Authors: Rob Mundle
Fatal Storm (36 page)
Stand Aside
lies at the mercy of the seas while its life raft trails behind. This yacht is 40 feet long, a fact that gives some indication as to the state of the seas.
Trapped by 80-knot winds and mauling seas that at times were more than 80 feet high, the 12 crew of
VC Offshore Stand Aside
await rescue. The yacht went close to being rolled yet again by this very wave.
Salvation for the crew of
Midnight Special
as their waterlogged yacht lies low in the water. Two female paramedics rescued four men from this yacht.
Heaven sent. In an unprecedented search and rescue effort paramedics winched 55 sailors to safety.
Covered in engine oil, Jim Rogers leads other
Business Post Naiad
crew away from a rescue helicopter knowing the bodies of two friends were still aboard the yacht.
A NSW water police launch located
Business Post Naiad
when the storm abated and towed it into Eden. The bodies of Bruce Guy and Phil Skeggs were still aboard.
One of the most miraculous rescues came when American John Campbell was plucked from the water 40 minutes after being knocked unconscious and lost overboard from
Kingurra.
An 80-knot tailwind got the Victoria Police Air Wing helicopter to him at a ground speed of near 200 knots. Campbell’s rescuers were David Key (left), Barry Barclay (centre) and Darryl Jones (right).
The six sailors who perished.
CYCA Findings
O
n June 1, 1999, the Cruising Yacht Club of Australia released the “Report, Findings and Recommendations of the 1998 Sydney to Hobart Race Review Committee”. The report’s key findings – summarised by Peter Bush, the committee chair, included the following:
- No one cause can be identified as being responsible for the 1998 Sydney to Hobart Yacht race fleet becoming involved in multiple incidents on 27 and 28 December 1998. As a result, there is no single change that can be identified for the future running of the Race that could preclude the repeat of such incidents. However, there is a series of incremental changes, that while on their own may appear of little significance, will together have a substantive and lasting impact on the organisation, running and safety of the event. These changes include a range of issues such as administration (processes and procedures), safety (education and equipment), communications and weather (forecasting and education).
- The Race Committee has the power under the “Racing Rules of Sailing 1997–2000” (RRS) published by the Australian Yachting Federation (AYF) to abandon the race. The Committee did not exercise this power. It was
the Committee’s view that Rule 4 (“Decision to Race”) should remain in each skipper’s hands, particularly because of the fact that each yacht was in the best position to evaluate its own circumstances fully in the conditions. - The competitors, while concerned about the 1998 SHYR itself, and being keen to pursue improvements, generally believe that the rules, safety regulations and safety equipment with which they raced, met their needs in the conditions. From interviews of 28 yachts, it is clear that skippers and crews do not see a single (or several) reason(s) for the incidents occurring and certainly see no basis to apportion blame to any particular group – organisers, Bureau of Meteorology (BOM), Search and Rescue (SAR) authorities etc. Furthermore, they do not see as a result, any need for wide sweeping changes to safety regulations and equipment.
- Yachts that experienced problems or encountered difficulties, and even those that continued racing reported that “exceptional” waves were responsible for inflicting the damage or causing severe knockdowns. These waves were always a minimum of 20% and up to 100% bigger than the prevailing sess and always came from a direction other than the prevailing wave pattern.
- Although the precise location, timing and depth of the low pressure system were not accurately forecast, the key issue relating to the weather was the gap in knowledge between the BOM’s forecasts and the way they were understood by the sailors. The Bureau assumed that its
forecast winds would be interpreted as being up to 40% more than stated and seas up to 86% bigger. The fleet reported expecting winds and seas to be “as forecast” or a bit stronger/bigger. - There is no evidence that any particular style or design of boat fared better or worse in the conditions. The age of yacht, age of design, construction method, construction material, high or low stability, heavy or light displacement or rig type were not determining factors. Whether or not a yacht was hit by an extreme wave was a matter of chance.
- The level of crew experience exceeded the requirements prescribed by race authorities and the AYF. However, many crews, despite having high levels of ocean racing experience, were poorly informed on aspects of safety equipment use and search and rescue techniques.
- After the 1993 SHYR, when only 38 out of 104 starters completed the race, the CYCA circulated a questionnaire to competitors. The results found safety equipment was satisfactory, but recommended that a series of actions be taken by the Club. These included the improvement of some safety equipment and the skill level and education of sailors in the use of safety equipment and heavy weather sailing. While some of the issues identified in the survey were addressed and implemented, many of the same issues emerged again during the investigations into the 1998 Race. There particularly relate to training and education. The CYCA should have pursued these issues more rigorously.