Hitler's Commanders (3 page)

In March 1941, Hitler secretly decided to wage a new kind of warfare, in which all restraints were cast aside. This war would be vicious and aimed at the total eradication of the enemy. Accordingly, Keitel issued Hitler’s draconian Commissar Order, which called for the liquidation of Soviet political officers, who always accompanied Red Army troops. Keitel also affixed his signature to a decree of July 1941, and it specified that the
Reichsfuehrer-SS
(Heinrich Himmler) would politically administer all rearward areas in the East. This order was tantamount to endorsing mass murder.

Although Keitel tried unsuccessfully to soften some of the decrees coming from Hitler, the field marshal continued to obey his orders. Keitel had unbounded faith in Hitler, and the Fuehrer craftily exploited this relationship. A series of decrees aimed at subduing Soviet resistance emanated from Fuehrer Headquarters, including instructions to kill 50 to 100 Communists for every German soldier who died in occupied territory.
8
These orders originated with Adolf Hitler but bore Wilhelm Keitel’s signature.

The failure of the German armies to win a quick, decisive victory in Russia caused Hitler to berate his generals and call for even harsher measures. Keitel meekly succumbed to Hitler’s outrages and continued to sign infamous orders, such as the
Nacht und Nebel
(night and fog) decree of December 7, 1941, which directed that “persons endangering German security” were to vanish without a trace, into the night and fog. The responsibility for carrying out this decree was assigned to the SD, and many resistance members and other anti-Nazis were secretly executed under the provisions of this order.
9
In many cases their bodies were never found.

Although on occasion the OKW chief offered quiet objections to Hitler’s proposals, he remained extremely loyal and was precisely the type of individual Hitler wanted in his entourage. Unfortunately, Keitel’s behavior adversely affected the behavior of his subordinates. Keitel would not defend them and submitted to the will of the Fuehrer on almost every issue.
10
Such irresoluteness led many officers to refer to him as
LaKaitel
(lackey).

On July 20, 1944, Colonel Count Claus von Stauffenberg planted his briefcase, containing a bomb, under the briefing table at the Wolf’s Lair during a Fuehrer conference. At 12:42 p.m. the bomb exploded. The chief of OKW was momentarily stunned, but as soon as he recovered, Keitel rushed to Hitler, shouting, “Mein Fuehrer! Mein Fuehrer! You’re still alive!” He then helped Hitler to his feet and embraced him wildly. Keitel supported the dazed Fuehrer as the two left the demolished wooden hut, which had been a briefing room only minutes before.

After the failure of this assassination attempt, Keitel became closer than ever to Hitler, and as Albert Speer observed, Hitler also leaned on Keitel.
11
The OKW marshal showed no mercy in carrying out measures against the attempted coup. He arrested his own signals chief, General Erich Fellgiebel, and ordered the arrests of Colonel General Friedrich Fromm, the commander-in-chief of the Replacement Army, and Field Marshal Erwin von Witzleben. Keitel displayed no sympathy for “disloyal” officers, such as Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, upon whom he had never wasted any love.
12

During the final months of the war, as the Soviets continued their march to Berlin, Keitel issued decrees against enemy “terrorist activities.”
13
His accepting without question the need for brutal retaliation against partisans and saboteurs clearly indicated that Keitel had reached the point where he accepted Hitler’s orders verbatim. During the Battle of Berlin, Keitel completely lost his grasp of reality. He blamed General Walter Wenck and Field Marshal Ferdinand Schoemer for the fall of the capital, as well as Colonel General Gotthard Heinrici, who retreated to the west without authorization. Keitel failed to realize that Germany had lost the war—no matter what these three officers did or failed to do.

On May 8, 1945, Wilhelm Keitel performed his last official act for Germany. Appearing in full-dress uniform, with his marshal’s baton in hand, he signed the surrender document in the presence of the Soviets in Berlin. He then returned to Flensburg-Muervik, the seat of the rump German government, now headed by Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz. He was arrested there a few days later by the British military police and remained in custody for the remainder of his life. He was tried at Nuremberg, where he admitted his responsibility for carrying out Hitler’s orders. Although his honesty did not lessen his crimes, he nonetheless faced his accusers truthfully. He was found guilty of committing crimes against peace, of war crimes, and of crimes against humanity. On October 16, 1946, Wilhelm Keitel was hanged. As he dropped through the gaping hole, he shouted his last words: “Deutschland uber Alles!” (Germany above all!)

