Aachen: The U.S. Army's Battle for Charlemagne's City in World War II (39 page)

By early afternoon Williamson finally had the situation under control in Verlautenheide. Now General Huebner wanted the attack on the Ravelsberg to go off without delay; he specifically directed Colonel Smith to leave most of Learnard's 1st Battalion near Crucifix Hill; Huebner did not want the Ravelsberg strike to exceed two reinforced rifle companies. Colonel Smith chose to assign Captain Hess's Company I to the operation; Captain Miller's Company B would still be representing the 1st Battalion, with Learnard providing command and control. But the Raveslberg assault continued to be an enigma; because it would take
the remaining afternoon hours to get Hess's men up from Hill 192, the attack would now have to wait until nightfall.

Miller, who had known McGregor since the regiment's time in North Africa, was briefed right away. He was told the new news first; the attack would be unsupported by artillery, or any noise for that matter. His men would be in the lead. It was to be a surprise attack, with no communication wires laid. Radio silence would be maintained until he actually started making contact with the Germans. He would have heavy machine guns and mortars attached to augment his strength, but other than Hess's men, that was it. It was late afternoon; darkness would fall soon. Hess finally showed up with his company at 1830; with just a minimal briefing, he lined his men up behind Miller's and the column started out in complete darkness along an unimproved dirt road that snaked around the western slope of Crucifix Hill.

Loaded down with their rifles, bandoleers of ammunition, grenades, mortar plates, tubes, ammo cases, and light machine guns, the men soon reached the flatter ground that would funnel them down to the Aachen road. It was a single-file move later described as “so difficult each man could reach out and touch the back of the man in front of him without seeing him.”

With Captain Miller walking slowly as the first man in the column, he could see practically nothing as he slowly made his way down the western slope of Crucifix Hill. He was relying solely on his compass and his memory of the terrain features. What he would find en route to Ravelsberg Hill was anybody's guess.

The first recognizable terrain feature he encountered was the Aachen-Haaren Road. No sooner had Captain Miller reached this point at 1955 hours than he heard a group of men approaching from the northeast. He passed word back to halt and get down. The column proved to be German infantry marching toward Aachen. Lying on the roadside, he could have reached out and grabbed any one individual by the boots, but his instructions were to reach the Ravelsberg without a fight, so he elected to remain silent.
⁴¹

After the enemy column moved past, Captain Miller carefully began infiltrating his line of men across the road. It could have been costly. His
3rd Platoon started over at the same time another enemy column led by two Germans on a horse-drawn cart came toward them, halted for no apparent reason, and then let the platoon cross in front of them without firing a shot. Why, no one knew. More traffic appeared behind this group, both vehicular and marching troops, so it was nearly two hours before the assault companies, nearly three hundred men strong, reached the other side of the roadway, still undetected.

Captain Hess now joined Miller at the head of the reformed single-file line before the anxious Americans quietly started moving through the orchard toward the base of the Ravelsberg; they came so close to a line of pillboxes that they heard Germans milling about. One soldier even remembered, “Three enemy could actually be seen sitting on top of a pillbox, smoking and talking. Six to eight more were spotted parallel to the column.”
⁴²

Two long and suspenseful hours later, both companies reached the foot of Ravelsberg Hill without contacting any more Germans; one of Miller's platoons had cleverly repurposed their communication wires as a hand-to-hand guide trailing back hundreds of feet so the men could more easily follow one another. It was near midnight, very black and moonless, but the formidable hill seemed eerily unoccupied; it was too quiet. The company captains ordered an all-around perimeter defense set up; the men then systematically investigated all the pillboxes in their company sectors. “This careful search was rewarded when, in one pillbox, they found a regimental commander and the reconnaissance party of a German unit,” Captain McGregor learned later. “They had been asleep and were surprised to find themselves being made prisoners.”
⁴³

Several more boxes were cleared before first light and by 0800 all of the fortifications had been emptied of slumbering enemy soldiers without a single shot being fired. A detail of four Germans approached with the morning meals for their comrades; instead they joined them as prisoners of war and the Americans chose to forego their cold rations and eat the hot meals meant for their opposite numbers instead. Later that morning eight Germans left a nearby chateau and unwittingly turned their vehicles off a roadway under observation by Hess's men. They stopped in full view, got out and started marching toward the bunker that had formerly been occupied by the captured German regimental commander and his party for what was likely their usual morning meeting. Instead, an American rifleman greeted them with a Browning automatic; he opened up and
killed two who were officers, and another two who turned out to be recent replacements. A lieutenant colonel and two sergeants were taken prisoner. The other two managed to escape.

