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Authors: Prit Buttar

Tags: #Between Giants: The Battle for the Baltics in World War II

Between Giants (58 page)

BOOK: Between Giants
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Bagramian’s closing sentence in this quotation immediately raises another question. Throughout the fighting for the Courland peninsula, the Soviet fleet based in Kronstadt made almost no significant intervention. Indeed, other than a small number of notable successes by its submarines, its ships made a negligible impact throughout the war. The fleet was considerable, both in numbers of ships and in fighting strength. At the outset of the war, it had two ageing battleships, the modern heavy cruiser
Kirov
, and a host of smaller vessels. Some were lost during the attempted naval evacuation of Tallinn, and others were damaged during the Siege of Leningrad, but the fleet remained a potentially powerful force. However, its surface units limited their voyages to the Gulf of Finland for the duration of the war. There are several possible reasons for this. Firstly, the long siege left many of the ships in a poor state, with a high likelihood of mechanical breakdown should they attempt a prolonged voyage. Secondly, Soviet warships had a poor maintenance record, even in peacetime, and there may have been serious concerns about their seaworthiness. Thirdly, many of their crews had been used as naval infantry during the Siege of Leningrad, and although some of these personnel returned to their ships after the end of the siege, they were short on training in their naval role, which would have further impaired the fighting power of the fleet. Fourthly, the Soviet navy had a poor historical record in surface warfare. During the wars that established the independence of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, a small squadron of British cruisers was able to prevent the Soviet fleet based in Kronstadt from making any major intervention, and inflicted repeated humiliations on the Soviet ships; two destroyers,
Spartak
and
Avtroil
, were captured by the British squadron and handed over to the Estonians, and the British naval officer Augustus Agar led two daring raids in 1919 on the Soviet naval base in Kronstadt with a group of flimsy coastal motor-boats armed with torpedoes, during which the British vessels succeeded in torpedoing the Soviet cruiser
Oleg
and – on the second raid – the battleship
Andrei Pervozvanny
at close range.
7
In late 1944 and 1945, faced with the possibility of a surface action against the experienced sailors of the Kriegsmarine, with their powerfully armed and strongly armoured cruisers, it is understandable that Soviet naval authorities were reluctant to risk their surface ships with their relatively inexperienced crews. Bagramian recorded in his memoirs that, as had been the case elsewhere, for example along the Black Sea coast and during the fighting around Lake Peipus, the Soviet High Command had intended to mount seaborne operations, including landings along the Courland coast, but the resources for such an undertaking were not available. Had even limited landings been possible, Army Group North would have been forced to deploy precious resources to protect the coast, which would have made assaults on the main front line much easier for the Red Army.

The fourth battle of Courland commenced on 23 January, and sought to tie down as much of Army Group North as possible. The first bombardment fell upon the ranks of the German 215th Infantry Division, near Saldus, and was followed by a swift Soviet attack, with infantry forces supported by tanks. Immediately, a penetration into the German positions was achieved near the village of Brammani, but despite repeated assaults by the Soviet 42nd Army, determined German counter-attacks consistently restored the front. 12th Panzer Division had been assigned the half-tracks left in Courland by the departing 4th Panzer Division, and used these to re-equip a battalion of its 5th Panzergrenadier Regiment; these troops found themselves deployed in counter-attacks to eliminate the Soviet penetrations.

Sturmgeschütz-Brigade 912
found itself in action near Priekule, where Soviet forces attempted to drive towards Liepāja. As had been the case in earlier battles, the assault guns proved to be formidable opponents, dealing with Soviet tanks and infantry alike. Major Brandner, the brigade commander, was credited with his 57th personal ‘kill’, and his brigade’s overall claimed tally for the war passed the 500 mark. Fighting continued until 3 February, when, as had been the case in earlier Soviet assaults, the boggy ground rendered further combat almost impossible. Once more, the front line had barely moved.

