Between Giants (11 page)

The Pz.IV was Germany’s heaviest tank in 1941, and originally had been intended as an infantry support weapon; however, the inadequacy of the Pz.III in tank-to-tank engagements led to a role reversal, with the Pz.IV being preferred in engagements against enemy armour and the Pz.III being used for infantry support. It weighed 25 tons and had 50mm frontal armour, and was armed with a variety of guns during its long life – it was the only German tank to remain in production throughout the war. In 1941, most Pz.IVs were armed with a short 75mm gun, and the low muzzle velocity of this weapon limited its efficacy in anti-tank combat.

In terms of preparation for war, the Wehrmacht in 1941 was in good shape; nearly all of the army officers and NCOs had experience of fighting in Poland and the west. The Luftwaffe, too, had a strong body of experienced men, but had not made good the losses suffered during the Battle of Britain. It now found itself committed to fighting a new war in the east, on a huge scale, while the RAF remained undefeated in the west. Perhaps the biggest weakness of the Wehrmacht was its logistic problems, partly due to a failure to plan for a prolonged war. In most respects, German equipment was not ordered with sufficient spare parts to allow for a sustained effort over a long time; for example, it was standard practice in Britain and the United States to order at least two aero engines per mounting, ensuring plentiful replacement engines and spare parts, whereas in Germany, the ratio was closer to 1:4. Stocks of spare parts had been badly depleted as a result of the fighting in France and the Battle of Britain, and unless the Wehrmacht won a quick victory, it would rapidly run into disabling shortages.

The operational orders for Army Group North called for Hoepner’s panzers to advance along the Tilsit–Daugavpils axis, with 18th Army on the left, between Hoepner and the Baltic, and 16th Army on the right, providing contact with the northern elements of Army Group Centre. Once this initial objective had been achieved, 4th Panzer Group would continue to drive north across Latvia and Estonia to the southern tip of Lake Peipus, at Pskov. 18th Army would complete the conquest of the Baltic States, but it was anticipated that as Army Groups North and Centre advanced on diverging axes, 16th Army would find it increasingly difficult to retain contact with Army Group Centre. The plan therefore required that, having destroyed the bulk of Soviet forces in its path, Army Group Centre would provide aid on its flanks to both Army Group North and Army Group South, prior to a final drive on Moscow. Army Group North would move against its ultimate objective, Leningrad, prior to any drive against the Soviet capital – Hitler’s directive of 18 December 1940, which first laid down the plans for
Barbarossa
, clearly stated this:

There were many factors that combined to produce the stunning German victories of the early war years. Perhaps the key to German success was the coincidental development of armoured and mechanised warfare at the same moment that German military doctrine reached a particular stage of evolution, a process that had started in the wake of a crushing defeat in the early 19th century. After the Prussian army was soundly defeated by Napoleon at Jena and Auerstadt in 1806, the Prussians began a detailed analysis of why the French had prevailed. The result was the Prussian – later German – General Staff. This body championed the concept of something that became known as
Auftragstaktik
, a word perhaps best translated into English as ‘mission-oriented tactics’, although this expression was not explicitly used in German military writing. The intention was to create an army in which a commander would make a subordinate aware of his intentions, and would assign the subordinate a mission. A mixture of forces would be assigned to the subordinate, who was left to make detailed arrangements without interference from above. Maximum emphasis was placed upon subordinates showing initiative in interpreting their orders. In its extreme,
Auftragstaktik
allowed for the subordinate to ignore the mission that he had been assigned, so long as the actions that he took achieved the overall intentions of his superior. One of the clearest articulations of this concept was made by Helmuth von Moltke:

The situations under which an officer has to act on the basis of his own view of the situation are diverse. It would be wrong if he had to wait for orders at times when no orders can be given. But his actions are most productive when he acts within the framework of his senior commander’s intent.
¹⁸

The movement began to gain pace after the Franco-Prussian War, and did not meet with universal approval. Indeed, those who preferred more traditional command and control, or
Normaltaktik
, were the very people who coined the expression
Auftragstaktik
to describe their opponents’ principles. It was only by detailed management of all aspects of combat, they argued, that the tendency of increasing mobility and range of weapons could be controlled, to prevent complete fragmentation on the battlefield.

Auftragstaktik
gained support throughout the First World War, and by the time the Germans mounted their final offensive on the Western Front in 1918, it was almost the norm for all German operations. It became commonplace for German officers and even NCOs to spend time with other arms – consequently, German commanders in the Second World War often had experience of working with infantry, artillery and armour. This resulted in excellent use of all components of the
ad hoc
battlegroups that were created for the fulfilment of missions.

In order for
Auftragstaktik
to be effective and successful, several factors needed to be combined. Firstly, all elements of the command structure had to understand its nature, and the importance of the overall intention of higher commands, rather than lower-level missions; the missions were merely a means to an end, to be altered or discarded if better means to the same end arose. Secondly, those entrusted with such tactical and operational freedom needed the skills and initiative to be able to react to changing circumstances effectively, so that any unexpected obstacles could be overcome, and any unexpected opportunities could be exploited. Thirdly, the extended command structure around any commander – the rest of the headquarters staff – had to be able to organise logistic and other matters in a flexible manner, allowing the commander himself to concentrate on battlefield developments. Finally, to allow for effective functioning in the event of casualties or other dislocation, every commander needed to be able to function up to two levels above his current command, and had to understand the objectives appropriate to those higher levels.

