Authors: Martin Bowman
Tags: #Bisac Code 1: HIS027140
At this time, we were gradually losing altitude when all of a sudden the aircraft gave a shudder and the other engine began running rough. Peter was getting ready to bale out, thinking we had lost both engines. I told him to hold on, sit tight for a moment. Suddenly it dawned on me that the superchargers had cut-out. They cut-out after you descend to a certain altitude with the increased density of the air. When they cut-out it was like losing another engine, so I immediately opened the throttle again to retain my boost. Finally, with my boost regained I was able to hold the aircraft on an even keel at around 14,000ft with no difficulty. I kept the engine running hot and it behaved properly. The radiator inlet was controllable and when opened, caused drag. I made adjustments opening the inlet enough to maintain speed and engine temperature barely below the danger point. The over-burdened engine seemed to run smoother when it was hot. A Rolls-Royce representative later told me that a certain safety factor was built into the engine and as long as vapour (overheating) doesn’t come off my engine, I was not running it too hot. The prop I had feathered was windmilling slightly. It had not feathered completely and was causing the aircraft to wallow, resulting in a loss of airspeed. I had a difficult time controlling the aircraft as it was! I unfeathered the prop, held the starter button, the engine turned over. I then punched the button again to get the prop feathered. It went into fine pitch immediately. I was able to trim the aircraft and found it would fly with hands off the wheel; it flew beautifully! Again our concern was whether enough petrol was left. According to the manual, we would be approximately 100 gallons short, running empty a few hundred miles from base. There were mountains ahead to go over yet. We took a direct route passing over known enemy airfields, still maintaining 14,000ft. You could see Japanese aircraft parked on the airfields below, located around the Irrawaddy Valley plain. We were not putting out any con-trail and I’m sure they must have heard the droning sound of our engine on the ground, but no one bothered to come up and investigate. If an enemy aircraft did come up, all we could do was dive for the ground and attempt to fly as far as possible. We flew over the Japanese aerodromes, escaping detection and then sighted the bluish hue of the far distant Andaman mountain range. We were doing 200 mph at this time and were surprised the aircraft would maintain this speed on one engine. We had close to 800 miles to reach Ramu and it would take us slightly over four hours to return.
At this time, we did not realise our SOS was not picked up at Ramu but had skipped and gone all the way to Calcutta. Our wireless officer there was working on a receiver when he suddenly heard the SOS coming through. He immediately wired Ramu and asked what their contingency plans were. They replied, having no knowledge of the situation we were in, they would dispatch Spitfires to escort us in. By this time we were flying over the inhospitable Andaman mountain range at 14,000ft and this was why I wanted to maintain altitude. If we ever had to dive down, it would be difficult to regain this altitude or to navigate our aircraft through the remote valleys and high ridges. Everything was going well and fuel consumption was better than anticipated. We were obtaining 90 gallons to the hour, where the manual said it would be around 125 gallons per hour. We encountered no head winds compared to the terrific tail wind at the high altitude we enjoyed on the outward journey. We still had some petrol in our tanks as we neared Ramu.
As our aircraft approached the strip, another Mosquito pilot entering the circuit heard our RT conversation with the field. He orbited then followed me to make sure I maintained my airspeed coming in on one engine to a fairly short strip. There were two runways at Ramu called ‘Reindeer 2’ located next to each other. The fighter aircraft used one and the other was for Mosquito aircraft to land on. All of a sudden this other pilot begins yelling that I’m landing on the wrong strip. I said the hell, wrong strip or not, there is one ahead of me. But he had mistaken the strips and we landed on the correct runway. On a previous occasion, I had made a single-engine landing at Ramu during an op. On another flight they brought me in downwind and I overshot, having to have the aircraft towed out of the mud by truck. But the landing I was presently making was the best I had ever made. When you have a single engine encounter like this, you’re working on it. You are so careful in bringing it in that you ease the aircraft onto the runway. Whenever I made single-engine landings, I always made perfect ones. It was when I had good conditions, two engines and was lax, that I had my ropey landings. We had been in the air over six and a-half-hours. Peter figured we had flown a distance close to 790 miles on one engine.
248
In May 1944 a 684 Squadron detachment began operations from Alipore, a suburb of Calcutta. On the 6th Flight Lieutenant ‘Kos’ Newman
DFC
*
RNAZF
and Flight Sergeant Ray Smith
DFM
took off to fly a reconnaissance sweep of Nancowry Harbour in Great Nicobar to ascertain whether there was any Japanese shipping in port. Ray Smith explains:
The trip (2,256 miles) was thought to be at the extreme range of the PR.IX and at the time it was felt that we might not be able to get back to our advanced landing ground at Ramu from where we had taken off. To cover this contingency the Royal Navy had placed caches of food and survival kits on some islands off the Arakan coast. If we thought that we would not be able to make it back to Ramu, we were to make a forced landing on the sea adjacent to one of these islands and, hopefully, we would be picked up by the Royal Navy. Fortunately, we were able to make it back, although we flew for about 10 minutes with our fuel gauges reading zero.
