Fortress Rabaul (12 page)

Each weapon had its own bubble of lethal coverage, and the Japanese placed the guns, to the extent possible, so that the kill zones overlapped. The Type 88s, for example, had a theoretical effective range of 9,000 meters (29,000 feet), while the lighter Type 96 cannon were deadly up to 5,500 meters (18,000 feet). In all, the caldera was surrounded by nearly
four hundred
antiaircraft guns, most of them concentrated in a C-shaped ring that started at the tip of Crater Peninsula and extended all the way around the basin to Kokopo. Any Allied aircraft attempting to attack Rabaul would first have to fly through this ring of fire and then run the gauntlet again in order to egress from the target.

Coastal defense systems at Rabaul were equally impressive. To streamline command and control, the Gazelle Peninsula was divided into areas of military responsibility. Simpson Harbor and Rabaul township were the navy’s domain, while the army controlled most of the remaining area. Naval defense batteries included thirty-eight heavy rifles—all but one having a bore of 120mm or larger—protected by at least fifty concrete pillboxes housing heavy machine guns. The army added dozens of 150mm howitzers, 75mm infantry guns, mortars, and antitank guns to this formidable group of weapons. In the southern part of the peninsula, army zones were further subdivided into sectors, each defended by eight hundred to four thousand troops. Fortifications included numerous pillboxes, bunkers, and reinforced caves. Choke points were created with roadblocks and antitank ditches, and foot trails were sowed with land mines. Any beaches that might be used for an Allied amphibious landing—particularly Talili Bay, the Keravat River area, and Kokopo—were heavily mined.

The array of weaponry dedicated to ground defense was astounding. Potential invaders would first have to navigate through a maze of underwater obstacles designed to rip the bottoms out of landing craft, then fight inland past a hornet’s nest of fixed defenses: almost 240 heavy cannon and howitzers, roughly the same number of antitank guns and field guns, 23 heavy mortars, and approximately 6,000 machine guns and grenade launchers.

In addition to building heavy fortifications, the Japanese improved local utilities. Engineers upgraded the availability of fresh water by drilling at least thirteen new wells. Total yield reached 290,000 gallons per day, some of it going into tank trucks and water bowsers for distribution to remote sites. As for electrical output, there had been only a single 200-kilowatt, diesel-powered generator in Rabaul, which lacked the capacity to fully electrify the township. The Japanese added twenty-three diesel power stations, upping the kilowatt output nearly five-fold, and placed numerous portable generators around the peninsula to provide additional lighting at night.

The communication infrastructure at Rabaul was likewise revamped. Little remained of the slapdash telephone system installed by Lark Force—most of the lines had been cut during the invasion—so the Japanese dug an extensive network of narrow ditches and laid miles of new cable. Radio communications were improved by placing new receiver/transmitter sets, which covered a broad range of frequencies, across northern New Britain and the surrounding islands, and the navy built an independent communications center at a road intersection known as Three Ways.

The newest advancement at Rabaul was radar, which the Japanese had been developing quietly. Two naval Type 1 (Model 1) sets were installed at Tomavatur Mission, placed so that each covered a separate 180-degree sector out to a maximum range of about ninety miles. Nine newer Type 1s (Model 2) were placed throughout the Bismarck Archipelago, including three sets on New Britain and two on New Ireland. Twenty smaller radars were removed from aircraft for use as ground equipment, but only eleven of these went into service. Nonetheless the Japanese successfully combined radar stations, observation posts, and the communications network into “a most satisfactory air warning system.” In many instances, they were able to receive up to an hour’s advance warning of approaching raids.

Fully aware that Rabaul would be viewed as the most important military target in the entire theater, the Japanese made careful preparations to withstand a lengthy siege. Using the newly built roads, the army and navy each dispersed millions of tons of food, fuel, ammunition, clothing, spare parts, and other essential supplies—enough for each service to conduct six months of warfare—among hundreds of caches hidden across the peninsula.