Field Marshal Keitel had naively believed that in serving Hitler he served the German people. He realized only after the war that his actions were wrong—something he did not grasp during the seven-year period from 1938 to 1945, when he helped Hitler carry out his demonic policies and wage his war. In the end, Keitel unconsciously aided in dooming the Prussian officer corps, which, in his own inept way, he had tried to defend.

alfred jodl
was born in Wurzburg on May 10, 1890. His father was a retired Bavarian artillery captain who had been compelled to leave active duty because of his intended marriage to a Franconian girl from a simple milling and farming family. Alfred was one of the five children produced by this union. There were three daughters, all of whom died at an early age, and another son, Ferdinand, who rose to the rank of general of mountain troops during World War II.
14

Educated in cadet schools, young Alfred Jodl joined the Bavarian Army as a
Faehnrich
(senior officer cadet) in the 4th Bavarian Field Artillery Regiment in 1910. He attended the Bavarian War School in Munich (1910–1912) and was commissioned to second lieutenant on October 28, 1912. Shortly thereafter he married his first wife, Countess Irma von Bullion of an established Swabian family, despite the objections of her father, Colonel Count von Bullion. The countess, who was five years Alfred’s senior, was an intelligent and vivacious socialite whom he dearly loved.

Jodl saw action as an artillery officer on both the French and Russian fronts in the Great War of 1914–1918. During the first month of the war he was wounded by a grenade splinter but soon recovered and returned to the front in December. Promoted to first lieutenant in January 1916, he served as a battery commander in the 19th Field Artillery Regiment (1916–1917), the Austro-Hungarian 72nd Honved Field Cannon Regiment (1917), and the 10th Bavarian Field Artillery Regiment (1917). He returned to the 19th as regimental adjutant in May 1917. His last World War I assignment was as adjutant, 8th Bavarian Artillery Command (Bavarian Arko 8) (December 1917–December 1918). Jodl remained in the army after the war, and after commanding batteries in four different regiments in the Augsburg area, he began clandestine General Staff training in 1921. His superiors were very happy with his performance, and a typical officer fitness report from his period described him as “very thoughtful, decisive, energetic, a good sportsman, eager, an excellent leader and suitable for higher command.”
15
During the Weimar era, Jodl attended the University of Berlin (1923–1924), served on the staff of the 7th Infantry Division in Munich (1924–1927), commanded a battery in the 7th Mountain Artillery Regiment at Landsberg/Lech (1927–1928), and served as a General Staff training officer with the 7th Infantry Division (1928–1932). Promoted to captain in 1921 and major in 1931, he received an appointment to the operations branch of the Troop Office (Truppenamt), as the secret General Staff was called, on June 1, 1932.

Jodl was a highly respected officer; however, his unbridled enthusiasm for Hitler and the Nazi Party created a chasm between himself and many other officers—a gap that was never bridged. In 1935 Jodl (by then a colonel)
16
entered the Armed Forces Office (Wehrmachtamt), and when Hitler created the High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW), Jodl took charge of the National Defense Office. A few weeks later, in March, 1938, Lieutenant General Max von Viebahn suffered a nervous breakdown because he feared war would result over the Austrian crisis.
17
Jodl replaced him as chief of operations of OKW.

Colonel Jodl took on his new task with enthusiasm and leveled harsh criticisms at the army generals (such as Ludwig Beck) who, following a Hitler talk on August 10, claimed Germany was not ready for war. Jodl, writing in his diary, called the generals’ attitude “pusillanimous” and wrote that they should focus on military strategy, not political decisions. He further noted that it was a tragedy that the whole nation supported the Fuehrer with one exception: army generals. He castigated the generals for not recognizing Hitler’s “genius.”
18
Without question, Jodl had unbridled faith in Hitler and truly believed the Fuehrer was politically infallible.