249
No.684 Squadron received some additional PR.XVIs in May and June. By this time the monsoon weather was affecting the number of successful operations being flown and eighty-one of the 110 sorties in June were abortive. On 22 July Flying Officers Tebb and Fletcher in a PR.XVI fitted with a 90-gallon jettison tank reconnoitred three airfields on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. At the beginning of August a 684 Squadron detachment was based at Yelahanka, near Bangalore, in southern India for aerial survey work. The weather over the Indian Ocean was clearer than over the Bay of Bengal, so, on 11 August, the squadron sent a detachment from Alipore to China Bay, Ceylon, for operations with 222 Group. The detachment’s task was to make the first air survey of northern Sumatra and nearby islands. To ease maintenance and processing problems, the Yelahanka detachment also moved to China Bay a few days later. The Ceylon detachment began operations on 15 August when a PR.IX crew flew a recce of Nancowry and Sabang Islands. On 23 August a flight was made to Sabang and Car Nicobar and two days later a PR.XVI crew flew to Sabang and along the west coast of Sumatra to Sibolga harbour. A further lengthy sortie to Sumatra the following day discovered a previously unknown Japanese airfield at Padang Tidji, near Sigh. By the end of August, however, the Mosquitoes had almost ceased operations due to the monsoon. In spite of the weather on the 28th Squadron Leader Kos Newman
DFC
* and Flight Sergeant Ray Smith
DFM
covered a section of the Burma-Siam railway adjacent to the side of a mountain just south of Moulmeio. They came under heavy AA fire and were lucky to escape, as Ray Smith recalls:
We were greeted with intense anti-aircraft fire whilst flying at about 500ft and just as we had completed the job the aircraft was hit in the air intake of the port engine and also in the nose, smashing Kos’ oxygen economizer. Not knowing the extent of the damage, which had been caused to the port engine, we climbed to 25,000ft, since we did not want to get caught at low altitude with only one engine functioning properly. We then decided to try and make out way to Chittagong above the Irrawaddy valley, where we felt that the weather would not be quite so severe. We were right in this assumption and upon successfully reaching the Chittagong area we decided to carry on to our base at Alipore, as the port engine appeared to be functioning normally. Whilst we were flying at high level we both had to use my oxygen supply alternately as became necessary.
As a result of this remarkable operation the area was heavily bombed a few days later, which caused a massive landslide that completely blocked the track. Newman was awarded a bar to his DFC.
No.684 Squadron’s activities at China Bay were halted until mid-September 1944, when a PR of parts of Sumatra was flown and were then halted again until October. That month, 684 Squadron Mosquitoes at Alipore used Cox’s Bazaar, at the mouths of the Ganges, to make long-range flights into Burma. All Mosquito operations came to an abrupt halt on 12 November 1944, when following a spate of crashes, a signal to all units required Mosquito aircraft to be grounded pending inspection.
250
The cause of the accidents was, supposedly, destruction by ‘termites’ and deterioration of glue. It was supposed that, as the aircraft were left standing in the open, extreme heat has caused the glue to crack and the upper surfaces to lift from the spar; but it soon became clear that the adhesive was not the cause of the trouble. In March 1944 production of the first batch of Mosquitoes in Australia had been disrupted when it was discovered that components in the wing failed to ‘mate’. Consequently, gaps occurred in the glued joints between the main spar and the plywood stressed-skin of the wings (under load the plywood upper wing surface could become detached and the box-section spar assembly could collapse). The wings for the first twenty Australian-built aircraft were scrapped.
251
The effects of the accidents in India were far-reaching. The intended manufacture of components at Karachi was abandoned and the re-equipping of squadrons delayed. Structural failures and added troubles with the engines meant the wooden aircraft was never a favourite with the crews of 27 Squadron, who preferred the Beaufighter for their low-level strafing sorties. All fourteen FB.VIs in 110 (Hyderabad) Squadron, which a few days earlier had retired its Vultee Vengeance aircraft, were grounded by 6 November. De Havilland still maintained that the failures in India resulted from climatic conditions and ordered the destruction of all parts made with casein glue.
