to Georgia. “It is not contested,” wrote
the authors of the report, “that the Georgian armed forces started an armed offensive
in South Ossetia on the basis of President Saakashvili’s order given on 7 August 2008
at 23.35.”
[50]
The report confirmed, however, that at the very moment the hostilities started,
troops from the regular Russian army—troops that were
not
part of Russia’s peacekeeping forces—were already present in South Ossetia, that
is, on Georgian soil. They were there illegally, without permission from the Georgian
authorities. This fact came on top of prior violations of Georgian sovereignty, such
as the passport offensive and the provocative flights of Russian fighter jets over
the Georgian airspace. The incursion of Russian regular troops (and irregular troops
in the form of Chechen and North Ossetian fighters coming from Russia) into South
Ossetia, together with tanks and heavy weapons, was a violation of Georgian sovereignty
of a totally new, and extremely menacing kind. In fact it constituted as such a
casus belli.
Vaclav Havel, Valdas Adamkus, Mart Laar, Vytautas Landsbergis, Otto de Habsbourg,
Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Timothy Garton Ash, André Glucksmann, Mark Leonard, Bernard-Henri
Lévy, Adam Michnik, and Josep Ramoneda, “Le test géorgien, un nouveau Munich?”
Le Monde
(September 23, 2009). The real question was, indeed, who
invaded
and not who fired the first bullet. As John Lukacs wrote, it is an old ruse used
by politicians, “who wanted war (and attempted to tempt their opponents ‘to maneuver
[them] into firing the first shot.’” (John Lukacs,
Democracy and Populism: Fear and Hatred
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2005), 211.)
Hans Crooijmans, the Moscow correspondent of the Dutch weekly
Elsevier
, for instance, four days after the ceasefire published an article titled “Reckless
Violence.” The word “reckless” referred not to the Russians, but to Saakashvili, who
was believed to have started the war regardless of the consequences. “What incited
the political leaders of Georgia to attack exactly on August 8, Tskinhvali, the capital
of South Ossetia,” wrote Crooijmans, “we cannot be sure.” And he continued, “As could
be expected the Russians came to the rescue of the South Ossetians.” (Hans Crooijmans,
“Onbesuisd geweld,”
Elsevier
(August 16, 2008).)
Pavel K. Baev, “Russian “Tandemocracy” Stumbles into War,”
Eurasia Daily Monitor
5, no. 153 (August 11, 2008).
Nicu Popescu, Mark Leonard, and Andrew Wilson, “Can the EU Win the Peace in Georgia?”
Policy Brief (London: European Council on Foreign Relations
,
2008), 3 (emphasis mine).
Cf. Thornike Gordadze, “Georgian-Russian Relations in the 1990s,” in
The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War in Georgia
, eds. Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2009),
37. Shevardnadze reported Grachev’s assertion in an interview, published in the Russian
magazine
Argumenty i Fakty
on July 2, 2005. In a report of the International Crisis Group even the separatist
Abkhaz authorities expressed a certain distrust vis-à-vis Moscow’s intentions. According
to the report they believed that Moscow “is more interested in its territory than
its people. The Abkhaz
de facto
leader, Bagapsh, said, ‘Russia is interested in access to the sea, of which our territory
offers 240 km.’” (“Georgia and Russia: Clashing over Abkhazia,” Europe Report No.
193,
International Crisis Group
, June 5, 2008, 3.)
Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Premature Partnership,”
Foreign Affairs
73, no. 2 (March-April 1994), 73–74.
Cf. Andrey Illarionov, “Another Look at the August War,” Center for Eurasian Policy,
Hudson Institute, Washington (September 12, 2008), 7.
Ronald D. Asmus,
A Little War That Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West
, 73. The Abkhaz and South Ossetian holders of Russian passports enjoyed complete
Russian citizen rights. In December 2007 they voted in the Duma elections and in March
2008 in the presidential elections of the Russian Federation. (Cf. Marie Jégo, “’L’indépendance’,
et après?”
Le Monde
(August 28, 2008).)
Asmus,
A Little War
, 42.
Janusz Bugajski, “Russia’s Soft Power Wars,”
The Ukrainian Week
(February 8, 2013).
Cf.
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia
, Report, Volume II (September 2009), 182.
http://www.ceiig.ch/pdf/IIFFMCG_Volume_II.pdf
.
