Between Giants (24 page)

It was only in 1975 that this dogmatic view began to change. Tomas Venclova, a Lithuanian dissident, was the first to write that Lithuanian involvement in the killings was substantial, and that the prevailing view of events was misleading. Although most of the previous beliefs about the events of 1941 have since shifted, there remains a body of opinion within Lithuania that the crimes of the Jews against Lithuania were at least as great as the crimes committed against the Jews.

In the case of Latvia, historical accounts of 1941 began to move towards a more ‘balanced’ view earlier. This was partly due to the fact that, as will be seen, Latvians played a much larger role in providing manpower for the German war effort than Lithuanians, and consequently the Latvian role in the war came under closer examination at an earlier stage. For the first few decades after the war, Latvian historians – under the scrutiny of the Soviet Union – concentrated on placing blame for all the crimes of 1941 upon the Germans, and the Latvian nationalist politicians. This latter group was a convenient scapegoat for the post-war Soviet regime, as it was composed of individuals who were strongly anti-Soviet. Whilst Latvian historians in Latvia itself condemned those who had served in the SS, Latvian exiles attempted to portray these men as patriots who had fought primarily for their country rather than for the Germans. As with Lithuania, the fall of the Soviet Union and restoration of Baltic independence has provided an opportunity for a reappraisal of the ‘German times’, as the period of German occupation is known in Latvia, and there is now a widespread acceptance that whilst the Germans were the instigators of the mass killings of Jews, and the use of Latvians in the SS, the Latvians who were involved have to share in the blame.

For Estonia, matters were rather different. With only a small Jewish population, most of whom had sided with the Soviet occupation and many of whom fled before the arrival of the Germans, there was less scope for local involvement in massacres. But many Estonians worked in the labour camps set up by the Germans, and as in the other Baltic States, acceptance of their culpability for what happened in those camps has been reluctant, not least because many of the same personalities played a large role in the anti-Soviet resistance after 1945.

After the Soviet occupation, all three Baltic States regarded the arrival of the Germans as an opportunity to re-establish their lost independence. However, there were widespread rumours that, under the terms of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, Hitler had quietly acquiesced to the Soviet takeover, and the refusal of the Germans to prevent the Soviet occupation – indeed, in many cases, Germany actively blocked attempts by the Baltic States to maintain their independence – should have alerted the politicians of the three nations to the fact that Germany would not necessarily support their return to independent status. Nevertheless, all three countries made an attempt to restore self-government.

From the perspective of the Germans, the plans for the administration of the new territories were remarkably incomplete. Several factors worked against the creation of a coherent and detailed plan. Firstly, unlike Stalin prior to his takeover of the Baltic States, Hitler did not have access to significant groups of expatriate Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians who supported his regime, and who could be prepared as a future government. In addition to communist exiles in the Soviet Union, Stalin had the support of a significant minority of the native population, thus ensuring that he had a reliable source of Baltic citizens, fluent both in Russian and in their own language; the Germans had no such resource. Secondly, the chaotic infighting between different sections of the National Socialist power structure ensured that, unlike planning for the repression and killing of Jews and communists, where cooperation was widespread, each agency pursued its own agenda. Finally, even within individual German organisations, such as Rosenberg’s ‘Chaos-Ministerium’, there were multiple factions, many of which clearly flouted the wishes and instructions of their nominal leader.
¹

Lithuania, the first country to see the Red Army expelled in 1941, wasted no time in trying to reassert its independence. When the Wehrmacht entered Kaunas, the Lithuanian Provisional Government was in clear control of the city, and was actively trying to recreate all of its previous posts and offices. The government had intended for Colonel Kazys Škirpa, the founder of the Lithuanian Activist Front and a former envoy to Berlin, to be its new head, but the Germans prevented him from travelling to Lithuania. He remained in Germany, and in 1944 was sent to a concentration camp near Bad Godesberg. It was his good fortune that the area was ceded to the advancing Western Allies almost without a fight, but he never saw his homeland again. He died in the United States in 1979, and his remains were finally returned to Lithuania in 1995.