The previous night had been agonizing for Lieutenant Colonel Learnard. Captain Miller had only made a brief report by radio when the long line of Americans got across the big road and were approaching the Ravelsberg. Colonel Smith had even come over to Learnard's CP in Verlautenheide in the middle of the night seeking more updates; there were none. Finally, at first light Learnard ordered Captain Brown to send a patrol over to the Ravelsberg to investigate; when these men returned with the good news that Miller and Hess had been successful in getting their men on the hill, “the weary battalion commander uttered a string of unprintable words. He then joyfully informed an equally weary regimental commander of the success of the mission.”
⁴⁴

Later that morning, Haaren fell to Captain Folk's Company L. On the Ravelsberg, Captain Hess shifted his men into a position where they would have direct observation over the big road; he was also able to effectively tie in a platoon with Captain Brown's extended line, which by now ran off Crucifix Hill and down to his side of the roadway. Captain Scott-Smith's Company A shifted their positions over to the western slope of the hill on Brown's immediate left. The 18th Infantry now stood shoulder to shoulder over the ground they had been ordered to seize after paying for it with much bloodshed, effectively closing the jaw along the northern flank of the 1st Division salient outside of Aachen.

The noose was tightening. The city was now much closer to being completely cut off and surrounded.

We coined a slogan—“Knock ’em all down!”

LT. COL. DERRILL M. DANIEL CO, 2ND BATTALION, 26TH INFANTRY REGIMENT

A
lthough there had been no actual linkup between the 1st and 30th Infantry Divisions, the still-open gap between these forces was under observed fire by both XIX and VII Corps. This and other factors led First Army to proceed with the plan to determine whether the German garrison was willing to surrender. Following a call from General Huebner to the 26th Infantry's Colonel Seitz in the early morning hours of 10 October, Pfc. Kenneth Kading of LaGrange, Illinois, joined with an interpreter, Lt. William Boehme of New York City, and the regiment's S-2, Lt. Cedric A. Lafley of Enosburg Falls, Vermont, who was now carrying the actual surrender ultimatum.

At 1020 hours, the trio departed from the Company F command post into a chilling autumn rain and proceeded down Triererstrasse toward a railroad underpass on the southeastern side of the city. Young, tall Kading, “gulping with nervous excitement,” carried the white flag, which was actually a bed sheet.
¹
No shots were exchanged. Instead, three soldiers of the 6th Company, 352nd Regiment, emerged from behind one of Aachen's old buildings, waved, and said “Come here” in German. They led the Americans to a pile of scattered wreckage strewn around the underpass and Boehme overheard the German soldiers talking among themselves about what to do with them. They apparently made a
decision; a few tense minutes later the Americans were told to give them their handkerchiefs. They were blindfolded, and this time led farther up the street to a bunker.

Here, the surrender party's blindfolds were removed so they could face an officer who told them to state their business. Boehme, in German, told him that his detail wished to give an ultimatum to the military commander of Aachen; the German officer, a lieutenant, obliged and ordered all three blindfolded again. They were then led to what they believed was the German battalion's command post.

This time they were shuffled down a stairway into a basement before their blindfolds were removed; they were presented to two more lieutenants—one named Keller identified himself as the battalion adjutant, and again demanded that the Americans state their business. Lieutenant Lafley stepped forward and handed Keller the surrender ultimatum; the German officer, without reading it, signed and stamped the attached receipt and handed it back to Lafley. Boehme then told Keller in a deliberative tone that their orders obliged them to be certain that the document was delivered to the Aachen commander. Keller got out of his chair, appeared insulted, and said his commander was not available and that he, as adjutant, had suitable authority to accept the ultimatum.

After the two exchanged steely stares, Keller sat back down. As he finally read the ultimatum, Boehme gazed at his Iron Cross, another war decoration, a combat badge, and a Russian campaign ribbon. The room was silent.

The city of Aachen is now completely surrounded by American forces who are sufficiently equipped with both air power and artillery to destroy the city, if necessary. We shall take the city either by receiving its immediate ultimate surrender or by attacking and destroying it.

While unconditional surrender will require the surrender of all armed bodies, the cessation of all hostile acts of every character, the removal of mines and prepared demolitions, it is not intended to molest the civil population or needlessly sacrifice human lives. But if the city is not promptly and completely surrendered unconditionally, the American Army Ground and Air
Forces will proceed ruthlessly with an air and artillery bombardment to reduce it to submission.