By the end of the battle, the German forces in Courland were no longer designated Army Group North. As part of a general reorganisation of the German army groups on the Eastern Front, the former Army Group Centre, in northern Poland and East Prussia, became Army Group North, and 16th and 18th Armies became part of the new Army Group Courland. 215th Infantry Division, which had been so heavily involved in the fighting in the Courland Bridgehead, was withdrawn from the front line and ordered to proceed to Liepāja. From there, it was transported by sea to Gdansk, in an attempt to bring reinforcements to the shattered German 2nd Army. Like other men who served in Courland, many of its personnel had a generally positive view of their former army group commander:

Our supply system functioned well, as did the mail from home. When it came to major fighting, there were always sufficient supplies of ammunition. In the times of greatest danger, tanks or assault guns rolled into our positions and forced the enemy out with their fire.

This was no accident. At that time we were commanded by the future Field Marshal Ferdinand Schörner. His rigorous measures made him many enemies and caused bitterness. However, he always made sure that the rear-area services literally did everything to optimally supply the fighting troops. None of the staffs, right down to the battalion level, gave up a single position without good reason. There were no signs of deterioration on the front in Courland. All of that made it impossible for the enemy to conquer us.
8

On 29 January, Army Group Courland received a new commander: Generaloberst Heinrich von Vietinghoff. The son of a military family, he had finished the First World War with the rank of
Hauptmann
, and led 5th Panzer Division during the invasion of Poland. He was a corps commander in France and
Barbarossa
, before taking over command of 9th Army after Walter Model was wounded in June 1942. He had commanded 15th Army in the west, then 10th Army in Italy, and now found himself assigned to replace Carl Hilpert in Courland. As soon as he arrived, he ordered his staff to draw up a plan in cooperation with the Kriegsmarine for a complete seaborne evacuation of the army group. Codenamed
Laura
, the plan was presented to Hitler on 15 February by Guderian, Chief of Staff at OKH. By concentrating all its naval and transport assets, Guderian advised the Führer, it would be possible to evacuate the entire strength of 16th and 18th Armies, together with much of their equipment, in four weeks. Guderian commended the plan, but after two days, Hitler rejected it. There could be no question of a withdrawal from Courland, he insisted.

How practical would it have been to evacuate Army Group Courland at this late stage of the war? In late January, the Kriegsmarine evacuated the personnel of its U-boat training formations from the eastern Baltic, and used surplus shipping capacity to take wounded soldiers and civilian refugees to the ports of northern Germany and Denmark. As the days passed, the operation, codenamed
Hannibal
, became predominantly an attempt to rescue the hundreds of thousands of refugees who had fled the advancing Red Amy and were now packed into the ports of Pillau, Gdansk and Gdynia. Any diversion of shipping to rescue Army Group Courland would have brought
Hannibal
to a complete halt. The consequences of this for the trapped civilians would have been considerable. The use of almost every available ship allowed
Hannibal
to complete the civilian evacuation only days before the end of the war, so its suspension for several weeks would have resulted in tens of thousands of refugees being left in the east Baltic ports when they fell; given that the ports became fiercely contested battlefields, many of the trapped refugees would probably have died. The evacuation of Courland would also have exposed the ships involved to an additional day at sea, under hostile skies with the constant threat of Soviet submarine attack. Although Soviet attempts to interdict
Hannibal
had only limited impact, it is likely that a greater effort would have been made if the shipping had been carrying almost exclusively military personnel. Consequently, not only would the men of Army Group Courland have suffered losses from aerial and submarine attack, but the ships damaged and lost in such attacks would then no longer have been available for any resumption of
Hannibal
at the end of the Courland evacuation. One can conclude, therefore, that
Laura
would have been a hazardous enterprise, with inevitable consequences for German naval operations elsewhere.

Meanwhile, in Courland, fighting continued. A substantial number of Sherman tanks, supplied to the Red Army by the Americans, were delivered to the depleted Soviet armies in early February, allowing them to restore their combat strength. On 17 February, air operations against the ports of Ventspils and Liepāja intensified; it is possible that the Soviet High Command was aware to some extent of the plans for
Laura
.

