Hellcats (25 page)

Hydeman, like Lockwood, never doubted that Operation Barney would succeed. The only concern he had, which he expressed to Lockwood and Sieglaff, was that his and the
Sea Dog
's arrival had been a last-minute affair and that the
Sea Dog
's substitution for the
Seahorse
hadn't allowed much time to train on FMS and to get the hang of locating mines. Sieglaff waved Hydeman's concerns away, saying that Hydeman's crew would get the hang of it in no time, which in fact they did, despite numerous equipment failures and the corresponding repairs that often lasted until dawn.

“Well, Hydeman,” Lockwood drawled during one of their frequent meetings, “what're y'all going to call this little group of yours?”

Hydeman thought a moment. “How about ‘Hydeman's Hellcats'?”

And so “Hydeman's Hellcats” became the official name attached to the Japan Sea Patrol Group. It was an apt name for the raiders. After all, a hellcat exists solely to torment others, in this case the Japanese, who, like the Americans at Pearl Harbor, were about to be caught by surprise. For purposes of further identification, Hydeman gave each of the three task groups its own name.

That settled, Hydeman and Sieglaff pored over the mission's operational details, Hydeman offering valuable opinions and ideas on how to improve it. Hydeman then met with the other Hellcat skippers to discuss any concerns they had. The first group of three subs, Hydeman's Hepcats, were scheduled to sail on May 27. They'd be followed by the second and third groups on May 28 and 29, respectively. After the meeting Hydeman reported to Lockwood that his Hellcats were itching to go. To make certain that the mission got off to the proper start, Lockwood had arranged to lay on a lavish luncheon for the departing skippers and, to liven it up, invited as many Red Cross girls and nurses from the Navy base at Guam to attend as could be spared. Lockwood was indeed a big-picture man.

 

 

Between letters to Sarah, Lawrence
kept his parents informed about his work, but only as much as he knew the censors would permit.

The Operation Barney briefing began
as scheduled for the skippers and their communications officers aboard the
Holland
. Security was tight. Blackout restrictions required that all of the ship's portholes and watertight doors remained secured. It was a sweltering night and the
Holland
lacked air-conditioning. Voge, his khakis blackened with sweat, started off screening a film produced by UCDWR in San Diego under the direction of Harnwell and Henderson. The black-and-white film showed every phase of FMS operation, training, and maintenance. Close-ups of juicy green pears on a sonar screen and a sound track of tolling hell's bells completed the picture.

Voge then launched into a full review of Operation Barney, starting with its conceptual framework, moving on to the details of the Sea of Japan's hydrography and geography. He ended the review with an ominous warning: Stay out of waters mined by B-29s along the northwest coast of Honshu. Voge explained that the magnetically actuated bottom mines dropped by B-29s might not show up on FM sonar. These U.S.mined waters were marked in red on the maps that had been provided for the conference. More information about them would be included in the skippers' op orders.

Voge reminded them, “If you get into such bad trouble that you can't make it out of the Sea of Japan, head for Vladivostok. There you'll have the status of a man-of-war of a belligerent nation entering a neutral port. Maybe you can effect repairs and get out in time. At the worst you'll be interned for the duration.”
⁶
He told them that if this should happen, they were to contact the U.S. consul in Vladivostok to claim sanctuary. They were warned not to enter Soviet territorial waters except in an emergency. The Russians patrolled these waters, which were probably mined, to prevent incursions by foreign ships.

After Voge completed his presentation, Barney Sieglaff took over. He had prepared the tactical plan that divided the Hellcats into three groups of three subs. He had also prepared the departure schedule of the three task groups from Guam, the timing of each group's entry through the Tsushima Strait into the Sea of Japan, their individual area assignments, the date and timing of the Hellcats' initial attacks, and the date and timing of their departure through La Pérouse Strait. He'd also developed the wolf-pack-style codes for use by the Hellcats en route and during the operation itself.

Sieglaff gave the skippers a detailed description of the minefields located in the southern approaches to Tsushima, based primarily on the data gathered by the
Spadefish
,
Seahorse
, and
Crevalle
. Sieglaff then explained what ComSubPac knew about the actual minefields the raiders would encounter in the Tsushima Strait, based on intelligence gleaned from sources including prisoners, spies, decrypts, etc. The sources confirmed that three, possibly four strings had been sown across the western channel. A thousand-yard gap separated each string, with fifty yards separating each mine from its neighbor. The mines themselves were said to be sown at depths of twelve feet, forty-two feet, and seventy-five feet. According to Sieglaff, as far as ComSubPac could determine, no changes or additions had been made in the layout of the minefields since they had first been sown in late 1941, other than to replace breakaways caused by storms and the deterioration of anchor cables.