In other words, there is no middle course. You will either unconditionally surrender the city with everything now in it, thus avoiding needless loss of German blood and property, or you may refuse and await its complete destruction. The choice and responsibility are yours.

Your answer must be delivered within 24 hours at the location specified by the bearer of this paper.
²

Keller, expressionless, made no comment when he finished reading; instead he just stood up. Boehme told him that accepting the terms meant sending a representative under a flag of truce to the railway station; his forces would then pass through the line in groups of fifty after weapons had been surrendered. Their business concluded, cigarettes were then exchanged, an odd but old soldierly tradition in such circumstances. The three German guides who first brought the Americans to the command post were quickly summoned, and Keller made out a pass permitting the party to return to their own lines. Boehme overheard him cryptically state, “They are evidently unit commanders,”
³
prompting Keller to dismiss them with a quick salute. Lafley, Boehme, and Kading returned it, and their blindfolds were put on again before they were led up the stairs and out of the building. On the way back, their German escorts stopped briefly beside some of their comrades, took a nip apiece from a bottle of liquor that was being passed around, but did not offer the same to the Americans who had just shared their cigarettes with them.

Their blindfolds were removed when they got back to the railroad underpass. At 1157 hours the trio finally walked back into the Company F command post, which was crowded with war correspondents full of questions. One later wrote, “They looked neither elated nor depressed as they told newsman what had happened.”
⁴

Unknown to the Americans, Keller had taken immediate steps to inform
Oberstleutnant
Leyherr, the Aachen battle commander, of the ultimatum. Stamped 1050 hours on 10 October, his message read: “The battalion is enclosing two documents from the Commander of the American
Army, which were delivered to this CP by two officers and one sergeant [
sic
] as plenipotentiaries.”
⁵

Leyherr, the son-in-law of former Hitler chief of staff
Generaloberst
Franz Hadler, responded in his own hand on the back of Keller's message a little less than an hour later: “Any new plenipotentiary is to be told through an officer that a capitulation is out of the question. This statement is to be given verbally only.”

Undoubtedly disconcerting to the defiant Leyherr, the U.S. Army had taken every possible step to ensure that the terms of the ultimatum would get the widest possible exposure. Two public address systems broadcasted the terms to his front-line troops. The Luxembourg radio channels were used to communicate the conditions of surrender directly to the Aachen people; German stations answered by unofficially reporting that the ultimatum had been rejected. American propaganda shells were fired into the city; over two hundred 105mm rounds encasing thousands of copies gave the details. Thousands more were dropped from Allied aircraft. All read:

TO THE GERMAN TROOPS AND PEOPLE OF AACHEN!

Aachen is encircled. American troops surround the city. The German command cannot relieve you.

The time has come for an honorable surrender. We Americans do not wage war on innocent civilians. Already many Aacheners are living peacefully in areas we occupy. But if the military and party leaders insist on further sacrifice we have no course but to destroy your city which has already suffered so much.

There is no time to lose. On our airfields bombers are waiting for the final order to take off. Our artillery surrounding the city is ready to fire. Our troops are alerted for the final advance.

Act quickly. Go now to those responsible and make them stop useless bloodshed and destruction. The time has come for your civilian leaders, for you to speak boldly. Tomorrow—may be too late.

There is only one choice—honorable and immediate surrender, or complete destruction.

The American Commander
⁶

Two prisoners were taken from the 1043rd Battalion by the 1106th Engineer Group that afternoon; they said that they had heard the terms of the ultimatum from the public address systems and had decided to give up at once. The commander of a company holding an isolated sector in northwest Aachen notified the Americans that “he was not sure what the remainder of the garrison was going to do, but he was ready to quit,” a correspondent reported back to his stateside paper.
⁷

But there was little hope that the warnings would be heeded in larger numbers. Some white flags started appearing in parts of the city that still housed nervous civilians, but detachments of German soldiers called them traitors and forced these Aachen citizens to take them down. “Indications were clear that the ultimatum would be refused, and that the offer to remove the civilians would also be turned down,” Headquarters 26th Infantry activity reports noted that day.
⁸
A war correspondent was even more sanguine in a dispatch sent to New York. “It is expected the Germans will be ordered to fight to the last in the ruins of Aachen. Goebbels will try to make Aachen the rallying cry, similar to Dunkirk for the British, and Pearl Harbor for the United States. The siege is likely to be long and bloody, paralleling Stalingrad.”
⁹