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia
, 147. In October 2009 the Abkhaz Ministry of the Interior announced that between
2006 and 2009 141,245 of the 180,000–200,000 inhabitants of Abkhazia had received
Abkhaz passports. On the basis of the data given in 2006 this would mean that almost
all Abkhaz passport holders also had a Russian passport. (Quoted in Sabine Fischer,
“Abkhazia and the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict: Autumn 2009,” ISS Analysis, EU Institute
for Security Studies (December 2009), 3.)
The passports in Abkhazia were issued on the basis of the Law on Citizenship of the
Republic of Abkhazia of October 24, 2005. Article 6 of this Law stipulated “that a
citizen of the Republic of Abkhazia is also entitled to obtain the citizenship of
the Russian Federation.” The South Ossetian
de facto
Constitution of April 8, 2001, stipulated “(1) The Republic of South Ossetia shall
have its own citizenship. (2) Double-citizenship is admissible in the Republic of
South Ossetia.” (Cf.
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia
, 163.)
The Abkhaz minister of Economic Affairs, Christina Osgan, confirmed in June 2008 that
there were fifty-one thousand pensioners in Abkhazia, thirty thousand of whom received
a pension from the Russian government. The average payment was 57 euro per month.
(Cf. Gerald Hosp, “Leise Hoffnung an der Roten Riviera,”
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
(June 14, 2008).) From 2003, paying pensions was one of the incentives Moscow used
to distribute its passports in Abkhazia. Only holders of Russian passports could apply
for a pension paid by Moscow.
“Putin Says Russia Has No Imperial Ambitions,”
RIA Novosti
, September 11, 2008. Cf. also Hannah Strange, “South Ossetia Slapped Down over Russia
Unity Claim,”
Times Online
(September 11, 2008).
A former minister of the interior of his government, Alan Parastayev, accused Kokoity
of terrorism and banditry. The terrorist acts were alleged to have been committed
in South Ossetia and have been attributed subsequently to Georgia. Cf. “Byvshyy glava
MVD Yuzhnoy Osetii obvinil Eduarda Kokoyti v terrorizme” (Former Head of the Ministry
of the Interior of South Ossetia Accused Eduard Kokoity of Terrorism),
Lenta.ru
(February 23, 2009).
Cf. Marlène Laruelle, “Neo-Eurasianist Alexander Dugin on the Russia-Georgia Conflict,”
Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst
(September 3, 2008).
http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4928/print
.
“Russia Launches Economic Blockade of Georgia, Puts Troops on High Alert,”
Pravda
(September 30, 2006).
Salomé Zourabichvili,
La tragédie géorgienne 2003–2008, De la révolution des Roses à la guerre
(Paris: Bernard Grasset, 2009), 305.
“Aktsiya Ya Gruzin,” Radio Ekho Moskvy (October 6, 2006).
http://www.echo.msk.ru/doc/281.html
.
Andrey Illarionov, “The Russian Leadership’s Preparation for War, 1999–2008,” in
The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War in Georgia
, eds. Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr, 65.
Thomas Graham Jr. and Damien J. LaVera, “The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty,”
in
Cornerstones of Security: Arms Control Treaties in the Nuclear Era
, eds. Thomas Graham Jr. and Damien J. LaVera (Seattle: University of Washington Press,
2003), 597.
Graham Jr. and LaVera,
Cornerstones of Security
, 593.
Graham Jr. and LaVera,
Cornerstones of Security
, 593.
There is no right “to suspend.” Article XIX of the CFE Treaty gives each State Party
“the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related
to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.”
The snub was not lessened by the heads of state and government agreeing “that these
countries will become members of NATO” (Bucharest Summit Declaration, April 3, 2008).
Without a concrete time schedule this membership risked being postponed indefinitely
.
On Angela Merkel’s refusal to grant Georgia a MAP, Illarionov wrote, not without irony:
“[A]t the NATO Bucharest SummitA] on April 3–5 [in fact it was April 2–4], German
Chancellor Angela Merkel noted that countries with unresolved territorial conflicts
could not join NATO. On the basis of this principle, which would have applied equally
to West Germany at the time of its NATO accession, the summit denied both Georgia
and Ukraine a Membership Action Plan” (Illarionov, “The Russian Leadership’s Preparation
for War, 1999–2008,” 68).
Quoted in “Georgia and Russia: Clashing over Abkhazia,” Europe Report No. 193,
International Crisis Group
(June 5, 2008), 14.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/193_georgia_and_russia_clashing_over_abkhazia.ashx
.
