Authors: Martin Bowman
Tags: #Bisac Code 1: HIS027140
Simpson’s first two attempts to contact Bobbie failed. Both missions were flown in Mosquito NS676, the second of two Mosquitoes supplied by the RAF, crewed by Captain Victor S. Doroski, pilot and Lieutenant Bill Miskho, navigator. On the first try the Mosquito’s elevator controls jammed and control of the aircraft was wrenched from Doroski’s hands. On the second effort Bobbie could not be contacted. On 22 November Simpson made a third attempt to make contact with Bobbie. Mosquito NS707 was used as NS676 had been badly damaged on landing after the abortive second trip. As they crossed the Dutch coast, Doroski lost height and the Redstocking Mosquito started circling at 30,000ft at a pre-set time and at an established rendezvous point to enable Simpson, crouched in the bomb bay, to record the conversation on the wire recorder There was no response from Bobbie. Simpson ordered Doroski down to 20,000ft in an effort to pick up the agent’s signal, but still there was no response. Below the Mosquito there unfolded a barrage of fireworks. The aircraft shuddered with each burst. Simpson shouted on the intercom, “We’re in a storm, Captain. You’d better get us out of here!” The reply came, “Commander, that’s no storm. We’re being shot at!”
Doroski climbed back up to 30,000ft and cruised around the area again. At midnight Simpson finally made contact with Bobbie. Through heavy static the agent informed Simpson that he was ‘quite all right’. He said that a
Panzer
regiment was headed towards Arnhem and pinpointed a railway bridge over the Ems Canal at Leeuwarden. If Allied bombers destroyed the bridge, he said, they would paralyze traffic from this key junction into Germany. Bobbie finished abruptly. “I am standing here near German posts. It is very dangerous.” Simpson said goodbye and told Doroski to head for home. (Doroski was subsequently lost on a night-photography Joker mission on 8 February 1945.)
On 12 December the seventh mission in contact with Bobbie was flown. Simpson’s pilot was ‘Paddy’ Walker; Captain Bill Miskho flew as navigator. Bobbie told Simpson that the IX SS
Panzer
Division was in a rest camp in the area but had been ordered to move in 48 hours. He added ominously that, “...it is almost impossible to travel as all railroads, cars, trucks and buses have been taken over and are moving troops and supplies. Something big is about to happen.” The message was clear and in English. After receiving and recording the full communication from Bobbie the Mosquito headed for Watton. On arrival, the recording wire was transported to London and reported to Secret Intelligence, but the significance was not realized. On 16 December Field Marshal Karl von Rundstedt’s Panzer divisions attacked the Allied front-line in an area of the Ardennes where American units were in rest and rehabilitation. The German offensive achieved complete surprise and caused widespread confusion and a salient, or ‘bulge’, was opened. The Ardennes Offensive had proved that the German Army was not finished and agents were needed in Germany. Bobbie was later apprehended by the Abwehr, who used him to transmit deceptive intelligence, but by a pre-arranged code OSS knew that he had been ‘turned’ and contact missions continued to be flown regularly by the 25th Bomb Group. However, the stripped-down Mosquito flew above 45,000ft to avoid German night-fighters and interceptors. Two months later Bobbie returned to England equipped with a German radio, having persuaded the Abwehr that he would make a good double agent!
Lieutenant Marvin R. Edwards adds:
These Mosquito missions involved a crew of three, the pilot, the navigator and a special operator who spoke to the agent on the ground. A compartment was designed to hold this operator in the belly of the aircraft. After I had been shown how the Mosquito navigation equipment operated I had few problems. The navigator on the B-24 had not only to wear an oxygen mask but a heated suit and heavy gloves as well. The outside temperature at 20,000ft in December was well below zero Fahrenheit. The navigator’s desk on the B-24 was located over the nose wheel and there was no air seal! Thus the temperature where the navigator stood was the same as outside the plane. Some of the navigational work required removing the gloves and thereby risking frostbite. Thus the Mossie heating system was a refreshing change. Mosquitoes used were Mk.VIII and the IX. They had Merlin 72 engines. Heat in the pilot-navigator cockpit area stayed at room temperature. These models were not pressurised so oxygen masks had to be used. We later learned that the Mossie was not designed to carry a passenger in the modified compartment. Happily, except for the great discomfort of the special operator, the plane handled well on most occasions. We all noted that the engines in American aircraft seemed to roar, while the Merlins seemed to purr. We were also impressed with the automatic supercharger that was activated at about 20,000ft, as we climbed to an altitude of 28-40,000ft. The thrust was so strong that it seemed as though we were taking off again. Once we reached 40,000ft we felt secure. The German flak could not reach us. The only German planes that presented any threat were the jet fighters that the Germans developed near the war’s end. Their numbers were very limited. Since our plywood plane was at such a high altitude, we felt that the German radar would have difficulty in spotting us. This was important. To maintain both our speed and altitude, our Mossie was stripped of what was considered all excess weight. We had no armament of any kind. Even our IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) was removed. Eliminating the IFF did present a problem on occasion when we returned to England.