In the absence of Škirpa, the Transitional Government appointed Juozas Ambrazevičius as acting prime minister. At first, his relationship with the German commandant of Kaunas, General Robert von Pohl, was cordial. However, whilst not overtly hostile to the Ambrazevičius administration, the Germans did all they could to obstruct its development into a proper government. Access to the radio station and the Kaunas press was obstructed; consequently, although the Provisional Government passed over 100 laws, it had great difficulty in implementing them, or even making anyone aware of the changes. There remained in existence a courier system that had been set up during the Soviet occupation, and using this, Ambrazevičius and his ministers were able to have some proclamations published in provincial newspapers.

The Germans rapidly established their own authorities in Lithuania. The country was given the name
Generalbezirk Litauen
(‘General District Lithuania’), one of four parts of
Reichskommissariat Ostland
, and was under the control of Adrian von Renteln. Like General von Pohl, he was outwardly cordial to the Provincial Government, but worked actively to undermine it. The Gestapo worked in collaboration with him to try to destabilise Ambrazevičius’ government, by encouraging a group of right-wing extremists to leave the Lithuanian Activist Front and therefore split the government. Although the attempt was unsuccessful, it further fuelled divisions within the Lithuanian leadership about how far they should collaborate with the Germans, with some favouring complete cooperation, while others wished to take a more overtly independent line. The reality was that with its army in firm control of the country, Germany could impose its will in a way that was beyond the ability of the Lithuanians to resist. Finally, after only six weeks of existence, the Provisional Government was disbanded.

In Latvia, nationalists tried to emulate the events in Kaunas, and briefly secured control of the radio station in Riga on 28 June, declaring the creation of a new Latvian government. Soviet forces arrived the following day and restored control, but the capture of Riga by the Wehrmacht three days later once more provided an opportunity for Latvian nationalists. A Latvian doctor named Malmanis called for volunteers to help form a new Latvian police force. Several thousand men responded, but any attempt to create a Latvian force answerable to a Latvian administration was blocked by the Germans.

During the preparation of
Barbarossa,
the
Abwehr
(German intelligence service) established a group in East Prussia called
Latviju Kareivju Nacionālā Savienība
(‘National Federation of Latvian Fighters’, or LKNS), composed of former soldiers and others thought to be of potential military help. This group, and others like it created by various competing German agencies, included in its ranks members of the Latvian
Pērkonkrusts
(‘Thunder Cross’) movement, a group variously described as extreme nationalists or fascists. Of all the Latvian groups active in Riga and Germany before and during the German takeover,
Pērkonkrusts
was the one that had the most coherent ideology, and therefore was the most unified. At first glance, the movement might have seemed to be the ideal partner for the National Socialists, much like fascist organisations elsewhere in Europe. However, from its foundation,
Pērkonkrusts
was as strongly anti-German as it was anti-Russian. Despite this, many members of the movement sought refuge in Germany during the Soviet occupation, and established strong links with the RSHA. Once the German invasion began, these links continued, with a close relationship between
Pērkonkrusts
and Stahlecker and his subordinates in
Einsatzgruppe A.
It had been a clear policy of
Pērkonkrusts
that Jews had no place in a future Latvia, and although the degree of involvement of
Pērkonkrusts
in the killings of Jews and ‘communists’ in Latvia remains unclear, these killings were certainly in keeping with
Pērkonkrusts
ideology. Certainly, within days of the arrival of
Einsatzgruppe A
in Riga, members of
Pērkonkrusts
helped create
Sonderkommando A,
under the command of Viktors Arājs. His unit, often referred to as the
Arājs Kommando,
was rapidly put to work by the Germans, as will be seen below.

Although members of LKNS were allowed to accompany the Wehrmacht into Latvia, their activities were strictly curtailed. The
Pērkonkrusts
leader, Gustavs Celmiņš, was with the German forces that seized Liepāja, operating immediately behind the front line; he was wounded when his vehicle ran over a landmine, and did not reach Riga until 10 July. Despite the obstacles placed in the way of all the returning Latvians, there was clearly a strong domestic movement for self-governance and independence, as Stahlecker reported:

Different Latvian groups are trying to establish central organisations. So far, the following have appeared: 1) the Central Organisation Committee for Liberated Latvia (leader: Colonel Kreišmanis); 2) the Interim Board of Direction of Latvia (leader: former trade minister Winbergs). As with the Wehrmacht, establishment of official contacts has been refused.
²