Not all of the improvements were implemented overnight, of course. Some developments required months to complete, and more than a year passed before all of the weapons and other defenses were installed. But the Japanese eventually accomplished what the Australians could not. Using trucks, horses, native laborers, and prisoners, they developed Rabaul into the most heavily fortified stronghold south of the equator. Indeed, the Imperial Army and Navy poured so many shiploads of troops, weapons, materials, and supplies into the effort that the garrison experienced a food shortage in the summer of 1942.

Tokyo’s intentions were clear: with Rabaul as the center of operations, the Japanese could now expand their domination over the entire South Pacific, from the Solomon Islands to New Guinea—and possibly far beyond. Little did they realize, however, just how quickly the Americans would try to attack their burgeoning stronghold.

CHAPTER 8

Task Force 11

B
ARELY A WEEK
after the Japanese captured Rabaul, events that would directly affect the fortress unfolded on opposite sides of the Pacific. Aboard the battleship
Nagato
, anchored in the Inland Sea at Hashirajima, Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto and the Combined Fleet Staff were concerned about the free-roaming carriers of the United States Navy. On February 1, aircraft from two independent task forces had attacked Japanese bases in the Marshall Islands and the Gilberts. The simultaneous raids caused only nominal destruction, but they provided the American public with an enormous boost in morale while deeply embarrassing the Japanese. Rear Adm. Matome Ugaki, the Combined Fleet chief of staff, later admitted: “After experiencing defensive weakness ourselves, we could no longer laugh at the enemy’s confusion at the time of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.”

Soon after the attacks, Imperial General Headquarters learned that a third American carrier force was loose, this time in the South Pacific. The Japanese went on high alert, broadcasting the news across the Southeast Area. Even the lowest ranks were informed. Akiyoshi Hisaeda, serving as a cook in the 55th Division field hospital at Rabaul, entered some of the details into his diary on February 7: “Enemy aircraft carrier with 50 aircraft advancing on New Britain.”

The information obtained by the lowly private was not only timely but remarkably accurate. The stately USS
Lexington
, one of America’s most
beloved warships, had crossed the equator into the South Pacific a mere two days earlier. She carried sixty-eight aircraft and served as the flagship of Task Force 11, consisting of two heavy cruisers, seven destroyers, and a fleet oiler. Commanded by Vice Adm. Wilson Brown, the task force had departed Pearl Harbor on January 31 for a variety of escort and patrol duties. First on the agenda was a mid-ocean rendezvous with Task Force 8, under the command of Rear Adm. William F. “Bull” Halsey Jr., whose ships had raided the Marshalls on February 1. His force would need to be refueled, after which Brown would take Task Force 11 south toward Canton Island for convoy duties.

Two days out of Hawaii, Brown received new orders. Halsey’s ships no longer needed refueling, so Brown headed straight for Canton. On February 6, a day after crossing the equator, his orders were amended once again: he was to proceed to the Fiji Islands and rendezvous with a newly formed multinational force known as the ANZAC squadron. A familiar name from World War I, ANZAC (Australian-New Zealand Army Corps) had been expanded to include American participation. The naval force included two American destroyers and the heavy cruiser
Chicago
along with two New Zealand light cruisers and some lightly armed corvettes. Rear Adm. John G. Crace, Royal Australian Navy, commanded the squadron aboard HMAS
Australia
, a heavy cruiser. The ships and other components of the ANZAC command were under the operational control of the senior American naval officer in Australia, Vice Adm. Herbert F. Leary. His task, as put forward by his superiors in Washington, was to seek a fight with the enemy. Since none of the Allied countries could challenge the Japanese on their own, the command had been formed to combine assets, but on the whole there wasn’t much to unify. Aviation units consisted mostly of RAAF reconnaissance planes, augmented by a few U.S. Navy Catalinas operating out the Fiji Islands. A fighter group and a light bomber group of the U.S. Army Air Corps had recently arrived in Australia, but their planes had neither the range nor the endurance to support naval forces.