252
A meeting at the Air Ministry on 1 January 1945 heard an explanation of the Mosquito defects from Major de Havilland on his return from India. He again attributed the faults to the entry of water, differential shrinkage and unsatisfactory glueing; admitting that there was scope for improving manufacturing techniques, particularly the method of assembling glued joints. Records show that accidents classified as caused by ‘loss of control’ were three times more frequent on Mosquitoes than on any other type of aircraft. However, the Air Ministry forestalled possible loss of confidence in its Mosquito squadrons at home and abroad by holding to Major de Havilland’s assertion that the accidents in India were caused by ‘faults largely due to climate’.
253
On 4 July 1944 meanwhile, 82 (United Provinces) Squadron at Kolar and 84 Squadron at Quetta, India were to begin conversion to the FB.VI from the Vultee Vengeance III dive-bomber.
254
No.82 Squadron began conversion at Kolar, 35 miles to the east, in July but 84 Squadron never did convert to the American aircraft owing to the lack of available Vengeances. In October the Squadron disposed of all its Vengeances and on 31 October moved to Yelahanka near Bangalore to re-equip with the Mosquito FB.VI. In November advice was received that, owing to technical problems with the Mosquito, the squadron would re-equip with Vengeance IIIs and return to the forward area. Two weeks later they were instructed to continue the conversion to the Mosquito owing to lack of suitable Vengeances and the Squadron was instructed to continue the conversion to the Mosquito! (The Squadron’s first Mosquito arrived in mid-February 1945). Meanwhile, heavy monsoons prevented any operations at all until mid-September but 45 and 82 Squadrons moved, in turn, to Ranchi, just over 200 miles west of Calcutta, for attacks on Japanese targets in Burma.
On 1 October 45 Squadron flew their first Mosquito sortie. On 9 November Flight Lieutenant Cliff Emeny led six of the Squadron’s Mosquitoes on a dawn raid on Meiktila aerodrome. Emeny, who as an NCO gunner/observer on Defiants on 225 Squadron destroyed a German bomber attacking Hull on 9 May 1941, destroyed a Japanese bomber taking off. However, his Mosquito was then hit by flak, which set the port engine on fire and caused the starboard engine to lose coolant. He was attacked by two Oscars, who were driven off his tail by another Mosquito and this enabled him to make a controlled crash-landing in the Burmese jungle. The Mosquito exploded on impact and cut a swathe through the trees before coming to a halt. Emeny and his navigator were subsequently reported ‘missing believed killed’ but though they were burned and injured they had both survived. On every operation Emeny carried a special axe with a very short handle and by using it he was able to cut himself free of the wreckage before he was badly burned. The Japanese captured him and his navigator, denied them medical treatment and after very brutal interrogation sentenced the pilot to death by beheading. Probably the advance of the 14th Army saved his life and he was imprisoned in Rangoon. In prison he saved the lives of many of the prisoners after persuading the Japanese to let him set up a rudimentary hospital. On liberation he weighed just 6 stone 10lb.
255
In late November all Mosquito VIs were grounded because of faults with the main wing-spars. The pilots were transferred to Cox’s Bazaar to bring out wounded from the Kaladan in Tiger Moths and Vultee-Stinson Sentinels and the navigators were sent on leave. Meanwhile, 47 Squadron had moved to Yelahanka on 7 October followed by 110 ‘Hyderabad’ Squadron three weeks later. When 110 Squadron was first formed during the First World War the Nizam of Hyderabad had met the cost of the aircraft as a contribution to the war effort. It was said that if any member of the Squadron was in the vicinity of the Nizam’s palace, there was a welcome awaiting him with lavish hospitality! Starting in December 1944, 47, 82 and 110 Squadrons commenced day and night Intruder sorties on the Japanese road, rail and river network system. On 18 December the Australian CO of 82 Squadron, Wing Commander Lionel V. Hudson and his navigator Pilot Officer Shortus failed to return from the squadron’s first operational sortie when they crashed in the Irrawaddy. They both managed to reach an island in the middle of the river and the Japanese took them prisoner. Hudson’s replacement was newly promoted Wing Commander F.W. ‘Freddy’ Snell
DFC
. On 19 December 45 Squadron resumed Mosquito operations after their aircraft had been passed airworthy with an attack on the Saye-Kinu railway. Next day the Squadron destroyed the Alon railway bridge. On 23 December a glide bombing attack with 500lb bombs was carried out at night on Meiktila aerodrome. Daylight attacks on locomotives and rolling stock and a night raid on the marshalling yards at Ywataung on the 27th followed. On 29 December six Mosquitoes of 45 Squadron made a dawn dive bombing attack on Meiktila aerodrome. Six Japanese Oscars intercepted them. Ben Walsh, pilot of one of the Mosquitoes managed to get a prolonged cannon and machine gun blast at one of them and he believed that he damaged it but he could not get confirmation since his was the last of the six Mosquitoes in the attack. All the Mosquitoes returned safely. Walsh tells his story: