Out of the Mountains (59 page)

33.
Department of Defense,
Joint Forcible Entry Operations
.

34.
See United States Marine Corps,
Marine Corps Operations
, MCDP 1–0 (Washington, DC: HQ
 
Marine Corps, 2011), I-15.

35.
See United States Marine Corps,
Marine Corps Operations
, MCDP 1–0 (Washington, DC: HQ
 
Marine Corps, 2001), 2–15ff.

36.
Ibid., 5–23ff.

37.
United States Marine Corps,
Marine Corps Concept Paper: Seabased Logistics
, n.d., online at www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/docs/sbl.htm.

38.
With the retirement from service in 2005 of the Navy's
Sacramento
-class fast combat supply ships (AOEs) and the decommissioning in 2004 of the remaining
Supply
-class fast combat supply ships (T-AOEs) and their transfer to Military Sealift Command (MSC), the principal supply vessel for afloat replenishment and support of amphibious operations is now the
Lewis and Clark
–class (T-AKE) dry cargo ship operated by the civilian-crewed Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force of MSC, of which only the last three ships (USNS
William McLean
,
Medgar Evers
, and
Cesar Chavez
) have a selective-offload capability allowing them to support amphibious operations using the sea-based logistics model.

39.
See United States Marine Corps,
Expeditionary Energy Strategy and Implementation Plan
(Washington, DC: Headquarters USMC, 2010), and Department of Defense,
Operational Energy Strategy Implementation Plan
(Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2012).

40.
See U.S. Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory,
Experimental Forward Operating Base
, online at www.mcwl.marines.mil/Divisions/Experiment/ExFOB.aspx.

41.
For Burke's work on natural resource security and energy policy, see U.S. Department of Defense, “Sharon E. Burke: Assistant Secretary of Defense for Oeprational Energy Plans and Programs,” www.defense.gov/bios/biographydetail.aspx?biographyid=259, and Center for a New American Security, “Sharon E. Burke,” http://cnas.org/node/64.

42.
U.S. Army,
The Modular Force
, FMI3–0.1 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008), vii.

43.
For a detailed discussion of Commando 21, see Major H. J. White RM, “Future War: Commando 21, an Increase in Combat Power and Flexibility,” master's thesis, U.S. Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting, Q
 
uantico, VA, May 5, 2002.

44.
Ibid.

45.
Ibid.

46.
Ibid.

47.
For a description of these initiatives, see Mark Unewisse,
Land NCW: An Australian Perspective
(Adelaide: Defence Science and Technology Organisation, 2010).

48.
See Steven Kornguth, Rebecca Steinberg, and Michael D. Matthews, eds.,
Neurocognitive and Physiological Factors During High-Tempo Operations
(Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2010), and North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
Human Performance Enhancement for NATO Military Operations (Science, Technology and Ethics)
, 2009.

49.
See E. Williams et al.,
Human Performance
(McLean, VA: Mitre Corporation, JASON, 2008).

50.
For an assessment of the last two operations, see Daniel Helmer, “Not Q
 
uite Counterinsurgency: A Cautionary Tale for US Forces Based on Israel's Operation Change of Direction,”
Australian Army Journal
5, no. 2 (Winter 2008): 117–28.

51.
Organizations such as the U.S. Marine Corps Force Headquarters Group or the U.S. Army's 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne) would seem ideally suited to this role, provided they were given appropriate command authority and resources. For descriptions of these organizations, see U.S. Army Special Operations Command, “95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne),” www.soc.mil/Assorted%20pages/95th%20CAB.html, and U.S. Marine Corps, “Force Headquarters Group,” www.marforres.marines.mil/MajorSubordinateCommands/ForceHeadquartersGroup.aspx.

52.
Author's interviews with civil affairs, commanders and planning staff, Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa, Djibouti, May-June 2011.

53.
For a description of the IDG, established in 2004, see Australian Federal Police, “International Deployment Group,” www.afp.gov.au/policing/international-deployment-group.aspx.

54.
Author's interview with commanders and staff, COESPU, Vicenza, November 2012.

55.
For a description of the Israeli system, see Israel Defense Forces, “Trophy,” www.idf.il/1557-en/Dover.aspx.

56.
For a description of AMAP-ADS, see ADS, “AMAP-ADS: The Active Defence System,” http://ads-protection.org/amap-ads/active-defence-system.

57.
Mike Davis,
Buda's Wagon: A Brief History of the Car Bomb
(London: Verso, 2007).

58.
U.S. Government, Joint IED Defeat Organization,
JIEDDO Annual Report 2010
, 8, online at https://www.jieddo.mil/content/docs/JIEDDO_2010_Annual_Report_U.pdf.

59.
U.S. Government, Joint IED Defeat Organization,
Counter Improvised Explosive Device Strategic Plan 2012–2016
, 2, online at https://www.jieddo.mil/content/docs/20120116_JIEDDOC-IEDStrategicPlan_MEDprint.pdf.

60.
Ibid.

61.
See Michael Petit,
Peacekeepers at War: A Marine's Account of the Beirut Catastrophe
(New York: Faber and Faber, 1986).

62.
See David Kuhn and Robert Bunker, “Mexican Cartel Tactical Note #15: IED Recovered from Trunk of Car by Police Station in Ciudad Victoria, Tamaulipas (January 2012),”
Small Wars Journal
, January 14, 2013.

63.
U.S. Government, White House,
Countering Improvised Explosive Devices
, February 26, 2013, online at www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/cied_1.pdf.

64.
See “Bombs Behaving Oddly,”
Strategy Page
, August 24, 2011, online at https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htweap/articles/20110824.aspx.