Operation Massacre (21 page)

I know the Chief of the Police Department of the Province of Buenos Aires has expressed great curiosity—which I presume remains unsatisfied—about the author of the articles allegedly attacking him. The truth, I must say, is that I had no intention of attacking him personally; I was attacking him only to the extent that he constitutes one of the two faces of Civilization and Barbarism as articulated by a great Argentine one century ago.
44
It is precisely this face that needs to disappear, whose disappearance we all need to fight for.

When this book is published with my name on it, the Chief of Police will have no more doubts. I am not revealing my identity like this out of some foolish sense of bravado or defiance. I know perfectly well that in this country a chief of police is powerful, while a journalist—an obscure one to boot—is hardly anything. But I happen to believe, with complete earnestness and conviction, in the right of every citizen to share any truth that he comes to know, however dangerous that truth may be. And I believe in this book, in the impact it can have.

I hope I am not criticized for believing in a book—even if it does happen to be written by me—when there are so many more people believing in machine guns.

Footnotes:

 

Obligatory Appendix

(to the first edition, March
1957
)

Lying as a Profession

The article that I published in
Mayoría
on July
15
,
1957
, served as a provisional epilogue to my book. The “provisional” part was not an accident. There were many things I still wanted to say. I preferred to leave them for another time because, first of all, I didn't want to abuse the space that the magazine had given me; secondly, I didn't want people to think I gained any pleasure from reporting on the moral wretchedness that prevails over some parts of this country; and thirdly, I hoped that the people whose duty it is to react against this kind of misery would be the ones to do so. This kind of hope, which I held onto for so long, is proof that I am one of the most naïve men ever to set foot on this soil.

Because the reaction came from somewhere else. The Chief of Police of the Province of Buenos Aires, Lieutenant Colonel Fernández Suárez, decided at last to acknowledge receipt of the charges that I made against him. He did so in the most skillful yet clumsy way possible. I will explain the clumsiness later.

First note the skill. The Chief of Police of the Province learns of the decidedly real existence of a band of terrorists. In fulfillment of his duties, he arrests them. He selects a certain “Marcelo” from among them (one of the secondary witnesses I mention in
Operation Massacre
). Then he chooses a judge, Judge Viglione, who is known as a man of integrity, and grants him the immediate authority to establish whether the prisoners are being treated correctly. And I am completely certain that this, this particular act, was one of the most measured, exemplary, even kind procedures that have ever been carried out in the struggle against terrorism. Judge Viglione agrees to hold a press conference—which is not objectionable in any way—where he offers some details regarding the terrorist plot. But that's when the ace in the hole is revealed, the key to everything, the bait to hook the gullible. Under the auspices of the esteemed judge, anointed by the presence of the esteemed judge, Lieutenant Colonel Fernández Suárez intervenes and addresses my colleagues, journalists from the big newspapers who believe they have come to hear a story about terrorism. But in fact they have come, without knowing it, so that Fernández Suárez can publicly “lift” the charges that I have brought against him and that are really weighing down on him. And my colleagues, journalists from the big newspapers, they write it all down. They diligently write down what Fernández Suárez has dictated without any one of them thinking to ask any questions or raise any doubts. Let's take a look at what they write.

From
La Razón
:

The Chief of Police, in turn, gave more background regarding the conspiracy plot in question, noting specifically that among the main characters involved was Marcelo Rizzoni, the same person who managed to escape on June
9
of last year, just before the raid in Florida that saw the arrest of men who were involved in the rebellion that same night. He added that Rizzoni is the person who, under the pseudonym M, went to opposition newspapers with the information about the executions, which was then used as the basis for a campaign against Lieutenant Colonel Fernández Suárez that included fabricated details about the incident.

From
La Nación
:

The Chief of Police, Lieutenant Colonel Fernández Suárez, then added that this Marcelo is the one who, under the pseudonym M, provided some press publications with information, unsubstantiated of course, for a campaign against the police department on account of the executions.