On 21 January 1945 a team code-named Troy was dropped into Stuttgart. They were followed on 28 February by a second team code-named Anzio, who were also dropped into Stuttgart. On the night of 1/2 March 1945 a lone A-26 Invader dropped two agents code-named Hammer near Berlin (the Mosquito could carry only one agent). The mission required two weeks of preparation, which included collecting all information from British sources regarding territory covered in flight. The crewmembers were familiarised with enemy gun batteries, enemy flying fields and enemy radar installations, enemy fighter control points and enemy navigational aids. Drop-points near large watercourses, which could be seen in the dark of the moon, were selected. Specialised navigational equipment was installed. The selected course was plotted on a special LORAN and Gee trainer attached to a link trainer. Major John W. Walch and William G. Miskho, the two navigators and Robert Walker the pilot, spent days in training for a fully co-ordinated exercise. The mission was flown on a moonlit night at fence-top level all the way. The flight took a zigzag course, following rivers and other features discernible at night. It skirted mountains and defensive areas. Major John W. Walch sat in the nose reading maps and observing the terrain. Bill Miskho operated specialised equipment. The weather was good of course. A weather observation flight to Berlin in a Mosquito had preceeded the mission and reported conditions as clear and favourable. The mission was successful.
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On 12 March a Redstocking Mosquito flying 30,000ft over Berlin successfully established contact with one of the Hammer agents by using Joan-Eleanor. The total exercise resulted in one of the most valuable intelligence commitments of the war.
On 20 March when over 400 B-17s and B-24s raided the shipyard and dock area at Hamburg a very eventful Chaff-dispensing mission was flown by four Mosquito XVIs of the 654th Bomb Squadron, as Lieutenant Roger W. Gilbert, one of the pilots, relates:
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The four aircraft began take-off shortly after 14.00 hours and contacted the bombers at the initial point one hour later. We took position ahead of and below the bombers at 26,000ft, flying four abreast. Over Stade, Germany 30 miles west of the target we began discharging chaff. This continued to and over Hamburg. We had received at least three radio transmissions warning us of Me 262 jets in the area. On the last call Lieutenant Norman R. Magee, pilot in the lead aircraft, called for us to break left because the jets were coming through our flight. Lieutenant Raymond G. Spoerl, my navigator, checking from the observation bubble, reported that one jet appeared to be coming toward us from six o’clock high. A moment later Spoerl reported that the jet was firing at us and I broke as hard as I could to the left. We had turned about 45° when we began taking 30mm hits in the cockpit, the instrument panel, the observation canopy and the left wing. The battle damage to the left wing helped us turn even tighter to the left, taking us out of the line of fire. The 30mm shells had worked the wing over, however. We were going down out of control in a tight spiral. The jet flashed by us on our right. Spoerl, who had been monitoring the jets’ activities from the observation bubble and without his safety belt, was thrown to the floor by gravity forces. This occurred as the cannon fire punched the hole in the observation bubble. As I looked down at Ray on the floor I thought that he had been shot. I was concerned that I could not get out of the tight spiral because of the damage to the left wing, but with a high power setting on the left engine the Mosquito straightened up. By keeping a much higher power setting on the left engine than the right, the Mosquito flew fairly well and, with the lifting of gravity forces, Raymond lifted himself up and proved to be OK: his lucky day.
Taking inventory of the damage, we found that the left wing-tip was lost. The flap and aileron extended perhaps two feet beyond the shredded main structure of the wing. The ailerons that had been jammed temporarily in the left turn position now worked only part way and the radio was inoperative. We had dropped 8,000ft below the flight, could not communicate and were no longer part of the team. We were on our own as we turned toward Watton. I did not experience further control problems unless my speed slowed to 170 mph. Then the aircraft would fall off to the left. Without the radio we could not communicate with the Watton control tower. To alert their personnel to our problems I raced across the field and by the control tower with the damaged wing on a level with and near its windows. Fortunately the control personnel saw it. I circled the field and set the wheels down at the edge of the runway at just above 170 mph. We stopped comfortably and taxied to our dispersal area. The crash and fire equipment were already on their way. They were followed shortly by the maintenance officer and the operations staff of the Squadron. The damaged wing was attracting concern combined with wonder and we were suddenly VIPs.