Leary’s options improved when Task Force 11 became available. Together, the ANZAC squadron and the ships under Brown’s command gave the Allies a potent striking force. With that in mind, Adm. Earnest J. King, commander-in-chief of the U.S. Fleet (COMINCH), ordered Brown and Leary to go on the offensive.

Eager to do something positive after the debacle at Pearl Harbor, Brown recommended a strike on Rabaul. It was a bold, high-risk proposal, the equivalent of an onsides kick on the first play from scrimmage. Rabaul lay 1,700 miles beyond Fiji, and the oiler
Neosho
did not carry enough fuel to supply all of Brown’s ships
plus
those of the ANZAC squadron. Therefore, Task Force 11 would have to conduct the strike on its own. Despite the obvious risks, King, a former skipper of the
Lexington
, appreciated the audacity of Brown’s plan and approved it.

Task Force 11 rendezvoused with the ANZAC squadron near Fiji on February 16, whereupon Brown consolidated his plans and obtained the latest intelligence on Rabaul. The most recent reconnaissance mission had been conducted two days earlier by a Hudson of 32 Squadron. The crew reported an “aircraft carrier” (probably an aircraft transporter), five warships, eleven merchant ships, and twelve flying boats in Simpson Harbor, plus several planes at Lakunai airdrome. Brown was concerned about the location of Admiral Nagumo’s carriers, but the briefers assured him that the enemy flattops would not be a threat. This was true, for the ironic reason that the carrier force was sailing into position to launch a strike on the Australian mainland just three days hence.

Rabaul would be relatively unprotected, or so the experts thought. Hoping to maintain the element of surprise, Task Force 11 departed Fiji on the afternoon of February 16 and sailed deep into enemy waters.

UNKNOWN TO THE Allies, eighteen of the Imperial Navy’s newest attack planes had recently arrived at Rabaul. Two
chutais
(nine-plane divisions) of Mitsubishi G4M1s, known to the Japanese as Type 1 land attack aircraft, landed at Vunakanau on February 14. Veterans of the Takao Air Group, with extensive combat experience in the Philippines and Netherlands East Indies campaigns, the crews had been transferred into the 4th Air Group, a brand-new composite unit created at Rabaul on February 10.

Commanded by Capt. Yoshiyotsu Moritama, a non-aviator whose duties were primarily administrative, the group was not yet at full strength. A third
chutai
, culled from the Chitose Air Group in the Marianas, had recently transitioned to Type Is, and the crews were still completing the training syllabus. Eventually the 4th Air Group would consist of twenty-seven
Type 1s and an equal number of
Rei-sen
fighters, all drawn from veteran units; however, as of mid-February, only the eighteen aircraft at Rabaul were operational.

In service for less than a year, the Type 1
rikko
was considered the Imperial Navy’s premier land attack aircraft. Similar in appearance to the U.S. Army’s Martin B-26 Marauder, the Mitsubishi was both larger and heavier. The B-26 had a slender fuselage that tapered at both ends, whereas the Type 1’s fuselage was uniformly thick, prompting crewmen to nickname it
hamaki
(the cigar).

The roomy fuselage served its purpose. The
rikko
doctrine favored the use of aerial torpedoes against ships, a specialty demonstrated with stunning effectiveness on December 10, 1941, when waves of land-attack aircraft sank the British warships
Repulse
and
Prince of Wales
. The Type 1’s internal weapon bay was designed to carry either a Type 91 aerial torpedo, which was more than seventeen feet long and weighed 1,820 pounds, or the equivalent weight in bombs.

Mitsubishi engineers achieved this load-carrying capability without sacrificing speed, armament, or range. The twin Kasai fourteen-cylinder radial engines generated over 1,500 horsepower each and gave the aircraft a top speed of almost 270 miles per hour. Well armed with four 7.7mm machine guns and a 20mm tail cannon, the Model 11 flown by the 4th Air Group boasted a range of more than 2,300 nautical miles.