Hitler apparently agreed, as a change in command for Aachen was ordered that very day for the expected grueling fight ahead.
Oberst
Gerhard Wilck, a twenty-eight-year veteran of the German army, many of those years spent commanding infantry units, would take charge. Wilck was a fighter, a Prussian; many thought Leyherr's relief was to spare his family from the legacy of having lost the first major German city in the war if Aachen fell. LXXXI Corps’
General der Infanterie
Köchling was more direct in affirming this rumor. “Purely political reasons were decisive for this,” he explained about Leyherr's relief after the war. “But Colonel Wilck surely was the firmer and more determined personality.”
¹⁰
Wilck, who certainly knew he was being handed “the dirty end of the stick,” was sworn in on the afternoon of 12 October by his old friend,
General der Panzertruppen
Brandenberger “in the name of the Fuehrer [
sic
] as commandant of the fortress Aachen, and told to hold the city to the last man.”
¹¹
A later account written by author Samuel W. Mitcham describes this meeting in stark terms:

It was a formal declaration that he would not surrender Aachen; if he violated this oath, the Fuehrer [
sic
] was empowered to
execute his family. Both officers knew Wilck dearly loved his wife and children; both knew that Aachen would be defended to the utmost. After he affixed his signature, Wilck noticed that Brandenberger had tears in his eyes.
¹²

Wilck would need more than Brandenberger's empathy and his firm style of command to defend Aachen. In General Huebner's most recent intelligence estimate, his G-2, Lt. Col. Robert F. Evans, had identified the German battalions that were penned up in the city: two battalions of the 689th Regiment; nine hundred to a thousand men of the 352nd Regiment, including two platoons of 120mm mortars, each with just four guns; about five hundred soldiers from the DIENDL Battle Group, made up of “odds and ends from other units”; another five hundred in the XIX German Air Force Battalion, a
Luftwaffe
unit converted to infantry soldiers; the 1043rd Battalion, now less two prisoners of war; and the 246th Field Artillery Battalion.
¹³
All had been suffering from heavy attrition. Captured soldiers from the recently formed DIENDL Battle Group were unable to remember what company they were in when they were interrogated. It was estimated that the units in Aachen had been cobbled together from as many as fifty-two different companies, but their total strength was no more than four thousand to five thousand men.

Armored support was even weaker; Wilck would inherit as few as five Mark IV tanks. His inner-city defenses beyond this included six horse-drawn 105mm howitzers, another six 75mm pieces, and only a half dozen 150mm guns. He would have other artillery support, but only from outside of Aachen if communications remained intact.

With the 18th Infantry overlooking the roadway into Aachen, the Germans could do little to get reinforcements into the city. Adjustments were necessary, really the only option at this point.
Oberst
Engel was ordered to move his 12th Infantry Division's boundary westward beyond Verlautenheide and closer to the big road. But even he was realistic. “The envelopment of Aachen was taking its course. If no stronger forces could be brought up to break through the ring of encirclement, Aachen would be lost.”
¹⁴

Supreme Command West had anticipated this. Back on 7 October, the 116th Panzer Division was ordered back to the Aachen front from its position near the Arnheim bridgehead; another hysterical Führer order was the basis for this.
¹⁵
The 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division had also been
given orders by this time to move to Jurlich from Metz in northeast France. Both divisions would come under the command of 1 SS Panzer Corps with the mission to “rectify the situation around Aachen by eliminating the entire penetration north of the city.”
¹⁶
Within days, VII Corps would identify four new battalions of the 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division and the entire 116th Panzer Division in the sector opposite to the 18th Infantry Regiment along the wide expanse of Colonel Smith's positions on the hills and ridges north of Aachen.

Two battalions of the 1st Engineer Assault Regiment had already hit Lieutenant Colonel Williamson's lines in Verlautenheide that very morning. The first attack came at 0200, hours before the surrender ultimatum was delivered in Aachen. Hostile artillery fire escorted two enemy companies as they departed from a draw to lunge for the northern approaches into the village. The fist of this attack was in squad strength; the Germans quickly got into the courtyard that bordered most of the houses where Company E's men were trying to get some sleep. Machine guns and mortars joined with long lances of TD fire thwarted the attack. These volleys were directed into the draw in order to stop any renewed enemy effort with greater muscle. It worked. Coffman later said, “They never really made a full attack; instead they withdrew leaving just a few snipers in the houses.”
¹⁷