Thus Rand saw an interaction in the conceptualization process between
conscious
volitional actions, such as focusing, logical reasoning, and abstraction, and nonconscious, tacit, habitual operations of
perception
, perceptual judgment, and measurement omission. As Peikoff explains, this ability to omit measurements is a natural cognitive function. That people may be unaware of the actual mechanism does not invalidate the theory. Rand sought to grasp
how
people form concepts—that is, the process by which the mind creates
relational
,
objective
conceptual classifications. Rand sought to identify these methods, not to direct the process, but to analyze a largely inarticulate
epistemological
mechanism. In articulating its tacit aspect, Rand aimed to validate the reality-based means of human cognition. She wished to preserve the integrity of objective conceptualization, in contradistinction to those intrinsicists and
subjectivists
who saw concept formation as a product of metaphysical revelation or arbitrary social convention.
52
INTERNAL RELATIONS REVISITED
In her theory of
concepts
, Rand navigated between the polarities of atomistic individuation and organicist integration. As I explained in
Chapter 2
,
these extremes are integral to
externalist
and internalist perspectives. The doctrine of external
relations
faces a problem of integration. Since every thing has an identity strictly external to its relations, the externalist endorses an atomistic
conception
of reality. The externalist argues that the choice of a single attribute as an essential characteristic is a linguistic exercise largely dependent on social conventions. Since we can never fully know an
entity
’s nature, our
definitions
of its essence are purely arbitrary. In fact, countless definitions of an entity are all equally valid.
Thus externalism cannot distinguish essential characteristics from nonessential ones. It arbitrarily multiples the number of legitimate classifications that can refer to the same entity. Without the ability to integrate such classifications objectively, the externalist achieves cognitive anarchy and epistemological
dis
integration.
By contrast, the doctrine of internal relations faces a problem of individuation and
abstraction
. In strict internalism, the nature of an entity is often dissolved into the relationships that constitute it. And yet, paradoxically, in the attempt to define a concept, the internalist, like the externalist, fails to provide any distinction between essential and nonessential characteristics. The internalist reasons thus: since the definition of an entity must reflect the
ontological
status of its constituent relations, and since
every
relationship is essential to the thing’s identity, it follows that
no
essential distinctions can be made. In a fully coherent system, where every element is an extension of every other element, abstraction and definition are agents of distortion. It is no coincidence that the ultimate internalist sees everything as One. Metaphysical plurality gives way to mystical Totality. Individualism gives way to Totalitarian Collectivism.
For Rand, internalism and externalism are both to be rejected. The internalist sees all characteristics as
intrinsically
essential, whereas the externalist argues that the identification of essentiality is entirely
subjective
or socially arbitrary. Ultimately, internalists view
everything
as essential, whereas externalists argue that
nothing
is essential. Thus the internalist is typically an intrinsicist, and the externalist is often a subjectivist. Neither can select an essential characteristic that would make possible an objective definition. Whereas the externalist multiplies concepts “
beyond necessity
,” the internalist integrates concepts in “
disregard of necessity
” (
Introduction,
72). Rand argues that definitions are neither subjective conventions nor “a repository of closed, out-of-context omniscience” (67). In Rand’s view, “A definition is a statement that identifies the nature of the
units
subsumed under a concept.… The purpose of a definition is to distinguish a concept from all other concepts and thus to keep its units
differentiated
from all other existents” (40).
The definition implies
all
of the
concepts
’ differentiated units. But a definition is only an identification that satisfies the cognitive need for “unit-economy”; it is not a description. Since people cannot grasp every characteristic of every existent in a single act of consciousness, they must utilize
definitions
that focus on essence within a specific
context
or level of generality. Rand attempted to avoid the pitfalls of internalist
intrinsicism
and externalist
subjectivism
by switching the focus of the debate from the realm of
ontology
to the realm of
epistemology
.
53
Like the internalists, Rand accepted as given the proposition that since everything belongs to one reality, everything is related. But she added the proviso that everything is related
in some sense.
She refused to speculate on the ontological character of these
relationships
. This does not mean that it is impossible to conceptualize existential relationships. It merely underscores the fact that human beings are not
omniscient
. They cannot establish “the relationship of a given group of existents to everything else in the universe, including the undiscovered and unknown.” They cannot adopt such a synoptic vantage point.
But human beings must show a scrupulous regard for cognitive clarity and precision in their definitions. How can they achieve such exactness, when at any given moment they do not know all the constituent relationships in which an
entity
may be involved? How can they pick an “essential” characteristic on which to base a definition, when they would have to know everything about the existent in order to know anything about its “essence”?
Rand rejected the view that everything must be known before anything can be classified or analyzed. The internalists and the externalists accept the same nonhuman standards by which to judge cognition, and then indict people for not living up to them. The internalists argue that since everything is intrinsically essential, no definition is fully valid because it is partial. The externalists argue that since nothing can be classified as objectively essential, no definition is fully valid because it is arbitrary. In both cases, the internalist and the externalist focus on essence as a metaphysical category divorced from the contextuality of knowledge.
For Rand, definitions must be “
contextually
absolute” since they must “specify the known
relationships
among existents (in terms of the known
essential
characteristics)” (
Introduction
, 47). The emphasis here is on what is essential within the
context
of knowledge. Definitions may change with the growth of knowledge. Hence, the distinction between essential and nonessential characteristics is neither
intrinsic
nor
subjective
. A definition identifies an existing characteristic of an
entity
as essential within a specified context of knowledge. This essential characteristic not only distinguishes the entity from other entities, but also explains the greatest number of
other characteristics (45). The identification of an “essential” characteristic serves as a cognitive device enabling people to classify, condense, and
integrate
the elements of their knowledge (52).