From
El Plata
, of La Plata:

This individual Rizzoni is the one who was providing the newspaper
Revolución Nacional
with information for its vitriolic campaign against the Chief of Police.

From
El Argentino
, of La Plata:

Afterward, the Chief of Police stated that a terrorist—who has been detained and whose name, as it turns out, is Marcelo Rizzoni—was the one responsible for assembling the bombs, and was responsible for supplying false information regarding the executions to the newspaper
Revolución Nacional
, which is publishing several articles entitled “Operation Massacre,” wherein the Chief of Police is put at fault. All of the information offered by the aforementioned periodical is false because it has been supplied by a person like Rizzoni, whose only goal is to confuse.

From
El Día
, of La Plata:

Lieutenant Colonel Fernández Suárez stepped in to note that one of the detainees, Marcelo Rizzoni—who played a central role in the terrorist group, signs his contributions to a newspaper where he has reported on alleged cases of torture “Mr. M,” and is the leader of “Operation Massacre”—has made statements apologizing for his behavior . . .

There are times when the lies get so intricate that you need just the right method to untangle them. For lack of a better one, and even at the risk of boring you, I will use one that I have used before. The five reported versions, which I have mentioned in order of increasing stupidity, contain the following facts that are clearly false, partially false, or unproven, namely:

1
. “
Marcelo Rizzoni, the same person who managed to escape on June
9
of last year, just before the raid in Florida . . .
” False. Marcelo did not “escape.” He came to the house in Florida three times, and on the third time he left quietly without suspecting anything or thinking to himself that he was “escaping.” The man who escaped when the raid took place was named Juan Carlos Torres.

2
. “
. . . the raid in Florida that saw the arrest of men who were involved in the rebellion that same night . . .
” Partially false. Among those arrested, only one had been involved, and that was Norberto Gavino; otherwise, there were two or three suspects, and nine or ten innocents. And from the point of view of the Martial Law that was applied to them, they were all innocent, including Gavino.

3
. “
Rizzoni is the person who, under the pseudonym M, went to all the opposition newspapers with the information about the executions . . .
” False. Marcelo did not go to them with
the
information, just
one
piece
of information.

4
. “. . .
information about the executions, which was then used as the basis for a campaign against
Lieutenant Colonel Fernández Suárez
 . . .” False. Not only was Marcelo's information
not
used as a basis for the “campaign”; the moment he brought it forth, the Chief of Police's position was significantly improved, as we will see later on.

5
. “
. . . that included fabricated details about the incident . . .
” False. The information provided by Marcelo, like all of the information I have used, is correct. I have verified it and can prove it before any civil or military court.

6
. “
. . . some press publications with information, unsubstantiated of course . . .
” There is no proof that it was unsubstantiated.

7
. “
This individual Rizzoni is the one who was
providing the newspaper . . . with information . . .
” Partially false, see subheading
3
.

8
. “
. . . to the newspaper
Revolución Nacional
, which is publishing . . .
” False.
Revolución Nacional
stopped being printed a while ago, and is therefore not publishing anything at all. Published.

9
. “
. . . which is publishing several articles entitled ‘Operation Massacre' . . .
” False.
Revolución Nacional
never published articles entitled “Operation Massacre.”

10
. “
Marcelo Rizzoni—who . . . signs his contributions to a newspaper . . . ‘Mr. M' . . .
” False, and also stupid. Marcelo is a witness, not a journalist. A witness whom I have called M. and not “Mr. M.” A witness who neither writes nor signs contributions to any newspaper of any kind.

11
. “
. . . a newspaper where he has reported on alleged cases of torture . . .
”
False and ridiculous to anyone who knows what is being discussed.

12
. “
He is the leader of ‘Operation Massacre' . . .
” False. It's confirmed: the person who drafted this version is mentally disabled. The indisputable leader of “Operation Massacre” was Lieutenant Colonel Fernández Suárez.

Earlier I showed that Fernández Suárez lied, statistically speaking, every other line. Now, with the help of my colleagues in the press, he has beaten his own record.

