France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1939 (35 page)

For Germany we have more information on the period prior to 1932, thanks to the work by Jacques Bariéty.
⁷¹
German involvement after Hitler’s rise to power is not as well known. We do know, for example, that
La Presse
received German funds in 1934-1935, that the daily
Notre Temps
was receiving financial support from the German embassy starting in 1936—it would buy 4,000 yearly subscriptions—and that it purchased the weekly
Le Cri des Peuples
in 1938. Landini’s correspondence quoted by Max Gallo indicates that the pacifist newsman Victor Margueritte, who was very vocal in defending the absence of German guilt in the outbreak of the First World War, also wrote in German-supported newspapers after Hitler’s rise to power. It seems that this did produce results since he could write on October 27, 1933: “One has no right to doubt Mr. Hitler’s good faith,” and wrote to Landini on March 26, 1936: “Mussolini is the only man of genius in the world today.” The
Prima Agency
headed since 1934 by Paul Ferdonnet, who was to become the “traitor from Stuttgart,” was a Nazi agency. The funds did not come from Dr. Schmoll, the German press attaché in Paris, but rather from chemical or pharmaceutical companies that overpaid exorbitant fees for their advertising. In fact, in July 1939 the news editor of
Le Temps
and the head of advertising at
Le Figaro
were both arrested.
⁷²

There are also indications of funding coming from Americans, Greeks, Bulgarians, Spaniards, and Hungarians. It appears that the British had rather close ties to Elie Bois, the editor of
Le Petit Parisien
, while
L’Action Française
accused
Le Temps
, at least up until 1929, of receiving funds from just about everyone, even from the USSR.

Regarding the USSR, the specialists at the Renseignements Généraux tried to establish the funding of
L’Humanité
at least through all of 1934.
⁷³
But the Soviets also financed in 1938 and until May 1939
La Liberté
run by Jacques Doriot, possibly, according to Alfred Kupferman to establish the existence of a pro-Nazi newspaper in Paris.
⁷⁴

With all these indications one could think, as did the American
Time
magazine in 1938, that the French press was the most corrupt in the world. Ageron offers an explanation: a newspaper was sold for 0.25 centimes, or four times less than a British or German paper and half the price of a Swiss daily.
⁷⁵

There is no indication that such awful habits had much of an influence on public opinion. Foreign “philanthropists” must have had big hopes in this area. In a democracy the variety of opinions displayed by the dailies—far more numerous than they are today—is a guarantee because the reader is always searching for the paper he prefers and can always switch. Furthermore, did foreign policy articles have many readers?

Other propaganda methods were required. We shall concentrate on Germany because they are the most pertinent to our subject. An effective peacetime propaganda may encourage some very honest and democratic-leaning citizens to think that Germany was, after all, less dangerous than it appeared and that an agreement could be possible.

The Nazi government was segmented into a number of rival “fiefdoms.” Ambassador Köster and his press attaché Dr. Schmoll were handling the purchase of newspapers. Propaganda Minister Goebbels also showed an interest. He had made the first attempt at a pseudo-rapprochement by trying to take over the
Comité France-Allemagne
. The German branch of this committee, the
Deutsche-Französische Gesellschaft
, or DFG, had emigrated to Paris when Hitler came to power because it was anti-Nazi. Goebbels assigned an official of I.G. Farben Industrie named Ilgner to get things under his control. The operation failed and the president of the DFG, the anti-Nazi Grautoff, preferred to shut down the association in July 1934. At that point Ribbentrop made his move.
⁷⁶

Joachim von Ribbentrop was a recently hatched Nazi and had been Hitler’s private foreign policy advisor since 1930. He had a low intellect but a gift for flattery that brought him to increasingly important positions. He was sent on missions to England—where high society opened its doors to him—and to France. He hated Foreign Minister von Neurath and in April 1934 created a small party office for foreign policy soon referred to as the “
Ribbentrop-Dienststelle.
” Hitler took a keen interest in the initiative, not for espionage operations but rather to set up contacts between Germans and foreigners.

In France Ribbentrop mostly relied on two men. The first was French journalist Fernand de Brinon, born in 1885, a staunch backer of Franco-German understanding, whose reputation was made by having published the first interview of Hitler granted to a French journalist.
⁷⁷
In 1934 he also published with Bernard Grasset, a publisher who believed in an understanding with Hitler’s Germany, a small book entitled
France Allemagne 1918–1934
where he offered a “one-sided” account of Franco-German relations after the First World War. Naturally he felt that the attempts to bring France and Germany closer together prior to 1933 were good only if pursued after Hitler’s rise to power. Because Pierre Viénot, whom we have mentioned, took a stand against Hitler he was attacked by Brinon. He also refused “to accept any lessons from the émigrés.”
⁷⁸

Fernand de Brinon knew how to get along with people. He became friendly with François de Wendel as a journalist at the
Débats
and had a falling out later on.
⁷⁹
In December 1933 he managed to have Ribbentrop meet Louis Barthou at his home.
⁸⁰
For a short time he had the ear of Daladier who, as a brave veteran, was at times fascinated by a sentimental rapprochement that could avoid a war.
⁸¹
What a beautiful thing a meeting between Daladier and Hitler would be on the bridge at Kehl with the two old and loyal opponents shaking hands!