Hence, “
all definitions are contextual,
” according to Rand. As our knowledge grows, we may select different essential characteristics by which to define an entity. But Rand emphasized that as our classifications become more advanced, they do not necessarily contradict more primitive definitions (43). Indeed, as Kelley and
Krueger
(1984) argue, the concept is an expandable relation. Over time, it incorporates “
all
the shared properties which science discovers in its investigation of the kind” (61). This dynamic definitional process views essences within a changing context. At no time does a change in definition signify a change in the referent. The same referent takes on different meanings depending on the context in which it is discussed.
For example, a “
human
being” might be defined by primitive peoples as “a being who talks.” Aristotle identified human beings as “rational
animals
.” Modem scientists have defined them as “bi-pedal mammals,” “rational primates,” or “Homo sapiens” (Peikoff 1976T, lecture 4). Each of these definitions is valid. But each is based on a different cognitive context.
54
And in no case does the changing definition alter the concept, which refers to an existential referent. The referent remains the same, only our definition of the referent changes according to context. That a concept (i.e., a referent) receives different definitions in various contexts does not mean that these alterations are arbitrary or subjective (Peikoff 1991b, 103). They depend on the conditions of our knowledge (
Introduction
, 73).
Rand further argued that since a definition is based on contextually identified, essential characteristics, a concept and its definition are not interchangeable (“Appendix,” 233–34). For example, though human beings may be defined as “rational animals,” human nature comprises more than rationality and animality (
Introduction
, 39). They also have thumbs, stand upright, and so on. In reality, all these facts are simultaneous. To identify one characteristic,
reason
, as essential, is to focus on the cognitive faculty, which fundamentally differentiates human from nonhuman life forms.
Moreover, when
Rand
stated that “reason” is humanity’s “essential” characteristic, she did not mean to imply that rationality best “explains” other inborn traits, such as the distinctively human digestive system. But upon closer inspection, Rand’s expansive
concept
of “reason” may help us to understand that even the most “nonrational” of human characteristics can be deeply affected by the mind. Indeed, such a fundamental insight is central to holistic and psychosomatic medicine. When Rand attempted to transcend the dichotomies of reason and emotion, mind and
body, her
integrated
,
dialectical
resolution preserved the centrality of the rational mind, even as it traced the reciprocal effects of the emotional and the somatic.
In her theory of definition, Rand admitted that there are some
existents
that may be difficult to classify or conceptualize. She called these “borderline cases.” Such existents may share some characteristics with the referents of a given concept, but lack others. Certain organisms, for instance, may be classified as either animals or plants. For Rand, the choice of classification is optional. One can make the borderline case a subcategory of either concept, or one can draw approximate dividing lines, or merely identify it descriptively. Since no definition is based on an unchanging, metaphysical essence, Rand did not consider her conclusions threatened by such borderline cases. Ultimately, by altering the level of generality, essential differences are bound to surface, and appropriate classifications will be generated (72–74).
What makes an essential characteristic “
objective
,” rather than
intrinsic
or
subjective
, is that it is a product of “a
volitional
relationship between
existence
and
consciousness
” (Peikoff 1991b, 113). Rand explained that metaphysically, objectivity is
the recognition of the fact that reality exists independent of any perceiver’s consciousness. Epistemologically, it is the recognition of the fact that a perceiver’s … consciousness must acquire knowledge of reality by certain means (reason) in accordance with certain rules (logic). This means that although reality is immutable and, in any given
context
, only one answer is true, the truth is not automatically available to a human consciousness and can be obtained only by a certain mental process which is required of every man who seeks knowledge—that there is no substitute for this process.… Metaphysically, the only authority is reality; epistemologically—one’s own mind. The first is the ultimate arbiter of the second.
55
Thus Rand’s
epistemology
does not endorse intrinsic essences as found in traditional internalism. But neither does it endorse the subjectively identified essences typical of externalism. Rand argued that the
relations
one traces in reality must be connected to a specific cognitive task. Every characteristic of an
entity
is potentially relevant to our grasp of its meaning. And each existent is potentially relevant to everything else that exists in the universe. But this relevance must be ascertained
within a specific context
. As Peikoff explains, every blade of grass is potentially relevant to human life, because
within a specific context
, an attempt to count these blades must be
related to a particular human purpose. The context helps us to determine relevance and essence (Peikoff 1989T). The meaning we attach to such counting is internally related to our actions, purposes, and knowledge. The meaning, the concept we form, constitutes a relationship between existence and consciousness.
While these principles have obvious application to the sphere of epistemology, they also have broader
theoretical
and methodological significance. In her social analysis and in her theory of
history
, Rand recognized a vast network of interrelationships between and among various, seemingly separable factors. Ultimately, she viewed these factors as she would those relational properties that organically constitute any
single
entity. She focused on the
internal
relationships between identifiable components within a single social totality. Whereas a nonradical would analyze social problems as if they were disconnected from one another, Rand was not unlike other
radical
theorists (e.g., Marx) in her emphasis on a kind of
asymmetric
internality between elements. Thus the singular issue of racial discrimination, for instance, cannot be disconnected from broad epistemic, psychological, ethical, political, and economic factors. Likewise, in her theory of history, she placed greater emphasis on the role of philosophy, even as she simultaneously recognized a form of organic, reciprocal interaction between many causal factors.