David J. Smith, “The Saakashvili Administration’s Reaction to Russian Policies before
the 2008 War,” in
The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War in Georgia
, eds. Cornell and Starr, 126.
Vladimir Socor, “The Goals Behind Moscow’s Proxy Offensive in South Ossetia,”
Eurasia Daily Monitor
5, no. 152 (August 8, 2008).
Neil Buckley, “Russia Accused of Annexation Attempt,”
The Financial Times
(April 17, 2008).
Buckley, “Russia Accused of Annexation Attempt.”
Andrey Illarionov provided a small list of Russians in the government of South Ossetia.
They included lieutenant-general Anatoly Barankevich, minister of defense from July
6, 2004, to December 10, 2006; Anatoly Yarovoy, FSB major-general, chairman of the
KGB in South Ossetia from January 17, 2005, to March 2, 2006; Mikhail Mindzayev, FSB
lieutenant-general, minister of the interior of South Ossetia from April 26, 2005,
to August 18, 2008; Andrey Laptev, lieutenant-general, minister of defense of South
Ossetia from December 11, 2006, to February 28, 2008; Aslanbek Bulatsev, FSB colonel,
prime minister of South Ossetia since October 31, 2008 (Illarionov, “The Russian Leadership’s
Preparation for War, 1999–2008,” 81–82).
Alexander Golts, “Opyat Kavkazskaya Voyna,”
Ezhednevnyy Zhurnal
(August 9, 2008).
Illarionov, “The Russian Leadership’s Preparation for War, 1999–2008,” 68.
Mart Laar, “Echoes of the 1930s in Russia’s Sweeping Annexation,”
Financial Times
(April 17, 2008).
“Georgia and Russia: Clashing over Abkhazia,” 4.
Cf. “Kommentary Departamenta informatsii i pechati MID Rossii v svyazi s voprosami
SMI otnositelno intsidenta s gruzinskim bespilotnym samoletom 20 aprelya 2008 goda”
(Comment of the Information and Press Department of the Foreign Ministry of Russia
concerning questions from the media on the incident with the Georgian drone on April
20, 2008). Website of the Russian Foreign Ministry.
Yuliya Latynina, “200 km. tankov. O rossiysko: gruzinskoy voyne” (Two Hundred Kilometres
of Tanks. On the Russian-Georgian War),
Ezhednevnyy Zhurnal
(November 19, 2008), 7.
Cf. Neil Buckley and Roman Olearchyk, “UN Says Moscow Shot Georgian Drone,”
The Financial Times
(May 27, 2008). The Russian attack also endangered the civil aviation. According to
the UN investigators the interception “took place very close to, or even inside an
international airway, at a time where civilian aircraft were flying.”
Pavel Felgenhauer, “Saakashvili Wants to Get to Moscow, While Russian Troops Are in
Abkhazia Already,”
Novaya Gazeta
(May 20, 2008). These plans for an ethnically cleansed “buffer zone” had, at that
time, certainly already been discussed with Shamba’s Kremlin bosses. The plans would
be executed during the August war.
Felgenhauer, “Saakashvili Wants to Get to Moscow, While Russian Troops Are in Abkhazia
Already.”
“NATO calls on Russia to withdraw railway troops from Georgia,”
International Herald Tribune
(June 3, 2008).
“Saakashvili Calls Security Council to Decide on Abkhazia,”
Nevtegaz.ru Novosti
(June 3, 2008). The journalist of the
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
who visited Abkhazia in June 2008 repeated, uncritically, the vocabulary used by the
Russian side to justify the entry of these troops, calling them “unarmed pioneers”
(
unbewaffnete Pioniere
), comparing this Russian army battalion of engineers and technicians with a group
of idealistic boy scouts. (Cf. Hosp, “Leise Hoffnung an der Roten Riviera.”)
“Tbilisi Condemns Russian ’Railway Troops’ in Abkhazia,”
Civil Georgia
(May 31, 2008).
http://www.civil.ge/eng/_print.php?id=18445
.
Socor, “The Goals Behind Moscow’s Proxy Offensive in South Ossetia.”
“Rossiya stoit na grani bolshoy Kavkazkoy voyny,”
Forum.msk.ru
(July 5, 2008).
http://forum-msk.org/print.html?id=496351
.
“Rossiya stoit na grani bolshoy Kavkazkoy voyny.”