The other, no doubt more naïve, protagonist was the German Otto Abetz. Abetz was an art teacher from Baden, a reader of Romain Rolland, in love with French culture and involved in the youth movements of the 1920s centering mostly on the meetings of young French and Germans in the summer of 1930 in the Black Forest at the top of the Sohlberg. It is worth noting that the main French speaker was Jean Luchaire, the founder of the daily
Notre Temps
. A
Cercle du Sohlberg
(
Sohlbergkreis
) was created for the movement to continue. With Hitler in power the German side of the Sohlbergkreis was taken over by the Hitler Youth. A meeting took place in Berlin in January 1934 where Drieu La Rochelle underlined the importance of Germanic blood in French blood. Ribbentrop summoned Abetz in July 1934 and told him his mission was to organize youth meetings and meetings between German and French veterans. Abetz thus became part of the
Ribbentrop-Dienststelle
.

Abetz was successful from the very beginning. In August 1934 he set up a veteran’s meeting in Baden-Baden. On November 2, All Souls Day, a new delegation led by Jean Goy, a member of Parliament and vice president of the UNC, was received by Hitler. An interview with Hitler by Jean Goy was published by
Paris-Midi
. The UNC president, Georges
Lebecq, repudiated Goy but at the association’s convention the latter was elected as president. The UFAC, the second large association closer to the radicals and its president, Henri Pichot, followed suit. Pichot traveled to Germany three times in 1934–1935. Scapini, who had been blinded in the war and was also a member of Parliament from Paris, followed with a meeting with Hitler in March 1935 at Godesburg. Hitler had been temporarily blinded by exposure to gassing in 1918. The meeting took on sentimental overtones. In February 1935, 4,000 veterans from the two countries marched in the streets of Besançon and finally, in 1936, an impressive reunion took place at Douaumont.

None of this went too far even though some people became concerned (Franklin-Bouillon and Jean Goy fought in a duel; Kérillis made no bones of his hatred of Abetz). Yet a strange atmosphere was being created. Books in favor of an understanding were published in 1934. Besides the one by de Brinon, we should quote Louis Bertrand’s
Hitler
and
Le couple France-Allemagne
by Jules Romains.

This brought about the reestablishment in October 1935 of the
Comité France-Allemagne
and the DFG. François-Poncet was present at the inauguration of the two new committees at the castle of Montbijou near Berlin. There were two German professors as presidents: Achim von Arnim and Friedrich Grimm, who published a book in 1938,
Hitler et la France
, with interviews Hitler had given to French newspapers. On the French side was Fernand de Brinon, along with Professor Fourneau of the Institut Pasteur played the leading role. Jules Romains whose plays were staged in Germany, received such a triumphant welcome that he joined the
Comité
. In any case, up to 1939, when Jules Romains broke with the group,
⁸²
every French government, including those of the Popular Front, was regularly funding it. Its mouthpiece was Jean Luchaire’s
Notre Temps
. From the 1936 Olympic games to the Franco-German declaration of December 6, 1938, after the Paris
Exposition Universelle
of 1937 there were to be many events taking place. There was a certain ambiguity to it all. Wasn’t it a moving and enriching experience to reconcile two great peoples? And, at the same time, was such reconciliation possible with Hitler as one of the partners? It did help his plans, and a few honest and patriotic Frenchmen became the pawns of this subtle propaganda for several years.

The “exchanges” went on as well. Whether they were film makers stunned by the reception they were given, the choir of
Les Petits Chanteurs à la croix de bois
, lecturers (for example on November 26, 1938, Benoist-Méchin in Stuttgart spoke about “The French soldier and the German
soldier”
⁸³
), every opportunity was put to good use. We should also point out the visit by the horsemen of the Saumur
Cadre Noir
to their German comrades. At first the school’s commander, General Bridoux, did not attend. He would do so in January 1939 when he met the Nazi leaders and was to speak highly of the “open comradeship” that was created. Later on General Bridoux was to become a fanatical pro-German in the Vichy government.
⁸⁴

Starting in 1936, the feeling that German propaganda was combined with espionage became a real “myth.” The Civil War in Spain gave rise to the expression “fifth column” with the most extreme elements of the right and left accusing each other of being just that.
⁸⁵
The ambassador to Berlin, Coulondre, sent a cable about the German propaganda budget which he termed “extraordinarily powerful.” The budget of Goebbels’ ministry was 30 million marks—or 640 million French francs at the “tourist-mark” rate, to which we must add 200 million marks (4,250 billion francs) in taxes on radio, press resources, secret foreign ministry funds, the party treasury and its annexes—for example, the 17 million members of the “Workers Front” were being taxed automatically.

Germany was collectively dedicated to propaganda.
⁸⁶
One shouldn’t forget the Organization of Germans Overseas headed by Dr. Bohle that was funding the Alsatian separatists.
⁸⁷
Coulondre estimated that the Nazi Reich was spending several billion marks on propaganda. Obviously, France was not the only country to “benefit” from this.

Is it possible to evaluate its effectiveness? It may be less important than the fact itself. As Coulondre wrote, “Fortunately its own excesses sometimes hamper its effectiveness.” Propaganda did not create left-wing anti-fascist pacifism nor right-wing anti-Soviet pacifism. It did not cause excited reactions in certain groups by itself.
L’Action Française
was a good example, as were the right-wing weeklies
Candide
and
Je suis partout
that were not German publications. As American historian Eugen Weber correctly points out, “The disciples of Maurras took very different positions…Some, like Jean Héritier, Georges Blond and Bernard Faÿ, backed Fernand de Brinon to reach an understanding with Germany, others like Dumoulin de La Barthète withdrew from pro-German organizations as soon as they understood the situation.”
⁸⁸
He could also have added activist monarchists such as Jacques Renouvin or Guillain de Bénouville.

In the end the public responds to propaganda when it coincides to its deeper tendencies. One may conclude that Goebbels, Ribbentrop and Abetz didn’t have the magic touch where the French public was concerned.

*
French word for “doughboys.”