The withdrawal of 4th Panzer Division from Courland substantially reduced the armoured assets of the army group. In an attempt to improve the flexibility of the remaining forces, a new formation, named
Panzer Brigade Kurland
, was created. Commanded first by Oberst von Usedom, then Major Graf von Rittberg, the brigade was initially termed
Panzer Aufklärungs-Gruppe Kurland
(‘Armoured Reconnaissance Group Courland’), and consisted of the reconnaissance battalions of 12th and 14th Panzer Divisions. The group then received the personnel of
Grenadier Sturmbataillon Kurland
(‘Grenadier Assault Battalion Courland’), another improvised formation, and a battalion of combat engineers. Two battalions of tank destroyers provided additional firepower. These were predominantly equipped with the excellent Jagdpanzer Pz.38(t) or
Hetzer
, a low-slung assault gun armed with a powerful 75mm gun mounted on the chassis of the Pz.38. This chassis had started life as the Czech Pz.38 tank, and was used by the Wehrmacht in the early years of the war. Although it had an excellent reputation for reliability, its relatively thin armour and small turret – which prevented the fitting of a gun powerful enough to deal with modern enemy tanks – rendered it obsolete. In its new role as a tank destroyer, equipped with a similar gun to the Pz.IV and
Sturmgeschütz III
, it was a capable vehicle. In addition to several
Hetzer
tank destroyers,
Panzer Brigade Kurland
also had a company of ten captured T34s. The creation of the brigade weakened 12th and 14th Panzer Divisions; their reconnaissance battalions had a powerful mixture of half-tracks and armoured cars, and were often used as independent battlegroups. However, the new brigade, effectively functioning as another battlegroup, was able to remedy some of the problems caused by the withdrawal of 4th Panzer Division.

On 20 February, the fifth battle of Courland commenced, with a heavy artillery bombardment of the German lines, using about 2,000 guns and mortars. There was little variation in either the tactics or objectives of the Soviet attack. As had been the case in previous bombardment, diagonal lanes were left clear during the preparatory bombardment, to allow the assault formations to move forward unobserved. The intention of this assault, as with previous attacks, was to separate the two armies of Army Group Courland, allowing for their destruction in detail. The attack, with about 21 rifle divisions with armoured support, fell either side of Priekule.
9

On this occasion, there appears to have been confusion in the Soviet attack plans; many of the infantry units assigned for the initial assault failed to move forward during the artillery bombardment, resulting at first in isolated groups of tanks attempting to penetrate the German positions with little support. The German 126th Infantry Division had plenty of warning of the coming attack. Soviet forces attempted to secure jumping-off positions prior to their main assault, and the German 426th Grenadier Regiment found itself involved in desperate fighting. The regiment had been reduced to a single battalion prior to the battle, and despite receiving reinforcements in the form of
Sturmbataillon 18
(‘18th Assault Battalion’), an improvised formation made up of training units and rear area personnel, the remnants of the regiment, reduced to about 200 men, found themselves surrounded by the end of the first day. On 21 February, the regiment came under repeated attack, but was able to hold its position, not least due to excellent artillery support. The following day, Oberst Henning Daubert, the regiment commander, was given permission to break out and retreat; his regiment had bought valuable time for a new defensive line to be established. As the Germans prepared themselves for a breakout, Soviet tanks penetrated into their positions. Confused fighting followed, but the majority of Daubert’s men were able to escape to the new front line. Daubert was awarded the Knight’s Cross for his role in the fighting.
10

The town of Priekule was declared a fortress on 21 February, meaning that its garrison, 422nd Grenadier Regiment (part of 126th Infantry Division), was required to hold the town to the last man. Fortunately for the men of the regiment, they were ordered to fight their way back to the new front line, and abandoned Priekule in the early hours of 22 February. Led by a small group of assault guns, they succeeded in reaching German lines.

After the loss of its reconnaissance battalion, 14th Panzer Division organised itself into a heavy armoured battlegroup and a light, infantry-strong battlegroup. This latter group had defended the German positions near Priekule prior to the Soviet assault of 20 February, and the single company of Panther tanks attached to the battlegroup, commanded by Hauptmann Herbert Zimmermann, found itself facing repeated Soviet armoured attacks. It seems that the Soviet tanks failed to concentrate their numbers sufficiently, and attacked in small groups; these proved easy prey for the powerful guns of the Panthers, which claimed 26 kills in a little more than a day for no losses of their own. It is interesting to note that similar lack of coordination of Soviet armour was reported by German troops in the fighting in East Prussia after the initial Soviet drive to the Baltic coast came to an end, and this may reflect increasing numbers of second-echelon units, lacking the experience of the elite tank armies, being thrown into the battlefield.
11

BOOK: Between Giants
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