As several bodies vied for authority in Riga, the competing German bodies – the Wehrmacht, the
Abwehr,
Goering’s
Wirtschaftsinspektion Ostland,
which was created as part of the
Reichsmarschall’s
economic post as supervisor of the Four Year Plan for industrial development, and the SD – all attempted to promote their own protégés. Briefly, an advisory council of former economics minister Alfred Valdmanis, Aleksandrs Plensners, General Oskars Dankers, and Gustavs Celmiņš formed in mid-July, but fragmented within days. In an attempt to cut through the mounting chaos, Rosenberg made a personal intervention in July, wishing to appoint Oskars Dankers as the leader of the future Latvian administration. On 20 August, Dankers was finally installed in Riga.

Meanwhile, the members of
Pērkonkrusts
were discovering the limitations of the new arrangements. The organisation had helped the Germans primarily in order to gain influence, with a view to forming the core of a future government. Instead, it found that the creation of units such as the
Arājs Kommando
and recruitment of large numbers of
Pērkonkrusts
personnel into sections of the
Einsatzkommando
diminished, rather than increased, the power of the
Pērkonkrusts
leadership: the new armed formations were entirely under the control of the Germans, rather than
Pērkonkrusts.
Nevertheless, Celmiņš continued with some success to promote the organisation in public, resulting in considerable support from Latvians across the country – some 200,000 signed a
Pērkonkrusts-
inspired petition calling on the Latvian community in the United States to acknowledge the crimes committed in the country by the communists, and to show solidarity.
³
Pērkonkrusts
was easily the most visible Latvian political movement in Riga, and was also active across the country, opening branch offices in several small towns. In many of these rural areas,
Pērkonkrusts
leaders took control of local partisan units, and on occasion used their close relationship with the German authorities to place political opponents under arrest.
⁴

Whilst it is difficult to establish a clear link between
Pērkonkrusts
and the massacres of Jews, the rise of the movement certainly coincided with an increase in anti-Semitic propaganda. The movement controlled several newspapers, and other newspapers were sympathetic to its cause. These were all used to promote the movement’s strongly nationalist, anti-Semitic and anti-communist message.
Pērkonkrusts
even set up a series of schools, in which its ideology was heavily promoted; perhaps with an eye on securing a future for itself and Latvia in Hitler’s New Order, the schools taught that Latvians were part of the Aryan races.
⁵

Celmiņš was also keen to create two Latvian divisions within the Wehrmacht, and had talks with General von Roques about this. He even travelled to Berlin in pursuit of this idea, but further progress was obstructed, particularly by Himmler. By the time he returned to Latvia in October 1941, he found that the Germans had banned
Pērkonkrusts.
The ban was first announced on 25 August, taking advantage of the absence of Celmiņš in Berlin, and appears to have been precipitated by several factors. It was increasingly clear to the Germans that
Pērkonkrusts
would continue to press for an independent – if allied – Latvia, and this was contrary to
Generalplan Ost
and the German vision of a Baltic colony. The suggestion that Latvians were Aryans seems to have been particularly irritating from a German point of view, given their plans for mass deportations of the population. It also seems that the various factions of the German administration were keen to subdue the group, which was seen as being closely related to the SD and RSHA. But the clinching factor was that the hard-line nationalist ideology of
Pērkonkrusts
was directed as much against Germans as against Russians, and the various Latvian protégés of the
Ostministerium
and the Wehrmacht worked hard to make their German friends aware of this.
⁶
However, it is characteristic of the sometimes chaotic consequences of the competition between different bodies within Germany that the SD continued to protect and foster its
Pērkonkrusts
members. Celmiņš remained active in encouraging Latvians to enrol in aid of the German war effort, and was appointed head of the
Latviešu Brīvprātīgo Organizācijas Komiteja
(‘Committee for Organising Latvian Volunteers’), which helped raise several Latvian police battalions. When these failed to transform into proper military formations, as he had intended, Celmiņš was removed from his post. Eventually, as he adopted an increasingly anti-German line, he was arrested in 1944 and placed in the Flossenbürg concentration camp in Bavaria.