On r9 December the issue was brought to the vote. The debate was charged and revealing, about both the future and the past; the ministers even sortied into political philosophy, questioning the ultimate worth and consequences of military action.
Ben-Gurion opened with his usual, meandering, tour d'horizon. The Israeli public was always oscillating between extremes, he said. Now it was "drunk with victory," just as it had been in a trough of depression before 15 May. Be that as it may, the war had to be "brought to an end," and the new state had to focus its energies on "immigration and settlement." Economically, the situation was no longer tenable; we are "on the verge of a catastro phe," he declared. Israel's long-term security required a major increase in strength, and this depended on a massive boost in manpower and an improvement of infrastructure, through immigration and settlement. The Yishuv had to settle the conquered areas, especially the Galilee, both to house the immigrants and to assure its continued rule over them. But this, too, required a cessation of hostilities.
Ben-Gurion explained Israel's victories to date. He spoke of the manpower differential, in terms of both quality and quantity. "One of the chief factors in our victory was the spiritual composition of our people, the quality of our manpower.... [But there was also the factor of numbers.] Until now there was a view that the Arabs were many and we were few. But this view is incorrect. It is true in relation to the overall numbers ofArab inhabitants, but not in relation to the army fighting us." Ben-Gurion went on to argue that in the civil war, against the Palestinians, Arab numbers had been greater. But in the conventional war, Israel fielded more troops than the Arab states, though they had been better armed during the four weeks between the invasion and the start of the First Truce. "We mobilized the maximum, but the Arabs mobilized the minimum." Moreover, the Yishuv had received both money and experts from the Diaspora. But ultimately, the Arabs were vastly stronger in manpower, which is why massive immigration was necessary, "a matter, for us, of life [and death]." The Arabs could be expected to seek "revanche" and renew their assault on the Yishuv, when they felt stronger. So the Yishuv needed to grow stronger, to deter the Arabs or at least assure victory.
Ben-Gurion proposed a two-stage military effort: (I) to drive out the Egyptian army and (2) to conquer a strip of land along the West Bank's western edge, including Wadi Ara and Latrun, to widen the narrow coastal "waist" and secure the road to Jerusalem. Ben-Gurion hoped that this would be followed by a peace agreement with Abdullah, "who exhibits a will to peace." And peace with Jordan could conceivably pave the way to a wider peace between Israel and the Arab world (Ben-Gurion was not particularly hopeful on this score).
A lively debate followed. Interior Minister Yitzhak Gruenbaum, a liberal (the General Zionists Party) and one of the leaders of interwar Polish Jewry (he had been a member of the Polish parliament, the Sejm, before emigrating to Palestine in 1932), said that he agreed with Ben-Gurion, that "it was possible that the situation of no-peace and no-war" would continue indefinitely. But he questioned whether Israel should take Qalqilya and Tulkarm, on the western fringes of the West Bank, since their inhabitants might not flee and Israel should do nothing to enlarge its Arab minority. Israel had been able to hold onto the areas it had conquered because their inhabitants had fled; it could not hold territory packed with Arabs. As to the Negev, Gru enbaum feared that an attempt to conquer the whole Negev, down to Aqaba, might result in a clash with the British, which neither he nor BenGurion wanted. Nonetheless, he supported an offensive against the Egyptians, including taking Aqaba. Ben-Gurion interjected that the IDF lacked the strength to both take and hold extended lines down to Aqaba. Gruenbaum also proposed that Israel formally declare Jerusalem part of Israel. Lastly, taking issue with Moshe Shertok, Gruenbaum opposed the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state in the West Bank. It would be ruled by the mufti or his allies and "would be a permanent enemy of the State of Israel" and a major obstacle to peace between the Jewish state and the Arab world. "All the aspirations and ideals of this [Palestinian] state would be directed against the State of Israel," and it would always strive to expand westward"against us." Gruenbaum, like Ben-Gurion, preferred Jordanian annexation of the West Bank.
Minorities Affairs Minister Bechor Shitrit, while favoring both an offensive against the Egyptians and "expansion" eastward into the West Bank, doubted whether it was appropriate to engage in both simultaneously. He also feared that an Israeli attack on the West Bank might suck in the British.