The other three craft on the Chaff dispensing mission escaped damage from the attack of German jets. Though the Mosquito of 1st Lieutenant Joseph A. Polovick and 1st Lieutenant Bernard M. Blaum had been attacked directly by one jet, they evaded its line of fire with the accepted tactic of breaking and diving for several thousand feet. The three Mosquitoes regrouped and completed their mission beyond the target. The jets, which had apparently reached their fuel limits, did not follow them.
Once the three Mosquitoes turned toward home German defences lost interest in them. Two of the Mosquitoes developed mechanical problems while Findley’s Mosquito purred back to Watton without a misfire. Lieutenant Norman R. Magee and Lieutenant Len A. Erickson were forced to feather their starboard engine propeller and drop out of the flight but they returned to Watton alone and without further concerns. The Mosquito flown by Polovick and Blaum was the one Mosquito that did not return. They and the Mosquito flown by Lieutenant Charles Findley and Lieutenant Robert Balser were still flying in formation and in good form until they were exiting Germany over the North Friesian Islands. Over the island of Fohr one engine of Polovick’s Mosquito ceased to function, followed shortly by the other, caused, apparently by a vapour lock in the fuel lines. As their Mosquito glided toward the central part of the island Findley and Balser circled over them. Two parachutes opened. Both Polovick and Balser became prisoners of war and were held in
Stalag Luft
I at Barth. (They were liberated in early May by Russian forces and were flown by Allied aircraft to a staging area near Reims, France. Polovick returned to Watton but Balser was transferred directly back to the United States from France).
On 13 March operations had moved to Harrington, where 492nd Bomb Group ‘Carpetbagger’ Liberators, commanded by Colonel Hudson H. Upham were used on covert missions. B-24 and B-17 night leaflet crews arrived from Cheddington at the same time and chaos ensued. Mosquito maintenance suffered drastically and, eventually, RAF ground personnel were brought in to maintain the aircraft. OSS regained control over all Mosquito operations and 25th Bomb Group pilots and navigators flew the aircraft until enough 492nd Bomb Group personnel were available. A 492nd Bomb Group pilot and navigator carried Commander Simpson on their first communications mission on 31 March 1945.
One of Lieutenant Marvin R. Edwards’ ‘most meaningful’ rendezvous Mosquito flights was in mid-April 1945:
Our assignment was to fly in orbit at a point in the Munich area. There had been reports that the German military were planning a last ditch stand in the mountains near Munich known as the ‘Redoubt’. That concept was first talked about after the failure of the last massive German counter attack in December 1944 in the Battle of the Bulge. Certain members of the German High Command had believed that underground fortifications and factories connected by tunnels could be constructed in the Alps. They believed that such a complex would be impregnable, even from air attacks. Many of those defending the facility would be German SS Storm Troops. Shortly after the war’s end, in May 1945, I went to OSS HQ in Grosvenor Square in London. I was informed that the OSS agent contacted in Bavaria had reported that there would be no organised German resistance in that area. The plan never got off the ground. The Germans offered no resistance to the American army assigned to that sector of operations.
Taking off from Watton on 6 April 1945 the right engine of 1st Lieutenant John A. Pruis and 1st Lieutenant Claude Moore’s Mosquito suddenly burst into flames. Pruis immediately chopped the throttle and feathered the right propeller. He gave more power to the right-hand engine, corrected flight altitude and worked to gain altitude. They levelled off at 1,000ft and got on the downwind leg but the right engine fanned into flame again and the prop began windmilling out of control. Pruis held extra power to compensate for the loss of the engine and as a result they were half way down the runway when they touched down. Moore jettisoned the escape hatch overhead and at the same moment pulled up the landing gear. Within seconds they were skidding, spinning around and coming to a very abrupt halt. Both men got out before the Mosquito was engulfed in flames, which were extinguished by fire fighters. Pruis and Moore were debriefed, reports were written up and they were given another Mosquito and sent up again, all within the hour. Moore was philosophical: ‘Just another day.’ He was also resourceful: he had rescued his parachute and, after giving it to a buddy nearby, it somehow made its way back to the States where silk cloth was unavailable, even with a ration card, and it furnished material for parts of a young bride’s trousseau!