After departing Guam on their appointed days, the Hellcats would proceed independently in three groups at normal two-engine cruising speed. Sieglaff reviewed the codes that had been adapted from wolf pack operations for use by the Hellcats to communicate with ComSubPac and with one another during their voyage and during the raid. Sieglaff's codes had been developed to meet the need for a rapid exchange of information, and consisted of hundreds of stock phrases, each represented by a two-number code group for geographic locations or operational procedures. For example, “No. 24” meant, “Am heading for internment at Vladivostok.” In addition, each sub had its own call numbers and letter groups to speed ship-to-ship communications and coordinate attacks. The
Bonefish
was 67V606.

As for the actual mine-penetration part of the mission, Sieglaff didn't mince words. “Inoperative FM sonar gear will not be considered sufficient cause to delay the transit of any ship. In case gear is not operative, the submarine will make transit at 200 feet or greater depth.” In other words, go in naked like the death-defying Ray Bass in the
Plunger
when he ran through La Pérouse submerged back in '43. Sieglaff's words surely must have raised eyebrows aboard the
Holland
, for this went against Lockwood's dictum that going in under mines was a sure way to lose submarines.

Sieglaff had devised three governing days for the Sea of Japan raid: Fox Day, Mike Day, and Sonar Day. Sieglaff had nominated Fox Day, June 4, for Hydeman's Hepcats' submerged transit through the western channel of the Tsushima Strait. Pierce's Polecats and Risser's Bobcats would make their transits on Fox Day plus one and Fox Day plus two, respectively. The nine submarines would begin attacking targets at sunset on Mike Day, June 9. The Hellcats then had fourteen days allotted to sink as many ships as they could, after which they would exit the Sea of Japan through La Pérouse Strait on Sonar Day, June 24.

Sieglaff stressed the importance of the subs remaining undetected in the Sea of Japan until Mike Day, when all the Hellcats would be in position. He warned them not to jump the gun by attacking too soon, no matter how tempting it might be, as attacking too early could jeopardize the mission by drawing Japanese antisubmarine forces to an individual sub. As it was, torpedo attacks erupting across the Sea of Japan would send enemy ships running for cover. Attacking too early would only make them run faster and make them harder to find. The only exception to this rule would be if an enemy man-of-war, say a heavy cruiser or carrier, were to show up before sunset on Mike Day. Sieglaff added that any submarine that expended all its torpedoes early should proceed to a position near La Pérouse Strait to await the arrival of the other Hellcats.

Sieglaff then addressed Sonar Day, June 24, the day of departure through La Pérouse. He had devised two exit plans, which he named “Sonar Xray” and “Sonar Yoke.” Depending on conditions, the density of antisubmarine patrols, and the like, the Hellcats were to make their exit run either during the day submerged (Sonar Xray), or at night on the surface (Sonar Yoke). In the event that intelligence revealed increased antisubmarine activity in and around La Pérouse Strait, ComSubPac would radio a warning to Hydeman along with a recommendation as to which plan he should employ. Sieglaff stressed that the final decision would be left up to Hydeman. If he chose to use a submerged exit run, the Hellcats would go through La Pérouse in two parallel columns at three knots, picking up a knot or two of extra speed from the outflowing Kuroshio Current.

In regard to mines, there was little in the way of fresh intelligence to indicate that, like Tsushima, changes had been made to the fields presently in place or to the layout of the safe channel used by the Russians. Sieglaff stressed that if a submerged exit became necessary, any subs with inoperative FMS gear would have to try to make the run-through at a depth below the deepest-sown mines—whatever that was—and good luck.

If Hydeman decided to make a surface dash—Sonar Yoke—he was to keep in mind that there were shore-based enemy radar stations on Rebun Island west of Kyushu and at the naval station at Wakkanai Ko near the tip of Kyushu itself. Sieglaff warned that according to intelligence, the stations were fully capable of detecting ships and even low-lying submarines. If Hydeman chose the surface option, Sieglaff recommended making the dash through the safe channel at flank speed, all nine subs closed up in a single column, gun crews standing by to slug it out with Japanese patrol boats if necessary. Lockwood, as he had during the Japan Sea incursion of 1943, had arranged for a diversionary bombardment by submarine of an island near the Tsushima Strait to draw antisubmarine forces away from La Pérouse. In any event, after clearing the strait the Hellcats were to make tracks to Pearl Harbor, where Lockwood and his crew would be waiting to greet them.

Sieglaff and Voge answered a few questions from the skippers about the mission, then handed out copies of ComSubPac's top secret Operation Order No. 112-45, predated May 26, 1945.
⁷
Annex “A” of the op ord contained all of the information in Sieglaff's presentation for study and review. With that, Sieglaff wrapped up the conference.