David Remez, the minister of transport, argued that "opening [hostilities] on two fronts does not seem to me great progress on the road to achieving peace [or] ... shortening the war." (Ben-Gurion interjected: "I did not mean the opening of two fronts simultaneously, but one after another.") He was against renewing the war with 'Abdullah, but he also saw "no logic" in renewing hostilities in the Negev, unless directed at conquest of the whole of the area, including Aqaba, which the IDF was too weak to do.
Justice Minister Pinhas Rosenblueth thought that Ben-Gurion was ignoring "international factors," meaning not so much Britain as the United States. He, too, cautiously favored an offensive against the Egyptians but took issue with renewing the war against 'Abdullah. Agriculture Minister Cisling, driven by his Marxist premises, argued that peace with 'Abdullah was out of the question-the British, who controlled him, wouldn't allow itand that only Lebanon was a potential peace partner. He favored offensives both against the Egyptians and in the West Bank. Peretz Bernstein, minister of trade and industry (General Zionists), was uncertain whether the proposed offensive in the south would bring nearer peace with Egypt or make it more remote. As to the West Bank, merely nibbling at its fringes would not improve Israel's strategic situation, he argued. But he fell short of recommending the complete conquest of the West Bank. He adamantly opposed the establishment of a Palestinian Arab West Bank state.
Finance Minister Eli'ezer Kaplan argued that achieving peace was vital for Israel. In principle, he opposed new campaigns of conquest. He was against conquering parts or all of the West Bank and was uncertain about the benefit of conquering more of the Negev. On the whole, he favored attempting to achieve peace on the basis of the existing territorial status quo. But he was willing to make an exception of the Auja al-Hafir crossroads, which, if taken by the IDF, might help prod Egypt into making peace.
Mapam's Bentov, too, was doubtftil about the value of further offensives; they would not necessarily bring Israel any closer to peace, which is what the country needed. Israel could not defeat the Arabs decisively, he reasoned. (Ben-Gurion interjected that the IDF could, were it not for international interventions. Bentov: "I am not sure. Would we have reached Cairo?" BenGurion: "We would have reached Beirut, Damascus, and Amman and bombed Cairo. We have the power to halt all sea traffic to Egypt. We have a secret weapon." But Ben-Gurion did not elaborate. Bentov responded by citing the adage that one could do everything with bayonets but sit on them. Real security was achievable only through political agreements-peace-not conquests.) As to the fate of the West Bank, Bentov said that a Palestinian state there might be like "a bone lodged in the throat" of the Jewish state (as Gruenbaum had phrased it), but a West Bank ruled by 'Abdullah would be like "a knife on the nape of our neck, and this is worse than a bone in the throat." He feared that an expanded Jordan would be swallowed up by Iraq-and such a large neighboring state might mortally threaten Israel. A small Palestinian state, which would be at peace with, and dependent on, Israel, would pose less of a threat. Bentov even suggested that Jews could settle in the West Bank.
Bentov's asseverations elicited an ideological outburst from Gruenbaum. He opposed peace on the basis of the territorial status quo: "A peace that doesn't guarantee Jerusalem for us, will not satisfy us, will not satisfy the will of the Jewish public ... and will not give us the only possibility of consolidating our victory or the start of the [Messianic] redemption [athalta digeula].... We will not give up Shechem [Nablus]."
At this point, Walter Eytan, the director general of the Foreign Ministry, who "represented" Shertok, who was abroad, intervened. He said that one must both distinguish between the sacred (the West Bank) and the profane (the Negev) and between "sacred" and "sacred"-by which he meant that one had also to distinguish between those parts of the West Bank occupied by Iraq (Tulkarm, Qalqilya, Nablus, Jenin) and those occupied by 'Abdullah. The implication was that attacking the Iraqi-held Qalgilya-Tulkarm area would not be an attack on Jordan.14 Eytan implied that Shertok would probably support a new offensive against the Egyptians-but that it should take place before the Palestine Conciliation Commission reached Israel.
The three-man PCC had been established a few days before on the basis of UN General Assembly Resolution i94, of ii December. The resolution, hammered out in weeks of behind-the-scenes debate between Israel, the Arab states, Britain, and the United States, embodied elements of Count Bernadotte's plan but also drew on Resolution 181, of November 1947, and charted out principles and a mechanism for the resolution of the conflict. The new resolution endorsed the General Assembly partition resolution as the basis for a settlement. But it also posited the right of peace-loving refugees to return to their homes ("the right of return") or to receive adequate compensation in lieu of return. And it provided for the establishment of a conciliation commission that would mediate a settlement (replacing the dead Bernadotte). The United Nations quickly cobbled together the PCC, consisting of an American chairman and French and Turkish representatives. Eytan hoped that the Israeli offensive would start, and finish, before their arrival in the region.