Fernández Suárez tries to discredit everything I have published, making it seem like the information I am using as a foundation was supplied by a terrorist. But “Marcelo” is just one witness among fifty, and perhaps the least important one at that. The information, the real information, has been supplied to me by Fernández Suárez himself. He is my chief witness.

Should a civil or military court, intelligence services, or publishers of serious newspapers want to retrace my research step by step, the following are the witnesses and statements I used, by order of importance:

1
. Fernández Suárez in his report before the Province Advisory Board on December
18
,
1956
;

2
. Juan Carlos Livraga's formal accusation, restated before the judge, and his oral statements;

3
. Miguel Ángel Giunta's statement;

4
. Horacio di Chiano's oral testimony; (I have spoken to each of these three survivors at least half a dozen times, thoroughly rechecking every single detail)

5
. a statement signed by Norberto Gavino, which I have in my possession;

6
. a joint statement signed by Julio Troxler and Reinaldo Benavídez, in my possession;

7
. testimony from Vicente Rodríguez's widow;

8
. testimony from Mario Brión's relatives;

9
. testimony from Nicolás Carranza's widow;

10
. testimony from Francisco Garibotti's widow;

1
1
. testimony from Carlos Lizaso's relatives;

12
. testimony from Juan Carlos Torres;

13
. testimony from Giunta's relatives;

14
. testimony from Livraga's relatives;

15
. testimony from Di Chiano's relatives.

Over the course of four months, I have conducted hundreds of interviews with these witnesses and with more minor ones, the vast majority of whom have not even made statements before a civil or military judge.

Now that there is no imminent danger, I should think that my fellow journalists from the big newspapers could go to the lengths I have gone to instead of taking dictation from the lieutenant colonel executioner.

Short History of an Investigation

In my account, I mention “Marcelo” three times using the initial M. I did not know him as a terrorist, but as a witness. I can't say, however, that I am surprised he became a terrorist: he was an embittered man who suffered tremendously. The ghost of Carlitos Lizaso—his blood-spattered chest, his cheek crushed by a bullet—tormented him relentlessly. His dear friend Mr. Pedro Lizaso had made him responsible for watching over the boy. He had brought him back dead.

In order to illustrate how untrue it is that “Marcelo” supplied the “
information used as the basis
” for my articles, and in an effort to stave off any more fanciful manipulations, I will have to refer briefly to the phases of my investigation. I first heard news of the massacre on December
18
,
1956
. On the nineteenth, I met Judge Doglia. On the twentieth, I met von Kotsch, Esq., and obtained a copy of Livraga's formal accusation. That afternoon, I sent it to the publisher of
Propósitos
. On the twenty-first, I met Livraga. On the twenty-third, the accusation was published in
Propósitos
.

The accusation and Livraga's oral statement were relatively precise, but they contained two basic errors that significantly hindered my later investigations. The first was the claim that, in the back apartment, where Livraga's friend Rodríguez had taken him, there were only three more people. The second was the assumption that there were only ten prisoners in the assault car.

On December
26
, I finished writing my story on Livraga which, after a long pilgrimage, was going to be published in
Revolución Nacional
on January
15
. It of course included those two errors. But it also included a noteworthy guess, a hunch even, based on a few words that Livraga heard in a semiconscious state: the theory of a third survivor. I never could have imagined how right it turned out to be. The piece also included another guess of mine that did not make it to the public: the nearly outright mention of the Chief of Police as the one responsible for everything. The editors at the newspaper thought it was too “bold” so they scrapped it.

On December
27
, while looking through newspapers from the time of the uprising, I discovered Vicente Rodríguez's name at the top of a list of “those executed in the San Martín Region.” But there were unbelievable errors here as well that would prove to be real stumbling blocks. There was a “Crizaso” on the list who I later realized was Lizaso. Reinaldo Benavídez was listed as dead though he was really alive. And Mario Brión's name was missing.