The advent of mechanised warfare, particularly in the form of the panzer division, occurred at a time when the German General Staff was particularly well adapted to
Auftragstaktik
. The panzer division, with its integration of tanks, artillery, infantry, and combat engineers, with dedicated support columns, was in many ways the ideal instrument for such a mode of operation. By the beginning of
Barbarossa
, many – though, as will be seen, not all – German officers had had time and opportunity to understand the new capabilities that such divisions offered, when combined with the prevailing operational doctrine within the Wehrmacht.

Generalplan Ost
required its initial phase, the
Kleine Planung
, to be carried out in the wake of the advancing armies. Partly to achieve this, and partly to ensure the rapid establishment of order, the SS reactivated several
Einsatzgruppen
(‘task forces’), which would follow in the wake of the Wehrmacht’s three army groups. The precursor for such units was Reinhard Heydrich’s
Einsatzkommando,
which had secured Austrian government buildings during the
Anschluss
of 1938. The
Einsatzgruppen
themselves were first formed during plans for the invasion of Czechoslovakia, but the Munich Agreement made the invasion unnecessary; nevertheless, the
Einsatzgruppen
repeated the role of securing government offices and documents, and also helped detain Czechoslovak government officials before they could quietly slip away. In preparation for the invasion of Poland, Heydrich once more resurrected his
Einsatzgruppen,
but on this occasion, their objectives were far more wide-ranging. They were given a free hand to execute anyone regarded as hostile to Germany, and using a special list of ‘undesirable’ Poles they sought out and killed Polish intelligentsia, clerics, and others who might be seen as being leaders of their communities, in addition to any other individuals who attracted their wrath. In many cases, their actions raised protests from the Wehrmacht, which feared that its own reputation would be damaged.
¹⁹

By the end of October 1939, the
Einsatzgruppen
, functioning in eight groups, had killed an estimated 20,000 Poles. The groups saw brief service in Western Europe in 1940, reverting to their original role of securing government offices, and in preparation for
Barbarossa
, they were once more activated. In May 1941, Heydrich visited the German Border Police School, where the leaders of the
Einsatzgruppen
were undergoing training, and gave clear instructions that the groups were to kill Jews.
²⁰
In order to prevent the friction seen during the Polish campaign, Heydrich met General Eduard Wagner, the First Quartermaster of the Wehrmacht, on 28 April 1941 and drew up an agreement for how the
Einsatzgruppen
would operate. In keeping with this agreement, Generalfeldmarschall Walther von Brauchitsch, commander of the German Army, issued instructions telling all army commanders that their units were to compile lists of Jews in the areas they seized, and that these lists were to be passed to the
Einsatzgruppen
. Although the orders did not specify what the
Einsatzgruppen
would do with these lists, there can have been little doubt in the minds of the commanders.

Heydrich would have been aware of the enmity between Latvians and Lithuanians on the one hand, and the Jewish populations of Latvia and Lithuania on the other, not least because German intelligence reports accurately commented on the growing anti-Semitism in the wake of the Soviet occupation. He therefore advised his subordinates to take advantage of this: ‘No steps will be taken to interfere with any purges that may be initiated by anti-Bolshevik or anti-Jewish elements in the newly occupied territories. On the contrary, these are to be secretly encouraged.’
²¹

Einsatzgruppe A
was assigned to Army Group North, and began to assemble in Gumbinnen in East Prussia on the eve of
Barbarossa
. Its commander was Franz Walter Stahlecker, a lawyer who rose to high rank in the
Sicherheitsdienst
(‘Security Administration’ or SD). His command was divided into two
Sonderkommando
and five
Einsatzkommando
, each responsible for a different section of the front.

Facing the Wehrmacht was the Red Army, still recovering from the terrible purges of the 1930s. The scale of the purges was enormous; they had accounted for over 30,000 officers, stripping the Red Army of many of its best leaders. The officers who were left were either completely inexperienced, or those deemed politically acceptable, or both. In the aftermath of the purges, the army was under far stricter political control, and the political commissars attached to units at every level repeatedly interfered with training and deployment, challenging orders if they felt that they did not satisfy political doctrine.

In 1939, after forcing the Baltic States to accept the mutual assistance pacts, Stalin had turned his attention to Finland, the remaining state covered by the secret protocol to the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. As early as 1938, the Soviet Union had started to push the Finnish concept of neutrality, warning the Finns that the Red Army might seek to move troops through Finland in the event of a war between the Soviet Union and Germany. It was suggested that in order to facilitate this, Finland might wish to cede or lease some of its islands on the maritime approaches to Leningrad; having fought their own war of independence against Russia, which they had won with aid from Germany, the Finns refused. In 1939, Finland became aware of a steady build-up of Soviet troops on its borders, and commenced a precautionary mobilisation of its reserves under the guise of ongoing military training. In early October, Moscow sent Helsinki a demand for the cession of territory, including several Baltic islands and part of the mainland close to Leningrad. After lengthy debate, the Finns rejected the ultimatum. On 26 November, a Soviet border post came under shellfire; the shells were later proved to have been deliberately fired by a unit of the NKVD, but the Soviet authorities placed the blame on the Finns and demanded that the Finns withdraw from the border area.
²²
At the end of the month, the Red Army invaded Finland.

The Winter War proved to be a stunning setback for the Red Army. Kliment Voroshilov, Stalin’s close ally and People’s Commissar for the Defence of the Soviet Union, had predicted a quick victory, but a combination of factors worked against the Soviets. The territory hugely favoured the defenders, and planning for the operation was inept and inadequate, based upon wildly optimistic assumptions of swift success. The weaknesses of the purged officer corps of the army were exposed in full as the determined and skilful Finnish defenders inflicted devastating losses on the Red Army. After 105 days of fighting, the Soviets were finally able to overcome the Finns and impose a treaty upon them; by then, they had lost over 320,000 casualties, compared to Finnish losses of about 70,000.