Ben-Gurion wound up the debate by cleaving to the consensus. He had not advocated, he said, simultaneous assaults in the Negev and West Bank; there was no need to decide on the West Bank operation now. But the Egyptians did not want peace and would have to be evicted from Israeli soil. As to the West Bank, he argued that it was best to wait for the outcome of the offensive against Egypt and to see whether the "UN will swallow it as it swallowed the Galilee business [that is, Operation Hiram]." In any event, Abdullah was the only Arab leader interested in negotiating with Israel. Lebanon would not sign a separate peace because it was too weak; the Christians of Lebanon would not dare "betray the other [Arab] states. But Abdullah could betray [them]."
As to the Negev, Ben-Gurion understood that he had the backing of a solid Cabinet majority. The matter was not even put to the vote.1s That evening Ben-Gurion went to the opera; the fare was Manon. On his left sat James McDonald, the American representative, with his daughter; on his right, two junior Soviet diplomats.'6 Israel knew, through wiretapping American diplomats' lines in Paris,17 that the United States would prevent sanctions against Israel. And the Soviets were consistent supporters of an Israeli Negev, if only to deny the British a land bridge, and bases, between their main Middle East outposts in Egypt and Jordan and Iraq. Besides, they viewed all the Arab monarchies as enemies. The Soviet minister in Tel Aviv, Pavel Ivanovich Ershov, spoke of King Farouk as "a corrupt, contemptible young man." ix (But Ben-Gurion's effort to use Operations Yoav and Horev to pry open the door to Jewish emigration from the Soviet Bloc-he argued that military conquests were all well and good but to hold on to the Negev, Israel would require massive settlement of Jewish immigrants in the area, and these could only come from behind the Iron Curtain`-acted like a boomerang. He antagonized his Russian interlocutors, who may have feared Zionist-possibly triggering other minority-agitation inside the Soviet Union. At any event, during the following weeks a frostiness crept into the Soviet attitude toward Israel; new limitations were imposed on Jewish emigration; and there was a gradual reduction in military supplies to Israel.)
The IDF offensive-Operation Horev (in Hebrew, Mount Sinai is also called Mount Horev)-began on the afternoon of 22 December. The Egyptians had reinforced their positions around Gaza, sensing that the Israelis were about to strike. They correctly estimated that the operation would begin between 20 and 25 December. But they weren't sure whether it would be directed at the Hebron Hills or Gaza.20 The British, Egypt's ambivalent patrons, appear to have been taken by surprise, if only because they could not understand how the Israelis could regard the Egyptian army as a threat: "They would have been a menace [to Israel] had they been soldiers," Hector McNeil, the Minister of State at the Foreign Office, told an Israeli representative in London.21
Operation Horev-which aimed "to defeat the Egyptian Army in the Land of Israel,"22 expel it from the country and force the Egyptians to sue for peace-began with air and artillery strikes on positions along the Mediterranean coast and inside the Gaza Strip. The IDF deployed elements of five brigades, and large auxiliary formations: Golan (battalions 12, 13, and ig); the Negev Brigade (Seventh and Ninth battalions); Harel (battalions 4, 5, and io); and Eighth Brigade (Eighty-second, Eighty-ninth, and Eightyeighth battalions). In addition, the Alexandroni Brigade and two undermanned Home Guard battalions (the Negev and Lower Coastal Plain districts) were also assembled around the Faluja Pocket, as were several artillery and mortar battalions.
Facing them were four Egyptian brigades: the Second Brigade, with three infantry battalions and armored and artillery support, strung out in an eastwest line from Bir Asluj through Auja to Abu Ageila in Sinai; the Third and Fourth Brigades, with more than ten battalions, strung out from Gaza westward to El Arish and southward from Rafah to 'Auja al-Hafir; and, at Faluja, the Ninth Brigade HQ, with two infantry battalions, some armored and artillery units, and several hundred irregulars. With the Saudi and Sudanese battalions, there may have been in all twenty thousand troops.