Delta Force (38 page)

The second go/no-go prerequisite must be permission from the host nation for Delta Force to act, and Delta Force probably has some exceptionally clear-cut requirements for forward deploying. Given the option, the unit is unlikely to tolerate another SS
Achille Lauro
operation. Based on the number of times Delta Force has forward deployed and not been allowed to operate, the issue of coordination clearly calls for a harder look.

Personnel:
One of the first battles Colonel Beckwith fought in Desert One was over the number of personnel required to successfully execute the mission. While Delta Force retains the small-team concept, the command itself has grown from a force of approximately 100 to more than 800 personnel. Delta Force personnel comb Army records twice a year to look for potential candidates. Some sources indicate that Delta draws on other services as well for candidates, but this is most probably done through standard interservice transfer procedures for particularly motivated candidates.

Delta Force experimented briefly with recruiting female operators, abandoned the program, and has reportedly since begun recruiting women for its special squadron in order to allow the actual shooters to travel as “married couples.” The females are said to be trained in espionage and covert operations to provide cover for advance infiltrations.
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Another hard lesson from Desert One was the lack of reliable communications. Delta Force probably has increased the number of computer and communications specialists, not only
for intelligence work but to monitor and maintain advanced secure communications networks.

While past operations provide valuable clues to understanding Delta Force's institutional culture and future, military organizations don't grow in a vacuum. National security strategies, current threat analysis, planning models, and funding considerations also fuel the tactical and doctrinal changes in any military organization.

When Delta Force was first organized, the Army chief of staff emphasized that Colonel Beckwith would need to identify a gap in the spectrum of capabilities then resident in existing special forces, show a gap in U.S. capabilities, and then prove that establishing Delta Force was the best way to remedy the deficiency. Today, the military-wide mandate for joint operations adds an additional layer of complexity to the “find the void” approach to force planning and structure. Single-service funding considerations are giving way to a more unified national approach to both special forces, military operations, and national strategy in general. Contrast Colonel Beckwith's concern over JCS's determination to have every military service have a piece of the Iranian hostage rescue with the operation in Peru following the takeover of the Japanese ambassador's residence, and with Delta's cooperation with SAS and GSG-9 in Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

Today, most operations are purple, the military term for joint, taken from the color of the joint operations qualification badge, and Delta's no exception. There's more cross-training, more coordination between the various SOF groups than ever before. International special warfare games pit teams from countries against each other, and Delta Force is alleged to be a frequent winner in the competitions.

Even the chain of command mirrors this cultural shift. Delta Force—not that it exists, mind you, but if it did—reports to the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) operationally.
It is funded through joint special operations budgets, and most probably has equipment that is at least nominally compatible with that of other U.S. and allied special forces. Dedicated frequency-agile radio circuits, miniaturized satellite receivers, and hardened communications headsets probably allow each Delta Force operator complete coordination with every military and civilian agency in the area.

At the same time, as money pots shrink, all units start looking for broader missions. In this funding climate, it would be reasonable to see Delta Force undertaking a number of more traditional special-forces missions and to operate even more closely with allied forces.

Joint operations are a good thing. They're cost effective and a force multiplier. Yet despite the advantages, there are some drawbacks.

Colonel Beckwith's tour of duty with the British SAS gave him particular insight into joint and allied operations, and put Delta Force in the forefront of joint operations. His original Delta Force had a strong British flavor (as do many American forces, particularly the Navy). The structure of the operating forces, the exercises, even the qualification tests were drawn directly from his experiences serving with the British SAS.

But his experience proved that not every element could be transferred from the British SAS to his new organization. Recall what happened when Delta Force was deployed for what the operators believed was a real hostage rescue. When they learned that the entire evolution was a test of whether or not the team would actually shoot, they were outraged. One journalist claims that Delta Force persuaded the colonel it was a mistake. The British, they argued, might have to test to see if their operators would shoot, but the American forces needed to be tested to see if they wouldn't. The difference in British and American military cultures mandated an entirely different approach to the problem. Colonel Beckwith agreed, and the
exercises in the future were designed to test Delta Force's firing discipline.

Similarly, one right answer to a problem is not necessarily the right answer for every service, and this becomes particularly evident during new aircraft acquisition programs. Delta needs lift, stealth, maneuverability, and hardened armor. Other services may need long unrefueled cruising ranges and no armor. Because procurement programs are required to investigate—and give some preference to—joint applications, the end result can be an aircraft that is mediocre in a wide variety of missions.

The other downside to complete jointness is losing the key ingredient that makes units such as Delta Force so effective: unit integrity. Each service has its own distinct culture, a way of doing business that tends to establish uniformity in unforeseen situations. The culture derives not only from the parent organization, but from the specific mission and the equipment and training within a unit as well.
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In small group operations, unit integrity is a critical factor. It's an old truism that a soldier doesn't risk his life for his country—he risks it for the buddy in the foxhole next to him.

Cross-training and cross-pollination work well and develop comfort zones in working with joint and allied forces. Crossbreeding is a bit trickier. Within the United States, all the services are committed to maneuver warfare rather than overwhelming force as an approach to current operational art. Of course, special forces lead the pack—they've always understood maneuver warfare, the concept of applying just the right amount of force to the opposing forces to tip the battle. It's a game of skill, fueled by solid intelligence and the ability to think outside the box, and the ground forces remain ahead of the pack in practicing it. For some services, skimpy budgets have been the impetus as much as sound operational thought, but maneuver warfare has been a good idea since the days of Sun-tzu and earlier.