Although Jodl now assumed Hitler would utilize the OKW Operations Staff to plan his military campaigns, the Fuehrer turned instead to OKH (
Oberkommando des Heeres
, the High Command of the Army) in the early planning stages. Meanwhile, Jodl was promoted to major general in 1939 and assumed command of the 44th Artillery Command (which became the 44th Infantry Division) in Vienna in November 1938. An avid mountaineer, Jodl became hopeful when General Keitel (the chief of OKW and brother of the chief of the Army Personnel Office) discussed the possibility of Jodl’s receiving command of the 2nd Mountain Division in early October 1939; however, he did not get to command this or any other mountain division because the war intervened.
19

On August 23, 1939, Keitel telegraphed Jodl to return to OKW as chief of operations; there he would conduct the planning for the attack on Poland (Case White). Jodl would remain in this post throughout the war, receiving a promotion to general of artillery in 1940 and to colonel general on January 30, 1944 (the 11th anniversary of the Nazis’ assumption of power). He bypassed the rank of lieutenant general altogether. He enjoyed his first personal conversation with Hitler on the Fuehrer’s train during the Polish campaign and remained loyally at Hitler’s side until the end of the war.

Due to the fact that Hitler turned to OKH to direct the campaigns against Poland (1939) and France (1940), Jodl made the decision to support Hitler whenever disagreements arose between OKH and the Fuehrer. According to his deputy, Walter Warlimont, Jodl initiated an order in May 1940, directing the 1st Mountain Division to turn south (i.e., carry out a Hitler order) without OKH approval. Such an action—in direct violation of the military principle of unity of command—is evidence of both Jodl’s outspoken support for Hitler, as well as of his frustration (shared by his superior, Keitel) with the lack of command authority of the OKW.

Operation Weser (the invasion of Norway) finally gave OKW an opportunity to exercise direct operational control. The Fuehrer sealed Weser for OKW by appointing General of Infantry Nikolaus von Falkenhorst as commanding general of the operation and as commander of Group XXI.
20
Normally, such command assignments were made by OKH and then sent to Hitler for routine approval. Hitler further decreed that Falkenhorst was to serve directly under him and that Falkenhorst’s staff be composed of officers from all three services. Consequently, Weser came directly under Hitler’s command through the OKW.

The operation was planned principally by Jodl and his staff. The German invasion of Norway caught the British (who were themselves planning to occupy Norway) completely by surprise. Although the campaign succeeded, a particularly tense situation developed when the British destroyed 10 German destroyers that had escorted Major General Eduard Dietl’s landing force to Narvik in northern Norway. The British also landed a large number of troops north of Narvik on April 14. A worried Hitler frantically ordered that Dietl’s troops be instructed to fall back to the south.

Jodl realized the folly of Hitler’s judgment. To abandon the battle merely because the enemy threatened the Narvik position might endanger the entire campaign. Jodl pointed out to Hitler that a march south would not only be impossible, but could well result in considerable loss of airplanes, which would then have to land on frozen lakes to resupply the mountain troops. Hitler, having calmed down, agreed to postpone a decision. However, on April 17, the navy suggested that Dietl’s group might be destroyed and thus rekindled Hitler’s anxieties. Even Goering entered the fray against OKW, claiming there was now no way the Luftwaffe could assist Dietl.

Hitler came completely apart and, screaming, ordered Dietl’s withdrawal from Narvik (after promoting him to lieutenant general). Jodl’s staff was astounded. Lieutenant Colonel Bernhard von Lossberg, of the OKW planning staff, refused to send the order to Dietl, and Jodl confronted the Fuehrer directly. Pounding the table with his fist, Jodl told Hitler that Dietl’s group should fight where it stood and not give up. Jodl emphasized that the position had not been lost and should not be passively surrendered. Hitler finally succumbed to Jodl’s stubbornness and allowed Dietl to remain at Narvik. By the end of the month, it was clear that Jodl had been correct and that the Germans were winning the Norwegian campaign. Hitler was pleased and asked Jodl to join him for lunch. For the next two years, Jodl sat at Hitler’s table for meals. The Fuehrer had great confidence in Jodl’s military judgment as a result of Operation Weser, and, for his part, Jodl’s faith in Hitler remained unimpaired.

Alfred Jodl thus became invited into the so-called inner circle of Adolf Hitler. This entourage consisted primarily of civilians; furthermore, as Albert Speer told Dr. Mueller, all were silent, loyal admirers who would listen for hours on end to the Fuehrer’s monologues. Jodl’s participation caused the OKW general considerable grief, for it separated him from his staff; and, since he was a soldier, Jodl considered himself to be merely a “guest.”
21
Nonetheless, he basked in the glory of Germany’s victories in 1940.