But not everyone speaks the same language yet. There's an old story about a National Guard unit assisting local law enforcement during urban riots. One police officer ran toward
the target building and yelled, “Cover me!” The National Guard, trained by the Army, immediately laid down a withering barrage of fire, not what the policeman had had in mind at all. Similarly, Navy officers assigned fire-support missions with the Marine Corps quickly learn that “destroy” means “create a smoking crater where that weapon is,” and that perhaps what the officer really meant was “suppress.”

But regardless of the remaining inconsistencies in language, at least most services now have an electronic common tongue.

Today, Colonel Beckwith would probably have had a small detachment of communications specialists riding along to set up a satellite communications channel to access a dedicated web. One of his troops might have been the designated webmaster for the operation, responsible for accessing the latest intelligence from a classified mission web site and E-mail (both classified and unclassified) and tapping into the aircraft carrier's tactical link to receive a direct feed on the missing helos' positions. He might have even been videoconferencing with the airwing commander to receive continuous updates on the mission progress.

Modern warfare has become networkcentric. Frequency-agile cryptological equipment and joint-compatible data nets enable every fighter to share the same data picture. There are advantages to this: operations that require a high degree of coordination and approval have shorter waits before the higher authority can be briefed and give the go signal. Indeed, the task force commander might be receiving direct video feed from opticals and acoustic sensors mounted within each individual team member's helmet. Were Desert One mounted today, Colonel Beckwith would have known why helicopters were late and when he could have expected to see them (at least in theory. Mister Murphy still plays in the real world.).

The primary disadvantages of networkcentric warfare are readily apparent. First, the sheer amount of data can be overwhelming.
It's essentially useless until it's correlated and turned into information.

Second, with increasing access to firsthand data on the battlefield, there's the eternal temptation to micromanage the war. Vietnam demonstrated the difficulty of having the commander in chief personally reviewing targeting lists. How much more damaging would it be to have a president directing individual fields of fire as the battle progresses?

Colonel Beckwith would have had the answer—he certainly had it during his last operation. When asked what his response would have been if he had been ordered to proceed with Desert One with only five helicopters, he came up with the answer that every field operator would immediately understand: feigning communication difficulties.

In the end, military operations—and particularly precision extractions and hostage rescue—comes down to a guy on the ground with a gun and an on-scene commander.

The face of war changes—yet stays much the same. Perhaps one of the most insidious demons in military planning and force structures is the compulsion to fight the last war all over again.

So what will the next war look like? What forces will be needed to counter that threat?

The proliferation of tribal warfare since the end of the Cold War has prevented many of the supposed peace dividends from ever materializing. Disbanded, disillusioned military men from a number of nations form groups of warriors that are an altogether different foe than an organized military force.
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The enemy is harder to identify. The causes of war run deep in some cultures and carpet bombing isn't likely to solve any of them. It's increasingly difficult to distinguish bleeding combatants from dead civilians. Within the United States, terrorism is on the increase. Civilian organizations struggle to catch up
in the wake of the Atlanta Olympics, the World Trade Center, Oklahoma City, and the Unabomber.

The culture of the enemy is not the only factor to consider. In the aftermath of Vietnam, the American public is increasingly intolerant of casualties, both overseas and within the United States.

There are at least some indications that the Army—and particularly Delta Force—regards preparing for urban operations as an integral part of its mission. RAND, a civilian organization often used as an Army think tank, has published at least one unclassified precis of the difficulties that the Army can expect to encounter in urban warfare, noting a number of weaknesses in the Army's current capabilities. Telling the difference between civilians and targets is crucial, as is developing the technology of forced entry into urban structures. RAND notes that a number of sophisticated devices such as handheld lasers are in the Army inventory, but reserved for special units (Delta being a likely candidate). Additionally, a number of weapons that are currently being phased out of the inventory could prove of critical importance in urban warfare. Light antitank weapons are excellent for punching through cement walls, as are bazookas.
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Cities pose special problems for assault forces. Maneuvering helicopters through cordons of skyscrapers, and avoiding power lines and snipers stationed on adjacent buildings are all continuing challenges. Collateral damage is another significant problem. How many fire departments are prepared to deal with a Class Delta (metallic) fire involving burning helicopter airframes and military weapons cooking off? What about casualties? Civilian or military hospitals? How to maintain operational security when wounded men and civilian casualties begin to flood local medical facilities?

In an ideal scenario, Delta Force would be working closely with local government to both gather intelligence, distinguish
between friend and foe, and arrange for damage control and extraction of casualties. Delta Force, along with other special forces, appears to be anticipating this problem by working a number of realistic scenarios in American cities. In some cases, those exercises have proved less than satisfactory, particularly from the viewpoint of the local population.
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One report notes that the U.S. Army Special Operations Command “has conducted at least 21 such [military] exercises in 21 U.S. cities, including Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, Houston, Los Angeles, New Orleans, Miami, Pittsburgh, and Seattle.” The report continues: “In city after city, the exercises have drawn fire from frightened residents who are not told beforehand that the roaring helicopters flying in circles several hundred feet overhead late at night—blacked out except for one that keeps on its tiny red taillight for safety—are trying to get as close as possible to the buildings they appear about to crash into.”
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